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Abstract 
 
The internationalisation of financial flows has meant that the assessment of risk 
reporting has recently become one of the most significant issues in financial markets. 
The findings of this study are analysed using decision-usefulness to enhance the 
understanding of the risk disclosures of UK banks. In particular, these findings have 
enhanced the understanding of risk categories, information richness, and the influence 
of societal discussion on the risk reporting of the banking sector. 
 
This study analyses risk disclosures in the annual reports of six UK banks (i.e. RBS, 
NatWest, Lloyds TSB, HBOS, and HSBC), between 1995 and 2010, and in three main 
areas, which are: risk category membership, information richness, and the intensity of 
societal discussion (on risks). Content analysis is developed in this study to investigate 
both longitudinal and intrasectoral aspects for interpreting the content of risk disclosures 
in annual reports. In addition, content analysis of the news coverage of UK newspapers 
is conducted by using the LexisNexis electronic database to analyse the association 
between volumes of longitudinal banking sector risk disclosures against the intensity of 
societal discussion as proxied by the frequency, by year, of relevant newspaper 
citations, and by risk category. 
 
The findings of this study show that credit risk is the most disclosed risk (by volume) 
for all banks and in all years. Almost all of the risks are disclosed with high information 
content (in both qualitative and quantitative aspects), although the proportion of 
quantitative disclosures has declined over time. In addition, the majority of risk 
disclosures are neutral news statements, while a small proportion of disclosures give a 
warning of bad news. Risk reporting has become proportionately more concerned with 
the narrative of opinion and perception rather than the reporting of facts and quantitative 
information. Both fact and quantitative information are found to be disclosed with 
decreasing proportions over time.  
 
The volume of overall risk disclosures has had a smooth increase over time; however, 
this trend conceals a volumetric increase with many switch points in many risk 
categories (particularly during 2005 to 2009). The causes of these switch points have 
been found to include the adoption of accounting standards in 2005 and the financial 
crisis of 2007. Moreover, the findings of the correlations between all of the risk 
categories disclosed and the number of newspaper citations are indicative that 
newspaper citations are positively associated with the disclosure of key strategic 
banking risks (i.e. risk management, credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk, equity risk, 
and insurance and investment risk). The pattern of volume fluctuation is most frequently 
observed in the disclosures of Lloyds TSB and HBOS. 
 
This study has found that the risk disclosures of all companies have increased over time. 
In particular, both the quantity of disclosures and the number of risk categories 
disclosed have increased, in both the overall analysis of all companies and in the 
analysis of the individual companies. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction and Motivation 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
Recently, there has been a considerable amount of interest in understanding what causes 
banks to fail and many attempts have been made to try to predict which banks will 
encounter difficulty next. Much of this concern stems from the taxpayers, depositors, 
shareholders and investors who want to be able to identify any potentially weaknesses 
in banks that may cause them to fail. The relevant issues include the danger of risk 
spreading from the source, the capabilities of the financial markets, and the general 
principles of market efficiency.  
 
Amongst the causes of the recent failure of many financial markets is the recent growth 
of the international financial market, which has been created as globalisation has 
promoted free-market capitalism. This is coupled with the greater diversity of financial 
instruments, which have allowed new means of raising funds and trading. Meanwhile, 
many markets have rapidly expanded. This has enabled the development of new 
instruments, products, services, and techniques, which have been arguably achieved at 
the expense of risk management (Holland, 2010).  
 
Even though the banking disclosure data that is available is quite comprehensive, most 
of the disclosure analysed for this study did not include any direct information on the 
quality of a bank’s management (Hahn, 2009). In addition, much of the available prior 
knowledge on organisation, intermediation, markets and risk was seemingly ignored by 
bankers (Holland, 2010). Consequently, vast losses followed from the 2007 financial 
crisis, which is the most significant economic crisis in nearly eighty years and the 
leading proximate cause of the steepest post-war global economic downturn (O'Connell, 
2010, p.148). 
 
The 2007 financial crisis revealed that massive financial mismanagement and 
misconduct has long been a part of the enormous risks taken by many banks and 
financial institutions (Tomasic, 2011). This crisis developed from the sub-prime credit 
problems that followed the collapse of the US housing market and the subsequent 
devaluation of many American mortgages. In August 2007, the interbank markets 
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experienced severe pressures to raise massive amounts of liquidity. However, at that 
time it was very difficult to increase capital due to the significant changes in 
collateralised markets and low quality collateral (Allen and Carletti, 2010). Moreover, a 
lack of confidence among financial institutions and investors, especially fears about 
their financial stability, made it much more difficult for them to improve their liquidity. 
This crisis of confidence, which became known as the ‘credit crunch’, later caused a 
credit crisis (Andersen et al., 2012). During the autumn of 2007, the prices of subprime 
securitisations continued to worsen and many financial institutions began to face 
adverse effects. Although the financial system, and in particular banks, came under 
tremendous strain during this time, this was not the riskiest or the worst effect. This 
period could later be identified to be just the initial phase of the crisis (Pisani-Ferry and 
Sapir, 2010). 
 
The most critical stage of the crisis started in September 2008 when Lehman Brothers 
collapsed, inducing significant losses in many counterparties. Large amounts of money 
were withdrawn from money markets in the week following Lehman’s collapse. More 
disruptive consequences spread to the international markets, affecting the majority of 
cross-border banks. The values of asset, real estate, and the prices of commodities all 
declined dramatically at this stage, which resulted in the collapse of a number of large 
banks and non-banks, coupled with a sharp increase in unemployment rate in the United 
States and a number of other countries. This led the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
to refer to the situation as the global financial crisis or “the Great Recession” 
(Moshirian, 2011).  
 
O'Connell (2010, p. 153) noted that other high-profile victims of this crisis included: 
Bear Stearns, which was absorbed by J.P. Morgan Chase in March 2008; Northern 
Rock, which was nationalised by the British Government in September 2007; Halifax 
Bank of Scotland (HBOS), which became part of the Lloyds Banking Group in 
September 2008; Lehman Brothers, which declared bankruptcy in September 2008; the 
American International Group (AIG), in which the US Government has acquired an 80 
percent equity stake; and, the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), which became more than 
70 per cent owned by the British Government. In addition, the Bank of America, Merrill 
Lynch, Citigroup, and the Lloyds Banking Group all received sizeable state bailout 
funds. In the US, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became commercial banks, 
subjecting themselves to more stringent regulation. Concerned that the global economic 
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outlook had deteriorated, some governments intervened urgently in the market to rescue 
their banks while other governments offered blanket guarantees to their depositors and 
creditors as a way out of the systemic crisis (Moshirian, 2011). 
 
The impact of the US sub-prime crisis on the international wholesale money markets 
and the accompanying liquidity problems, were the principal causes of the collapse of 
Northern Rock in August 2007 (Hall, 2009).
1
 This was the first effect of the crisis in the 
UK. In September 2007 there was a run on Northern Rock and the Bank of England had 
to give assurances that all deposits would be guaranteed (Hall, 2008; Llewellyn, 2008). 
Keasey and Veronesi (2008) suggested two causes for the failure at Northern Rock. 
Firstly, the credit rating agencies did not provide a better assessment of the risks 
involved in securitised instruments. Instead, they focused on clarity and transparency 
and, hence, they allowed the liquidity risk of loan originators to be comprehensively 
understood. Secondly, the existing regulatory framework of the tripartite system of 
supervision (Treasury, Bank of England, and FSA) had the role of intervening ex post 
rather than in a more alert role in order to avoid the disruption. However, Llewellyn 
(2008, p.36) argued that there were several fault-lines related to the collapse of Northern 
Rock, as follows: 
 The implications of securitisation and a consequent over-reliance on short-term 
market instruments; 
 Poor risk management; 
 The deposit protection regime in the UK; 
 The money market operations of the Bank of England; 
 The institutional structure of financial regulation and supervision; 
 Corporate governance arrangements; 
 The role of the government in responding to financial market distress; and, 
 Ambiguity with regard to the distinction between liquidity versus solvency 
issues in banks. 
 
One of the lessons of this crisis is that there is a strong public interest in whether bank 
executives and boards have adequate competence to balance appropriately between risk 
and return. Holland (2010) found that the failure in the role of monitoring, a lack of 
                                                          
1
    Northern Rock (a previous mutual building society) converted to bank status in 1997 and grew into the 
UK’s eight largest bank and fifth largest UK mortgage lender by wholesale money market finance 
rather than retail deposits (Llewellyn, 2008). 
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basic knowledge of banking risks, together with inappropriate value drivers by bank 
executive and boards of the failing banks were major causes of the banking crisis. The 
impact of the bank sector’s collapse has imposed large costs on UK citizens. For 
example, in 2008 the UK government was forced to inject £45.5bn of equity capital to 
prevent the collapse of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) (FSA, 2011). However, this 
loss seemed to be only a small part of the whole disaster resulting from this financial 
crisis. Unsurprisingly, it is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the crucial points 
that made the large UK banks fail. 
 
In December 2011, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) issued a report entitled “The 
Failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland”, which aimed to identify the multiple factors 
which combined to produce RBS’s failure. This report reveals that RBS’s failure amid 
the systemic crisis resulted from poor management decisions, deficient regulation, and a 
flawed supervisory approach. It also detailed six key factors which were involved in the 
failure of RBS, as the follows (FSA, 2011, p.21): 
 Significant weaknesses in RBS’s capital position during the review period as a 
result of management decisions, which were permitted by an inadequate 
regulatory capital framework; 
 Over-reliance on risky short-term wholesale funding; 
 Concerns and uncertainties about RBS’s underlying asset quality, which in turn 
was subject to little fundamental analysis by the FSA; 
 Substantial losses in credit trading activities, which eroded market confidence 
(both RBS’s strategy and the FSA’s supervisory approach underestimated how 
bad losses associated with structured credit might be);  
 The ABN AMRO acquisition, on which RBS proceeded without appropriate 
heed to the risks involved and with inadequate due diligence; and, 
 An overall systemic crisis in which the banks in worse relative positions were 
extremely vulnerable to failure, RBS was one such bank. 
 
As the importance of the financial crisis became clear it was obvious that risk is among 
the greatest significant issues in the UK banking sector. In the aftermath of the crisis, 
bankers, investors, regulators and researchers around the world have shown an 
increased interest in re-evaluating existing prudential regulatory standards, corporate 
governance, risk management, and risk monitoring in the banking sector. This reflects 
the needs for a new conceptual frame-based development in risk management and risk 
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disclosures. Given the core principles for effective banking supervision, the Basel 
committee recommend that corporate governance, risk management, the importance of 
disclosure, and transparency in maintaining confidence in banks are essential elements 
in the safe and sound functioning of banks (BCBS, 2011e).  
 
From the perspective of a developed traditional economy, banks play a strategic role as 
intermediaries that also provide liquidity. This makes banks different from other 
businesses. There are two key risks which are related directly to the banks’ intermediary 
role and which need to be managed: liquidity risk and operational risk (Heffernan, 
2005). Meanwhile, Barrell et al. (2010) suggested that the regulation of a developed 
economy banking systems is more likely to concern liquidity and capital adequacy 
because both impact on banking crisis probabilities. However, Chakraborty and Ray 
(2006) have argued that banks are seen to affect economic growth through the 
effectiveness of corporate governance and the ability to raise external funds. In addition, 
banks also enhance market power when they can boost the value of the bank by 
reducing incentives for bank owners and managers to take excessive risk and by 
reducing the probability of systemic banking distress (Beck et al., 2006). In terms of 
monitoring, since bank profitability is an important predictor to evaluate the effects on 
macroeconomic and financial crises (Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009; Kanas et al., 
2012), financial reporting and risk disclosures concern public interest in the financial 
system and are economic incentives for the monitoring and controlling of individual 
bank behaviour (Sánchez-Ballesta and Lloréns, 2010). 
 
Focusing on risk management, Christoffersen (2003) suggested that firms should devote 
careful attention to bankruptcy costs, taxes, capital structure, the cost of capital, and 
human capital. Meanwhile, Chortareas et al., (2011) proposed that to promote the safety 
and soundness of banks, it is important to understand the relationships among financial 
frictions, bank performance, and bank lending quality, coupled with the key roles of 
deposit insurance and capital ratios in mitigating informational problems. However, 
Bessis (2002, p.56) argued that risk management becomes effective and successful only 
if it develops to the stage where it facilitates decision-making and monitoring. In 
addition, the board also needs to make sure that true risk governance is made 
transparent to managers and to stakeholders through adequate internal and external 
disclosure (Crouhy et al., 2006). 
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The knowledge of the link between the strategic role of banks in the UK economy and 
banking risks is important in order to evaluate the stability and soundness of the 
banking sector. Therefore, the importance of corporate governance, risk management, 
and risk disclosures, which relate to the strategic role of banks, are key motivations in 
this study and will be reviewed later in this chapter.  
 
 
1.2  A Definition of Risk 
 
This section provides the definition of risk in order to establish common ground on the 
issue studied. In general, risk is defined in different ways by different authors. Table 1.1 
summarises this. 
 
Table 1.1  Definitions of risk 
Organisation/Author Definition of Risk 
Institute of Risk 
Management (IRM, 2002, 
p.2) 
Risk is the combination of the probability of an event and its 
consequences. In all types of undertaking, there is the 
potential for events and consequences that constitute 
opportunities for benefit (upside) or threats to success 
(downside). 
International Organisation 
for Standardisation (ISO, 
2009, p.1) 
Effect of uncertainty on objectives. An effect is a deviation 
from the expected and can be either positive and/or negative. 
Objectives can have different aspects (such as financial, health 
and safety, and environmental goals) and can apply at 
different levels (such as strategic, organisation-wide, project, 
product and process). 
Jorion (2001, p.3) The volatility of unexpected outcomes. 
Bessis (2002, p.11) Adverse impacts on profitability of several distinct sources of 
uncertainty. 
Heffernan (2005, p.104) The volatility of net cash flows of the firm. 
 
Jorion (2001, p.3) further classified risk into business and non-business risks. Iqbal and 
Llewellyn (2002, p.18) classified risk into two types: firstly, uncontrollable risk or the 
chance that the decision-maker has no control whatsoever over this type of risk; and 
secondly, controllable or responsive risk that can be controlled and affected by the 
decision-maker. Meanwhile, by focusing on the meaning of risk as uncertainty, 
Schroeck (2002, p.24) differentiated uncertainty into: firstly, general uncertainty is 
complete ignorance about any potential outcome making both rational decision making 
and any quantification impossible; and secondly, specific uncertainty, which is 
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objective, or at least subjective, probabilities that can be assigned to the potential 
outcomes and, hence, allow for some degree of quantification.  
 
In another definition of risk, Horcher (2005, p.2) argued that risk refers to the 
probability of loss while exposure is the possibility of loss, although they are often used 
interchangeably. Although a variety of definitions of the term ‘risk’ have been 
suggested, this study defines risk as uncertainty, volatility, and exposure affecting the 
deviation from an expected outcome. 
 
  
1.3  Corporate Governance 
 
One of the most significant causes of the financial crisis was poor corporate governance 
(Haspeslagh, 2010). This puts pressure on boards and management committees to carry 
out their corporate governance and risk management responsibilities in a more effective 
manner. Consequently, corporate governance is a particular challenge for complex risk-
taking financial institutions, especially in the banking sector.  
 
The Cadbury Committee (1992) defined corporate governance as the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled. This definition involves a set of relationships 
between the responsibilities of board of directors for managing their companies and the 
role of shareholders in governance by appointing the directors and auditors.  
 
The Organisation for Economic and Co-operation and Development (OECD)
2
 is 
internationally recognised as a benchmark for good corporate governance, its Principles 
of Corporate Governance states that: 
Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a 
company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through 
which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining 
those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. Good 
corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board and 
                                                          
2
  OECD is an international organisation of thirty-four countries founded in 1961 to stimulate economic 
progress and world trade. It also provides ideas and reviews progress in specific policy areas, such as 
economics, trade, science, employment, education or financial markets (OECD website). 
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management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company 
and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring. The 
presence of an effective corporate governance system, within an 
individual company and across an economy as a whole, helps to provide 
a degree of confidence that is necessary for the proper functioning of a 
market economy. As a result, the cost of capital is lower and firms are 
encouraged to use resources more efficiently, thereby underpinning 
growth. (OECD, 2004, p.11) 
 
When compared with the Cadbury committee’s definition, the OECD definition has 
added the role of other stakeholders, the relationships among participants in the 
governance system, and the effective monitoring of a company’s objectives. This 
widely accepted and long-established definition was used to develop the principles of 
corporate governance by the Basel committee (BCBS, 2010a). 
 
Since 1999, and a later revision in 2004, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
have become an international benchmark for governments, regulators, investors, 
corporations, and other stakeholders worldwide. Its principles cover the following six 
areas (OECD, 2004):   
1) Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework; 
2) The rights of shareholders and key ownership functions;  
3) The equitable treatment of shareholders;  
4) The role of stakeholders;  
5) Disclosure and transparency; and, 
6) The responsibilities of the board.   
However, there have been a number of corporate governance failures following the 
financial crisis that began in mid-2007. Global wealth suffered losses of up to forty-five 
percent (Pirson and Turnbull, 2011). Meanwhile, evidence has shown that corporate 
governance in the banking sector was ineffective to prevent the economic damage and 
the collapse of the financial system (BCBS, 2010a; Grove et al., 2011). 
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Following this crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
3
 pointed 
out that the failed corporate governance involved the key issues relating to insufficient 
board oversight of senior management, inadequate risk management and opaque bank 
organisational structures and activities (BCBS, 2010a). Consequently, in 2010 the Basel 
committee issued a final set of principles for enhancing sound corporate governance 
practices at banking organisations aiming to assist banking supervisors and to provide a 
reference point for promoting the adoption of sound corporate governance practices. 
There are six areas that are crucial the effective implementation of these principles 
(BCBS, 2010a), which are:  
1) The role of the board;  
2) The qualifications and composition of the board;  
3) The importance of an independent risk management function, including a chief 
risk officer or equivalent;  
4) The importance of monitoring risks on an on-going firm-wide and individual 
entity basis;  
5) The board's oversight of the compensation systems; and, 
6) The board and senior management's understanding of the bank's operational 
structure and risks.  
 
In the wake of the 2007-08 financial crisis, there has been an increasing interest in 
corporate governance practices in the banking sector (Grove et al., 2011). In general, the 
core operation of banking business comprises the provision of deposit and loan 
products, and this normally distinguishes banks from other types of financial 
institutions. Deposits are liabilities for banks, while they have to manage the assets that 
are created by lending. Therefore, the key activity of a bank is to act as an intermediary 
between depositors and borrowers. Mullineux (2006) also emphasised that banks are 
special because their supervisors have a fiduciary duty to both depositors and 
shareholders and, therefore, resolution of the principal-agent problem focusing on 
maximising shareholder value is not appropriate. This is because banks have a number 
of stakeholders in addition to shareholders.  
 
                                                          
3
  BCBS is a committee of banking supervisory authorities that was established by the central bank 
governors of the Group of ten countries in 1975.  It provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking 
supervisory matters (Wikipedia). 
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Given the important financial intermediation role of banks in an economy, the public 
and the markets have a high degree of sensitivity to any difficulties potentially arising 
from corporate governance in banks. The failure of corporate governance suffers from 
agency problems, which affects the various groups relating to the principal agent theory. 
In general, the principals are the shareholders and the agents are directors (Haspeslagh, 
2010). However, Heffernan (2005) argued that there were a number of other principal 
agent relationships in modern banks, including: the contracts between the shareholders 
of a bank (principal) and its management (agent); the bank (principal) and its officers 
(agent); the bank (principal) and its debtors (agent); and, the depositors (principal) and 
the bank (agent). Hence, this can lead to the weakness of corporate governance and risk 
management which can affect shareholders, investors, depositors, debtors and other 
stakeholders, including the taxpayers whose money was used by the UK government to 
prevent a collapse of the banking sector. 
 
 
1.4  Risk Management 
 
Risk management has recently become a central issue for commercial banks. However, 
it is very difficult to separate best practice risk management from best practice corporate 
governance (Crouhy et al., 2006) because risk management is a central activity of 
corporate governance (Cade, 1999). Given the importance of risk management in a 
modern bank’s operation, the efficiency of a bank’s risk management has an influence 
on its financial performance. It is crucial to gain insight into products and services, as 
well as strategies, to reduce risk within the context of a bank’s risk tolerance and 
objectives (Horcher, 2005). However, Sensarma and Jayadev (2009) argued that risk 
management demands that banking supervisors should understand the process of 
identifying the risks to which the bank is exposed; they should then be able to quantify 
those risks and control them. The purposes of risk management are threefold: 
identifying risk, determining an appropriate level of risk response according to policies, 
and managing risks in an appropriate and effective manner (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008). 
 
Any definition of risk management normally relates to the aim and process of risk 
management. For example, Vallabhaneni (2008, p.58) defined risk management as the 
process of assessing risk, taking steps to reduce risk to an acceptable level, and 
maintaining the reduced level of risk. Given both the aim and the process, Schroeck 
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(2002, p.28) defined risk management as an active, strategic, and integrated process that 
encompasses both the measurement and the mitigation of risk, with the ultimate goal of 
maximising the value of a bank while minimising the risk of bankruptcy. Meanwhile, 
Merna and Al-Thani (2008, p.2) defined risk management as a formal process that 
enables the identification, assessment, planning, and management of risk. While the 
previous definitions generally explained the basic process of risk management, the 
Basel committee (BCBS, 2010a, p.17) suggested that internal controls may be included 
in risk management and described how risk management generally involves:   
 Identifying key risks to the bank;  
 Assessing these risks and measuring the bank’s exposures to them;  
 Monitoring the risk exposures and determining the corresponding capital needs 
(i.e. capital planning) on an on-going basis;  
 Monitoring and assessing decisions to accept particular risks, risk mitigation 
measures, and whether risk decisions are in line with the board-approved risk 
tolerance or appetite and risk policy; and,  
 Reporting to senior management and the board as appropriate.   
 
It is necessary to have a comprehensive risk management strategy to survive in today’s 
financial markets. A weakness in risk management may cause many factors of financial 
distress, involving both indirect and direct costs, such as: litigation fees, loss of market 
share, and inefficient asset management. On the other hand, the potential benefits from 
risk management can maximise opportunities and minimise adverse effects. Effective 
risk management can, therefore, help reduce the costs of bankruptcy, tax losses, the cost 
of capital, and the problem of compensation incentive schemes, including the 
compensation package for recruiting key personnel (Christoffersen, 2003). In addition, 
Sensarma and Jayadev (2009) found that stock returns have a positive association with 
risk management capabilities. Similarly, Lehar (2005) also found that implementation 
of more advanced risk management systems is positively related to the value of banks’ 
asset portfolios. In other words, when a bank’s board and supervisors fail to monitor 
and control sufficiently the operating costs, together with the weakness in managing 
loan portfolio, this may create higher numbers of loan loss provisions (Chortareas et al., 
2011). From the viewpoint of the mentioned authors, it is clear that the risk 
management mechanism typically is beneficial since it will allow banks to respond to 
risks that they face in an appropriate way. 
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Risk management in banking is not a new issue (Cade, 1999). It is a discipline at the 
core of every bank and encompasses all the activities that affect the bank’s risk profile. 
In practical terms, the key aspect of risk management involves strategic and capital 
planning, asset-liability management, and the management of a bank's business and 
financial risks (Greuning and Bratanovic, 2003, p.76). The financial market crisis that 
began in mid-2007 has led to substantial financial losses. It is apparent that many 
financial institutions did not fully understand the relationship between risks and 
businesses (BCBS, 2009). While financial institutions have subsequently faced a large 
range of difficulties, one of the major causes of serious banking problems is poor risk 
management. Consequently, in 2010 the Basel committee issued new risk management 
guidance as part of its recommendations on sound corporate governance (as described in 
Section 1.3). 
 
To enhance the later Basel II framework, the Basel committee, with respect to banks’ 
firm-wide risk management and capital planning processes, also addressed the guidance 
of risk management in its “Enhancements to the Basel II framework” (2009). This 
guidance was intended to assist banks and supervisors in better identifying and 
managing risks in the future and in appropriately capturing risks in their internal risk 
assessments. When supervisors implement this framework, they should be able to define 
risk appetite and recognise all significant risks, including the risks posed by 
concentrations, securitisation, off-balance sheet exposures, valuation practices and other 
risk exposures. The key elements in this guidance consist of (BCBS, 2009, p.12):   
 Adequately identifying, measuring, monitoring, controlling and mitigating these 
risks;   
 Clearly communicating the extent and depth of these risks in an easily 
understandable, but accurate, manner in reports to senior management and the 
board of directors, as well as in published financial reports;  
 Conducting on-going stress testing4 to identify potential losses and liquidity 
needs under adverse circumstances; and,   
 Setting adequate minimum internal standards for allowances or liabilities for 
losses, capital, and contingency funding. 
                                                          
4
  Stress testing is an important tool that is used by banks as part of their internal risk management that 
alerts bank management to adverse unexpected outcomes related to a broad variety of risks. It provides 
an indication to the banks of how much capital might be needed to absorb losses should large shocks 
occur (BCBS, 2009, p.24). 
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As business activity and the need for improvement in risk management rapidly grows, 
boards are likely to confront the challenges of understanding risk, including identifying, 
quantifying, and monitoring the risk profile, and controlling, mitigating, and reporting 
on risk exposures.  
 
 
1.5  The Importance of Risk Disclosure 
 
Risk disclosure has a central role in the aforementioned debate. Transparency about risk 
disclosure is an important component in corporate reporting. It enables the bank to 
achieve and maintain an accurate value of business, as well as confident and well-
informed investors (Deumes, 2008). Transparency is a cornerstone of accounting and 
investment practice (Abraham and Cox, 2007). 
 
Risk disclosure is driven by increased complexities in business, and an objective to 
promote transparency and enhance the quality of disclosure by reducing information 
asymmetries. In addition, risk disclosure has a number of potential benefits for 
shareholders, analysts, investors, and other stakeholders (Lajili and Zéghal, 2005). 
However, Linsley and Shrives (2005b) warned that disclosure itself will not create 
transparency when it lacks useful information. Improved public disclosure strengthens 
the market participants’ ability and encourages safe and sound banking practices. In 
1998, the Basel committee issued a paper on “Enhancing Bank Transparency”. This 
paper suggested that useful information should contain transparency, which it defines as 
the public disclosure of reliable and timely information that enables its users to make an 
accurate assessment of a bank’s financial condition and performance, its business 
activities, and the risks related to those activities (BCBS, 1998, p.15). Moreover, this 
paper also provided five critical qualitative characteristics of information that contribute 
to bank transparency, which are:  
1) Comprehensiveness;  
2) Relevance and timeliness;  
3) Reliability;  
4) Comparability; and,  
5) Materiality.  
Meanwhile, Horcher (2005, p.187) proposed that specific informational requirements 
should serve the different needs for information that is reliable, timely, accessible, 
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accurate, consistent in format and suited to different users. In addition, Greuning and 
Bratanovic (2003) argued that producing useful information depends on timeliness, 
considering benefit and cost of providing information, and balancing qualitative 
characteristics to ensure that such characteristics are adequate for their particular 
environment. 
 
The banking supervisors’ attention to the topic of market discipline in banking is based 
on the recognition that markets contain disciplinary mechanisms that mean that banks 
will earn rewards when they manage risk effectively under appropriate conditions and 
will be punished for greater risk-taking by demanding higher yields on bank liabilities. 
Prudential supervision and market discipline is important to promoting the long-term 
stability of both individual institutions and banking systems. Moreover, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is aware that market discipline can 
contribute to a safe and sound banking environment. The Basel committee has 
established Pillar 3 in Basel II to achieve the appropriate disclosures, with the aim of 
encouraging greater bank disclosure to strengthen banking stability. Market discipline, 
however, can only work if it consists of three conditions: understanding of market 
participants about risk of loss; assessing the cost of banking risk; and adequate 
information to measure the riskiness of the bank (Nier and Baumann, 2006). 
 
There are a number of studies that have explored the usefulness of risk disclosure. For 
example, Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) pointed out that investors demand increased 
corporate risk disclosure to improve their investment decisions. This requirement 
includes the implementation of risk management systems and effective monitoring of 
the risks affecting a firm’s strategies. In addition, it needs response plans before taking 
on emerging opportunities and minimising the risk of failures. Lajili and Zéghal (2005) 
also emphasised that risk disclosure should provide guidance in evaluating 
management’s effectiveness because this relates to firm-level economic value and 
growth, as well as trading volume sensitivity to different risks. Poshakwale and Courtis 
(2005) found that firm disclosure information enables the reduction of investor 
uncertainty and attracts long-term investment. This positively influences and reduces 
the cost of equity capital. They also further explained that useful disclosures are likely 
to reduce uncertainty and lower the estimated risk. 
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Even though there are benefits for disclosing risks, the costs of increased disclosure 
must be weighed against the benefits arising from a lower cost of capital or higher 
market valuation (Murugesu and Santhapparaj, 2010). Based on this trade-off, Helbok 
and Wagner (2006) found that banks which have a lower equity ratio and are less 
profitable choose a higher level of disclosure with respect to operational risk in order to 
assure the market that operational risks are well managed, while highly capitalised 
banks, which outsiders believe unlikely to fail, tend to provide a lower level of 
disclosure. Therefore, internal and external parties are an important influence when 
considering the trade-off between the costs and benefits of risk disclosure. They can 
ensure that banks are acting for the best interests of the shareholders.  
 
Risk disclosure reduces the information asymmetry between informed and uninformed 
investors (Poskitt, 2005). Iatridis (2008) pointed out that the reduction of uncertainty 
and information asymmetry would convey the effective communication between 
managers and other related interested parties (such as shareholders, debtors, regulators, 
and financial analysts). Consequently, risk disclosure tends to reduce the related agency 
and political costs. This monitoring mechanism also influences the ability of 
stakeholders to monitor and assess changes in a bank’s condition. A high quality of 
disclosure will provide market signals about the bank’s conduct, which is useful 
information to supervisors responsible for reducing a bank’s risk exposure (Oliveira et 
al., 2011c). However, risk disclosure should not be considered as a stand-alone 
mechanism to reduce information asymmetry without integrating the whole process of 
risk management relating to planning, controlling and monitoring (Conti and Mauri, 
2008). Hence, the risk disclosure practices of a company should enable it to reflect on 
the effectiveness of its risk management and control systems (Murugesu and 
Santhapparaj, 2010). 
 
 
1.6  The Objectives of this Study 
 
The rationales underlying this study of risk disclosure in the UK banks stem from the 
weakness in corporate governance and risk management which were both critical causes 
of the beginning of the global financial crisis of mid-2007. As a consequence of this 
crisis, the Basel committee also recommended that corporate governance, risk 
management, disclosure, and transparency are essential elements in the safe and sound 
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functioning of banks. Therefore, the transparency of risk disclosure has become a key 
principle that underpins both corporate governance and risk management frameworks. 
 
There are two main objectives for this study. Firstly, this study aims to investigate risk 
disclosures in the annual reports of UK banks on a longitudinal basis. A longitudinal 
study can describe how shareholders monitor risk and risk management through annual 
reports on a number of aspects, such as in financial crises, through regulatory changes, 
and with increased accounting standards. Secondly, given the need for useful 
information which is related to risk reporting (as identified in Section 1.5), this study 
attempts to develop a method that enables capture of the quality and characteristics of 
risk disclosures because useful information about risk disclosures can reduce 
uncertainty and lower estimated risk. Hence, a longitudinal analysis should show 
whether UK banks have improved their risk disclosures. It should also show how they 
disclose risks when they face regulatory and public pressures.  
 
 
1.7  Chapter Outline 
 
This thesis is comprised of nine chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the risks 
and motivation of this study, containing corporate governance, risk management and the 
importance of risk disclosure. Chapter 2 reviews the previous literature of banking risk 
and risk disclosure. In terms of banking risks, four main risks are categorised: financial 
risks, operational risks, business risks, and event risks. However, considerable attention 
has been paid to subcategories of seven main risks related to the market movements, or 
the economic changes of the environment, which are credit risk, liquidity risk, capital 
adequacy, market risk, interest rate risk, currency risk, and operational risk. 
Consequently, Chapter 2 outlines the conceptual issues in each of the seven risk 
categories, including its definition. A broad definition of risk disclosures is discussed 
and the development of risk disclosures is provided to determine the nature and extent 
of risk disclosure in the various corporate reports in different countries. The final part of 
this chapter will review risk disclosure in various countries. Chapter 3 describes the 
theoretical framework, the process of identifying the research problem and research 
questions. 
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Chapters 4 and 5 describe the method development and sample selection. Chapter 4 
introduces the conceptual and methodological developments of the content analysis 
with the various definitions of relevant studies. This chapter also provides a description 
of the procedures in the content analysis, including both constraints and alternative 
solutions for implementing this method. Chapter 5 outlines the stages of method 
development. It begins with the sample selection and follows with the different steps 
involved in creating reliable content analysis tool. The method’s coding mechanisms are 
explained in detail to examine six interrogations of risk disclosures, which are: risk 
categories; disclosure direction; the time orientation of disclosure; the disclosure of 
factuality and perception; the quality of disclosure; and societal concern about banking 
risks. 
 
Chapter 6 and 7 provide the results of longitudinal findings and analysis for three 
aspects, which are: volumetric analysis of risk categories, information richness, and the 
association between volumes of longitudinal risk disclosures against the intensity of 
societal discussion (as proxied by the frequency and by the year) of relevant newspaper 
citations (by risk category). Chapter 6 gives an overall view of the findings for all six 
companies (i.e. RBS, NatWest, Lloyds TSB, HBOS, Barclays, and HSBC). Meanwhile, 
Chapter 7 provides the intrasectoral longitudinal findings which are analysed by 
comparing six companies for three aspects as mentioned. The main findings and 
discussions from Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are highlighted in Chapter 8. The study’s 
conclusions, implications, limitations, and contributions to theory are presented in 
Chapter 9, which is the final chapter. 
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Chapter 2. Banking Risks and Risk Disclosures 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
Assessment of the financial distress warning systems of banks has been one of the most 
significant issues of the past decade, especially in financial markets where the 
internationalisation of financial flows has rapidly changed as the economic and financial 
sectors have developed. In addition, technological progress and deregulation have 
increased the competitive pressures amongst banks and other businesses (Greuning and 
Bratanovic, 2003). Since the 1980s, there have been a number of global financial crises 
that have had a considerable impact and which have led regulators to consider new 
conceptual frameworks to address emerging structural problems (Paulet, 2011). The 
introduction of the Basel Accord on International Bank Capital Standards (Basel I) in 
1988 reignited interest in the effect of bank capital regulations (Altunbas et al., 2007; 
Fiordelisi et al., 2011). The banks responded to these new challenges by recognising the 
necessity of managing financial distress. Meanwhile, the need for capital adequacy was 
recognised as the banking business began to diminish and capital adequacy was 
required.   
 
The recent growth in the financial liberalisation of international financial markets has 
led to increased innovation of new products in the financial segment of the marketplace. 
Recent developments in derivatives have led to the development of new instruments, 
products, services, and techniques. Financial derivatives stem from standardised 
exchange-traded derivatives, which gained widespread acceptance during the 1970s, 
and simple, customized Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives (i.e. forwards, swaps, and 
options), which gained popularity during the 1980s. These derivatives have been 
supplemented by basic structured products (i.e. convertible bonds, hybrid – putable and 
callable – bonds) (Banks, 2004, p.4). The introduction of these new instruments, 
products and services has led to an increased market orientation. It has also led to the 
marketability of bank assets (Greuning and Bratanovic, 2003). It even includes the 
destruction of derivatives (Banks, 2004). This happens because some instruments are 
technically very complicated and difficult to understand by general investors. Therefore, 
the poor risk management and control which is inherent in these instruments based on 
financial liberalisation can lead to a financial crisis (Chen, 2007).  
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In recent years, the banking industry has moved away from its traditional role of earning 
profit from receiving deposits and making loans. Financial innovation can be created 
quickly in a standardised form by bank trading and large profits can be earned from this 
in the global marketplace. Unsurprisingly, extreme competition among banks has also 
increased their market segmentation. Many products are created to attract more 
customers, especially the off-balance-sheet instruments that are related to currency and 
interest rates. The effects of these innovations have increased earnings volatility within 
the banking system, both within individual banks and throughout the banking sector. 
Moreover, not only does each category of risk increase its own uncertainty, it also 
causes effects across categories of risk. In addition, it increases volatility in the banking 
operation, causing it to become more complex. Consequently, it is inevitable that banks 
have faced an increase in the global levels of risk as well as the emergence of systemic 
risk (Paulet, 2011). 
 
As the movement of banks into new areas of off-balance sheet banking has increased, 
this has led banks into ever more risky and highly-regulated business (Lastra, 2004). 
Many methods have been suggested to address these problems; for example, risk 
disclosure is currently one of the most widely used methods to monitor and manage risk 
exposure. However, the quality of risk disclosures of banks has become a controversial 
issue in the global financial market. The approach to regulation and supervision has 
changed dramatically in order to enhance the quality of risk disclosure, which is done 
out of concern to gain useful information and to make market discipline effective. This 
chapter aims to discuss the questions of banking risk, risk disclosure, and prior research. 
 
 
2.2  Banking Risks 
 
Banking risks are defined as potentially adverse impacts on cash flow, cost of capital 
and, hence, profitability. They can include several distinct sources of uncertainty 
(Bessis, 2002, p. 11). Banks face a wide number of risks in the process of providing 
financial services. To manage risk, banking risks are generally classified into four main 
categories: financial risks, operational risks, business risks, and event risks (Greuning 
and Bratanovic, 2003; El Tiby, 2011). Several previous studies of banking risk have 
further subdivided these four risk categories; however, different authors frequently 
categorise these subcategories differently. Table 2.1 compares the four main risks as 
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they have been categorised by Greuning and Bratanovic (2003), El Tiby (2011), and 
Horcher (2005).  
 
Table 2.1  A comparison of banking risks as they have been categorised by different 
authors 
Greuning and Bratanovic 
(2003, p.3) 
El Tiby (2011, 
p.29) 
Horcher (2005, p.3, p.149) 
Financial Risks    
1. Pure risk:1 
 Credit risk 
 Liquidity risk 
 Solvency risk (capital 
adequacy) 
2. Speculative risk:2 
 Market risk 
 Interest rate risk 
 Currency risk 
 Credit risk 
 Liquidity risk 
 Equity 
investment risk 
 Market risk 
 Rate of return 
risk 
 
1. Financial risks arising from an 
organisation’s exposure to changes in 
market prices (e.g. interest rates, exchange 
rates, and commodity prices). 
2. Financial risks arising from the actions of, 
and transactions with, other organisations 
(e.g. vendors, customers, and counterparties 
in derivatives transactions). 
3. Financial risks resulting from internal 
actions or failures of the organisation; 
particularly people, processes, and systems. 
Operational Risks   
 Internal fraud 
 External fraud 
 Employment practices and 
workplace safety 
 Client, product, and 
business services 
 Damage to physical assets 
 Business disruption and 
system failures 
(technology risk) 
 Execution, delivery, and 
process management 
(compliance risk) 
 Legal risk 
 Failure risk 
 Fiduciary risk 
 Compliance risk 
Operational exposure arises from the 
possibility of fraud, error, or system or 
procedural problems. 
Business Risks   
 Macroeconomic and 
policy concerns 
 Legal infrastructure 
 Legal liability 
 Regulatory compliance 
 Financial infrastructure 
 Reputational and fiduciary 
 Withdrawal risk 
 Settlement and 
prepayment risk 
 Volatility risk 
 Reputation risk 
 Country risk 
 Equity  
 
                                                          
1
  These can result in loss for a bank if they are not properly managed (Greuning and Bratanovic, 2003).  
2
  Based on financial arbitrage, this can result in a profit if the arbitrage is correct or a loss if it is incorrect 
(Greuning and Bratanovic, 2003). 
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Greuning and Bratanovic 
(2003, p.3) 
El Tiby (2011, 
p.29) 
Horcher (2005, p.3, p.149) 
 Country risk 
Event Risks   
 Political 
 Contagion 
 Banking crisis 
 Other exogenous 
 Banking crisis 
 Exogenous 
 
 
It is evident from table 2.1 that these categories have been divided into different sub-
categories depending on the author’s perspective.  
 
Several previous studies have not categorised banking risks into four categories (i.e. 
financial risks, operational risks, business risks, and event risks) but instead have 
focused on the main risks that are related to market movements or changes in the 
economic environment (such as credit risk, liquidity risk, capital adequacy, market risk, 
interest rate risk, currency risk, and operational risk). Consequently, table 2.2 compares 
the definition of risk categories that focus on market movements (i.e. Bessis, 2002; 
Greuning and Bratanovic, 2003; and, Frost, 2004). 
 
Table 2.2  A comparison of the main banking risks  
Bessis (2002) Greuning and 
Bratanovic (2003) 
Frost (2004) 
Credit Risk   
The risk that customers default 
is a major source of loss, 
meaning that they fail to comply 
with their obligations to service 
debt. Default triggers a total or 
partial loss of any amount lent 
to the counterparty.  
Credit risk is the risk of a 
decline in the credit standing of 
an obligor of the issuer of a 
bond or stock. 
The chance that a debtor 
or financial instrument 
issuer will not be able to 
pay interest or repay the 
principal according to the 
terms specified in a credit 
agreement is an inherent 
part of banking.  
A credit risk means that 
payments may be delayed 
or ultimately not paid at 
all, which can in turn 
cause cash flow problems 
and affect a bank's 
liquidity. 
 
 
 
Credit risk is the risk that a 
counterparty that owes (or who 
potentially owes) a bank money 
fails to meet its obligations. 
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Bessis (2002) Greuning and 
Bratanovic (2003) 
Frost (2004) 
Liquidity Risk   
Liquidity risk refers to multiple 
dimensions:  
 Inability to raise funds 
at normal cost;  
 Market liquidity risk; 
and, 
 Asset liquidity risk. 
A bank may have 
insufficient funds on hand 
to meet its obligations. A 
bank's net funding 
includes its maturing 
assets, existing liabilities, 
and standby facilities 
with other institutions. It 
will sell its marketable 
assets in the stable 
liquidity investment 
portfolio to meet liquidity 
requirements only as a 
last resort. 
Companies and individuals 
rarely borrow unless they have a 
financing need.  
Banks face the risk that a large 
portion of their depositors will 
demand their funds back at the 
same time. Consequently, 
management has to determine 
the appropriate balance between 
holding low yield, but liquid, 
assets such as government 
securities that can be readily 
sold and higher yielding, but 
illiquid, assets such as loans. 
Capital Adequacy/ Solvency Risk 
Solvency risk is the risk of 
being unable to absorb losses, 
generated by all types of risks, 
with the available capital. 
An adequate capital base 
serves as a safety net for 
a variety of risks to which 
an institution is exposed 
in the course of its 
business. Capital absorbs 
possible losses and, 
therefore, provides a 
basis for maintaining 
depositor confidence in a 
bank.  
Capital adequacy is the capital 
available within the business 
required to absorb a defined 
level of possible losses before 
the bank faces insolvency. 
Required risk capital is 
estimated assuming a specified 
holding period and confidence 
level. The level of risk capital 
required, as defined by 
management, may be more or 
less than the bank’s actual level. 
Market Risk 
Market risk is the risk of 
adverse deviations of the mark-
to-market value of the trading 
portfolio due to market 
movements during the period 
required to liquidate the 
transactions. The period of 
liquidation is critical to assess 
such adverse deviations; if it 
gets longer then so do the 
deviations from the current 
market value. 
 
 
Market risk is the risk 
that a bank may 
experience loss due to 
unfavourable movements 
in market prices. 
Exposure to such a risk 
may arise as a result of 
the bank taking deliberate 
speculative positions (i.e. 
proprietary trading) or 
may ensue from the 
bank's market-making 
(i.e. dealer) activities. 
 
 
 
This is the risk that the prices of 
financial instruments (i.e. 
equities) in which a bank has a 
position falls. This could result 
in the bank suffering unrealised 
losses on any open positions 
that it has. 
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Bessis (2002) Greuning and 
Bratanovic (2003) 
Frost (2004) 
Interest Rate Risk 
Interest rate risk is the risk of a 
decline in earnings due to the 
movements of interest rates. 
Interest rate risk is the 
sensitivity of capital and 
income to changes in 
interest rates. 
Bank balance sheets are made 
up of a mix of fixed and floating 
rate assets and liabilities whose 
composition is continually 
changing over time. A bank that 
makes a lot of fixed rate loans 
(i.e. car loans) funded with 
floating rate deposits is exposed 
to the risk that interest rates rise. 
This will push up its cost of 
funds while the returns on its 
assets will remain largely 
unchanged. 
Currency Risk 
A currency risk happens when 
there are incurring losses due to 
changes in exchange rates. 
Variations in earnings result 
from the indexation of revenues 
and charges to exchange rates or 
of changes of the values of 
assets and liabilities 
denominated in foreign 
currencies. 
Currency risk results from 
changes in exchange rates 
between a bank's 
domestic currency and 
other currencies.  It 
originates from a 
mismatch, and may cause 
a bank to experience 
losses as a result of 
adverse exchange rate 
movements during a 
period in which it has an 
open on- or off-balance-
sheet position (either spot 
or forward) in an 
individual foreign 
currency.   
A foreign bank that borrows 
US$ and lends it out in its local 
currency is exposed to exchange 
risk. The main risk here is that 
US$ will appreciate against the 
local currency leaving it with a 
liability that in local currency 
terms is greater than the value 
of its matching asset. 
Operational Risk 
Operational risks are those of 
malfunctions of the information 
system, reporting systems, 
internal risk-monitoring rules 
and internal procedures 
designed to take timely 
corrective actions, or the 
compliance with internal risk 
policy rules. 
Operational risk is 
defined by the Basel 
Committee on Banking 
Supervision as "the risk 
of loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed 
internal processes, people 
and systems or from 
external events." 
Operational risk is a catchall 
category for other things that 
could go wrong. It includes 
potentially catastrophic events 
(such as earthquakes, flooding 
and fire) and other more 
mundane factors (such as 
power, computer or 
telecommunications failures). 
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In general, banking risks fall into seven categories (as illustrated in table 2.2). These 
risks have increased the need for the function of risk measurement, management, and 
control. Therefore, the role of bank regulators and supervisors is to act as facilitators in 
the process of risk management and to enhance and monitor the statutory framework.  
The Basel committee has published several papers on policy issues as well as risk 
management frameworks for banking risks, and it expects its members to move forward 
with the appropriate adoption procedures in their respective countries. Consequently, 
conceptual issues in each risk category (including its definition) will be described in the 
following sections. In addition, each section will refer to the recommendations and 
principles of risk management as issued by the Basel committee for justifying quality of 
risk disclosure in the analytical process. 
 
 
2.2.1   Credit risk 
 
Credit, or counterparty, risk is one of the most significant risk categories in the banking 
sector (Al-Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei, 2007; Richard et al., 2008; Angelini et al., 2008; 
Bonfim, 2009; Lin, 2009). This happens because a bank’s profitability is closely related 
to credit risk (Al-Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei, 2007). In addition, weakness in credit risk 
management is the most important factor and underlying cause of bank failures 
(Barnhill et al., 2002; Greuning and Bratanovic, 2003; Richard et al., 2008). Risk 
management has recently been receiving greater attention from the financial and 
banking industry since many banks have gained first-hand experience of risk during the 
current financial crises. Specifically, the potentially severe effects of credit risk are 
significant reasons behind many macroeconomic difficulties (Carling et al., 2007; 
Bonfim, 2009). 
 
Since banking failures are coupled with a corresponding economic and social impact, 
credit risk management is needed to reduce potential losses from defaults on loans. 
Moreover, a clearer understanding of credit risk drivers may be able to help a bank to 
successfully manage defaults on its credit liabilities. In general, the main processes of 
credit risk management in the banking industry have five main stages, which are: 
identification, measurement, assessment, monitoring, and control (Richard et al., 2008). 
There are three main types of credit risk which are used to identify credit risk using the 
level of effects of credit risk, which are: personal or consumer risk; corporate or 
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company risk; and, sovereign or country risk (Greuning and Bratanovic, 2003). 
However, when considering the sources of credit risk that arise in portfolios, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS hereafter) divides credit risk into two types: 
systematic risk
3
 and idiosyncratic risk
4
 (BCBS, 2006a).  
 
While modern banks have continued to increase in scale and complexity, they have also 
faced difficulties from credit risk management issues, such as a lack of credit standards 
for borrowers and counterparties, poor portfolio risk management, and a lack of 
attention to changes in economic or other circumstances. Machiraju (2008) points out 
that government controls, political pressures, production difficulties, financial 
restrictions, market turmoil, and instability in the business environment can all affect 
credit risk management. However, Richard et al. (2008) argued that the effectiveness of 
credit risk management depends on establishing an appropriate management regime for 
credit risk while operating a sound credit granting process, maintaining an appropriate 
credit administration and monitoring process, as well as ensuring that there are adequate 
controls over credit risk. 
 
Credit risk management has become a central issue, and a number of principles have 
been put forward to help its development. Machiraju (2008) proposed three key 
principles for credit risk management: selection, limitation, and diversification. 
Selection, the first of the key principles of credit management, is described as the 
process for considering loan application form which elicits information on the amount 
of the loan, purpose of loan, repayment and collateral. With regard to this principle, 
Fraser and Simkins (2010) argued that setting appropriate policies (such as the term of 
the repayment, interest charges, and partial prepayment) is required. Limitation, the 
second of the key principles of credit management, is a system of limits which are set 
for different types and categories of lending. Diversification, the third of the key 
principles of credit management, is described as the process of spreading lending over 
different types of borrowers, different economic sectors and different geographical 
                                                          
3
  Systematic risk represents the effect of unexpected changes in macroeconomic and financial market 
conditions on the performance of borrowers. Borrowers may differ in their degree of sensitivity to 
systematic risk, but few firms are completely indifferent to the wider economic conditions in which they 
operate. Therefore, the systematic component of portfolio risk is unavoidable and only partly 
diversifiable (BCBS, 2006a). 
4
  Idiosyncratic risk represents the effects of risks that are particular to individual borrowers. As a 
portfolio becomes more fine-grained, in the sense that the largest individual exposures account for a 
smaller share of total portfolio exposure, idiosyncratic risk is diversified away at the portfolio level. 
This risk is totally eliminated in an infinitely granular portfolio (i.e. one with a very large number of 
exposures) (BCBS, 2006a). 
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regions (Machiraju, 2008, p. 198). However, following the recent expansion of financial 
markets and the rapid growth of off-balance sheet activities of global banks, Herffernan 
(2005) suggests that credit derivatives and asset securitisation should be included as 
another of the key principles for reducing credit risk exposure.  
 
With regard to the importance of credit risk management, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision issued a paper on principles for the management of credit risk in 
1999. These principles were subsequently developed until the completed version was 
released in 2000 as “Principles for the Management of Credit Risk” (BCBS, 2000a). 
This paper contained five areas for the management of credit risk:  
1)  Establishing an appropriate credit risk environment; 
2)  Operating under a sound credit granting process;  
3)  Maintaining an appropriate credit administration, measurement and monitoring 
process;  
4)  Ensuring adequate controls over credit risk; and,  
5)  The role of supervisors. 
 
The business of banking is credit, and credit is the key component on which a bank’s 
quality and performance are judged. In the other words, the credit quality of a bank’s 
loan portfolio is the one of the most significant risk factors that it faces (Barnhill et al., 
2002). Hence, banks face the necessity of managing rapidly changing credit risk 
exposures due to higher financial stress on credit risk that is caused by the intermediary 
role that they play on the financial markets. 
 
 
2.2.2   Liquidity risk 
 
The concept of liquidity is a core component in the modern banking system and it plays 
a key role in managing financial risk (Greuning and Bratanovic, 2003; Asian 
Development Bank (ADB hereafter), 2008; Pokutta and Schmaltz, 2011). The banking 
system has a close relationship with liquidity because the banks operate liquid assets by 
producing loan and investment portfolios, and these assets are funded by liquid deposits 
and other liabilities. Based on an asset-liability mismatch, banks can generate two types 
of imbalances: firstly, an imbalance between the amount of funds collected and lent; and 
secondly, an imbalance between the maturities as well as interest rate sensitivities of the 
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sources of funding and the loans extended to clients (Crouhy et al., 2006, p. 182); 
therefore, liquidity risk is exposed when an asset-liability mismatch occurs (Pokutta and 
Schmaltz, 2011). Consequently, this relationship means that liquidity risk can cause the 
bank to fail (Jorion, 2003). This failure can in turn involve other banks, which has a 
negative impact on the entire economy (Brighi, 2002). Hence, liquidity risk 
management is a key activity in banking system (Greuning and Bratanovic, 2003; 
Pokutta and Schmaltz, 2011). 
 
Banks traditionally have met their liquidity needs by managing their assets and funding. 
Generally speaking, liquidity risk consists of both asset liquidity risk and funding 
liquidity risk (Jorion, 2001; Jorion, 2003; ADB, 2008). Asset liquidity risk involves the 
ability to continually enter into market transactions and is also referred to as market, 
product, or trading liquidity risk (Jorion, 2003; ADB, 2008). By its definition, asset 
liquidity risk arises when transactions cannot be conducted at quoted market prices due 
to the size of the required trade relative to normal trading lots. Meanwhile, funding 
liquidity risk, which is also called cash-flow risk, arises when banks cannot meet 
payment obligations (Jorion, 2003, p. 276). Jorion (2003) also described how both risks 
interact with each other when the portfolio contains illiquid assets that must be sold at 
distressed prices.  
 
In theory, a bank may manage liquidity in two ways: firstly, by increasing its liquidity 
through asset management (i.e. liquid assets are sold on the market in order to generate 
liquidity); and secondly, through liability management (i.e. the banks raise funds to 
obtain liquidity) (Greuning and Bratanovic, 2003; Pokutta and Schmaltz, 2011). 
However, in practice most banks use a mixture of both methods (Greuning and 
Bratanovic, 2003). In addition, Brighi (2002) also proposed that liquidity risk can be 
reduced by managing portfolio diversification and investing the excess liquidity on the 
interbank market.  
 
Asset and liability management is a critical discipline in liquidity management, which 
rests on the structure for matching asset and liability. Asset and liability management is 
a complex method that involves various risks, such as market risk, interest rate risk, 
currency risk, funding and capital planning, taxation, and regulation constraints (Crouhy 
et al., 2006). Consequently, sovereign debt crises and banking crises in financial 
markets are usually associated with liquidity crises (Brutti, 2011). 
28 
 
The concept of liquidity risk management is at the heart of stability in the banking 
system (Greuning and Bratanovic, 2003). It analyses the bank’s on and off-balance 
sheet positions to estimate cash flow requirements in both normal and stressed 
conditions and it also looks at how the requirement for funds will be met (Machiraju, 
2008). Moreover, the lessons of the recent financial market turmoil demonstrate the 
imperative need for banks to improve the efficiency of their operations through 
managing liquidity risk. Consequently, the Basel committee has focused on developing 
a greater understanding of the way in which international banks manage their liquidity 
on a global basis by publishing guidance on liquidity management. In December 2010, 
the Basel committee published the “Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity 
Risk Measurement, Standards, and Monitoring”, aiming to strengthen global capital and 
liquidity regulations, and to promote a more resilient banking sector (BCBS, 2010). 
 
 
2.2.3   Capital adequacy 
 
Capital is one of the most significant factors for a bank because it can provide 
protection against some of the risks of the banking business (Cade, 1999; Greuning and 
Bratanovic, 2009; Ojo, 2010). Altunbas et al. (2007) also found evidence that capital 
levels are related to risks, which means that efficient banks tend to have high levels of 
capital. Consequently, capital adequacy has become one of the key tools to prevent 
excessive risks (Altunbas et al., 2007; Jokipii and Milne, 2011). However, capital is not 
a replacement for poor risk management, bad corporate governance, or weak internal 
controls (Greuning and Bratanovic, 2009, p.122). 
 
The Basel committee has released a framework, known as the Basel Accord, to secure 
international convergence on revisions to supervisory regulations governing the capital 
adequacy of internationally active banks. The Basel committee has recently issued a 
revised framework, which is called Basel III. A brief description of the historical 
development of the Basel Accord is provided below. 
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a) From Basel I to Basel III  
 
In the late 1980s, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision started to introduce a 
risk-based capital adequacy standard known as Basel I Accord which encouraged the 
prudent management of risks. This framework aimed to strengthen the soundness and 
stability of international banking system by specifying minimum bank capital adequacy 
levels, and this had a marked impact on bank approaches to capital management 
(BCBS, 1988). However, in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 
1998 default crisis in Eastern Europe, the Basel I Accord has been criticised as being 
insufficient to provide a capital buffer for unexpected events (Greuning and Bratanovic, 
2009).  
 
In January 2001, the Basel Committee published a revised and updated draft of its 
earlier proposals of June 1999. This was intended to replace the 1988 Basel Capital 
Accord. When the development of this framework, known as Basel II, was completed in 
2006 it consisted of three pillars, namely: minimum capital requirements, a supervisory 
review process, and market discipline (BCBS, 2006b).  
 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009, it was shown that the capital 
regulation of Basel II may be insufficient to strengthen the banking sector (Varotto, 
2011). In 2009 the Basel committee started to reform the standard, and the revised 
framework, known as Basel III, was published in 2010. To improve the banking sector’s 
ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, Basel III raised both 
the quality and quantity of the regulatory capital base and enhanced the risk coverage of 
the capital framework (BCBS, 2011a). 
 
Although the purpose of the revised Basel framework was to promote a more resilient 
banking sector, it is inevitable that banks will face difficulty from raising higher capital 
as required by Basel III. The effects of higher capital requirements may have direct and 
material impacts on banking operations, such as the costs of a bank’s financial distress, 
the transaction costs of issuing equity, substantial financial distress costs from low 
capital, and problems between shareholders and creditors (Drumond, 2009). 
Consequently, the rationale underlying the purpose of a revised framework will force 
banks to consider the trade-offs between lower lending and raising capital to meet 
capital requirements (Francis and Osborne, 2011). However, one of the lessons of the 
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recent financial crisis is that capital regulation alone is not sufficient to strengthen 
financial stability when the effectiveness of supervision is not accompanied. 
 
 
2.2.4   Market risk 
 
Banks may be exposed to market risk in a variety of ways. Market risk exposure may be 
subdivided into two types: firstly, a systematic risk that affects the volatility of similar 
assets in financial markets; and secondly, a specific risk that only affects individual 
financial assets (Apostolik et al., 2009). In the financial market, market risk may also 
arise from unfavourable movements in four risk types, which are: interest rate, foreign 
exchange rate, equities,
5
 and commodities
6
 (Greuning and Bratanovic, 2003; Jorion, 
2003; Apostolik et al., 2009). Market risk is described as the potential for loss resulting 
from an adverse movement in price or value of marketable financial instruments that 
may affect the value of on and off-balance sheet positions of banks. 
 
There has been an increasing interest in market risk management as major investment 
and commercial banks have rapidly expanded into trading assets. The concern for 
management of market risk should begin with the top management. Market risk requires 
consistency in the management’s attention and adequacy analysis (Greuning and 
Bratanovic, 2003; BCBS, 2011b). However, it has been argued that supervisory 
management should have strong and knowledgeable oversight of its risk management 
function due to its complexities (Frost, 2004; Fraser and Simkins, 2010). Greuning and 
Bratanovic (2003) advise that there are four types of policies related to market risk 
management, which are: firstly, indicating to the market that assets should be priced at 
market value according to the accounting standard; secondly, position limits should be 
related to the capital available to cover market risk; thirdly, stop-loss provisions; and 
fourthly, the limitation of a new market and its trading in new financial instruments. 
Meanwhile, Fraser and Simkins (2010) focussed on how cash flows help in operational 
                                                          
5
  Equity risk relates to taking or holding trading-book position in equities or instruments that display 
equity-like behavior (e.g. convertible securities) and their derivatives (e.g. futures and swaps on 
individual equities or on stock indices). Similarly, equity-related risk is calculated for the specific risk 
of holding a security (beta) and for the position in a market as a whole. For derivatives, the risk is 
measured by converting the derivative into a notional equity position in the relevant underlying 
instrument (Greuning and Bratanovic, 2003, p. 240). 
6
  Commodity risk refers to holding or taking position in exchange-traded commodities, futures, and other 
derivatives. Commodity prices may be volatile, as commodity markets are often less liquid than 
financial markets and changes in supply and demand can have dramatic effects on prices (Greuning and 
Bratanovic, 2003, p. 240). 
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planning and estimating. They proposed that predictability and consistency of cash 
flows are significant for managing market risk.  
 
 
2.2.5   Interest rate risk 
 
Interest rate risk is accepted as a major financial risk because changes in interest rate 
can have an important effect on a firm’s expected cash flow and on the discount rates 
that are used to value a firm (Ballester et al., 2011). There are two common perspectives 
for the impact of interest rate risk (BCBS, 2004; Saha et al., 2009): firstly, the earning 
perspective focuses on the variation in interest rates that affects a bank's earnings by 
changing its net interest income and adjusting the level of other interest sensitive 
income and operating expenses; and, secondly, the economic value perspective focuses 
on the changes in interest rates that affect the underlying value of the bank's assets, 
liabilities, and off-balance sheet instruments. The present value of future cash flows 
(and, in some cases, the cash flows themselves) changes when interest rates change. 
 
The different sources of interest rate risk in the banking book can have significant 
effects on the banking sector. There are four main sources of interest rate risks in the 
banking book, which are: repricing risk,
7
 yield curve risk,
8
 basis risk,
9
 and optionality
10
 
(BCBS, 2004; Saha et al., 2009). 
 
The recent liberalisation of financial markets has led the majority of firms being 
exposed to many sources of risk. For example, the adverse impact of volatility on 
interest rates is a possible cause of failures in banking operation (Kasman et al., 2011). 
However, banks can reduce their interest rate risk by assessing various activities related 
to interest rates and implementing effective risk management techniques. The key 
                                                          
7
  Repricing risk arises from timing differences in the maturity (for fixed-rate) and repricing (for floating-
rate) of bank assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet positions. While such repricing mismatches are 
fundamental to the business of banking, they can expose a bank's income and underlying economic 
value to unanticipated fluctuations as interest rates vary (BCBS, 2004, p. 5). 
8
  Yield curve risk refers to repricing mismatches that can also expose a bank to changes in the slope and 
shape of the yield curve. Yield curve risk arises when unanticipated shifts of the yield curve have 
adverse effects on a bank's income or underlying economic value (BCBS, 2004, p. 5). 
9
  Basis risk arises from imperfect correlation in the adjustment of the rates earned and paid on different 
instruments with otherwise similar repricing characteristics (BCBS, 2004, p. 5). 
10
  Optionality arises from the options embedded in many bank assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet 
portfolios. Formally, an option provides the holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy, sell, or in 
some manner alter the cash flow of an instrument or financial contract (BCBS, 2004, p. 6). 
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concept of managing interest rate risk is ensuring that asset and liability management is 
highly sensitive to changes in the level of interest rates (Drehmann et al., 2010). 
Meanwhile, Frost (2004) proposes three further methods for managing interest rate risk:  
a) Gap analysis;  
b) Duration matching; and,  
c) Sensitivity analysis.  
 
Gap analysis is a tool that banks or regulators use to assess interest rate risk by 
measuring and evaluating the net repricing mismatch between assets, liabilities, and off 
balance sheet items (i.e. derivatives). Duration matching evaluates the effects of the 
price sensitivity of assets and liabilities to changing interest rates. And finally, 
sensitivity analysis involves detailed assessments of the potential effects of changes in a 
portfolio to a wide range of possible changes in interest rates. 
 
The importance of interest rate risk relates to international bank supervisory issues. The 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued a paper on principles for the 
management of interest rate risk in September 1997. These principles were 
subsequently developed until the completed version was released in July 2004 as: 
“Principles for the Management and Supervision of Interest Rate Risk” (BCBS, 2004). 
This paper contained fifteen principles in the guidance of interest rate risk management. 
Principles one to thirteen are intended to refer to an interest rate risk management 
process, which includes the development of a business strategy, the assumption of 
assets and liabilities in banking and trading activities, as well as a system of internal 
controls. Meanwhile, principles fourteen and fifteen specifically address the supervisory 
treatment of interest rate risk in the banking book. 
 
 
2.2.6   Foreign exchange rate risk 
 
Understanding the impact of foreign exchange risk has become a central issue for a 
firm’s valuation and for risk management (BCBS, 2000c; Martin and Mauer, 2005). 
Foreign exchange risk (or currency risk) is described as the risk of loss that results from 
changes in exchange rate when there is a mismatch between selling and buying in 
foreign exchange transaction (BCBS, 2000c). Originally, a mismatch results from the 
assets and liabilities that are valued in different currencies (Greuning and Bratanovic, 
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2009). A mismatch may also exist between the settlement problem and receiving 
payments in a foreign currency in the future (Frost, 2004). Moreover, a mismatch is 
possible between principal and interest (Greuning and Bratanovic, 2009). 
 
Since banks are exposed to various sources of potential foreign exchange risks, there are 
many risk categories relating to foreign exchange risk. Currency risk may arise from 
counterparty risk, involving various risk categories such as credit risk, liquidity risk, 
operational problems, market liquidity constraints, and legal risk (BCBS, 2000c). 
Furthermore, a currency risk may be incurred as a result of transaction risk,
11
 economic 
or business risk,
12
 a revaluation risk or translation risk
13
 (Greuning and Bratanovic, 
2009). Since currency risk is related to various risks, this may cause financial crises to 
affect other variables, such as capital controls, many types of domestic financial 
liberalisation, and the quality of financial regulation and supervision (Angkinand and 
Willett, 2011). 
 
The serious implications for risk management and banking sector stability means that 
managing a bank’s foreign exchange exposure has long been a core interest of banking 
supervisors, researchers, and regulators. Creating diversified portfolios related to 
currency risk is an important requirement for reducing foreign exchange risk (Martin 
and Mauer, 2005). However, Greuning and Bratanovic (2009) argued that setting 
specific policies and foreign exchange exposure limits is crucial for management and 
control purposes. They also further recommended that limits may be applicable in 
various positions, such as the maximum loss limit, the specific currency limit, and the 
stop-loss provision limit. Risk management also means that a greater disclosure is likely 
to improve the detection of critical foreign exchange risk (Martin and Mauer, 2005). On 
the other hand, it has also been argued that banks cannot mitigate risk merely through 
monitoring net foreign currency exposure while the bank’s board and senior 
management do not close pay close attention to the many activities that involve 
currency risk taking (Sahminan, 2007). 
                                                          
11
  Transaction risk, or the price-based impact of exchange rate changes on foreign receivables and 
foreign payables (i.e. the difference in price at which they are collected or paid and the price at which 
they are recognized in local currency in the financial statement of a bank or corporate entity) 
(Greuning and Bratanovic, 2009, p.256). 
12
  Economic or business risk is related to the impact of exchange rate change on a country’s long-term 
(or a company’s) competitive position. For example, a depreciation of the local currency may cause a 
decline in imports and greater exports (Greuning and Bratanovic, 2009, p.256). 
13
  Revaluation risk, or translation risk, arises when a bank’s foreign currency positions are revalued in 
domestic currency, or when a parent institution conducts financial reporting or periodic consolidation 
of financial statements (Greuning and Bratanovic, 2009, p.257). 
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In terms of the role of regulation and supervision, in 2000 the Basel committee 
published its “Supervisory Guidance for Managing Settlement Risk in Foreign 
Exchange Transactions” (BCBS, 2000c). The purpose of this guidance was to provide 
banking supervisors with information about foreign exchange settlement risk and its 
management for them to use when assessing a bank's policies and procedures. This 
guidance involves the implications of seven alternative aspects:  
1) Overall management;  
2) Measurement;  
3) Setting and using limits;  
4) Identifying and managing fails;  
5) Understanding the implications of techniques to manage exposures;  
6) Contingency planning; and,  
7) Internal audit. 
 
 
2.2.7   Operational risk 
 
The past decade has seen the rapid development of products and internal process in 
financial institutions, leading to an increasing interest in operational risk (Di Renzo et 
al., 2007). This recognition has brought supervisors of financial institutions to be 
concerned about their institution’s ability to manage operational risk. Consequently, 
financial institutions have been required to enhance their practices for the management 
and supervision of operational risk. 
 
Under the Basel II Accord, operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events 
(BCBS, 2006b, p.144). Related to loss from its method operations, the Basel II Accord 
has considered five categories of operational risk: internal process risk,
14
 people risk,
15
 
systems risk,
16
 external risk,
17
 and legal risk.
18
 It excludes strategic and reputational risk 
                                                          
14
   Internal process risk is the risk associated with the failure of a bank’s processes or procedures 
(Apostolix et al., 2009, p.183). 
15
   People risk is the risk associated with employee error or fraud; this is a common source of operational 
risk (Apostolix et al., 2009, p.184). 
16
   Systems risk is associated with the use of computer technology and computer systems (Apostolix et 
al., 2009, p.185). 
17
   External risk is the risk associated with events occurring beyond the direct control of the bank such as 
external fraud and theft, terrorist attacks, and transport system interruption (Apostolix et al., 2009, 
p.186). 
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(BCBS, 2006b). However, Apostolix et al. (2009) included strategic risk, business risk, 
and reputational risk into operational risk because these risks have an interrelation with 
operational hazards. Moreover, it seems that the terms of operational risks may cover 
market risk and credit risk (Schroeck, 2002) because both risks have an influence on 
operational loss (Cade, 1999). However, both risks are commonly separated from 
operational risk for the purpose of identifying its scope (Moosa, 2007). In addition, 
Greuning and Bratanovic (2009) emphasise that operational risk has to be minimised 
whereas credit and market risk tend to be optimised in risk management. 
 
Since operational risk is the risk of losses arising from the materialisation of a wide 
variety of events, it has been a major cause of many recent spectacular banking failures, 
operational risk management has been of interest not only to senior managers but also 
of regulators. Consequently, in 2003 the Basel committee issued their principles for the 
sound management of operational risk, which was revised in 2011 (BCBS, 2011d). To 
address the key elements of the overall framework for managing operational risk, the 
principles for operational risk management consist of three areas: fundamental 
principles of operational risk management; governance; and risk management 
environment. 
 
There are five processes related to operational risk management environment:  
1) Identification;  
2) Assessment; 
3) Measurement;  
4) Mitigation and control; and,  
5) Monitoring and reporting (Crouhy et al., 2006; Apostolix et al., 2009; BCBS, 
2011d).  
Meanwhile, Fraser and Simkins (2010, p. 290) identified three main requirements for 
the management of operational risk:  
1) Identifying and quantifying the risks associated with implementing a particular 
strategy;  
2) Evaluating the organisation’s risk management effectiveness; and,  
3) Developing an adaptive risk response capability to bring the risk within the 
defined risk tolerance range.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
18
   Legal risk is the risk associated with the uncertainty of legal actions or the application or interpretation 
of contracts, laws, or regulations (Apostolix et al., 2009, p.187). 
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However, some authors (e.g. Jorion, 2001; Horcher, 2005) proposed different tools to 
manage operation risk, such as internal controls, audit oversight, exception reporting, 
critical self-assessment, key risk indicators, and formal quantification. Unlike credit risk 
and market risk, where the source of risk lies outside banks, operational risk arises from 
sources internal to banks. Therefore, operational risk policies and procedures that 
clearly define the policies in which all aspects of operational risk are managed should be 
documented and communicated, although banks follow principles or tools to manage 
risk. 
 
 
2.3  Risk Disclosures 
 
The issue of risk disclosures has received considerable critical attention and it is an 
important point of the debate of how to implement risk disclosures (Conti and Mauri, 
2008). The influence of the shareholders means that banks are expected to engage in 
effective risk management and control systems because they can affect an increase in 
shareholder value (Murugesu and Santhapparaj, 2010). However, Ismail and Rahman 
(2011) argue that because institutional investors hold a large percentage of shareholding 
in a company they have a greater ability to reduce agency problems and are involved 
with a company’s risk management policy. Meanwhile a wide variety of stakeholders 
have influence on risk disclosures. In addition to shareholders and institutional investors 
the stakeholders can include supervisors, bondholders, depositors and other creditors, 
correspondent and other banks, counterparties, and the general public (Greuning and 
Bratanovic, 2009).  Therefore, both internal and external parties are an important 
influence on the conduct of banks, improving the quality of risk disclosures. 
 
The following sub-sections aim to examine the main topics related to risk disclosures, 
consisting of three issues: definitions of risk disclosures, and development of risk 
disclosures. 
 
 
2.3.1   Definitions of risk disclosures 
 
It is essential at the outset to explain the meaning of risk disclosures before discussing 
the development of risk disclosures and the relevant research studies of risk reporting. 
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Some previous studies have proposed a definition of risk disclosure in order to establish 
a conceptual framework for their research. For example, relating closely to the 
definition of risk, Linsley and Shrives (2006, p. 389) defined risk disclosures as 
disclosures that have been judged to be risk disclosures if the reader is informed of any 
opportunity or prospect, or of any hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure, that has 
already impacted upon the company or may impact upon the company in the future or 
of the management of any such opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, threat or exposure. 
 
Linsley and Shrives’s (2006) definition focuses on a broad definition of risk covering 
both good and bad information. Likewise, Hassan (2009, p.669) also defined risk 
disclosures as the communication of good and bad information for uncertainty of 
business; however, with regard to risk information, Hassan’s (2009) definition provides 
a broader definition because of the financial statements inclusion of information about 
managers’ estimates, judgments, reliance on market-based accounting policies (such as 
impairment, derivative hedging, financial instruments, and fair value) as well as the 
disclosure of concentrated operations, non-financial information about corporations’ 
plans, recruiting strategy, and other operational, economic, political and financial risks. 
 
Based on an uncertainty-based definition of risk, Dobler (2008, p.185) defined risk 
disclosure as risk-related disclosures which imply information on the distribution of 
future cash flows. This definition covers both verifiable risk reporting (i.e. on risk 
factors and risk management) and non-verifiable risk reporting (i.e. direct managerial 
forecasts on the distribution). 
 
Focusing on banking business, Homölle (2009) defined risk disclosure as the kind of 
reporting that gives the bank’s stakeholders perfect information about the risk of bank 
assets and, therefore, on the true distribution function of future asset values but not on 
the (still uncertain) asset value itself. For this present study, risk disclosures are defined 
as the communication of risk and uncertainty through both numerical and narrative 
information on multidimensional arrays comprised of disclosure direction, timely 
orientation, factuality, and perception.  
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2.3.2   The development of risk disclosures in the UK 
 
In July 1993, the preliminary framework on the voluntary disclosure of business risk 
was established in the UK when the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) introduced the 
Operating and Financial Review (OFR), which is the equivalent of the US 
‘Management Discussion and Analysis’ (MD&A). This framework recommended 
boards of directors to disclose the discussion of the principal risks facing the business, 
together with a commentary on their risk management approach and the potential 
impact of risk on their performance. This reporting statement was updated and a revised 
version issued in January 2003 to improve the quality of disclosure (ASB, 2006). 
However, some firms seemed to be unconcerned about the guidance of the OFR because 
this framework was not a mandatory requirement (Abraham and Cox, 2007). In 
response, the OFR regulations were passed into law (taking effect on or after 1 April 
2005) and the UK government gave the power to ASB for making Reporting Standard 
(RS) 1, which was issued in May 2005. Subsequently, in November 2005, UK 
government repealed the OFR legislation returning to the position prior to April 2005 
when publication of the OFR was voluntary. Therefore, the OFR has been formally 
withdrawn and the ASB has converted RS 1 into a Reporting Statement of best practice 
on the OFR, which will have a persuasive rather than mandatory force. The statement 
was published on 26 January 2006 (ASB, 2006). With regard to the weakness of the 
mandatory disclosures, Hill and Short (2009) agreed that increased regulation may lead 
to the reduction in the amount of useful information for investors because firms tend to 
focus only on regulatory standards.  
 
While a reporting statement of best practice under the OFR deals with business risk 
(relating to the requirement of financial risk disclosures), the ASB issued Financial 
Reporting Standard 13 (FRS 13) ‘Derivatives and Other Financial Instruments: 
Disclosures’, which is effective for all accounting periods ending on or after 23 March 
1999 (ASB, 1998).  FRS 13 requires publicly listed companies to provide risk 
disclosures, and both narrative and numerical reporting about interest rate risk, currency 
risk, liquidity risk, fair value, financial instruments used for trading, financial 
instruments used for hedging, commodity contacts, and net investment in foreign 
entities. Following International Accounting Standard (IAS) 32 ‘Financial Instruments: 
Presentation’, the ASB issued FRS 25, which has the effect of withdrawing FRS 13 for 
most listed entities after 1 January 2005; however, FRS 13 remains in force for any 
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banking or similar institution. Subsequently, since IAS 32 was replaced by International 
Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 7 ‘Financial Instruments: Disclosures’ on after 1 
January 2007, the ASB also issued FRS 29 ‘Financial Instruments: Disclosures’, which 
has replaced the requirement in FRS 25 since January 2007. 
 
In terms of UK corporate governance, compulsory reporting on the aspects of corporate 
governance specifically related to financial reporting and accountability started in 
December 1992 when the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance (known as the Cadbury Committee) issued a report on the financial aspects 
of corporate governance. In 1995, the Greenbury Report on directors’ pay and share 
options set out extensive disclosure in annual reports on remuneration and 
recommended the establishment of a remuneration committee comprised of non-
executive directors. In January 1996, the Hampel Committee was established to review 
the extent to which the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports had been implemented and 
whether the objectives had been met. Consequently, in 1998 the Hampel Committee 
issued the publication of the Combined Code of Corporate Governance by combining 
the recommendations of the Cadbury report and the Greenbury report. In 1999, the 
‘Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code’ (also known as the 
‘Turnbull Report’) provided guidance to assist companies in the implementation of the 
requirements of the combined code relating to internal control. In October 2005, the 
Turnbull report was revised by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) publishing report 
on ‘Internal Control: Revised Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code’, while the 
revision of the Combined Code was issued in 2003 by recommendations on board 
composition from the Higgs Report (2003) and the Smith Report (2003) on audit 
committees (Abraham and Cox, 2007). Subsequently, the revised version of the 
combined code was published in 2005 and 2007. Regarded as an integral part of the 
code, eventually the Financial Reporting Council has revised the combined code as the 
‘UK Corporate Governance Code’, beginning on or after 29 June 2010 (FRC, 2010). 
 
With regard to the other institute relating to development of risk disclosure in the UK, 
debate on risk reporting commenced in 1997 when the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) published a discussion paper on 
“Financial Reporting of Risk – Proposals for a Statement of Business Risk”. This paper 
found that information in financial statements was deficient in useful risk information 
and lacked a comprehensive discussion of the risks (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Linsley 
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et al., 2006; Amran et al., 2009). The issue of the need to report risk has historically 
grown in importance. The ICAEW has published two discussion papers on the topic of 
risk: “No Surprises: The Case for Better Risk Reporting” (1992) and “No Surprises: 
Working for Better Risk Reporting” (2002). These papers recommended that enhanced 
disclosure of the key risks can assist the investor’s decisions, which is in contrast to the 
increased costs that would occur if sensitive information is omitted from any risk 
disclosures (Linsley and Shrives, 2005a). 
 
 
2.3.3   The development of risk disclosures in the US and Germany 
 
In the US derivative market, risk disclosures are required under Financial Reporting 
Release No. 48 (FRR 48), which was published by the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in 1997. These disclosures must be made by all SEC registrants as 
part of the “Management’s Discussion and Analysis” (MD&A) section in Form 10-K 
(Amran et al., 2009). In 1998 the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued 
FAS 133 on ‘Accounting for Derivatives Instruments and Hedging Activities’, which 
requires the disclosure of market risk arising from adverse changes in interest and 
foreign exchange rates, and in stock and commodity prices (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). 
The fundamental accounting treatment of derivatives under FAS 133 is similar to 
International Accounting Standard 39 (IAS 39). 
 
In 2001, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued guidance for the 
Critical Accounting Policy and Estimate (CAPE) disclosures to improve the quality and 
transparency of public company disclosures in MD&A section of Form 10-K. In 2003, 
this guidance was included in FRR 72 “Interpretation: Commission Guidance 
Regarding MD&A of Financial Condition and Results of Operations” with the purpose 
of making financial statement disclosures useful (Hughes et al., 2011). The collapse of 
several high profile companies during the US corporate crises of 2001 to 2002 
(including Enron Corporation, WorldCom, Tyco, Global Crossing, Adelphia, 
HealthSouth, and Parmalat) represented significant failures of corporate disclosure and 
internal control. In 2002, US legislators introduced the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to 
improve corporate governance and accountability. In addition, SOX aimed to increase 
corporate financial transparency based on an accepted internal control framework, such 
as the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations’ (COSO) 1992 framework of internal 
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controls. In 2004, the COSO framework introduced a broader risk management into its 
integrated framework, which is known as COSO 2 (Fraser and Simkins, 2010). 
 
In Germany, a reaction to risk reporting commenced in 1998 when amendments of 
paragraphs 289 (1) and 315 (1) of the German Commercial Code required companies to 
report risks in their annual report. Subsequently, in 2001, the German Accounting 
Standard Board regulated German Accounting Standard No.5 (GAS 5), Risk reporting, 
with GAS 5-10 about risk reporting by banks (Homölle, 2009). GAS 5 is seen to be a 
comprehensive approach that requires general disclosures covering all risk categories 
and the entire risk management (Dobler, 2008). 
 
 
2.3.4   The development of risk disclosures: The adoption of IAS/IFRS 
 
The International Accounting Standard (IAS) and International Financial Reporting 
Standard (IFRS) have responded to developments in the international financial market 
concerning disclosure and presentation related to financial instruments because the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the IFRS interpretations 
committee play a key role in standard-setting body to bring about convergence of 
national accounting standards and IFRSs to high quality solutions. Consequently, a new 
framework of qualitative and quantitative information concerning both risk exposure 
and corporate handling of liquidity, credit and market risks has been developed by 
focusing on the risks of financial assets and liabilities in the long-term (Conti and 
Mauri, 2008). The following table illustrates the development of accounting standards 
that relate to risk disclosures. 
 
Table 2.3  A summary of IAS/IFRS related to risk disclosures 
Issue 
Year 
IAS/IFRS 
1997 IAS 1   Presentation of Financial Statements – Amendments to IAS 1 in 2011, 
effective in 2012. 
1990 IAS 30 Disclosures in the Financial Statements of Banks and Similar Financial 
Institutions) – Superseded by IFRS 7, effective 2007. 
1995 IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation – Disclosure provisions superseded 
by IFRS 7, effective 2007. 
1998 IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets–revisions to 
IAS 37 in 2005. 
42 
 
Issue 
Year 
IAS/IFRS 
1998 IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement – Superseded by 
IFRS 9 (Financial Instruments), effective 2013. 
2005 IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures - Amendment to IFRS 7 related to 
disclosures on transition to IFRS 9 in 2011, effective 2015. 
 
By now the coverage of IFRS 7 is embodied in three main risk topics: the disclosure of 
the significance of the measurement categories used in accordance with IAS 39, 
disclosure and presentation related to financial instruments under the previous standards 
IAS 32, and all disclosure requirements related to the financial statements of banks and 
similar financial institutions under IAS 30. Consequently, IFRS 7 is a higher standard 
because the financial regulators require a full disclosure approach (Bischof, 2009; 
Greuning and Bratanovic, 2009). 
 
 
2.3.5   The development of risk disclosures: The adoption of the recommendations of 
the Basel Committee 
 
Over the past decade, the issues of risk disclosure have been increasingly and strongly 
debated as part of financial market discussions. Focusing on public disclosures by banks 
and securities firms, in 1995 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
released a paper that was titled, “Public Disclosure of the Trading and Derivatives 
Activities of Banks and Securities Firms”. The aim of this paper was to recommend the 
importance of enhancing the adequacy of disclosures related to internal risk 
measurement and management systems in credit risk, market risk, and liquidity risk 
(BCBS, 1995). Since this paper merely introduced the significance of disclosures in 
order to promote quality of risk reporting, in 1998 the Basel committee issued a paper 
that was titled: “Enhancing Bank Transparency”. This paper contained six broad 
categories of information, which were:  
1) Financial performance;  
2) Financial position (including capital, solvency and liquidity);  
3) Risk management strategies and practices;  
4) Risk exposures (including credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, and operational, 
legal and other risks);  
5) Accounting policies; and,  
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6) Basic business, management and corporate governance information (BCBS, 
1998).  
 
In June 1999, mandatory disclosures were introduced when the Basel Committee issued 
new capital adequacy accord (Basel II) under Pillar 3, which required market 
participants to have information about the bank’s capital structure and its risk profile. In 
2001, working paper on Pillar 3 was published to enhance the quality of risk 
disclosures. The revised framework was issued in 2004. The comprehensive version 
was subsequently issued in 2006. It covered highly detailed quantitative and qualitative 
risk disclosures in the areas of: capital structure, capital adequacy, risk exposures and 
assessment, credit risk, market risk, operational risk, equities risk and interest rate risk 
(BCBS, 2006b). Following the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009, Basel II was revised in 
2009 and in 2010 the Basel III was introduced. Consequently, Pillar 3 on risk disclosure 
was improved to strengthen the transparency of regulatory capital and market discipline 
(BCBS, 2011a). Recently, the development of principles under the Basel III has been 
continually upgraded to address effective crisis management, recovery, and resolution 
measures in reducing both the probability and impact of a bank failure. 
 
 
2.4  Prior Research 
 
Risk reporting has gained interest in financial reporting practice, regulation, and 
international research. Consequently, there have been a number of studies that have 
explored the extent of risk disclosures in various countries. The majority of the existing 
studies are based on empirical evidence. This section will introduce a range of studies 
related risk disclosures by separately considering studies of single country and cross-
country comparisons. Table 2.4 presents the prior research related to risk disclosure, 
containing the main findings and research sample from different countries of studies. 
 
 
2.4.1   Studies in a single country 
 
The first group of studies reviewed risk disclosures of companies within one country. 
Most studies aimed to examine risk disclosures by using content analysis. The following 
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section presents an assortment of applications and finding from different single country 
studies. 
 
 
a) Studies in the UK 
 
In their study, Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) focused on narrative risk disclosures in the 
interim reports of seventy-two non-financial listed companies during 2009 to 2010. 
Although the content analysis of these interim reports revealed that company size was 
positively associated with the volume of risk disclosures, the practical implication 
showed that the large companies were less likely to be associated with company risk 
level. These findings corroborate the findings of Linsley and Shrives (2005a; 2006) who 
examined risk reporting in seventy-nine annual reports of non-financial listed 
companies in 2000 and the findings of Linsley et al. (2006) who studied risk disclosure 
in twenty-two annual reports of banks in the UK and Canada. Moreover, Abraham and 
Cox (2007) analysed risk information in UK FTSE 100 annual reports in 2002. They 
found that although the number of executive and the number of independent directors is 
positively correlated with the level of corporate risk reporting, the number of dependent 
non-executive directors is not. They also found that corporate ownership by long-term 
institutions was negatively related to risk reporting, while corporate ownership by short-
term institutions was positively related to financial risk reporting. Their implications 
showed that institutional investors did not pressure companies who have a lower risk to 
increase disclosure.  
 
With regard to the perceived difference in disclosure quality, Linsley and Shrives 
(2005a; 2006) stressed that many companies do not reveal complete information about 
the risks that they face and that most risk disclosures were generalised statements of risk 
policy with minimal disclosure of quantified risk. Large generalised information can 
tend to obscure bad news and, therefore, bad news may be concealed (Linsley et al., 
2006) or the release may be postponed because it may increase the level of volatility 
(Kothari et al., 2009). However, Linsley and Lawrence (2007) found no evidence that 
directors concealed bad risk news through their writing style in twenty-five UK annual 
reports of non-financial listed companies in 2000. Moreover, Iatridis (2008) who 
examined 284 financial statements of UK firms in 2004 also found that the disclosure of 
sensitive accounting information had not adversely affected the firms' profitability. The 
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quality of risk disclosures at this time was probably enhanced by the adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs). 
 
In a longitudinal study in the UK of 420 prospectuses of IPO companies during 1991 to 
2003, Hill and Short (2009) found that IPO companies disclosed less information 
relating to risk management and internal controls than was provided by listed 
companies. Furthermore, IPO risk statements tended to be forward looking, whereas 
listed companies disclosed more information related to the past. In terms of prior 
information in risk reporting, Linsley et al. (2006) also confirmed that qualitative and 
prior information were disclosed much more often than quantitative and future risk 
information. 
 
 
b) Studies in other European countries 
 
Deumes (2008) conducted a content analysis of narrative risk disclosures in 
prospectuses to determine whether ninety Dutch companies reported risk information to 
prospective investors. His analysis showed that the future information of risk disclosed 
was useful for predicting the volatility of future stock prices, the sensitivity of future 
stock prices to market-wide fluctuations, and the likelihood of severe declined in stock 
price in the 30-month period after publication. With regard to future information of risk, 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) analysed eighty-five annual reports of Italian companies in 
2001 and found that disclosed items were more focused on the present and the past than 
on the future. Furthermore, Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) found that voluntary disclosure 
had a bias towards the management’s self-justification of expected negative impacts and 
that disclosed information tended to avoid the company’s expected impact even though 
disclosure of future strategies were concerned. Meanwhile, Oliveira et al.’s (2011b) 
study of Portuguese firms also found that most risk disclosures were in the past rather 
than in the future, and the large proportion of disclosures contained generic and 
qualitative information. 
 
In further research in Portugal, Oliveira et al. (2011a; 2011b; 2011c) found that public 
visibility (as assessed by size and company listing status), independent directors 
(2011b), shareholders, and corporate reputation (2011c), has an important influence on 
the improvement of risk reporting. However, Oliveira et al. (2011b) argued that the 
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adoption of IFRSs in 2005 did not positively affect the quantity and quality of risk 
disclosure. Moreover, Oliveira et al. (2011a) also found that both financial and non-
financial institutions disclosed risk information with a lack of transparency in minimum 
binding disclosure requirements for market risk, liquidity risk, and risk management 
objectives and policies while only credit risk disclosures presented optimal levels of 
mandatory compliance. 
 
 
c) Studies in the United States of America (US) 
 
Abdelghany (2005) focused on the disclosure of selected significant accounting 
variables relating to market risk. He analysed the prospectuses of 323 companies listed 
in NYSE over a five year period (1997-2001) and found that companies with a higher 
ratio of current asset to current liabilities tend to have a higher degree of market risk. 
Abdelghany (2005) also found a close relationship between accounting measures and 
market risk. Meanwhile, Hughes et al. (2011) were interested in bank responses to SEC 
disclosure guidance between 2007 and 2008 because of the importance of the disclosure 
of critical accounting policies. They found that the quantity of accounting disclosures 
increased in 2008 but banks did not fully comply with SEC guidance regarding the 
critical accounting disclosures. However, they concluded that the 2008 disclosures were 
of higher quality and quantity than the 2007 disclosures. 
 
With respect to longitudinal study of risk disclosures in banking sector, Pérignon and 
Smith (2010) examined sixty annual bank reports during 1996 to 2005. They found that 
there was a general upward trend in the quantity of information disclosed over the 
survey period. This finding is also consistent with the finding of Hughes et al. (2011), 
whose study covered a shorter period. Additionally, given VaR
19
 disclosure as 
disclosure quality, Pérignon and Smith (2010) found that the quality of a bank’s 
disclosure did not improve over time. 
 
With regard to governance crisis during 2000-2002 in the US, Akhigbe and Martin 
(2008) studied the influence of disclosure and governance on risk of 201 US financial 
services firms following the introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) in 2002. They found 
                                                          
19
  Value-at-Risk (VaR) is a method for quantifying potential losses resulting from movements in market 
rates or prices (Emm et al., 2007). 
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that firms with the strongest disclosure and governance experienced smaller increases in 
risk. Based on the introduction of SOX, Akhigbe et al. (2008) examined 1,160 firms 
between 2001 and 2002, and also confirmed that market risk was lower for firms with 
improvement in board independence and monitoring after the mandates of the SOX 
legislation were released. Additionally, they also found that total return variance, market 
risk and idiosyncratic risk increased over a two year period of study even though the 
SOX Act had been introduced. 
 
 
d) Studies in Asia 
 
It seems that risk reporting by Malaysian companies is still at the initial stage. Amran et 
al. (2009) analysed risk management disclosure in one hundred Malaysian annual 
reports of listed companies. The recording unit was the sentence. It was found that the 
number of risk disclosures in Malaysian companies in 2005 was very much less when 
compared to UK companies in 2000, as reported by Linsley and Shrives (2006). 
However, the finding that company size and industry were positively associated with 
the volume of risk disclosures was consistent with the findings of Linsley and Shrives 
(2006). Related to the level of risk management disclosures, Ismail and Rahman (2011), 
who examined 124 Malaysian annual reports of listed companies during 2006 to 2008, 
found that most companies perform the same level of risk management disclosure 
practices from year to year. They also found that investors and director’s education had 
an influence on risk management disclosures, while director’s experiences did not affect 
an increase in information on risk. 
 
Othman and Ameer (2009) also investigated the market risk disclosure practices among 
429 Malaysian listed firms in 2006 and 2007. They found that, although the majority of 
the firms studied had complied with IAS 32 Financial Instruments – Disclosure and 
Presentation, most firms did not provide useful information related to speculative 
activities of hedging instruments. This may reflect the critical need for observing a 
certain standardised reporting format or for following guidelines for disclosing new 
financial instruments. Murugesu and Santhapparaj (2010) have recently published a 
study which examined the impact of risk disclosure on valuation and initial returns of 
267 Initial Public Offerings (IPO) firms in Malaysia during 1999 to 2004. They found 
that riskier IPO companies had lower offer prices. They also found that firms who 
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provide greater information on their ability to control their risk tended to increase the 
value of their shares. Therefore, they concluded that the need for increasing both quality 
and quantity of risk disclosure in the prospectus can increase the value of these firms. 
In China, Tang (2011) was interested in the effect of risk disclosures on price difference 
between shares to domestic investors and shares to foreign investors by examining 
sixty-eight prospectuses of Chinese firms. She found that a greater difference in risk 
disclosures between domestic and foreign investors was related to a higher level of price 
difference between shares to domestic investors and shares to foreign investors. 
However, after controlling for investors’ average information precision, she found that 
information asymmetry had no effect on the cost of capital. 
 
 
e) Studies in Canada 
 
Lajili and Zéghal (2005) analysed risk management disclosures in the annual reports of 
228 Canadian companies in 1999. Their findings showed that almost all of the risk 
disclosures were narrative information. They also found that companies attained a high 
level of risk disclosure intensity reflecting both mandatory and voluntary risk 
management disclosures. However, the disclosure of risk assessment and analysis was 
limited. Additionally, although risk mitigation was noted, the potential effects and value 
creating opportunities were largely absent from these disclosures.   
 
 
f) Studies in Australia 
 
Taylor et al. (2010) studied the financial risk management disclosure patterns in the 
annual reports of 111 Australian listed companies during 2002 to 2006. They also 
focused on the question of risk reporting when companies adopted IFRS on reporting of 
financial risk management practices. The evidence of their findings shows that the 
implementation of IFRS has had positive results, with risk disclosures containing more 
transparent reporting in risk management, accounting policies and practices as well as 
company policies. In addition, firm size and leverage was found to be positively 
correlated with financial risk management disclosure. Taylor et al. (2010) also found 
that corporate governance and capital raisings of firms was positively associated with 
financial risk management disclosure patterns, while overseas stock exchange listing of 
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firms was negatively correlated. Consequently, it can be seen that Australian companies 
that raise capital tend to have more requirements to disclose information concerning 
financial risk management practices. Their evidence also showed that firms with an 
inherent uncertainty audit qualification disclosed significantly less financial risk 
information when compared with firms without an audit qualification. 
 
 
g) Studies in Dubai 
 
Hassan (2009) examined the relationship between characteristics and level of risk 
disclosure. In his content analysis study, he used a risk disclosure index to investigate 
this relationship in the annual reports of forty-nine companies listed on either the Dubai 
Financial Market or on the Abu Dubai Security Market. He found that company size 
was not significantly associated with the level of risk disclosure. This finding is 
inconsistent with the results that have been found in the UK (Linsley and Shrives, 
2005a; 2006; Linsley et al., 2006; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012), in Malaysia (Amran et 
al., 2009), and in Australia (Taylor et al., 2010). The reason for this disagreement is that 
this disparity was caused by the difference in business environment and political 
sensitivity between Europe and United Arab Emirates (UAE) countries. Meanwhile, 
Hassan (2009) indicated that the level of risk and industry type is related to risk 
disclosure. Additionally, he found that corporate reserve is negatively associated with 
level of risk disclosure and that corporate annual reports audited by high profile auditing 
firms achieved higher levels of disclosures. 
 
 
2.4.2   Inter-country comparative studies 
 
This section introduces the key findings of inter-country comparative studies. There are 
five main studies that have conducted a cross-country comparative study.  
 
Firstly, Linsley et al. (2006) examined risk disclosure practices within the annual 
reports of eleven Canadian banks and eleven UK banks in 2001. Their content analysis 
showed that Canadian banks had greater risk information to disclose than banks in the 
UK. This finding is ascribed to the Canadian banks who adopted a more proactive 
approach towards transparency under the influence of the US banking regulations. 
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However, other findings showed that the level of risk disclosure is positively associated 
with both bank size and number of risk definitions, and in this there was no significant 
difference in risk disclosure levels between the Canadian banks and the UK banks. 
 
Secondly, Poshakwale and Courtis (2005) examined disclosure level and cost of equity 
capital for 135 banks from Europe, North America and Australia during 1995 to 1999. 
The study found that higher levels of disclosures were consistently associated with 
lower cost of equity capital. They also found that disclosures related to risk 
management practices tended to be most influential in explaining the cross-sectional 
variation in the cost of equity capital. By comparing between European banks and non-
European (US and Australian) banks, the evidence showed that the European banks 
seemed to have more benefit of reduced cost of equity capital from higher levels of 
disclosure. Poshakwale and Courtis (2005) explained this by referring to the differences 
in regulatory regimes on voluntary disclosures, bank accounting practices, and stock 
exchange mandatory disclosures. 
 
Thirdly, Helbok and Wagner (2006) applied content analysis to 142 annual reports of 
banks during 1998 to 2001 from Europe, US and Asia. Their analysis showed that both 
the extent and content of the banks' disclosure on operational risk increased 
significantly over the survey period. Additionally, they found that operation risk 
disclosures were negatively associated with the bank's equity ratio and profitability. 
This meant that banks with a lower equity ratio and/or lower earning provided a higher 
level of disclosure with respect to operational risk. This reflected the intensified risk 
management efforts of banks to assure the market that operational risk was well 
managed. Although the sampling companies were chosen from different continental 
countries, the authors focused risk disclosure study of banks without comparing their 
findings among the different countries sampled. 
 
Fourthly, with respect to the effects of IFRS 7 adoption on bank disclosure, Bischof 
(2009) examined 545 prospectuses of banks in 2006 and 2007 based on the year of 
adoption IFRS 7 from thirty-two European countries. Investigations in risk disclosures 
showed that in a sample of 171 banks from twenty-eight countries, the level of 
disclosure had significantly increased during the year of adoption IFRS 7. However, 
one-third of the banks in the sample did not fully comply with all requirements under 
IFRS 7 (e.g. customer ratings). The major part of the risk report revealed the three 
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categories of risk exposure, which are: credit risk, liquidity risk and market risk. 
Additionally, voluntary disclosure of operational risks also increased, although it was 
not explicitly required by IFRS 7. Bischof (2009) concluded that the adoption of IFRS 
had contributed to an overall increase in the quality of bank disclosures in Europe. The 
conclusion that the adoption IFRS had positive effects in risk disclosures, was 
corroborated by Iatridis (2008) in the UK and Taylor et al. (2010) in Australia. 
Meanwhile, Bischof (2009) pointed out that the adoption of IFRS 7 was weaker in Italy 
and Denmark. The possible reason was explained by the effect on disclosure quality 
related to the national supervisory framework in each country. 
 
Fifthly, and finally, Yong et al. (2005) studied the derivative and risk management 
disclosures of Asia Pacific banks by conducting a content analysis of 164 annual reports 
of banks in different Asia Pacific countries
20
 in 2002. Based on Basel Committee and 
IOSCO
21
 joint recommendations, which were used as the derivative and risk 
management disclosure benchmark, they found that Asia Pacific banks did not adopt 
many of the disclosure recommendations. This was likely to be due to the inability of 
the Basel Committee to enforce their recommendations. Yong et al. (2005) also found 
that most disclosures contained generalised information and narrative information with 
low quantitative and earnings information disclosure. This happened because certain 
factors tended to impact on the quality of disclosure, such as the complexity of 
quantitative information, cost of providing information, and the sensitivity of disclosure. 
In terms of cross-country comparison, Singapore, Hong Kong and Australia had a 
higher level of disclosure when compared to other countries. It was also found that 
banks in Australasia provided more disclosures than East Asian and South East Asian 
banks, while Philippine banks had the lowest mean disclosure scores among all of the 
sample countries. The authors felt that this happened because those countries that 
emphasised transparency tended to have a higher level of disclosure. Table 2.4 provides 
an overview of the studies that have been discussed in this section. 
 
 
                                                          
20
  Sample banks were grouped into three regions, namely, East Asia (Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan), South East Asia (Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) and Australasia 
(Australia and New Zealand).  
21
  The International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) responded in a timely manner to 
information demands from stakeholders' by developing derivative and risk management disclosure 
guidelines in October 1999 to promote the transparency of all significant trading and derivative 
activities of banks and securities firms (Yong et al., 2005, p. 16). 
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Table 2.4  Empirical studies of risk disclosures 
Study Country 
Research 
Sample 
Size/Media/Year 
Key Findings 
Beretta and 
Bozzolan 
(2004) 
Italy 85 annual reports 
of non-financial 
listed companies 
(2001) 
 The risk factors mainly concern strategy, 
financial structure of the company, and 
business processes. 
 Disclosed items are more focused on the 
present and the past than on the future. 
 Voluntary disclosure concerns future 
strategies but avoid conducting their 
expected impact. 
 Voluntary disclosure appears biased 
towards management’s self-justification 
of expected negative impacts. 
 Disclosure quality is not influenced by 
size or industry. 
Abdelghany 
(2005) 
US 323 listed 
companies, 
database from 
S&P 500 (1997-
2001) 
 Companies with a higher ratio of current 
asset to current liabilities tend to have a 
higher degree of market risk. 
 The accounting measures most closely 
associated with market Beta. The financial 
manager may be able to influence the 
return on a stock measurement. 
Lajili and 
Zéghal 
(2005) 
Canada 228 annual 
reports of 
companies 
(1999) 
 The risk assessment analysis appears to 
lack uniformity, clarity, and 
quantification. 
 Risk disclosure is almost exclusively 
qualitative information. 
 The most frequently cited risk categories 
are financial risk, commodity and market 
risk. 
Linsley and 
Shrives 
(2005a) 
UK 79 annual reports 
of non-financial 
listed companies 
(2000) 
 The companies do not reveal complete 
information about the risks they face. 
 The highest proportion of risk disclosure 
is generalised statements of risk policy 
and there is minimal disclosure of 
quantified risk. 
 Levels of risk disclosure are positively 
associated with company size, but not 
company risk level.  
Poshakwale 
and Courtis 
(2005) 
Europe, 
Canada, 
US, and 
Australia 
135 banks, 
database from 
various sources 
(1995-1999) 
 Higher levels of disclosures are 
consistently associated with a lower cost 
of equity capital. 
 Disclosures related to risk management 
practices are most influential on reducing 
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Study Country 
Research 
Sample 
Size/Media/Year 
Key Findings 
the cost of equity capital. 
Yong et al. 
(2005) 
Asia 
Pacific 
countries 
164 annual 
reports of banks 
(2002) 
 Many of the IOSCO and the Basel’s 
disclosure recommendations (derivative 
disclosures) are not being adopted by the 
banks. 
 Disclosures contain low quantitative and 
earnings information. 
Helbok and 
Wagner 
(2006) 
US, Asia, 
Europe 
142 annual 
reports of banks 
(1998-2001) 
 The risk management disclosures mainly 
cover market and credit risk. 
 The extent and content of disclosure on 
operational risk are negatively related to a 
bank's equity ratio and profitability. 
 Disclosure increased in both extent and 
content, although reporting was not 
mandatory at that time. 
Linsley and 
Shrives 
(2006) 
UK 79 annual reports 
of non-financial 
listed companies 
(2000) 
 A positive correlation exists between the 
volume of risk disclosures and company 
size. 
 Companies with lower levels of 
environmental risk provide greater 
amounts of risk information. 
 Risk disclosures are general statements of 
risk management policy and a lack of 
coherence in the risk narratives. 
 Qualitative risk disclosures are far more 
prevalent than quantitative risk 
disclosures. 
Linsley et al. 
(2006) 
UK and 
Canada 
22 annual reports 
of banks (2001) 
 Quantity of risk disclosure does not 
associate with either levels of risk or bank 
profitability. 
 There is a positive association between 
quantity of risk disclosure and either bank 
size or the number of risk definitions. 
 The highest proportion of risk disclosures 
are generalised statements of risk 
management policy. 
 Quantitative and future risk information is 
disclosed much less often than qualitative 
and past information. 
Abraham 
and Cox 
(2007) 
 
UK 100 annual 
reports of FTSE 
100 (2002) 
 Corporate ownership by long-term 
institutions is negatively related to risk 
reporting, while corporate ownership by 
short-term institutions is positively related 
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Study Country 
Research 
Sample 
Size/Media/Year 
Key Findings 
to financial risk reporting. 
 The number of dependent non-executive 
directors is not related to the level of risk 
reporting. 
 UK firms with a US stock exchange 
listing disclose more risk information 
within the UK annual report than non-US-
listed UK firms. 
Linsley and 
Lawrence 
(2007) 
UK 25 annual reports 
of non-financial 
listed companies 
(2000) 
 There is no significant difference between 
the level of readability of the risk 
disclosures in bad news and in good news. 
 No evidence is found to suggest that 
directors are concealing bad risk news 
through their writing style. 
Akhigbe and 
Martin 
(2008) 
US 201 firms, The 
Corporate 
Library’s Board 
Analyst database 
(2002) 
 Corporate disclosure and corporate 
governance are significant determinants of 
the risk shifts surrounding the passage of 
SOX. 
 Firms with the strongest disclosure and 
governance experienced smaller increases 
in risk. 
Akhigbe et 
al. (2008) 
US 1,160 firms, 
database from 
CRSP (2001-
2002) 
 Total return variance, market risk and 
idiosyncratic risk increase from before to 
after the passage of SOX. 
 Post-SOX improvements in information 
certainty, board independence and 
monitoring are associated with smaller 
increases or greater decreases in risk. 
Deumes 
(2008) 
 
Netherlands 90 companies, 
database from 
DATASTREAM 
(1997-2000) 
 Risk-relevant information can predict: 
volatility of future stock prices; sensitivity 
of future stock prices to market-wide 
fluctuations; and the likelihood of severe 
declines in stock price in the 30-month 
period after publication. 
Iatridis 
(2008) 
UK 284 firms, 
database from 
DataStream 
(2004) 
 The disclosure of sensitive accounting 
information has not adversely affected 
firms' profitability. 
 The adoption of IFRS standards enhances 
the quality and the comparability of 
financial statements. 
Amran et al. 
(2009) 
Malaysia 100 annual 
reports of listed 
companies 
 The number of risk disclosures in 
Malaysian companies is very much less 
when compared to UK companies in 2000 
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Study Country 
Research 
Sample 
Size/Media/Year 
Key Findings 
(2005) Linsley and Shrives (2006). 
 Company size is positively associated 
with risk disclosures. 
Bischof 
(2009) 
 
32 
European 
countries 
545 banks on 
database from 
BvD BankScope 
(2006/2007) 
 In a sample of 171 banks from 28 
countries, the level of disclosure has 
significantly increased during the year of 
adoption IFRS 7. 
 The major part of the risk report still 
covers the three areas of risk exposure: 
credit risk, liquidity risk and market risk. 
 Voluntary disclosure of operational risks 
has increased, although disclosure of 
operational risk is not explicitly required 
by IFRS 7. 
 One-third of the banks in the sample did 
not provide certain information required 
under IFRS 7 (e.g. customer ratings). 
Hassan 
(2009) 
 
Dubai 49 annual reports 
of listed 
companies 
(2005) 
 Corporate size is not significantly 
associated with the level of risk 
disclosure. 
 Level of risk and industry type related to 
risk disclosures. 
 Corporate reserve is insignificant and 
negatively associated with level of risk 
disclosure. 
 Annual reports audited by high profile 
auditing firm attain higher levels of 
disclosures. 
Hill and 
Short (2009) 
UK 420 prospectuses 
of IPO 
companies 
(1991-2003) 
 IPO risk statements tend to be forward 
looking, whereas listed companies 
disclose more information related to the 
past. 
 IPO disclosures contain less information 
relating to risk management and internal 
controls than is provided by listed 
companies. 
 Risk disclosure of IPO companies has 
increased across time, although none of 
the risk regulation was aimed. 
 Various signals of quality reduce the 
incidence of risk warnings. 
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Study Country 
Research 
Sample 
Size/Media/Year 
Key Findings 
Othman and 
Ameer 
(2009) 
Malaysia 429 annual 
reports of listed 
companies, 
2006/2007 
 A large number of companies have 
complied with IAS 32 Financial 
Instruments – Disclosure and 
Presentation. 
 Most Malaysian firms did not engage in 
hedging any type of market risk over the 
reporting period of 2006 to 2007. 
Murugesu 
and 
Santhapparaj 
(2010) 
Malaysia 267 listing 
statistics of listed 
companies 
(1999-2004) 
 IPO companies can increase the value of 
their shares by providing greater 
information on their ability to control their 
risk. 
 Riskier IPO companies have lower offer 
prices. 
Pérignon 
and Smith 
(2010) 
US 60 annual reports 
of banks(1996-
2005) 
 There is a general upward trend in the 
quantity of information. 
 VaRs are excessively conservative and 
their quality of disclosure did not improve 
over time. 
Taylor et al. 
(2010) 
Australia 111 annual 
reports of listed 
companies  
(2002-2006) 
 Corporate governance and capital raisings 
of firms are significant and positively 
associated with Financial Risk 
Management Disclosure patterns, while 
overseas stock exchange listing of firms is 
negatively correlated. 
 The introduction of IFRS has a positive 
influence on risk disclosures. 
 Firm size and leverage are positively 
associated with financial risk management 
disclosure. 
 Firms with an inherent uncertainty of 
qualified audit report disclose 
significantly less financial risk 
information when compared with firms 
without an audit qualification. 
Hughes et al. 
(2011) 
US 20 banks, 
MD&A, article 
citing, 
newspaper, 
(2007-2008) 
 The quantity of total sentences and 
accounting topics disclosed increased in 
2008. 
 Banks did not fully comply with SEC 
guidance regarding the critical accounting 
disclosures. 
Ismail and 
Rahman 
(2011) 
Malaysia 124 annual 
reports of listed 
companies 
 Most companies perform the same level 
of risk management disclosure practices 
from year to year. 
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Study Country 
Research 
Sample 
Size/Media/Year 
Key Findings 
(2006-2008)  Mandatory risk management disclosure is 
71.11%, whereas management disclosure 
is 50% for voluntary risk. 
 Investors have an influence on risk 
management disclosure. 
 Directors’ education influences risk 
management disclosure level. 
 Directors’ experiences do not contribute 
towards increasing information on risk. 
Oliveira et 
al. (2011a) 
Portugal 111 annual 
reports of  banks 
(2006) 
 Stakeholder monitoring and corporation 
reputation are crucial factors that explain 
risk reporting practices. 
 Voluntary risk reporting appears to 
enhance legitimacy by fulfilling 
institutional pressures and by managing 
stakeholder perception of a corporation’s 
reputation. 
Oliveira et 
al. (2011b) 
Portugal 81 annual reports 
of 42 listed and 
39 unlisted 
companies 
(2005) 
 Implementation of IAS/IFRS and the 
European Union’s Modernisation 
Directive in 2005 did not affect the 
quantity and quality of risk disclosure 
positively. 
 Disclosures are generic, qualitative and 
backward-looking. 
 Public visibility has a crucial influence on 
companies to disclose risks. 
 The presence of independent directors 
improves the level of risk disclosure. 
Oliveira et 
al. (2011c) 
 
Portugal 190 financial 
institutions, 99 
non-financial 
institutions, 
annual reports 
(2006) 
 There were low levels of disclosure 
among financial holding companies. 
 There was a lack of transparency in 
minimum binding disclosure requirements 
for market risk, liquidity risk and risk 
management objectives and policies. 
 Only credit risk disclosures presented 
optimal levels of mandatory compliance. 
Tang (2011) 
 
China 68 firms, 
database from 
WISENEWS 
(1999) 
 A greater disparity in disclosure to 
domestic and foreign investors is related 
to a higher level of price difference 
between domestic investor’s shares and 
foreign investor’s shares. 
 Information asymmetry has no effect on 
cost of capital. 
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Study Country 
Research 
Sample 
Size/Media/Year 
Key Findings 
Elzahar and  
Hussainey 
(2012) 
 
UK 72 interim 
reports of non-
financial listed 
companies 
(2009-2010) 
 Company size is positively associated 
with the volume of risk disclosures. 
 Industry activity type is positively 
associated with levels of risk disclosure. 
 Profitability, liquidity, gearing* and cross 
listing** have an insignificant relationship 
with level of risk disclosure. 
 
* [(Short term loans and overdrafts+long term liabilities) / Shareholders funds] × 100 % 
** These are UK companies that are also listed on the US market. 
 
 
2.5  Relevance for This Study and the Limitations of the Previous Studies 
 
Having reviewed the application of content analysis within various studies of risk 
disclosures, this section will introduce the relevant studies that have influenced the 
rationales for this research study. 
 
Table 2.4 shows that there are eight studies involving risk disclosures in banking sector, 
which can be divided into two groups: single country studies and cross-country studies. 
Single country studies have been conducted in the US (Pérignon and Smith, 2010; 
Hughes et al., 2011) and in Portugal (Oliveira et al., 2011a). Meanwhile, cross-country 
studies have been conducted by comparing: the UK and Canada (Linsley et al., 2006); 
European countries (Bischof, 2009); Europe, Canada, US, and Australia (Poshakwale 
and Courtis, 2005); US, Asia, and Europe (Helbok and Wagner, 2006); and, among 
Asia Pacific countries (Yong et al., 2005). 
 
Six out of eight studies used a sample size of between one and two years to examine the 
effects of risk disclosures (Linsley et al., 2006; Yong et al., 2005; Bischof, 2009; 
Pérignon and Smith, 2010; Hughes et al., 2011; Oliveira et al., 2011a). Of the other two 
studies, Poshakwale and Courtis (2005) examined disclosure level and cost of equity 
capital over a five year period (1991-1995) while Helbok and Wagner (2006) employed 
a four year period (1998-2001) to investigate operational risk reporting. However, a 
short period of study seems inadequate for considering the effects of risk disclosures 
because there are various factors related to banking disclosures (such as law and 
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regulations, accounting standards, economic changes, financial crises and other 
potential factors affecting banking operation), therefore, a longitudinal study is 
considered more appropriate to be employed in this study. Time coverage will be one of 
the significant factors to be considered in the impact of economic changes, crises, 
regulation changes, accounting standard changes, and other effects. 
 
None of the previous studies that were reviewed have focused on an inter-company 
comparative study. The review found no previous comparative study of banks which 
has examined the different effects on disclosures when banks face the same adverse 
conditions. For example, sampling banks were employed to examine derivative and risk 
management disclosures (Yong et al., 2005), risk disclosure practices (Linsley et al., 
2006), the effects of IFRS 7 on disclosures (Bischof, 2009), the effects of SEC guidance 
on disclosures (Hughes et al., 2011), factors that affected the voluntary risk reporting 
(Oliveira et al., 2011a), and the level and quality of VAR disclosure (Pérignon and 
Smith, 2010). However, the failure of one bank may have a serious impact on all banks 
and markets. For example, the Lehman Brothers failure in 2008 immediately spread to 
other key banks and triggered an economic crisis (Holland, 2010). Consequently, an 
intrasectoral study will be applied in this study to examine the different disclosures 
among banks when they face various categories of banking risks. 
 
Overall, although content analysis is widely employed in the study of disclosure, risk 
disclosures in UK banks has only been examined by Linsley et al. (2006). In addition, 
there has been little discussion about risk categories in the banking sector. These results 
have motivated this thesis to study the subject of risk disclosure of UK banks, including 
a longitudinal study and an in-depth sectoral study. A detailed discussion relating to this 
purpose is presented in the next chapter. 
 
 
2.6  Summary 
 
This chapter has presented three main perspectives, banking risks, risk disclosures, and 
prior research. Following the financial crisis of 2007, banking risks have received 
considerable attention from a large range of stakeholders (e.g. investors, shareholders, 
regulators, and researchers). Dealing with banking risk, four main risks have been 
categorised, which are: financial risks, operational risks, business risks, and event risks. 
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However, much attention has been paid to seven main risks that relate to market 
movements or economic changes, which are: credit risk, liquidity risk, capital adequacy, 
market risk, interest rate risk, currency risk, and operational risk. Related to these seven 
categories of risk, the Basel committee has published many papers on policy issue and 
risk management framework for those risks. Consequently, in the overview of the full 
spectrum of banking risks this chapter has described the conceptual issues in each risk 
category, including its definition. In addition to the operational framework of risk 
management, this chapter also offers the recommendations and principles of risk 
management related to the risk categories which these are requirements of the Basel 
committee. These requirements, moreover, have an influence on the justification for 
quality of risk disclosure in banking business, which this study also aims to measure the 
level of risk disclosures. 
 
Because of the influence of various stakeholders, risk disclosures are expected to 
engage in the effectiveness of a bank’s risk management and control systems, which 
affects an increase in shareholder value. In this study a broad definition of risk 
disclosures is discussed to identify information about any hazard, danger, harm, threat 
or exposure that the banks conduct to the relevant stakeholders. The importance of 
disclosure quality is one of the most significant discussions in a worldwide network of 
banking supervision. In this chapter, the development of risk disclosures has been 
provided to determine the nature and extent of risk disclosure in the various corporate 
reports in different countries. This chapter has also reviewed the prior research related 
to risk disclosure in various countries. The rationale underlying the purpose of this 
section is to find the various concepts relating to risk reporting and the potential 
relationship between them. 
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Chapter 3. Theory, Gaps in Research and Research Questions 
 
 
This chapter has four sections. The first section starts with the theoretical framework, 
explaining a theory justification that shows why agency theory has been employed as 
the theoretical background to examine risk disclosures in this research. The second 
section describes the key points of discussion in the previous studies. It then explains 
the need for this present research project, which aims to address this research gap. The 
third section provides the main objectives of this study. Given the gaps in the previous 
research and the research objectives, the research questions have addressed four main 
points, which are detailed in the fourth section. 
 
 
3.1  Theoretical Framework 
 
This section describes the theoretical framework for examining risk disclosures in 
annual reports. It has two main subsections, which are theory justification, and agency 
problems. 
 
 
3.1.1   Theory justification 
 
The motives for risk disclosure have been explained by several relevant studies. For 
example, Amran et al. (2009) employed stakeholder theory to examine risk reporting of 
risk management. Meanwhile, Taylor et al. (2010) argued that agency theory provides a 
better conceptual framework for examining financial risk management disclosures in the 
annual reports of Australian listed companies. Some authors have suggested that a 
combination of more than one theory (i.e. agency theory, stakeholder theory, signalling 
theory, and media agenda setting theory) could achieve a better explanation of corporate 
disclosures (Brown and Deegan, 1998; Oliveira et al., 2011b; Elzahar and Hussainey, 
2012). However, the review of prior studies in Chapter 2 showed how Abraham and 
Cox (2007), and Taylor et al. (2010) employed agency theory alone to investigate risk 
disclosures. In this research project, agency theory is used in the study of risk 
disclosures. A brief description of why the three other theories (i.e. stakeholder theory, 
signalling theory, and media agenda setting theory) will not be used is set out below. 
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Firstly, Freeman (1984, p.25) defined a stakeholder as any group (or individual) that can 
affect (or be affected by) the achievement of organisational objectives. Stakeholder 
theory is the basis of corporate accountability to many related parties (i.e. shareholders, 
lenders, regulatory, tax and supervisory authorities, and financial analysts) rather than to 
a single group or shareholders (Solomon, 2010). Consequently, companies are 
encouraged to disclose more voluntary information to support stakeholder use 
(Solomon, 2010). However, stakeholder theory does not exactly match with the aims of 
this study to examine the information richness of risk disclosures because agency theory 
is a better fit under the assumption of conflict of interest between principal and agent, 
which may cause the directors to delay or conceal useful information. 
  
Secondly, signalling theory is used to explain the communication issues in the 
relationship between the sender (who must choose whether and how to convey signal 
information) and the receiver (who must choose how to interpret the signal) (Connelly 
et al., 2011). Consequently, based on signalling theory, problems of information 
asymmetry occur when some relevant information is known to some parties (i.e. 
information holders, managers) but not to all of the parties involved (i.e. shareholders, 
investors) (Levy and Lazarovich-Porat, 1995). Although signalling theory is deemed to 
fit risk reporting in the aspect of disclosure direction (bad news, good news and neutral 
news), it is not able to examine the other aspects of disclosure quality. Therefore, 
agency theory is better able to explain the broader aspect of information richness, 
including the aspect of disclosure direction. 
 
Thirdly, the idea of media agenda setting theory is the relationship between the relative 
emphasis given by the news media to various topics and the degree of salience these 
topics have for the general public (McCombs, 1977). Consequently, the increased media 
attention may lead to increased community concern about a particular issue (Brown and 
Deegan, 1998). In addition, Dyck et al. (2008) pointed out that press coverage increases 
the probability of companies taking action to improve corporate governance. In their 
study of the relationship between risk reporting and public interest, Dahlstrom et al. 
(2011) indicated that an increase in levels of precise risk information in the media has a 
positive correlation with the rationale for risk perceptions in the public. Although media 
agenda setting theory is able to reflect the intensity of societal concern in risk reporting, 
this theory tends to focus on mass media (i.e. television news, newspapers) rather than 
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corporate annual reports that are of interest to this present study. Consequently, media 
agenda setting theory is not chosen for use as a theoretical background in this study. 
 
After considering all of the relevant theories, this study has decided to employ agency 
theory as its theoretical assumption to examine risk disclosures in annual reports of UK 
banks. The next subsection will review agency problems, which are related to risk 
disclosures. 
 
 
3.1.2   Agency problems 
 
The first detailed theoretical exposition of agency theory was provided by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), who defined the managers of the company as the agent and the 
shareholders as the principal (Solomon, 2010). However, Heffernan (2005) argued that 
there were a number of other principal agent relationships in modern banks, including: 
the contracts between the shareholders of a bank (the principal) and its management (the 
agent); the bank (the principal) and its officers (the agent); the bank (the principal) and 
its debtors (the agent); and, the depositors (the principal) and the bank (the agent). Hill 
and Jones (1992) also pointed out that agency theory could be applied to stakeholder-
agency relationships. Consequently, this study agrees that agency theory may be 
subsumed within a stakeholder narrative (i.e. shareholders, debtors, investors, tax 
payers, and financial analysts). 
 
Agency theory deals with a relationship in which one party (the principal) delegates 
authority to another (the agent) to perform work on their behalf, and the welfare of the 
principal is affected by the decisions of the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Wright et al., 2001; Saam, 2007). However, an agency conflict can 
occur when the manager (i.e. the agent) acts in their own self-interests instead of the 
best interests of the principal in order to gain private benefits at the expense of the 
shareholder (i.e. the principal) (Ness and Mirza, 1991). This conflict is referred to as an 
agency cost (Ness and Mirza, 1991). In terms of the agency problem, there are three 
main problems related to agency relationships. Firstly, the agency problem arises when 
the goals of the principal and the agent conflict (Eisenhardt, 1989; Wright et al., 2001; 
Saam, 2007). Secondly, the agency problem of different risk preferences arises when 
the principal and agent have different attitudes toward risk (Eisenhardt, 1989; Saam, 
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2007). Thirdly, the agency problem of information asymmetry arises when the principal 
does not receive useful information to verify the competences, intentions, knowledge, 
and actions of the agent (Mahaney and Lederer, 2003; Saam, 2007). 
 
Transparency about risk disclosure is an important component in corporate monitoring 
and is able to help resolve agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 
1989). Transparency enables the principal to use information to verify the agent’s 
behaviour and to monitor that the agent is more likely to act in the interests of the 
principal (Saam, 2007). Therefore, risk disclosure in the monitoring system is important 
for the monitoring and controlling of the behaviour of an individual firm (Sánchez-
Ballesta and Lloréns, 2010). Lajili and Zéghal (2005) have also emphasised that risk 
disclosure should provide guidance in evaluating the management’s effectiveness 
because this relates to firm-level economic value and growth, as well as trading volume 
sensitivity to different risks. Risk disclosures are also able to reduce the problem of 
information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors (Poskitt, 2005).  
 
 
3.2  Research Gaps 
 
Chapter 2 has reviewed the previous literature on risk reporting. There are eight studies 
involving risk disclosures in the banking sector, which can be divided into two groups: 
single country studies and inter-country studies. Single country studies have been 
conducted in the US (Pérignon and Smith, 2010; Hughes et al., 2011) as well as in 
Portugal (Oliveira et al., 2011a). Meanwhile, inter-country studies on risk disclosures 
have been conducted by comparing: the UK and Canada (Linsley et al., 2006); 
European countries (Bischof, 2009); Europe, Canada, US, and Australia (Poshakwale 
and Courtis, 2005); US, Asia, and Europe (Helbok and Wagner, 2006); and, Asia 
Pacific countries (Yong et al., 2005). 
 
So far, however, there has been little discussion about the use of longitudinal analysis 
and intrasectoral analysis in risk disclosures. Additionally, to date only a limited 
number of studies have focused on risk disclosures in UK banks (excepting the 
influential study by Linsley et al. in 2006). Therefore, one of the motivations for 
conducting this study was the desire to investigate risk disclosures in the UK banking 
sector by conducting an intrasectoral longitudinal study. Based on the small number of 
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studies relating to both aspects, four significant issues were found (i.e. risk category, 
quantity of risk disclosures, information richness, and societal concern) by which these 
interrogations of risk disclosures (particularly in UK banks) have been carried out. The 
following subsections outline the gaps in the previous research, which this study aims to 
address. 
 
 
3.2.1   Longitudinal focus 
 
Chapter 2 found that there were nine studies which had conducted a longitudinal 
analysis of risk disclosures. These, in turn, can be divided into two groups: the first 
group comprises short-term studies which focussed on a period of three to six years 
while the second group took a long-term approach and studies a period of ten to twelve 
years.  
 
Most previous short-period studies have examined the association between risk 
disclosure and various associated factors. Those studies that examined risk management 
disclosures found that both investors and the educational level of the directors had an 
influence on risk disclosure levels, although the directors’ experiences did not 
contribute towards increasing information on risk (Ismail and Rahman, 2011). 
Meanwhile, Taylor et al. (2010) found that corporate governance, capital raising, the 
adoption of IFRS, firm size, and leverage (i.e. debt to equity) are positively associated 
with risk disclosures. In addition to the auditor’s opinion, Taylor et al. (2010) found that 
firms with a qualified audit report (i.e. having the issue of inherent uncertainty of going 
concern) disclosed significantly less financial risk information when compared with 
firms that have a non-qualified audit report. Focusing on the importance of risk 
disclosure, Murugesu and Santhapparaj (2010) found that IPO companies could increase 
the value of their shares by providing greater information on their ability to control their 
risk. Furthermore, Helbok and Wagner (2006) found that firms which had a lower 
equity ratio and/or were less profitable chose a higher level of risk disclosure. Both 
Murugesu and Santhapparaj (2010), and Helbok and Wagner (2006), found that it was 
possible to explain how investors were able to predict the potential returns from 
weighting compensation between adequate information and the risks they estimate. The 
evidence of Deumes (2008) also confirmed that adequate risk information could predict 
the volatility of future stock prices, the sensitivity of future stock prices to market-wide 
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fluctuations, and the likelihood of severe declines in stock price in the 30-month period 
after publication. Meanwhile, Abdelghany (2005) found that the financial managers had 
an influence on the return on a stock measurement when they changed the company’s 
structure, including accounting measures. With regard to the other impacts of risk 
disclosure, Poshakwale and Courtis (2005) found that disclosures related to risk 
management practices were most influential in reducing the cost of equity capital. The 
overall trend to risk reporting in a short-term period shows that disclosure increased in 
both extent and content, although reporting was not mandatory (Helbok and Wagner, 
2006). 
 
There were two long-term studies that examined the effects of risk disclosures: Hill and 
Short (2009), and Pérignon and Smith (2010). Both of these studies found that risk 
disclosure had a general upward trend across time, although both focused on different 
samples and different periods of time. Hill and Short (2009) examined IPO companies 
during 1991 to 2003 while Pérignon and Smith (2010) chose US banks for sampling 
during 1996 to 2005. 
 
The previous longitudinal studies that have been reviewed show that there has been 
little discussion on intrasectoral reporting (e.g. Poshakwale and Courtis, 2005; 
Abdelghany, 2005; Helbok and Wagner, 2006; Deumes, 2008; Hill and Short, 2009; 
Pérignon and Smith, 2010; Murugesu and Santhapparaj, 2010; Taylor et al., 2010; 
Ismail and Rahman, 2011). In addition, little is known about the quality (i.e. the 
qualitative characteristics) of risk disclosures and far too little attention has been paid to 
societal concerns about risks in the banking sector. Therefore, this study aims to address 
the question of information content quality by developing a method that allows the 
evaluation of risk disclosures in UK banks. To describe risk disclosure patterns, this 
study aims to examine disclosure content and its quality in six UK banks over sixteen 
consecutive and contiguous years (i.e. between 1995 and 2010). 
 
 
3.2.2   In-depth sectoral study 
 
With respect to an in-depth sectoral study, most studies in the field of risk reporting 
have focussed on inter-country comparative studies (e.g. Linsley et al., 2006; 
Poshakwale and Courtis, 2005; Helbok and Wagner, 2006; Bischof, 2009; Yong et al., 
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2005). To date no previous study has investigated risk disclosures in the banking sector 
by conducting a comparative study among banks. This indicates a need to understand 
the various effects that exist among disclosures when different banks face the same 
adverse conditions. Far too little attention has been paid to the comparative study of a 
bank’s risk disclosures, although some authors have examined risk reporting in banking 
sectors (e.g. Yong et al., 2005; Linsley et al., 2006; Bischof, 2009; Hughes et al., 2011; 
Oliveira et al., 2011a; Pérignon and Smith, 2010). 
 
It should be noted that the failure of one bank may have a serious impact on all banks 
and markets, which can be seen in the Lehman Brothers failure in 2008, which 
immediately spread to other key banks and triggered a financial crisis (Holland, 2010). 
Consequently, an in-depth sectoral study will be applied in this study to examine the 
different disclosures among banks when they face various categories of banking risks. 
 
 
3.2.3   Focusing on risk categories 
 
Different studies of risk have used different risk categories in their research. For 
example, Akhigbe et al. (2008) examined market risk and idiosyncratic risk (i.e. firm-
specific risk) while Othman and Ameer (2009) grouped interest rate, foreign exchange, 
and hedge instruments into market risk. The review of the previous literature found that 
there were two studies that have focused only on market risk. Firstly, Abdelghany 
(2005) found that companies with a higher ratio of current asset to current liabilities 
tended to have a higher degree of market risk. Secondly, Othman and Ameer (2009) 
found that most Malaysian firms did not engage in hedging any type of market risk over 
the reporting period of 2006 to 2007 and that the disclosure of interest rate was the most 
mentioned category in market risk. Meanwhile, Akhigbe et al. (2008) also examined 
market risk and idiosyncratic risk (i.e. firm-specific risk), and found that board 
independence and monitoring were associated with smaller increases or greater 
decreases in risk after the adoption of SOX. 
 
In their study of operational risk, Poshakwale and Courtis (2005) found that higher 
levels of disclosures were associated with lower costs of equity capital. With the 
adoption of IFRS 7, which became effective in 2007, Bischof (2009) found that 
voluntary disclosure of operational risks increased even though disclosure of 
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operational risk was not explicitly required by IFRS 7. Helbok and Wagner (2006) 
confirmed that disclosure increased in both extent and content, although reporting was 
not mandatory during the survey period. However, they also found that banks tended to 
have a lower level of disclosure when they had a higher equity ratio and profitability. 
 
Lajili and Zéghal (2005) found that the most frequently cited risk categories in 
Canadian annual reports in 1999 were financial risk, commodity, and market risk. 
However, Helbok and Wagner (2006) found that the risk management disclosures 
mainly contained market and credit risk in the bank’s annual reports between 1998 and 
2001. Meanwhile, Bischof (2009) argued that the major part of the risk report in 
European banks during 2006 to 2007 still covered the three areas of risk exposure, 
namely: credit risk, liquidity risk, and market risk. Whereas Oliveira et al. (2011c) 
showed that there was a lack of transparency in minimum disclosure requirements for 
market risk, liquidity risk, and risk management objectives and policies. They found 
that only credit risk disclosures presented optimal levels of mandatory compliance. The 
evidence of Linsley and Shrives (2006), who focused on financial and non-financial 
risks, is consistent with the finding of Oliveira et al. (2011c) in that risk disclosures 
were found to be general statements of risk management policy while there was a lack 
of coherence in the risk narratives. 
 
Some of the previous studies of risk category have tended to focus on single risk 
categories (e.g. market risk, operational risk, and financial risk). In addition, some 
studies have examined a few risk categories, mainly focusing on market risk, credit risk, 
and liquidity risk. This indicates that most of the previous studies have broadly 
examined the main risks. Although Linsley et al. (2006) considered a wide variety of 
risks (they included a total of twelve risk categories),
1
 they focused on the 
characteristics of risk disclosures in annual reports (i.e. qualitative and quantitative 
information, disclosure direction, past and future information) rather than investigating 
the effects of each risk category on risk disclosures in annual reports. So far, however, 
little attention has been paid to the disclosures of all risk categories in the banking 
                                                          
1
  Linsley et al. (2006) classified risk categories based on three publications of Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2001; 2002; 2003), in which the Basel Committee grouped risk into 
twelve categories: 1) Capital structure; 2) Capital adequacy; 3) Market risk internal modelling; 4) 
Internal and external ratings; 5) Credit risk modelling; 6) Securitisation activities; 7) Credit risk; 8) 
Credit derivatives and other credit enhancements; 9) Derivatives; 10) Geographic and business line 
diversification; 11) Accounting and presentation policies; and 12) Other risks. 
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sector. The aim of this study has, therefore, been to try and evaluate both the quantity 
and quality of risk disclosures in all risk categories of bank’s annual reports that have 
been disclosed. 
 
 
3.2.4   Quantity of risk disclosures 
 
Previous risk disclosure studies have frequently found that the volume of risk 
disclosures has increased during the period that they surveyed. For example, Helbok 
and Wagner (2006) found an increased volume of risk disclosures in the US, Asian, and 
European banks during 1998 to 2001; Bischof (2009) found an increased volume of risk 
disclosures in European banks during 2006 to 2007; Hill and Short (2009) found an 
increased volume of risk disclosures in IPO companies in UK during 1991 to 2003; 
Pérignon and Smith (2010) found an increased volume of risk disclosures in US banks 
during 1996 to 2005; and Hughes et al. (2011) found an increased volume of risk 
disclosures in US banks during 2007 to 2008. 
 
Although those authors who have studied risk disclosures in a single year have not been 
able to test an increase in the quantity of risk disclosures, they have found other 
relationships between risk reporting and some influential factors (i.e. company size, and 
implementation of IAS/IFRS) when companies disclose a higher level of disclosures. 
For example, levels of risk disclosure have been found to be positively associated with 
company size (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2005a; Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006; Linsley et al., 2006; Amran et al., 2009). Meanwhile, Oliveira et al. 
(2011b) found that implementation of IAS/IFRS and the European Union’s 
Modernisation Directive in 2005 did not positively affect the quantity and quality of risk 
disclosures in Portugal. However, Taylor et al. (2010), who examined the risk 
disclosures of Australian listed companies in a longitudinal study during 2002 to 2006, 
argued that the adoption of IFRS had a positive influence on risk disclosures. 
 
Little attention has so far been paid to how much banking risk is disclosed when banks 
face various categories of risk exposure in financial crisis, or when there are changes in 
regulations and accounting standards. Consequently, this study aims to propose a 
method for the analysis of risk disclosure by capturing the volume of risk disclosures, 
including the more extensive interrogation of qualitative characteristics and disclosure 
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quality, reflecting longitudinal banking sector risk reporting by total volume by 
company and by year. 
 
 
3.2.5   Focusing on information richness 
 
Recent developments in risk disclosure practices can make clear to financial 
communication practitioners if risk reporting in prospectuses can be viewed as a key 
factor for corporate risk communication. In particular, transparency about risk 
disclosure is an important component in corporate reporting. It enables the bank to 
achieve and maintain an accurate value of business, as well as confident and well-
informed investors (Deumes, 2008). For example, Deumes (2008) found that risk 
information was an important area in best practice for corporate communication because 
risk information is able to predict the volatility of future stock prices, the sensitivity of 
future stock prices to market-wide fluctuations, and the likelihood of severe declines in 
stock price in the 30-month period after publication. Consequently, future information 
in risk disclosures plays a key role in risk communication with regard to the aspect of 
information richness. However, in previous studies of risk disclosure the proportion of 
risk disclosures related to future information in annual report is mixed. For example, 
most studies found that proportions of risk disclosures were more focused on the present 
and the past than on the future (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley et al., 2006; 
Oliveira et al., 2011b) while Hill and Short (2009) found that risk disclosures of IPO 
companies tended to be future oriented information. 
 
Risk disclosure is driven by increased complexities in business, and an objective to 
promote transparency and enhance the quality of disclosure by reducing information 
asymmetries. In addition, risk disclosure has a number of potential benefits for 
shareholders, analysts, investors, and other stakeholders (Lajili and Zéghal, 2005). 
However, Linsley and Shrives (2005b) warned that disclosure itself will not create 
transparency when it lacks useful information. In addition, Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) 
pointed out that although disclosure concerned future information, its expected impact 
was avoided and it appeared biased towards bad news reporting. Meanwhile, Lajili and 
Zéghal (2005) found that Canadian annual reports in 1999 appeared to lack uniformity, 
clarity and quantification. Consistent with these findings, Linsley and Shrives (2005a, 
2006), Yong et al. (2005), and Linsley et al. (2006) all found that companies did not 
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reveal complete information about the risks they faced and that most risk disclosures 
were generalised statements of risk information which contained low disclosure of 
quantified risk. 
 
Based on the quantified information for measuring the level and disclosure quality of 
market risk in US commercial banks, Pérignon and Smith (2010) examined VaR
2
 
disclosure and found that the quality of disclosure did not improve in the survey period 
(i.e. 1996 to 2005). To improve the quality of disclosure, Iatridis (2008), who studied 
accounting disclosure of UK firms in 2004, found that the adoption of IFRS standards 
enhanced the quality and comparability of financial statements. On the other hand, 
Oliveira et al. (2011b), who examined risk disclosures in Portuguese firms, argued that 
the implementation of IAS/IFRS and the European Union’s Modernisation Directive in 
2005 did not positively affect the quantity or quality of risk disclosure. 
 
Although there has been a discussion in the previous literature on the forward 
orientation of risk disclosures, it is not yet clear whether the proportion of forward-
looking information in risk reporting is less than that for past and present information. 
Moreover, little is known about other interrogations of information richness, such as 
disclosure direction, the determinant of factuality and perception, as well as 
measurement of quality of disclosure. Although Pérignon and Smith (2010) attempted 
to measure quality of market risk by investigating VaR disclosure in the banking sector, 
this was partly to evaluate a specific area whereas banks contain complex systems and a 
wide variety of risks. Therefore, this study intends to investigate four interrogations of 
risk disclosures: the time orientation of disclosure (future, present, past information); 
the disclosure of factuality and perception; the disclosure direction (neutral news, bad 
news); and the quality of disclosure by risk categories, by companies and by year. 
 
 
3.2.6   Societal concern 
 
It is not widely known that press media reporting has a significant influence on attitudes 
and perceptions of risk (Vilella-Vila and Costa-Font, 2008). In addition, influence has 
seldom been empirically assessed (Dahlstrom et al., 2011). Some researchers found that 
                                                          
2
 Value-at-Risk (VaR) is a method for quantifying potential losses resulting from movements in market 
rates or prices (Emm et al., 2007). 
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media attention positively influenced a firm’s behaviour (i.e. Koning et al., 2010; 
Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012). In addition, Carvalho and Burgess (2005) found that media 
coverage has a significant impact on risk reporting. Meanwhile, Dyck et al. (2008) 
pointed out that press coverage increases the probability of companies taking action to 
improve corporate governance. In their study on the relationship between risk reporting 
and issues of public concern, Dahlstrom et al. (2011) found that an increase in the levels 
of precise risk information in the media has a positive correlation with the rationale for 
the public’s perceptions of risk. 
 
The review of previous risk disclosure studies in Chapter 2 found that Oliveira et al. 
(2011b) was the only study to have examined the association between risk disclosure 
and public visibility. Oliveira et al. (2011b) analysed the content of the annual reports of 
Portuguese non-finance companies that were published in 2005 and found that public 
visibility has an important influence on corporate risk disclosures. 
 
Concerns have been raised by several relevant studies about societal awareness in risk 
reporting. So far, however, there has been little discussion about the association 
between the volume of risk disclosure in the banking sector and the intensity of societal 
interest. Even though Oliveira et al. (2011b) attempted to examine this relationship with 
regard to public visibility, they measured public visibility by company size and listing 
status, which may not reflect faithfully the public concern about risk. Therefore, one 
aim of this study is to shine a new light on this debate through an examination of the 
association between volumes of longitudinal banking sector risk disclosures against the 
intensity of societal discussion, as proxied by frequency, by year, by relevant newspaper 
citations, and by risk category. 
 
 
3.3  Research Objectives 
 
The main purpose of this research project is to develop an understanding of risk 
disclosures in the banking sector. Given the core principles for effective banking 
supervision, the Basel committee recommended that corporate governance, risk 
management, the importance of disclosure, and transparency in maintaining confidence 
in banks were all essential elements in the safe and sound functioning of banks (BCBS, 
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2011e). Therefore, the importance of corporate governance, risk management, and risk 
disclosures are also key motivations in this study. 
 
Driven by increased complexities in the banking system, and an objective to promote 
transparency and enhance quality of disclosure by reducing information asymmetries, 
risk disclosure plays a key role in the banking sector. Coupled with the methods 
developed in the previous studies and the content analysis approach to the empirical 
research of the data, there are two primary aims to meet, which are set out in the 
following research objectives: 
 
Research Objective 1: To explore disclosure content in annual reports over a 
longitudinal period and to investigate any distinctive practices in the information 
content of risk disclosures on an inter-company basis.  
 
Studies in the field of risk reporting are mainly focussed on the impact of risk exposure 
on financial markets and how banks manage their risks in specific event impacts on 
disclosure patterns. Consequently, this study employs content analysis to examine risk 
disclosures in the annual reports of six UK banks over contiguous sixteen years between 
1995 and 2010. A longitudinal timeframe is used to investigate changes in risk 
disclosures and content in individual samples, which is applied in an intrasectoral 
analysis, leading to the second research objective, which is: 
 
Research Objective 2: To develop a method to evaluate the content of risk disclosures 
in annual reports and to examine the association between risk reporting of UK banks 
against societal concern about risk issues. 
 
Based on the gaps in research that have been reviewed in Section 3.2, the main aim of 
this investigation is to develop a more sophisticated method that can capture disclosures 
in all banking risk categories reflecting aspects of information richness. This aspect has 
four interrogations: the time orientation of disclosure (i.e. future, present, and past 
information); the disclosure of factuality and perception; disclosure direction (i.e. 
neutral news, bad news); and the quality of disclosure. At the same time, this study will 
further examine the association between risk reporting of UK banks and societal 
concern about risk issues. Therefore, this study will provide insight on the qualitative 
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characteristics of risk disclosures, quality of disclosure, and the intensity of societal 
discussion on banking risks. 
 
 
3.4  Research Questions 
 
The mainstream literature on risk disclosure was reviewed in Chapter 2, while the gaps 
in the previous research were identified in Section 3.2 of this chapter. However, without 
a clear body of academic literature concerning the contents and semantic properties of 
corporate risk disclosure, this research has established two main objectives in Section 
3.3 to examine risk disclosures in UK banks. Based upon these, this thesis sets out four 
main research questions, which are: 
 
Research Question 1: How can longitudinal banking sector risk reporting by total 
volume, by company, and by year be described? 
 
Research Question 2: How can longitudinal banking sector risk reporting by risk 
category, by company, and by year be described? 
 
Research Question 3: How can longitudinal banking sector risk reporting by 
information richness (i.e. the time orientation of disclosure, the disclosure of factuality 
and perception, disclosure direction, and quality of disclosure), by company, and by 
year be described? 
 
Research Question 4: How can the association between volumes of longitudinal 
banking sector risk disclosures against the intensity of societal discussion as proxied by 
the frequency, by year, of relevant newspaper citations, and by risk category be 
described?   
 
To answer the research questions above, table 9.1 of Chapter 9 shows how the research 
questions of this study have been answered by summarising the main findings. 
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3.5  Summary 
 
This chapter has provided a theory justification that has described how agency theory is 
employed for the theoretical background of this study of risk disclosures. In addition, 
this chapter has described the key points in previous studies and explained the need of 
this research, which aims to fill a research gap. This study is driven by the desire to 
investigate risk disclosures in the UK banking sector in both longitudinal and in-depth 
sectoral aspects. This chapter has also established the research objectives, as well as 
establishing four research questions. Following the identification of the gaps in the 
previous research and the establishment of the research objectives, this study will use 
content analysis (including the creation of research design). Consequently, Chapter 4 
will describe the research method and Chapter 5 will describe the method development. 
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Chapter 4. Research Method 
 
 
Communication lies at the heart of human interaction. It involves human relationships. 
It begins at the level of two individuals communicating and rises to the level of 
international diplomatic communication. Nations, institutions, organisations, and 
companies require the benefits of communication because it is fundamental and links all 
matters among people in all societies. For a business, the annual report is one of the 
most important communication channels to convey messages to investors. An annual 
report is used to convey a variety of information, such as the financial statement, 
management discussion and analysis, and corporate strategy. This information can help 
the shareholders to understand how their investment is doing. Consequently, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the contents of annual reports. While the 
contents of the annual reports of large companies generally provide the mandatory 
information that is required by law, stock exchange regulations, and official accounting 
standards, most companies also include varying degrees of voluntary information. 
 
So far, however, there has been an assumed problem because the decision makers who 
use the substantive contents in annual reports find that the reports are poorly 
comparable or standardised (especially the voluntary sections). Consequently, several 
techniques which aim to improve the interpretation of the contents of annual reports 
have been developed. For the purposes of this study, content analysis is considered to be 
the most appropriate method to assess how risk contents are disclosed in annual reports. 
This chapter aims to give in detail the reasoning behind this choice. 
 
This chapter will first give a brief overview of content analysis, including a description 
of conceptual developments in the first section, definitions in the second section, and its 
advantages in the third section. The fourth section will outline the issues related to 
content analysis design. The fifth section will review the issues involving the 
measurement and level of measurement under analytical construct topic. The choice of 
measurement of reliability and validity is discussed in the sixth section. The seventh 
section will outline the limitations of content analysis. 
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4.1  Content Analysis: An Introduction 
 
The conceptual and methodological development of content analysis has been an 
important research method for some considerable time and it has been used in a large 
number of disciplines. The term ‘content analysis’ was first used in the study of 
religious texts in the early seventeenth century (Carney, 1972). However, Berelson 
(1952, p.22) pointed out that a body of interrelated analytical method which was used 
under the name ‘content analysis’ was first used in the early 1930s by a school of 
journalism at Columbia University to study the content of American newspapers in the 
period when they were growing in importance. In addition, Berelson (1952) reported 
that ‘content analysis’ has also been used in the study of literature when it was used to 
analyse a variety of stylistic features in English poetry and prose. He further added that 
in the late 1930s the use of content analysis increased rapidly, including advances in the 
field of politics where it was used for the realisation of political values such as violence, 
bribery, negotiation, and symbol manipulation. The other major use of content analysis 
is in the study of communication where it is used in the study of public opinion. As a 
result of the rapid development of communication, content analysis was employed by 
several American government departments who used it in relation to mass 
communication to study the contents of newspapers, magazines, radio programs and 
even comic strips during World War II (Berelson, 1952).  
 
Krippendorff (2004) reported that a wide variety of occupations have adopted content 
analysis. For example, psychologists have used content analysis to study a number of 
phenomena through verbal records, open-ended interview questions, data of verbal 
exchange, and measure of meaning form. Meanwhile, anthropologists have used this 
technique to study myths, folktales and riddles. Historians have employed content 
analysis to study historical documents and educational materials (Krippendorff, 2004). 
The history of content analysis shows that this analytical method has been used broadly 
in a number of different disciplines.  
 
 
4.2  Defining Content Analysis 
 
A large number of different concepts of content analysis are used in the study of the 
social sciences and humanities, often the choice of which specific method to use 
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depends on the theoretical background of the studies. Rosengren (1981) suggested that 
the different emphases on content analysis have led to the development of the different 
elements of the communication model. This indicates a need to understand the various 
definitions of content analysis (which are set out below) in order to inform the method 
preference that is used in this study. This sections aims to discuss the generally accepted 
definitions and approaches that are available across the literature.  
 
The most commonly cited definition of content analysis is that offered by Berelson 
(1952, p.18), who described content analysis as a research technique for the objective, 
systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication. 
Meanwhile, Holsti (1969, p14) defined content analysis as any technique that is used to 
make inferences by objectively and systematically identifying the specified 
characteristics of messages. Similarly, Weber (1990, p.9) defined content analysis as a 
research method that uses a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text. 
Rosengren (1981, p.34) added that the premise that content analysis relates to 
quantitative method defines this technique as consisting of division of the text into units 
of meaning and quantification of these units according to certain rules. The concept of 
content analysis as a quantitative method is also shared by Neuendorf (2002, p.10), who 
defined content analysis as: 
A summarizing, quantitative analysis of message that relies on the 
scientific method (including attention to objectivity-intersubjectivity, a 
priori design, reliability, validity, generalizability, replicability, and 
hypothesis testing) and is not limited as to the types of variable that may 
be measured or the context in which the messages are created or 
presented.  
 
Krippendorff (2004, p18) also argued that content analysis is a systematic technique. He 
defined content analysis as a research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences from text (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use. 
Some differences have arisen as a result of the various definitions of content analysis. 
One of the most comprehensive definitions of content analysis was suggested by Riffe 
et al. (2005, p.25), who stated that: 
Quantitative content analysis is the systematic and replicable 
examination of symbols of communication, which have been assigned 
numeric values according to valid measurement rules and the analysis of 
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relationships involving those values using statistical methods, to describe 
the communication, draw inferences about its meaning, or infer from the 
communication to its context, both of production and consumption.   
 
The definitions of content analysis have tended to change over time with the 
development of the technique, based on a multi-purpose research study. However, in 
order to be explicit about exactly what is meant by the term of content analysis, this 
study adopts the definition that content analysis is a scientific tool for investigating the 
symbols of communication by making inferences objectively based on systematic and 
replicable processes.   
 
 
4.3  The Advantages of Content Analysis 
 
By definition, content analysis is one of the more practical methods that are used in the 
social sciences. It may even be one of the most important research techniques in the 
social sciences (Krippendorff, 2004, p.xiii). Several studies have agreed that content 
analysis is a research method that is widely applied because it can answer a wide range 
of questions that are important to many disciplines and it is a set of procedures that can 
help the researcher to make an inference from the text (Berelson, 1952; Carney, 1972; 
Kassarjian, 1977; Weber, 1990; Krippendorff, 2004; Riffe et al., 2005). There are six 
main strengths of content analysis as a technique, which are described below. 
 
Firstly, data accessibility is a notable characteristic of content analysis when it is used to 
obtain data through experimentation in the laboratory, questionnaires, interviews, or in 
artefacts used as documentary evidence (Holsti, 1969; Krippendorff, 2004). Content 
analysis can be used by a researcher to overcome a number of difficulties that are 
experienced by other research methods (e.g. questionnaires, interviews, and 
observation), such as problems of accessing sources of data, the distance of study, and 
respondents who are no longer alive (Holsti, 1969). This distinction confirms that 
content analysis is a useful technique for use in studies that have multiple purposes.  
 
Secondly, many studies have found that content analysis can be an unobtrusive 
technique (Holsti, 1969; Weber, 1990; Kassarjian, 1977; Krippendorff, 2004; Riffe et 
al., 2005). The other techniques (e.g. questionnaires, interviews, and observation) 
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require an interaction between researchers and the respondents, which may lead to the 
respondent’s unwillingness or lack of reaction when they feel that the process of 
measurement is interfering with them. In comparison with these other techniques, 
content analysis is a significantly more powerful tool. 
 
Thirdly, content analysis is necessary when analysts must use the data’s own language 
for sensitive or skilled interpretation, for example psychiatric analysis of interviews and 
tests (Holsti, 1969; Krippendorff, 2004; Riffe et al., 2005). However, Weber (1990) 
argued that the problem of interpretation delivered from a translating procedure is that it 
may convey an incorrect meaning. Hence, analysts should be concerned with the 
appropriate procedure of translation before texts are analysed. Perhaps, therefore, 
content analysis may not be a sole technique when researchers face complex 
circumstances. 
 
Fourthly, content analysis may be used as a combination of several techniques (Holsti, 
1969; Carney, 1972; Weber, 1990). Holsti (1969) proposed that content analysis is 
useful to enhance validity in terms of supplementary source of data when analysts need 
to compare the results of interviews or questionnaires. Likewise, Riffe et al. (2005) 
suggested that the combination of method is helpful to increase the reliability of data 
when analysts need to indicate quantitatively the relationships among cultures, society, 
and political changes. Therefore, as an integrating method consisting of both qualitative 
and quantitative approaches, content analysis can be a flexible technique used to 
supplement several research studies. 
 
Fifthly, it is possible to use content analysis where there is a large volume of material 
that may exceed the practical capabilities of other techniques (Holsti, 1969; 
Krippendorff, 2004; Riffe et al., 2005). In the study of mass media and many other 
forms of communication, it is often not worthwhile or practical to investigate all of the 
relevant data; consequently, sampling units in content analysis is a solution that has 
been used by many analysts (Holsti, 1969). Because of the ability of content analysis to 
execute large volumes of text, this technique can be operated repeatedly by many coders 
or even by computer applications, under the condition of having clear coding scheme 
(Krippendorff, 2004). 
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Finally, content analysis is useful for longitudinal studies because the contents often 
have a life beyond the communicators, their audiences, or the events presented in the 
communication contents (Holsti, 1969; Weber, 1990; Riffe et al., 2005).  
 
As mentioned in this literature review, many of the distinctions in content analysis are 
attractive features that analysts employ widely in many disciplines and fields. 
Therefore, content analysis is applied in this study by determining which narratives of 
disclosure are evaluated as a risk disclosure. In the subsequent process, a content 
analysis instrument will be used according to the research design. 
 
 
4.4  Designing a Content Analysis Instrument 
 
The application of any research usually relies on a systematic process that consists of 
three components, these are: firstly, conceptualisation; secondly, planning, or research 
design; and thirdly, data collection and analysis (Holsti, 1969; Weber, 1990; 
Krippendorff, 2004; Riffe et al., 2005). In addition, the overall structure in this study is 
based on general prior research practice in content analysis. The first step begins with 
the conceptual definition, which plays an important role as a basic background on the 
rules and terminology of the research method. A conceptual definition of content 
analysis is established by reviewing the relevant literature and theories to create a 
framework for proceeding with an analysis (Holsti, 1969; Riffe et al., 2005). This step is 
described in detail in Section 4.2. The second step is research design. There are several 
different patterns of content analysis depending on the research questions being asked 
(Holsti, 1969). The relevant issues involving research questions have received 
considerable attention because they rely on several specialised procedures for handling 
texts. Therefore, this section will review the literature before proceeding to the next 
step. The third step is provided in the next section, which focuses on the measurement 
and levels of measurement under the analytical construct topic.  
 
 
4.4.1   Categorising data in content analysis 
 
The conceptual definition of categories is of central importance in content analysis 
based research design. According to Holsti (1969, p.95): 
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A central problem in any research design is selection and definition of 
categories, the “pigeonholes” into which content units are to be 
classified. 
 
In general, content analysis is based on categories; therefore, clear articulate categories 
are necessary for researchers who wish to examine and navigate sets of related contents. 
In contrast, content analysis cannot be effective when the system of categories is poorly 
formulated (Berelson, 1952). It is recommended that clear categories should be 
generated from a reliable classification procedure. Riffe et al. (2005, p.87) defined a 
classification system as a collection of category definitions that assign values to 
recording units. Likewise, Krippendorff (2004, p.87) described the classification of a 
category as categorial distinctions whose units are defined by their membership in a 
class or category (i.e. by their having something in common). 
 
Categorising data is required for content analysis (Weingast, 1950). In other words, as 
Titscher et al. (2000, p.58) argued, “the core and central tool of any content analysis is 
its system of categories”. One of the most significant issues in the use of content 
analysis categories is the choice of what should be included in the categories. A number 
of methods have been developed and introduced to categorise data in content analysis.  
 
There are two typical approaches to categorise text in content analysis: form-oriented 
analysis and meaning-oriented analysis (Smith and Taffler, 2000; Sydserff and 
Weetman, 2002). Form-oriented analysis is an objective approach that sets keyword 
variables to generate the category, whereas meaning-oriented analysis is a subjective 
approach that relies on themes in the texts under investigation. To compare between 
words and themes, Weber (1990, p.36) argued that it is difficult to use words for 
classifying a category because this leads to ambiguity in word meaning, even though the 
categories are defined precisely. This happens because any word may have more than 
one meaning and as such a word alone is inadequate to indicate a category. 
Consequently, a theme is far more reliable than a word in this point because a theme 
contains the richness of description to identify the clear meaning of a category. 
However, Krippendorff (2004, p.109) argued that the use of a theme can easily be led in 
a different direction of categorisation, especially when there are a number of different 
interpretations given by different coders (even if they are well trained). A theme often 
has interrelationships between and among contents, which are given categories. This 
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means that it is not always easy to categorise texts clearly by theme. Although each 
approach has its own weaknesses, some researchers (Smith and Taffler, 2000; Sydserff 
and Weetman, 2002) have combined both approaches (i.e. form-oriented analysis and 
meaning-oriented analysis) to investigate texts. These approaches tend to enhance the 
clarity of categorising texts. 
 
A number of studies have used different conceptual approaches, depending on their 
background, including Deese (1969; as cited in Riffe et al., 2005, p.88) who suggested 
that there are six approaches of conceptualising in content analysis categories, which are 
outlined in Table 4.1. 
 
 Table 4.1  Approaches of conceptualising in content analysis categories 
Type Description 
1.  Grouping The content is placed into groups when the recording units 
share common attributes. The more shared attributes that a 
group has, the easier it is to classify the units and the smaller 
the amount of measurement error. The examples involved in 
this study are credit risk, market risk, and liquidity risk. 
2.  Class Structure Class structure is similar to grouping but the groups have a 
hierarchical relation, with some classes (or groups) being 
higher than others. A categorical structure can be represented 
as a hierarchically ordered branching tree in which each node 
represents some set of attributes or markers which 
characterise all concepts below that node. 
3.  Scaling Some content units can be classified on the basis of a 
numerical scale. Deese (1969) gave five abstract properties 
that typically involve scaling: (a) intensity, (b) numerosity, 
(c) probability, (d) position or length, and (e) time. 
4.  Spatial Representation  The meaning of words and language can be placed in a 
mental spatial model that allows a researcher to evaluate 
objects, issues, and people along continua or dimensions as 
representing a cognitive space or map (such as 7-point scales) 
as good-bad, effective-ineffective. 
5.  Abstract Relations Unlike, scaling and spatial representation, this approach 
categorises recording units by relations that exist among 
elements within the expressed contents rather than the 
common characteristics (such as aggression) which is defined 
not by the behaviours of the aggressor (such as hitting) but by 
the impact on the victims. 
6.  Binary Attribute 
Structure 
Characteristics attributed to a person or thing often have an 
opposite (such as good is the opposite of bad, and bright is 
the opposite of dark). 
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Different researchers have categorised data in a variety of ways. For example, Hsieh 
and Shannon (2005) proposed three distinct approaches to interpret the meaning of text 
data in coding categories, which are: the conventional approach, the directed approach, 
and the summative approach. The first is the conventional approach, in which coding 
categories are derived directly from the text data during analysis with clearly understood 
phenomena. The second is the directed approach, in which the researcher develops the 
initial coding scheme, which relies on existing theory or prior research, before analysing 
the data. The third is the summative approach, which is fundamentally different from 
the prior two approaches because it focuses on single words or related contents rather 
than analysing the data as a whole. The coding category for this last approach is 
constructed by interpretation of the context associated with the use of word or phrase in 
data. In addition, the meaning of the word is explored by word usage or summarising 
the range of possible meanings that are in common usage.  
 
Other classifications include the concept that generating a category derives from 
inductive and deductive reasoning. Elo and Kyngäs (2008) argued that the category is 
derived from the data in an inductive way because there is insufficient former 
knowledge about the phenomenon or the relevant knowledge is fragmented. In contrast, 
the deductive approach is used when the structure of the analysis is operated on the 
basis of previous knowledge, theories, or models for categorisation. Although both 
approaches have their own strengths, both also have the weaknesses. Insch et al. (1997) 
criticised the deductive approach because it generates a category by imposing only the 
value of researchers, while the inductive approach is difficult to apply to the defined 
category because each set of texts has its own meaning. In fact, each approach has its 
own strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, Elo and Kyngäs (2008) proposed that it is 
appropriate to combine both the inductive and deductive approaches to generating a 
category, depending on the aim of the study and on the circumstances.  
 
It has been suggested that the best approach should be chosen because it is most 
meaningful for a particular problem. Therefore, there should be a single set of 
categories for each and every unit that is coded (Berelson, 1952). However Neuendorf 
(2002) argued that it is possible to have multiple sets of categories when they are broken 
down into different measures. Weber (1990) also suggested that classifying a word or 
other recording units into a category depends on whether its category can answer the 
existing research question. A more appropriate method is for the relevant categories to 
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be produced to fit the problem. Therefore, a combination of approaches can be 
appropriately adapted for multiple problems and contents. This mixed method has been 
applied in a number of previous studies, and it is used in this present study (further 
details are provided in Chapter 5). 
 
 
4.4.2   Unitising text in content analysis 
 
The annual report is considered to be an informative source that can be used to study a 
company’s reporting intent. Generally, the annual report can be divided into two parts, 
which are: financial statements and narrative sections. The financial statement will be 
audited by the auditors while the narrative sections (e.g. risk reporting, chairman’s 
statement) are less controlled and may convey information which gives a better 
impression of the general situation of the company (Balata and Breton, 2005). When 
investigating the narrative sections, content analysis helps researchers to reduce the 
amount of qualitative data into a manageable number of relevant aspects by using 
unitising (Berelson, 1952; Weber, 1990; Krippendorff, 2004). Unitising is a process 
which breaks down any form of communication into specific computable forms 
(Carney, 1972, p.39). The form of designating units is an important process for almost 
all content analysis studies (Holsti, 1969) to determine the extent of a controversial 
issue (Berelson, 1952). Although the term unitising is commonly used to refer to the 
process of breaking down a whole text into smaller units, unitising may have a different 
scope of use depending on the aims of the researchers. For example, Neuendorf (2002, 
p.71) defined a unit as an identifiable message or message component which:  
a) Serves as the basis for identifying the population and drawing a sample; 
b) Measures a variable; or,  
c) Which serves as the basis for reporting analyses.  
In another definition, Krippendorff (2004, p.102) said that the importance given to these 
units derives largely from the early definitional requirement of content analysis that it 
be quantitative, which simply means that textual units have to end up being categorised 
or measured in numerical terms. 
 
The concept of unitising has received considerable critical attention in the previous 
literature. The first step in the process of measurement is for the analyst to define the 
elements of content so that they can study textual units which are drawn from the entire 
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content of interest. Generally, unitising has a number of elements involving different 
forms of study. For example, Riffe et al. (2005, p.69) classified “study units” into four 
elements:  
1) Sampling units; 
2) Recording units; 
3) Context units; and, 
4) Analysis units. 
However, Neuendorf (2002) classified his units into three elements:  
1) Units of sampling; 
2) Units of data collection; and,  
3) Units of analysis.  
Meanwhile, Krippendorff (2004) categorised units into:  
1) Sampling units; 
2) Recording/coding units; and,  
3) Context units.  
Holsti (1969) described recording units and context units under the heading of units of 
analysis.  
 
In conclusion, the most common elements usually refer to three types of units, which 
are:  
1) Sampling units; 
2) Recording/coding units; and,  
3) Context units.  
In terms of analysis, units can be separated into analytical processes (see Krippendorff, 
2004). Hence, unitising involves four elements, namely: sampling units, context units, 
recording units (further details are given in Section 4.4.3), and units of analysis (as 
described in Section 4.5 in terms of using units for measurement in analytical 
construct). 
 
 
a) Sampling units 
 
In most cases, an entire population is too large for researchers to examine all of its 
members. Consequently, a sampling unit is carefully chosen from the entire content of 
interest (Riffe et al., 2005). To clarify the terms ‘population’ and ‘sampling unit’, 
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Neuendorf (2002, p.74) defined population as the set of units being or the set of units to 
which the researcher wishes to generalise. Krippendorff (2004, p.98) defined sampling 
units as units that are distinguished for selective inclusion in an analysis. The clear 
rationale for sampling units is that analysis is impractical when the researchers face very 
large content units (thousand or even million of units) under the limitations of time and 
budget (Riffe et al., 2005). In contrast, there is no necessity to generate sampling units 
in the case of a small population (Neuendorf, 2002). While content units in a small 
population may all be selected for analysing contents, it is necessary to use sample 
selection in a population containing a large number of content units. However, sampling 
units has a problem of sampling bias, in which there is a systematic error due to the use 
of a non-random sample of a population. This causes some parts of the population to be 
less likely to be included than others. Therefore, a sampling plan plays an important role 
in minimising the risk of such a bias arising (Krippendorff, 2004). Moreover, 
Krippendorff (2004) also pointed out that a sampling unit is not truly independent 
because it is natural for people who create content to make a link between time and 
several issues, which are then placed into units.  
 
Upon consideration, the use of sampling units faces a number of problems. To reduce 
these problems of sampling units, many researchers of risk disclosure will use the 
annual report as the only texts of a particular population of texts (e.g. Lajili and Zéghal, 
2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2005a; Linsley and Lawrence, 2007; Amran et al., 2009). 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is inappropriate to investigate the significant 
relationships between risks and disclosure in annual reports by using sampling units 
because they have a number of interconnected streams of content. Therefore, this study 
follows the advice of previous research and uses the annual reports of six companies as 
the defined population. The entire contents of the annual reports will be examined for 
evidence of risk disclosures in order to answer all of the relevant research questions in 
this thesis. 
 
 
b) Context units 
 
The defined population contained within the whole narrative might be classified as a 
context unit (Krippendorff, 2004, p.101). Krippendorff (2004) also defined context units 
as units of textual matter that set limits on the information to be considered in the 
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description of recording units. Meanwhile, Holsti (1969, p.118) considered context units 
to be the largest body of content that may be searched to characterise a recording unit. 
To impose the range of context units; therefore, it has been suggested that the context 
unit can be the same as (or larger than) the recording unit but it cannot be smaller (Riffe 
et al., 2005, p.73).  
 
Generally, the larger context is more meaningful than the smaller context for analysts to 
identify the direction of information, because the existing recording units are adequate 
for making inferences (Krippendorff, 2004; Riffe et al., 2005). Even if context units 
may contain several recording units, preceding recording unit (e.g. headlines, footnotes, 
indices) play a key role in identifying context units accurately because context units 
may not be independent of each other (Krippendorff, 2004).  In addition, Holsti (1969) 
suggested that context units should be selected efficiently in order to meet the 
requirements of the research problem because the selection of units may affect the 
results of the analysis. Therefore, this study supports the idea of the paragraph as a 
context unit for the inference of accurate meaning of the themes on risk disclosures. The 
sentence is the recording unit chosen; capable of placing a recording unit into a given 
category (further details of this will be given in Chapter 5). 
 
 
4.4.3   Issues in recording units 
 
Unitising text has heightened the need to study the choice of recording units in a variety 
of ways. Unitising is defined as a process whereby smaller units can be constructed 
from larger information (such as paragraphs, articles, and publications) by combining 
smaller (or even smallest) units which are characterised by a given informative category 
(Riffe et al., 2005). Recording units, or coding units,
1
 are distinguished for separate 
description, transcription, recording, or coding, as defined by Krippendorff (2004, p.99). 
Similarly, Riffe et al. (2005, p.72) defined recording units as the elements of content 
that will be classified in the coding process. In another definition, Holsti (1969, p.116) 
suggested linking units to categorisation, he defined a recording unit as the specific 
segment of content that is characterised by placing it in a given category.   
 
                                                          
1
  Budd, Thorp, and Donohew (1967) called recording units “coding units” (cited by Riffe et al., 2005). 
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The choice of recording units is an important component in research design and it plays 
a key role in obtaining reliable information because different units may illustrate 
strikingly different results (Holsti, 1969). Many researchers suggested that recording 
units should not be too large because this leads to potential ambiguity when analysts 
must consider such large units that contain long and complex issues (Guetzkow, 1950; 
Insch et al., 1997; Krippendorff, 2004). Weber (1990, p.22) agreed that long or complex 
units should be broken down into shorter thematic units or segments. Therefore, 
defining recording units involves selecting types of recording units, categorising 
information, and combining units logically. However, a number of different types of 
recording units have been used, with each having its own advantages and disadvantages. 
Different authors have classified the different types of recording units. For example, 
Weber (1990), who is often cited in the literature on content analysis, proposed that 
there are six types of recording units that are commonly used: word, word sense, 
sentence, theme, paragraph and whole text. Meanwhile, some analysts (e.g. Berelson, 
1952; Neuendorf, 2002) suggested the use of five types of recording units, which are: 
words, themes, characters, items, and time measures. The next section will review the 
research conducted on the three major and most-used types of recording units, which 
are: words, sentences, and themes. 
 
 
a) Words 
 
The word is the smallest unit that is usually applied in content analysis. This unit 
includes symbol and word compounds (such as phrases) as well as single words 
(Berelson, 1952, p.136). The word is widely used in studies on readability because it is 
more precise (Holsti, 1969) and is the most straightforward in terms of capturing 
meaning (Campbell and Rahman, 2010). Additionally, the word is the most powerful 
unit in terms of counting its frequency in the whole narrative using computer-aided text 
analysis (Neuendorf, 2002). In contrast, this analysis becomes difficult if the context 
contains a very large number of words and must be counted frequently by humans 
(Carney, 1972). A further possibility was put forward by Carney (1972, pp.84-85), who 
also suggested three conditions for the disadvantages of the use of the word: firstly, a 
word may convey a number of meanings simultaneously (such as the different sense of 
meaning in ‘democracy’, ‘bureaucracy’, and ‘capitalism’); secondly, the meaning of a 
word can be shifted by place and time period; and thirdly, words become meaningless 
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when there is no ‘ideal reality, no ‘basic essence’, and no ‘inner picture’. Hence, it is not 
be possible to use words independently to make inferences without also including the 
defined context (Holsti, 1969) because individual words may appear in more than one 
category or may be a part of one or more subdivisions of overlapping discourse (Holsti, 
1969; Campbell and Rahman, 2010). Therefore, the choice of recording units can be 
partly resolved by using sentences (Hackston and Milne, 1996; Milne and Adler, 1999). 
 
 
b) Sentences 
 
The sentence is often used when the analyst is interested in words or phrases that co-
occur closely in sentences to enumerate such words clearly in terms of evaluating an 
idea from words (such as negative, positive, or neutral assertions) (Weber, 1990). This 
type of recording unit has been widely used in accounting research (D’Aveni and 
MacMillan, 1990; Tilt, 2001; Deegan et al., 2002). Moreover, analysts who need to 
infer meaning also prefer to use sentences in recording units (Gray et al., 1995) because 
this type of unit provides complete, reliable and meaningful data for further analysis 
(Milne and Adler, 1999). Based on research dealing with meaning for coding, a single 
sentence may exist in more than one category of content (Holsti, 1969; Weber, 1990; 
Beattie and Thomson, 2007; Steenkamp and Northcott, 2007). This leads to the 
criticism of the use of sentences as a recording unit that was made by Unerman (2000), 
who argued that using a single sentence alone may fail to convey the ‘real’ meaning. 
Additionally, the purpose of using a sentence is influenced by grammatical units and 
stylistic choice, which can affect the number of words contained in each sentence 
(Unerman, 2000). Therefore, this may affect the results of the analysis under 
consideration because of the amount of information that is being used.  
 
 
c) Themes 
 
Holsti (1969) suggested that themes may be the most useful method for content analysis 
because they are popularly used in the study of values, attitudes, and beliefs. However, 
Riffe et al. (2005) argued that units based on values, attitudes, and beliefs can lead to 
problems of reliability and validity among coders because the connotation of words in 
communication may involve more than the manifest contents. Regardless of value, 
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attitude or beliefs, another benefit of the use of theme is that it covers a wide range of 
codings, which may start from only one sentence of a summary and expand to a whole 
narrative (Berelson, 1952). The problem here is that it can be difficult to identify the 
boundaries of a theme clearly when compared with words (Holsti, 1969; Carney, 1972). 
However, Campbell and Rahman (2010) argued that this provides an advantage because 
there are no constraints of having to interconnect meaning by word, sentence, or 
paragraph among categories when categorising units by a whole narrative. 
It is apparent from this study that each type of recording unit has its own benefits and 
disadvantages. The technique of combining recording units is an important 
consideration in choosing which method to use for further analysis; therefore, this study 
employs this approach. In this study, sentences were employed for recording units 
because they are capable of referring meaning clearly. The problem of ambiguous 
meaning across categories was resolved by using themes for categorising, which was 
completed before the themes were broken down into sentences. Additionally, words 
played a key role in terms of keywords that can support capturing meaning precisely for 
categorisation. Hence, the appropriate techniques that have been employed to collect 
data prior to analysis will affect the process of analytical construct, which will be 
reviewed in the next section.  
 
 
4.5  Analytical Construct 
 
Data analysis techniques about the context are formalised in the process of analysis in 
order to examine the relationships between the texts and the target of intended 
inferences that the analyst wants to understand. Although there are many analytical 
techniques, researchers should give careful thought to the context of a study’s goals 
before any data are collected. Careful thought at this stage enables the researcher to 
identify the theoretical concepts that are involved, including issues of measurement. 
Measurement is developed to link the selected concepts and collected data by 
transforming data into numbers that can be analysed statistically. The theoretical 
concepts and data collection relate to designing a content analysis study (which has 
been reviewed previously in Section 4.4). The next section will assess the forms of 
measurement and the level of measurement. 
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4.5.1   Forms of measurement 
 
There are many forms of measurement which are able to make sense of the results of 
quantitative research. The results involve variations, which link to the conceptualisation 
and analysis step. Recording units are considered to be quantification in the system of 
analysis (Holsti, 1969) and counting them is one of the simplest summarising 
measurements in quantitative content analysis (Riffe et al., 2005).  
 
The frequency count can be used to establish two main approaches of frequency, which 
are related to qualitative and quantitative content analysis. The first approach has been 
described by Holsti (1969, p.119) as a simple dichotomous decision in which the coders 
focus on the appearance or nonappearance of attributes in messages without counting. 
He added that coding may vary considerably in the precision of assertion (e.g. 
favourable or unfavourable). This is often called a non-frequency approach. Holsti 
(1969) added that some researchers define this approach as qualitative content analysis. 
There are some advantages that arise from the qualitative method. Krippendorff (2004, 
pp.87-8) proposed five positive benefits of using qualitative analysis, which are:  
1) Answering research question straightforwardly by using known literature to  
contextualise reading of given texts and rearticulating the meanings of those 
texts in view of the assumed contexts;  
2) Reducing the sequence of analytical steps by focusing only on a defined unit in a 
whole body of texts;  
3) Supporting multiple interpretations by considering alternative perspectives from 
different ideological positions;  
4) Constructing parallelisms by engaging in triangulations and by elaborating on 
any metaphors, these research results tend to be compelling for readers who are 
interested in the contexts of the analysed texts; and,  
5) The results have more reliability and validity than many alternative criteria in 
terms of inter-subjective verification.  
However, a number of critics have pointed out that this approach can tend to focus on 
trivial issues (e.g. appearance or non-appearance) when the researchers capture the 
superficial issues in the research, which leads to misdirection of the justification of 
content analysis design (Hackston and Milne, 1996; Riffe et al., 2005). Moreover, 
ignorance of the weighted level of occurrence of contents may skew the results; such as, 
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whether a symbol that has occurred once or a hundred times receives the same score 
(Hackston and Milne, 1996; Beattie and Thomson, 2007). 
 
The second main approach is frequency, which is the most widely used approach for 
measuring features of content by counting all occurrences of a given attribute (Holsti, 
1969). In the other words, frequency combines the first approach and it also counts the 
number of appearances in the context. The forms of counting involved in a classification 
of the three different kinds of content analysis
2
 can be explained by the three different 
purposes of counting, which are:  
1) Counting the number of times that something is said, which is likely to have the 
effect of producing attitudes toward the context unit in a given audience;  
2) Counting the number of times that the context unit is referred to; and,  
3) Counting the number of times that the word appears.  
It is apparent from this that quantitative analysis involves the process of counting; 
consequently, some investigators have described this approach as quantitative content 
analysis (Holsti, 1969; Riffe et al., 2005).  
 
The advantage of frequency is that it is useful when analysts want to investigate a linear 
relationship between frequency, and it places importance upon content attributes 
(Holsti, 1969).  Moreover, the distinction of this approach is not only the use of this 
relationship but also the correlation analysis among attributes that can be performed 
(Krippendorff, 2004). The important content usually exists over a long period, which 
means that analysts can trace the contents back to the investigation. Consequently, the 
advantage of frequency is that it can be used with a longitudinal study because it is 
based on quantitative information which outlives communicators (Riffe et al., 2005). 
However, the disadvantages of using units of analysis are that using large recording 
units (e.g. the whole article rather than a single sentence) tends to place undue emphasis 
on the unusual characteristics and that it is inclined to obtain neutral results which are 
meaningless for consideration because the result of counting is too small to analyse 
(such as two or three times) (Carney, 1972). Moreover, the use of frequency, and 
analysing values and attitudes can be insufficient to answer research questions because 
                                                          
2
  Janis (1965) who is cited by Krippendorff (2004, p.44) and Rosengren (1981, p.56) wrote the three 
kinds of content analysis, which are: 1) Pragmatical content analysis-procedures, which classify signs 
according to their probable causes or effects; 2) Semantical content analysis-procedures, which classify 
signs according to their meanings; and, 3) Sign-vehicle analysis-procedures, which classify content 
according to the psychophysical properties of the signs. 
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this approach lacks the ability to take intensity into account (Holsti, 1969; Bos and 
Tarnai, 1999). Therefore, it is important to comprehensively assign the content elements 
to specific attitude categories. 
 
Since this approach is a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, the 
significant advantages of frequency outweigh many of the weaknesses involved. All 
readings of the texts use a qualitative method at the beginning of the content analysis 
process. Later, certain characteristics of a text are converted into numbers using 
quantitative methods. Therefore, qualitative and quantitative methods are interrelated 
and the qualitative method could adopt quantitative method to improve accuracy and 
reliability (Kracauer, 1952). Consequently, this study partly employs the frequency 
approach to measure the attributes of a given category in the annual reports.  
 
 
4.5.2   Levels of measurement 
 
Before developing a carefully constructed measurement procedure, researchers should 
first consider the level of measurement because the measurement assumes that each 
variable on each topic has a true value that a group of people want to discover 
(Neuendorf, 2002). Therefore, to concede a goal of measure, choices of appropriate 
level of measurement play an important role to illustrate the analysis. 
 
Several studies have argued that there are four levels of measurement, which are: 
nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Neuendorf, 2002; 
Krippendorff, 2004; Riffe et al., 2005). The nominal measure is the least complicated or 
the most basic kind of measurement (Krippendorff, 2004; Riffe et al., 2005). There is no 
order of categories and no metric system because this measure is assigned to 
categorising by its attributes (such as gender, colour, marital status, and religion). 
Consequently, the first approach, appearance or nonappearance (which is mentioned in 
Section 4.5.1) can be called nominal measure. Krippendorff (2004, p.161) suggests that 
recording units in nominal categories are also called ‘qualitative’. 
 
Riffe et al. (2005, p.85) proposed that there are two forms of other concepts related to 
nominal measures. The first form is similar to appearance or nonappearance (see 
Section 4.5.1), although they give the example of ‘includes’ or ‘excludes’. For example, 
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each risk category will get “1” if it appears in risk disclosures and it will get “0” (zero) 
if it does not appear in risk disclosures. Consequently, if credit risk and market risk 
appear in risk disclosures and do not appear in liquidity risk, then there are two 
variables in risk disclosures, which means that both credit risk and market risk get “1”. 
The second form is the collection of all designated memberships of subcategories. From 
the previous example, there are three fundamental variables in risk disclosures, which 
are: credit risk, market risk and liquidity risk. In further consideration it might be useful 
to use nominal measures for multivariable approaches because this approach yields the 
same article (i.e. credit risk) to be categorised into more than one subcategory in the 
different main categories (i.e. credit risk disclosure in UK, US, or Germany) (Riffe et 
al., 2005). For example, if the credit risk disclosure of individual companies deals with 
more than one subcategory when such disclosures appear in more than one country, 
then the multivariable system might be used. 
 
The second measure is ordinal measures or ordinal scales, which is the most widely 
used in social science because it is a compilation of the fact that the relationship 
between people and objects can be learnt from language, spoken, and written through 
recording in words (Krippendorff, 2004). Its characteristic is that content units classify 
sets with certain kinds of order structures on them, such as time (past, present, and 
future), and news (good, bad, neutral). Using 3, 5, or 7 point scales relate closely to 
language usage (Krippendorff, 2004): 3-point scales are used to identify paradoxical 
contents (good to bad, with neutral as its midpoint); 5-point scales have added simple 
adjectives (more and less); and, 7-point scales have added superlatives (most and least). 
However, Neuendorf (2002) emphasised that using numbers is for ordering purposes 
only and should not predominate equal interval measures when measured in a wide 
range of numbers (i.e. age, length, and weight). For example, two characters of 60 and 
65 years of age may be grouped into the same ordinal scale as “5, elderly of  5-point 
scales” when using an ordinal measure, although both characters are evaluated to be 
different groups of age when this measure is based on interval measure.  
 
The third measure is interval measures, which have the property of order; however, the 
number assignment also assumes that the differences between the numbers are equal 
(Riffe et al., 2005, p.85). For example, the difference between a temperature of 100 °F 
and 80 °F is the same difference as between 90 °F and 70 °F. Moreover, this level is a 
measurement where various recording units can be quantified in number. For example, 
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various recording units of time, distance, and volume can be assigned to numerical 
intervals. This measure might be used to quantify values and attitudes in semantic 
differential scales, such as measuring judgement and personality traits of characters 
(Krippendorff, 2004). Moreover, it is the preferred measure in empirical social research, 
largely because of the wealth of statistical techniques that are available and accessible 
such as, variance calculations, correlations, factor analyses, multidimensional scaling, 
and clustering (Krippendorff, 2004). This measurement is also used effectively in 
parametric statistical tests (Marston and Shrives, 1991). However, Krippendorff (2004) 
also suggested the use of other techniques (such as quantitative indices of phenomena) 
because using semantic differential scales may be inappropriate to interpret language 
precisely. To describe this weakness further, the Fahrenheit scale of temperature is a 
classic example where zero degree is not a lack of heat nor is 60 °F twice as warm as 30 
°F (Neuendorf, 2002).  
 
The fourth measure is the most sophisticated or highest level of measurement, which is 
called ratio (Neuendorf, 2002). This measure is similar to intervals in that the difference 
between numbers is typically equal but ratio scales include a meaningful zero point 
(Neuendorf, 2002; Riffe et al., 2005). There are many examples of ratio for level 
measurements, such as column inches of newsprint, inches on the map, frequencies of 
citations, sizes of pictures and audience sizes. The example used in this thesis is the 
percentage of forward-looking disclosures as a proportion of total sentences (in all 
companies) between 1995 and 2010. Moreover, it should be considered that a nominal 
classification system may be used in ratio measures (Neuendorf, 2002). For example, in 
this thesis, the contents differ between groups of risk disclosures with neutral news and 
bad news. The contents are then calculated to find the percentage of content units within 
the various categories (e.g. credit risk, market risk, and liquidity risk) and to compare 
the percentages for the disclosures of bad news with the percentages for the disclosures 
of neutral news. One of the advantages of using ratio measures (which are similar to 
interval measures) is that the ratio measure allows the use of more sophisticated 
statistical procedures (Krippendorff, 2004). 
 
The choice of a measurement level for a category depends on the characteristics of the 
contents that the researchers aim to analyse. Data language means that all measures 
(nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio) are important to help researchers clarify the 
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textual evidence in the same story. Moreover, the appropriate measures will affect the 
reliability and validity of the content analysis. 
 
 
4.6  Reliability and Validity in Content Analysis  
 
Recent developments in content analysis have highlighted the need for reliability and 
validity in the process of measurement because unreliable and invalid data in the 
process of measurement may lead to misleading and unreliable conclusions (Riffe et al., 
2005). In other words, measurement is related to the reliability and validity in the 
research procedure, where coders agree on the readings, interpretations, responses to, or 
uses of given texts or data. Riffe et al. (2005) described reliability in terms of requiring 
the researcher to assign the same numbers that would be generated by different coders 
adopting the same classification criteria to the same content. Validity requires the 
reliable and accurate assignment of numbers which represent the subjective concept 
being examined. Therefore, reliability and validity are integral to the quality of 
inferences (Holsti, 1969). It is apparent from this that analysts require practicable 
measurement to analyse contents in a trustworthy way. This has been widely discussed 
within the social sciences and the issues concerning trustworthiness and productivity are 
often discussed under the main topics of reliability and validity (Rosengren, 1981). 
Consequently, this section will review reliability and validity in content analysis. 
 
 
4.6.1   Reliability 
 
By definition, content analysis requires an element of objectivity; whereby, analysts 
must minimise subjectivity in analysing communication content (Berelson, 1952). To 
minimize subjectivity, analysts must be confident that contents have been generated 
carefully against the distortions and biases with certain instruments of measurement that 
give the same results whoever employs them (Krippendorff, 2004). This leads to the 
importance of reliability. Riffe et al. (2005) showed that a reliable measurement 
instrument is required to provide the consistency of results, even though the analysis is 
conducted at different times, places, and by different analysts. Therefore, reliability is 
one of the distinguishing characteristics in measures and procedures that arise when 
research requires objectivity (Holsti, 1969).  
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Several studies have defined reliability as a measuring procedure that yields the same 
results on repeated trials, even though it is made by different coders (Holsti, 1969; 
Weber, 1990; Neuendorf, 2002; Krippendorff, 2004; Riffe et al., 2005). Consequently, 
reliability is crucial to content analysis. The problem of assessing reliability comes from 
testing coder agreement in order to verify the assumption that content coding is 
determined by the concept definitions (Riffe et al., 2005, p.124). Moreover, Holsti 
(1969, p.135) described reliability as a function of the coders’ skill, insight, and 
experience. The clarity of categories and coding rules which guide their use is also 
important as is the degree of ambiguity in the data. From this proposition, it can be seen 
that two things are required to achieve reliability in content analysis. The first is the 
coders’ ability, which means that coders are trained adequately to be able to classify 
content into the appropriate analytical categories (Milne and Adler, 1999; Riffe et al., 
2005). Second is the clarity of the categories, which must be clear enough to support the 
coder’s judgment on which recording units belong in the category and which do not 
(Holsti, 1969; Milne and Adler, 1999). Therefore, improving coders, categories, or both 
are seen to be opportunities for enhancing reliability (Holsti, 1969).  
 
Some authors have suggested that there are three types of reliability: stability, 
reproducibility and accuracy (Carney, 1972; Weber, 1990; Krippendorff, 2004). 
Stability is the extent to which a measuring or coding procedure yields the same results 
on repeated trials (Krippendorff, 2004, p.215). Weber (1990) also described how 
stability means that the same coders achieve the same content even though the content is 
coded more than once. By definition, stability sometimes is mentioned as an intracoder 
assessment (Neuendorf, 2002, p.163), an intraobserver agreement, and a test-retest 
condition (Krippendorff, 2004, p.215). However, relying on a sole coder in stability is 
the weak point to assure reliability in measurement of content analysis because 
individual considerations may lead to bias or inconsistent interpretation of given coding 
decisions (Krippendorff, 2004; Weber, 1990). Therefore, agreement between two coders 
is likely to strengthen reliability while using more than one coder to code the same text 
is referred as reproducibility. 
 
Reproducibility is the process of measurement that is employed by two or more coders 
working independently of each other under varying circumstances with the same 
measuring instruments (Krippendorff, 2004; Weber, 1990). This type of reliability is 
referred to as intercoder reliability, interobserver agreement, intersubjective agreement, 
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parallel-forms reliability, test-test conditions (Krippendorff, 2004, p.215) or intercoder 
reliability (Neuendorf, 2002, p.142). Using this type of reliability may cause a conflict 
of coding because the multiple coders usually have different cognition in the coding 
scheme; such as, when dealing with ambiguous text, instructions, or random recording 
errors (Weber, 1990). Therefore, an approach which provides a basis to cross-reference 
the coding results of each and every coding decision is employed (Hackston and Milne, 
1996; Neuendorf, 2002). There are two reasons in this approach to achieve an 
acceptable level of intercoder reliability. The first reason is that the coding scheme is 
used by more than one coder where all coders have independence from individual 
subjective judgements. Secondly, similar results may be achieved when two or more 
coders crosscheck the assignment of splitting coding tasks. By comparing the first type, 
it should be noted that reproducibility is more reliable than stability because it provides 
a stronger measure. 
 
The third type of reliability is accuracy, which is considered to be the strongest type 
(Weber, 1990; Krippendorff, 2004) because the process of recording results is compared 
with a well-known established standard (Milne and Adler, 1999). Weber (1990, p.17) 
referred to accuracy as the classification of text corresponding to a standard or norm. 
Furthermore, Krippendorff (2004, p.215) suggested that analysts must obtain data under 
test-standard conditions ,with such conditions meaning that they must compare the 
performance of one or more data-making procedures with the performance of a 
procedure that is taken to be correct. However, this type may be problematic in practice 
because it is not easy to have standard coding for text, particularly in newly developed 
research (Weber, 1990). Consequently, accuracy is infrequently adopted, except in 
certain areas where acceptable standards are readily available against standards that 
have been established by panels of experienced content analysts (Krippendorff, 2004).  
 
Sometimes, content analysts accept the data when it has been tested by one type of 
reliability and feel confident because their coding achieves perfect agreement. However, 
there are some threats to reliability that give the illusion of high reliability, which are 
reviewed in the next section.  
 
 
 
100 
 
4.6.2   Threats to reliability and their management 
 
All of the types of reliability described in Section 4.6.1 include a proper procedure to 
increase the quality of measurement since if any research uses an unreliable 
measurement then all of the contents related to such research become untrustworthy. 
Therefore, threats to reliability are issues which analysts should carefully take into 
account. A review of the literature shows that threats to reliability can be classified into 
two perspectives: procedures and coders. Threats to reliability in procedure may happen 
at the beginning of defining the categories and subcategories that are relevant to the 
study goals. Without clarity and simplicity of concept definition, the coders will fail to 
apply them properly when looking at the content (Riffe et al., 2005). Neuendorf (2002) 
also warned that the poor management of the coding scheme may cause a failure of the 
content analysis. To execute this threat, Riffe et al. (2005, p.131) suggested using a 
coding sheet to record the content attributes of each unit of content in the study. This 
coding sheet has the same level of importance as a questionnaire in a random sample 
survey and the same rules for clarity of presentation apply. To address this threat, 
Krippendorff (2004) suggested that it is important to establish coding instructions that 
contain clearly formulated coding, practical data language, and step-by-step instructions 
on their use.    
 
The second perspective is focused on coders. Threats to reliability involving coders 
include inadequate coder training, coder fatigue, and biased coders (Neuendorf, 2002). 
There are several approaches to minimise this risk to reliability. This study will provide 
three methods to minimise risk, which are: coder training, coder reliability tests, and 
computer aids. Firstly, coder training is a good solution to resolve the problem of 
categorising that which is ambiguously defined (Holsti, 1969; Neuendorf, 2002; 
Krippendorff, 2004; Riffe et al., 2005). Secondly, a coder reliability test ensures that all 
coders who work independently of each other generate reliable and comparable data 
(Krippendorff, 2004). Various authors have introduced different methods (such as 
percentage, ratio, and statistical calculations) to measure the level of agreement among 
coders. The key concept of measurement relies on comparing coding results among 
coders to ensure agreement. This agreement focuses on coders’ performance, in which 
each category in the analysis is assessed by observing whether the coders have agreed 
on coding rules, coding definition, and procedures (Neuendorf, 2002; Krippendorff, 
2004; Riffe et al., 2005). Where there is a single coder, the test can be done by 
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themselves at different points of time (Milne and Adler, 1999; Riffe et al., 2005). 
Thirdly, computer aids are becoming increasingly useful to resolve problems involving 
human data handling and to eliminate the problem of unreliable coding (Krippendorff, 
2004). Recent developments in the field of computer content analysis have led to the 
development of many tools of investigation for processing large volumes of textual data 
and the development of software that can serve the needs of content analysts (Holsti, 
1969; Neuendorf, 2002; Krippendorff, 2004). 
 
Although computer aids are used in many research studies, they do have some 
limitations. For example, Holsti (1969) pointed out that it tends to be impractical or 
expensive when a large volume of data is not in computer readable form. In addition, he 
proposed that using a computer may be inappropriate when dealing with thematic 
analysis because thematic analysis usually needs the occurrence or co-occurrence of 
certain words and the relationship between them to be specified, and this exceeds the 
capacity of some computers. Therefore, although computer applications can be 
indispensable for research, using computers in certain specific research contexts or in 
some parts in research will solve the problems of achieving reliable coding. 
 
 
4.6.3   Validity 
 
The term ‘validity’ has been used in a variety of ways in the method literature. It is 
interpreted in different ways depending on what assessment is being considered, for 
example: the assertion of findings based on an acceptable judgement or common trust is 
labelled as ‘face validity’ (Holsti, 1969; Weber, 1990; Krippendorff, 2004); if the 
research finding is supported by social concerns then it is labelled as ‘social validity’;3 
and, if the research finding is the result of empirical processes then it is labelled as 
‘empirical validity’.4 In terms of content analysis, Weber (1990) defined validity as 
concerning the validity of the classification scheme, or variables derived from it, or the 
validity of the interpretation relating content variables to their causes or consequences. 
To assert that a category or variable is valid is to assert that there is a correspondence 
between the category and the abstract concept that it represents (Weber, 1990, p.18). 
                                                          
3
  Krippendorff (2004, p.314) defines social validity as quality of research findings that leads us to accept 
them on account of their contribution to the public discussion of important social concerns. 
4
  Krippendorff (2004, p.315) defines empirical validity as the degree to which available evidence and 
established theory support various stages of a research process. 
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The most common ways in which validity is used is in terms of internal validity and 
external validity (Weber, 1990; Neuendorf, 2002; Krippendorff, 2004; Harwood and 
Garry, 2003; Riffe et al., 2005). To help clarify the concept, this study refers to the 
definitions to Neuendorf (2002), who defined external validity as generalisability and 
relates it to whether the results of a measure can be extrapolated to other settings, times, 
and places. Internal validity, in contrast, is the matching of a conceptual definition and 
an operational definition (measurement) (Neuendorf, 2002, p.115). 
 
By definition, the stronger validity is external validity because of the measurement 
based on external criterion (Weber, 1990). This may happen because the judgement is 
made on a multiple-dimensional basis.  
 
In the field of content analysis, Riffe et al. (2005, p.162) also agreed that content 
analysis can be a very strong research technique when it relies on external validity. In all 
concepts of validity, the weakest aspect is face validity (Weber, 1990) because the 
finding can be accepted without evidence or detailed reason if it makes sense. However, 
it is possible that face validity has most frequently been relied on by content analysts 
(Holsti, 1969) because, fundamentally, content analysts are grounded on common sense 
and shared cultures to interpret texts and, therefore, their assessment is considered 
sufficient for accepting validity (Holsti, 1969; Krippendorff, 2004). 
 
 
4.7  Limitations of Content Analysis 
 
This chapter has described how the use of content analysis as a research method is 
applied to many purposes because it can answer a wide range of questions that are 
important to many disciplines and fields under a defined set of procedures to make 
inferences from a text. However, Krippendorff (2004, p.40) recommended that every 
research technique has its own powers and limitations, and content analysis is no 
exception to this. Therefore, caution must be applied when using content analysis and 
the limitations of its use need to be addressed. 
 
Firstly, a high level of reliability does not ensure validity, whereas a low level of 
reliability is able to limit validity (Holsti, 1969; Krippendorff, 2004). As described in 
the previous section, reliability is accepted by the agreement among coders who tend to 
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have the same conceptual framework, knowledge, or interest without concerning the 
world outside of the research process. Therefore, although reliability can achieve such 
an agreement, it may rarely have the chance of being declared as valid by the substantial 
agreement of results among analysts who share a worldview reflecting real phenomena 
because they have differences in cultural understanding or frame of reference that may 
be dividing coders. Consequently, a reliable process may or may not lead to valid 
outcomes. Conversely, in cases of low levels of reliability, even among coders who 
disagree with the results, this indicates that validity is difficult for others who tend to 
lack an insight into what actually happened. Hence, an unreliable process is less likely 
to consider existing validity in its results. 
 
Secondly, the requirement of objectivity limits merely manifest content (Holsti, 1969).
5
 
This accords with Berelson’s (1952, p. 18) definition of content analysis as a research 
technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest 
content of communication. In addition, Berelson (1952, p.16) also indicated that the 
categories of analysis should be defined so precisely that different analysts can apply 
them to the same body of content and secure the same results. This links to the first 
limitation about reliability and validity in that placing emphasis on manifest content is 
likely to assure high reliability, although it may still not have validity. Using merely 
manifest content, however, Neuendorf (2002, p.23) suggested that content analysis may 
apply latent content
6
 when using a set of manifest variables representing measures of 
one or more latent contents (for example, using twenty-seven manifest variables 
measures stereotypic images of women). He also provided more examples of studies to 
describe how latent content can be used in terms of integrating quantitative content 
analysis and qualitative message analysis. Likewise, Krippendorff (2004, p.19) argued 
that content analysis should not limit merely quantitative description of the manifest 
content, although quantification is important in many scientific endeavours because 
texts have no single meaning that can be identified for what they are. In addition, texts 
can be interpreted from numerous perspectives; therefore, they can have several 
designations and data can be subjected to various analyses (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 22). 
Hence, using a content analysis tool may be related to both manifest content (the surface 
                                                          
5
  Manifest content or surface are elements that are physically present and countable (Gray and Densten, 
1998, p.420 cited by Neuendorf, 2002, p.23). 
6
  Latent or deep content is defined as consisting of unobserved concepts that cannot be measured directly 
but can be represented or measured by one or more indicators (Hair et al., 1998, p. 581 cited by 
Neuendorf, 2002, p.23). 
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meaning of the text) and latent content (the deeper layers of meaning) because content 
analysis may apply the use of latent constructs as a way of integrating a wide variety of 
manifest indicators (Neuendorf, 2002).  
 
Thirdly, content analysis cannot claim to be a purely qualitative or quantitative method. 
Holsti (1969) described the relation between qualitative and quantitative method as the 
initial step in categorising deals with qualitative application. The investigators will 
judge text containing any attributes before coding them and counting the frequency of 
the coding characteristics that are related to quantitative method for the final step of 
categorisation. For example, analysts may read over a sample of data to identify the feel 
of interpretation for the type of symbols or themes prior to coding them. Subsequently, 
after the coding and data analysis have been completed, the analysts may check the 
quantitative results of coding and counting by rereading all of their texts, which is 
related to qualitative method (Holsti, 1969). Consequently, although qualitative and 
quantitative methods are used in different orders of the process in content analysis, 
several studies have agreed that qualitative and quantitative methods are mutually 
supportive and mutually enriching (Holsti, 1969; Perreault and Leigh, 1989; Weber, 
1990; Harris, 1996; Neuendorf, 2002; Krippendorff, 2004; Riffe et al., 2005). A broad 
definition integrating both qualitative and quantitative methods will be adopted in this 
present study. 
 
The content analysis that content analysts must adopt may vary from one analysis to 
another because there are a number of different reasons to use content analysis. The 
same body of texts can, therefore, yield very different findings when examined by 
different analysts. The analysts should carefully consider using both manifest and latent 
content, and integrating qualitative and quantitative methods under acknowledged 
limitations, to ensure that the analysis of texts proceeds to achieve their research 
objectives.  
 
 
4.8  Summary 
 
This chapter has introduced the conceptual and methodological developments of content 
analysis, including the various definitions employed in previous relevant studies. From 
the evidence of these studies, there are several distinctions in content analysis which are 
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attractive for analysts employing the technique widely in a range of disciplines and 
fields (e.g. Smith and Taffler, 2000; Sydserff and Weetman, 2002; Hsieh and Shannon, 
2005; Lajili and Zéghal, 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2005a; Linsley and Lawrence, 
2007; Elo and Kyngäs, 2008; Amran et al., 2009). However, analysts should 
acknowledge its limitations and a note of caution should be applied. 
 
Content analysis is a technique that is applied in this study by the determination of 
which narratives of the disclosures are evaluated as risk disclosures and these are 
analysed according to the design of the content analysis. Content analysis design 
consists of categorising data, unitising text and recording units. Categorising data is the 
classification of texts into categories, depending on whether its category can answer the 
existing question. Therefore, a more appropriate way is useful for relevant categories to 
fit the problem. The next step of designing the research is uniting, which involves a 
given category in which there are three elements of units: sampling units, context units, 
and recoding units. Each type of unit has its benefits and disadvantages. In practice, the 
technique of combining recording is an important consideration in choosing a research 
method; for example, using themes for categorising as context units and counting them 
by using sentences as recording units. Consequently, this study has decided to apply the 
integrated method. 
 
This chapter has also outlined the issues of measurement. Measurement is developed to 
allow coded texts to be turned into numbers that can be analysed statistically. Regarding 
data analysis, selecting a measurement level for a category depends on the 
characteristics of narratives that the researchers aim to analyse. All measures (i.e. 
nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio) are important to help researchers clarify textual 
evidence in the same narrative because the appropriate measures will affect the 
reliability and validity in content analysis. All types of reliability involve a proper 
procedure to increase the quality of the measurement because if any research uses 
unreliable measurement then all of the contents related to the research can become 
untrustworthy.  
 
For the purpose of this study, content analysis is considered to be the most appropriate 
method to evaluate characteristics of contents in annual reports. The next chapter will 
explain its use in this study. 
 
106 
 
Chapter 5. Method Development 
 
 
The concept of content analysis was discussed in the previous chapter. The 
methodology that was developed and applied in this study optimises the use of the 
content analysis method to study risk contents, both in diversity and in depth. This study 
has adopted a way of integrating both qualitative and quantitative methods by using 
frequency count as a quantitative method to investigate qualitative characteristics in the 
information content of risk disclosures on a qualitative basis.  
 
This present chapter aims to describe the detailed development of the content analysis 
method that was used in this study. The first section starts with a description of the 
selection of samples (including time frame) and it gives the reasons why annual reports 
were used in this study. The next section gives an overview of the use of a coding 
matrix to examine risk disclosures for six interrogations. The first interrogation is the 
main tool for categorising data and linking to the other interrogations. The next three 
interrogations which deal with the characteristics of disclosure are described in: Section 
5.4 - Disclosure Direction; Section 5.5 - Time Orientation of Disclosures; and, Section 
5.6 - The Disclosure of Factuality and Perception. The recording units and coding 
instructions used for the three interrogations are described in Section 5.7. Meanwhile, 
the fifth interrogation relating to the quality of disclosure is addressed in Section 5.8. 
The last interrogation is described in Section 5.9, which was developed to examine how 
press media reporting has influenced risk categories. Section 5.10 describes how the 
method was tested, its reliability, and it outlines the problem of measuring the quality of 
risk disclosure that was found in the pilot study. Finally, Section 5.11 describes how the 
main study changed after the lessons were learned from the pilot study. 
 
 
5.1  Sample 
 
An understanding of increasing uncertainty in a world which is both volatile and 
complex is important in order to comprehend how a risk management strategy can help 
a company to survive (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008). Moreover, the pattern of risk 
involves anticipating, understanding, and taking action to make the right decisions to 
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create competitive advantages (Shaw, 2003). Consequently, the concepts of risk and 
risk management have received increasing attention (Power, 2004). 
 
The effectiveness of how annual reports communicate with their readers is thought to 
play an important role in providing risk information to those who need it. In terms of 
contents in annual reports, shareholders and other stakeholders require companies to 
disclose narrative contents that pertain to their future performance and sustainability. 
Such disclosures should provide not only clarification and validity but also useful 
insights into value creation (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). Therefore, to date, a number 
of studies have tended to focus on narrative information in their assessment of 
disclosure quality (Courtis, 1998).  
 
All companies have to deal with risk and risk management; therefore, the selection of 
samples drawn from the interested population plays an important role in research 
development. It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore risk in banks when studying 
risk disclosures. According to the rationale for risk-based practices that is provided by 
Bessis (2002, p. x), banks can be seen as ‘risk machines’ since they take risks, they 
transform risk, and they then embed risk in their banking products and services. 
However, selecting samples from all of the companies in the banking sector in the 
whole world is too large to be reasonably examined because of time and energy 
constraints. Selecting a particular country in the world in order to study its risk 
disclosure is necessary in the sampling frame. The UK is one of the most important 
countries in the banking sector in the EU. It holds banking assets that are worth over 
25% of all banking assets in the EU (Kosmidou et al., 2006). It is also the largest single 
international banking centre, accounting for 20% of the world’s cross-border lending 
(Kosmidou et al., 2006). Moreover, the UK banking sector has traditionally been one of 
the most diverse and competitive banking operations in the world, having both bank and 
non-bank services such as credit cards, insurance and loans (Farquhar and Panther, 
2008). Consequently, because of their importance in the global market, UK banks were 
selected to serve as a sampling frame in this study in order to examine their risk 
disclosures. 
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5.1.1   Sample selection 
 
Although UK banks comprised the sample for this research, considerably more work 
needed to be done to determine which companies in the UK banking sector should be 
selected. The large size of UK banks was an important factor for sampling when 
performing this phase.  
 
The sample selection had two stages. The first stage in the sampling process involved 
choosing sources of information. During this stage this study used a list of banks listed 
on the London Stock Exchange
1
 at the end of 2009, which was the year that this study 
commenced. This list consisted of forty-eight banks, which included each bank’s market 
capitalisation. It was found from this list that there were both small and large banks. The 
second stage in the sampling process was to determine company size. Many studies 
have found that there is a significant relationship between firm size and the number of 
risk disclosures. Linsley and Shrives (2006), Iatridis (2008) and Hill and Short (2009) 
all found a significant relationship between firm size and the number of risk disclosures 
in UK firms. Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) found a significant relationship between firm 
size and the number of risk disclosures in Italian firms. Meanwhile, Linsley et al. (2006) 
found a significant relationship between firm size and the number of risk disclosures in 
UK and Canadian banks. Moreover, several studies have found that firm size is 
positively related to the volume of voluntary disclosures generally (Patten, 1992; 
Hackston and Milne, 1996; Cormier and Gordon, 2001; Kolk et al., 2001; Campbell et 
al., 2003; Othman and Ameer, 2009). Therefore, this study draws upon control of size 
effects by selecting large companies, which has been made under the sampling frame 
that is based on companies incorporated in the UK and listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. The following table shows the results of this decision: 
  
                                                          
1
  A list of all companies in London Stock Exchange can be downloaded at 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/companies-and-issuers/companies-and-issuers.htm 
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Table 5.1  A list of UK banks listed on the London Stock Exchange  
 Company 
Market Capitalisation  
as at 31 December 2009  
(£ million) 
1 HSBC 123,362 
2 Lloyds Banking Group plc 32,327 
3 Standard Chartered 31,667 
4 Barclays 31,442 
5 Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc 16,553 
6 European Islamic Investment Bank 60 
7 Islamic Bank of Britain plc 37 
 
When the samples were considered in terms of company size, the European Islamic 
Investment Bank and the Islamic Bank of Britain plc were not selected because both 
were small UK banks that had a market capitalisation of less than £100 million. 
Meanwhile, when the samples were considered in terms of UK banks, Standard 
Chartered was not selected because its largest shareholder is Temasek Holdings,
2
 which 
is owned by the government of Singapore. Consequently, with the selection being based 
on large UK banks listed on the London Stock Exchange, four banks were included in 
the selection: HSBC, Lloyds, Barclays and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS). 
 
In order to increase the number of sampling companies, HBOS plc (which is owned by 
Lloyds) and National Westminster Bank plc (or NatWest, which is owned by RBS) 
were chosen as additional sample companies. Hence, six large UK banks were chosen 
because of their known size effects, which are: HSBC, Lloyds, Barclays, RBS, HBOS, 
and NatWest. 
 
 
5.1.2   Sample period  
 
When the sample companies were selected, the period of time during 1995 to 2010 was 
framed for investigating risk disclosures in annual reports of six UK banks in both 
longitudinal and intrasectoral studies. In terms of longitudinal study, choosing the 
starting year is important for analysis.  
 
                                                          
2
  See Standard Chartered Annual Report, 2009, p.77. 
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The starting year for a longitudinal analysis is important when considering the relevance 
in risk reporting. For this study, the year 1995 was chosen because several controversial 
issues of risk reporting occurred in and around that year. Public concern about banking 
standards was raised in 1995 when Barings bank collapsed and Shell experienced 
reputational damage with the disposal of Brent Spar (an old oil storage and loading 
buoy) in the North Sea. Discussions about the idea of risk reporting have become more 
significant following these events (Power, 2004). In the UK, Linsley and Shrives 
(2005b) explained that the publication of ‘Enhancing Bank Transparency’ by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision in 1998 was at the root of the risk disclosure 
debate. This is consistent with the Combined Code on Corporate Governance that was 
published by the London Stock Exchange in 1998, which required risk management and 
which also encouraged companies to report key risks (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). 
However, the Turnbull Report (1999) responded directly to the Combined Code by 
replacing the whole system of internal control with the aim of compelling companies to 
disclose risk (Solomon et al., 2000). Moreover, the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in England and Wales (ICAEW) issued three discussion documents (in 1998, 1999, and 
2002) to encourage company directors to disclose risks with deep insight (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006). This stemmed from the publication of ‘Financial Reporting of Risk: 
Proposals for a Statement of Business Risk’ (ICAEW, 1997), which revealed that many 
companies financial statements lacked risk information and also lacked formal risk 
reporting (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). 
 
Since 1997 the requirements of risk disclosures have extended beyond the purely 
operational reporting to embrace the broad range of risks that are experienced by 
companies. As a result of this, and coupled with public concern about risk reporting in 
1995, this study includes the annual reports of sample companies from the year 1995 to 
2010 in a contiguous longitudinal study. 
 
 
5.1.3   Annual reports: Media selection 
 
Many researchers have accepted the importance of an annual report as the major media 
for disclosure (Tilt, 2001). It also has an advantage for analysing the comparability of 
management attitudes and policies across reporting periods (Guthrie et al., 2004). The 
annual report is a formal public document that is arranged by the directors to comply 
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with mandatory legal requirements and which is considered as an important part of the 
accountability of an organisation (Linsley and Shrives, 2005a). However, Stanton and 
Stanton (2002) discussed how annual reports may be produced for a proactive purpose 
which seeks an opportunity to manage corporate image or to reduce the effects of events 
that are perceived as negative. Because of this supposed benefit, directors tend to 
provide voluntary disclosures or report more than the minimum mandatory reporting 
requirements. Generally, the annual report can be divided into two parts, which are the 
financial statements and the narrative sections. The financial statement will be audited 
by the auditors while the narrative sections are less controlled (they are auditor 
‘reviewed’) and may convey information which gives a better impression of the general 
situation of the company (Balata and Breton, 2005). 
 
Following the requirement of more detailed and useful information for a greater depth 
of risk disclosures, the annual report is used by investors and other interested parties to 
investigate whether its contents provide useful information (Woods et al., 2008). 
Moreover, the annual report has been recognised as a tool for communicating with the 
many different audiences of the firm (Stanton and Stanton, 2002; Breton, 2009). 
Without considering the distinction of annual report, it is not necessary to study the 
content of the narratives sections on risk disclosures, management attitudes, or even the 
financial statements. It has recently been widely recognised that annual reports have an 
influence on their users (Balata and Breton, 2005); therefore, the trustworthiness of the 
annual report is crucial. In the process of generating annual reports, there is a third-party 
certification (i.e. they are audited) which helps to assure credibility in two ways: the 
annual report is prepared according to generally accepted accounting standards and it 
has been audited by an independent audit firm (Kothari et al., 2009). Consequently, 
annual reports were chosen to be investigated in this study. In addition, the analysis of 
the risk disclosures for the sample companies was performed on all narrative sections, 
including the notes to the accounts that include details of the preparation of the financial 
statement, a summary of significant accounting policies, details of the assets and 
liabilities, and other additional information that relate to the company’s periodic reports.  
 
The next step was collecting information. The annual reports were obtained primarily 
through the companies’ own websites. In cases where the annual reports were not 
available, particularly in the early years of the investigation, companies were asked to 
provide the electronic document files via email. However, most companies replied that 
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they had no electronic files for their earlier annual reports and, therefore, the hard copies 
were obtained from the database at Companies House.  
 
 
5.2  Coding Matrix 
 
The explanation and interpretation of risk disclosures depends on the specific context 
and application. Although on the positive side risk can mean an opportunity, it is 
basically a negative outcome that includes any hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure, 
that has already impacted upon the company or may impact upon the company in the 
future (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). To reduce the failure from risk, investors and other 
stakeholders need better tools to assess and manage risk. The risk disclosure in an 
annual report is one of the most useful items of information to avoid an unsatisfactory 
outcome. In order to examine risk disclosures in a specific context, understanding the 
multiple dimensions related to risk reporting is essential. Risk disclosures in annual 
reports from six sample companies during 1995 to 2010 were analysed by content 
analysis to investigate their risk disclosures in several ways, which is illustrated in 
figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1  Coding matrix 
 
 
To develop reliable and valid measures, six interrogations were performed. These 
interrogations used the content analysis instrument to analyse risk disclosures. Taken 
together, an exploratory matrix was developed and tested. The first interrogation of the 
risk categories is discussed in Section 5.3. Each category was then used to develop the 
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other interrogations, using three types of recording unit, which are: sentences, themes, 
and phrases.  
 
Firstly, the sentence was employed as the coding unit to examine the characteristics of 
disclosures for three interrogations:  
1) Disclosure direction (Section 5.4);  
2) The time orientation of disclosure (Section 5.5); and,  
3) The disclosure of factuality and perception (Section 5.6).  
To develop these three interrogations, the coding instruction was defined to increase the 
reliability and the validity of the research method (see Section 5.7). Secondly, risk 
categories were employed as themes to examine the quality of disclosures, which is the 
fifth interrogation (see Section 5.8). Thirdly, each risk category was used as a keyword 
to retrieve the number of newspaper hits in LexisNexis in the sixth interrogation (see 
Section 5.9). Moreover, each interrogation played a central role in its main function and 
the correlations among them were formulated to examine their relevant effects in this 
study.  
 
 
5.3  Risk Categories  
 
One of the most significant issues in the use of content analysis categories is the choice 
of what should be included in the categories. The success of content analysis is directly 
involved in the coding process (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). The basic coding process in 
content analysis is to organise large quantities of text into much fewer content 
categories (Weber, 1990). Defining the categories is the first step which is brought into 
the verifiable scope of the research process so that it can be used to carry out a test to 
investigate the reliability of the application (Bos and Tarnai, 1999). However, there are 
several different ways to generate risk categories. The difference of perspectives in the 
quality of narrative has been captured by various researchers (see Raar, 2002; Coy and 
Dixon, 2004). In this study, four previous studies have influenced the formulation of the 
conceptual framework for risk categorisation because they had examined the issues of 
risk disclosures similar to those employed in this study. 
 
The first study used the model ICAEW (1998), which was developed by a professional 
accountancy firm to study risk disclosures in the annual reports of seventy-nine UK 
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companies in the year 2001 (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Their risk classification was 
comprised of six categories and thirty-six sub-categories. 
 
The second study reviewed the three sources of disclosure (i.e. corporate, analyst, 
business press) from 889 U.S. publicly traded corporations between 1996 and 2001 
(Kothari et al., 2009). They developed six risk categories by using a business word 
classification scheme. 
 
The third study examined the impact of disclosure level on the cost of equity capital. It 
selected 135 banks from Europe, North America and Australia, between 1995 and 1999, 
to serve as sample companies (Poshakwale and Courtis, 2005). They categorised the 
disclosures using the PwC ValueReporting’s Best Practice model (PwC, 1999), having 
twenty-nine key financial industry-specific performance measures that were derived 
from a banking survey. 
 
The fourth study investigated the risk disclosures in the annual reports of nine UK 
banks and nine Canadian banks in the year 2001 (Linsley et al., 2006). They classified 
risk categories based on three consecutive editions of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS, 2001; 2002; 2003), in which the Basel Committee grouped risk 
into twelve categories. 
 
Table 5.2 provides an overview of the formation of categories used in the prior risk 
disclosure studies. 
 
Table 5.2  Category comparisons of previous studies in risk disclosure 
Linsley and Shrives 
(2006), ICAEW (1997) 
Kothari et al. 
(2009) 
Poshakwale and 
Courtis (2005), PwC 
(1999) 
Linsley et al. 
(2006), Basel 
(2001,2002,2003) 
1.  Financial risk   
 Interest rate 
 Exchange rate 
 Commodity 
 Liquidity 
 Credit 
2.   Operations risk  
 Customer satisfaction 
 Product development 
 
1. Market risk 
2. Firm risk 
3. Organizational 
risk 
4. Reputational 
risk 
5. Performance 
risk 
6. Regulatory 
risk 
1. Strategy 
 Plans for growth 
 Delivery channels 
 Product innovation 
 IT expenditures 
 Degree of 
diversification 
2. Customers and 
markets 
 Customer retention 
1. Capital 
structure 
2. Capital 
adequacy 
3. Market risk 
internal 
modelling 
4. Internal and 
external ratings 
5. Credit risk 
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Linsley and Shrives 
(2006), ICAEW (1997) 
Kothari et al. 
(2009) 
Poshakwale and 
Courtis (2005), PwC 
(1999) 
Linsley et al. 
(2006), Basel 
(2001,2002,2003) 
 Efficiency and 
performance 
 Sourcing 
 Stock obsolescence and 
shrinkage 
 Product and service 
failure 
 Environmental 
 Health and safety 
 Brand name erosion 
3.   Empowerment risk  
 Leadership and 
management 
 Outsourcing 
 Performance incentives 
 Change readiness 
 Communications 
4.   Information 
processing and technology 
risk  
 Integrity 
 Access 
 Availability 
 Infrastructure 
5.   Integrity risk   
 Management and 
employee fraud 
 Illegal acts 
 Reputation 
6.   Strategic risk   
 Environmental scan 
 Industry 
 Business portfolio 
 Competitors 
 Pricing 
 Valuation 
 Planning 
 Life cycle 
 Performance 
measurement 
 Regulatory 
 Sovereign and political 
 Customer 
penetration 
 Market growth 
 Market share 
3. People and 
reputation 
 Quality of 
management 
 Employee 
satisfaction 
 Brand equity 
 Regulatory 
reputation 
4. Risk management 
 Risk management 
practices 
 Asset/liability 
management 
 Asset quality 
 Market risk 
exposure 
5. Financial position 
 Capital adequacy 
 Capital management 
 Assets under 
management 
 Investment 
performance 
 Core deposit growth 
6. Financial 
performance 
 Earnings 
 Loan loss ratio 
 Return on risk-
adjusted capital 
 Fee-based revenue 
growth 
 Economic profit 
 Performance by 
business segment 
  Cost/income ratio 
modelling 
6. Securitisation 
activities 
7. Credit risk 
8. Credit 
derivatives and 
other credit 
enhancements 
9. Derivatives 
10. Geographic and 
business line 
diversification 
11. Accounting and 
presentation 
policies 
12. Other risks 
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As shown in table 5.2, it appears that the formation of categories in the first study 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2006) and the second study (Kothari et al., 2009) were developed 
to examine risk disclosures of companies from a range of industrial sectors rather than 
focusing solely on the banking sector. However, managing bank risk is different from 
managing risk in other industries (Bessis, 2002). The details of risk reporting in the 
banking sector also have its own peculiarities which tend to differ from other industries. 
Therefore, the first and the second models were not applied in this study. For the third 
study (Poshakwale and Courtis, 2005) and the fourth study (Linsley et al., 2006), 
although both models were developed for the banking sector, there are some points that 
need to be considered. The PwC model in the study of Poshakwale and Courtis (2005) 
may not be entirely appropriate for capturing current risk disclosure practices because 
this model was developed over ten years ago. Meanwhile, the fourth study (Linsley et 
al., 2006) used the Basel Committee framework, and grouped risk into twelve 
categories. This framework was developed by the Basel Committee for their own 
disclosure review purposes (Linsley et al., 2006). 
  
Not all of the prior models that were found in the literature review are relevant to the 
purposes of this study. Different firms have their own concept of risk management and 
different requirements for risk disclosure; therefore, it is necessary to study these firms 
independently (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). 
 
This study has employed a combined approach that includes the conventional approach
3
 
as well as the directed approach
4
. This combined approach codes risk categories that are 
derived directly from risk disclosure in annual reports during analysis (which is the 
conventional approach) and relies on prior research before analysing risk disclosure and 
coding risk categories (which is the directed approach). Consequently, articulation and 
structuring of data related to risk disclosures was conducted to obtain risk categories in 
two aspects. In the first aspect the risk categories were classified by name, as given by 
the companies. In the second aspect the risk categories were classified as the companies 
disclosed risks, without grouping risk categories. Therefore, the narrative was analysed 
and grouped on the basis of the definition of risk categories that is given in Chapter 2. 
                                                          
3
  The conventional approach is that coding categories are derived directly from the text data during 
analysis with clear understanding of the phenomenon by researchers. For more detail see Chapter 4, 
Section 4.4.1. 
4
  The directed approach is that the researcher develops the initial coding scheme which relies on existing 
theory or prior research before analysing the data. For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1. 
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Consequently, thirty-five risk categories were used in this study, as illustrated in table 
5.3. 
 
Table 5.3  Risk categories used in this study 
Risk Category 
1. Risk management 2. Liquidity and funding risk 3. Credit risk 
4. Cross-border risk 5. Market risk 6. Interest rate risk 
7. Currency risk 8. Risk related to derivatives 9. Hedged risk 
10. Economic risk 11. Operational risk 12. Legal and Regulation risk 
13. Capital management 
risk 
14. Insurance and Investment 
risk 
15. Strategic and Business risk 
16. Reputation risk 17. Pension risk 18. Risk related to fair value 
19. Financial crime risk 20. Competition risk 21. Tax risk 
22. Financial report risk 23. Safety and security risk 24. Leasing risk 
25. Sustainability risk5 26. Customer treatment 27. People risk 
28. Political risk 29. Industry risk 30. Risk related to impairment 
31. Special purpose 
entities 
32. Technology risk 33. Equity risk 
34. Change risk 35. Governance risk  
 
 
 
5.4  Disclosure Direction 
 
This interrogation of the narrative in content analysis concerned the news direction of 
disclosures. These generally have three directions of disclosures that are grouped as bad 
news, good news, and neutral news (see Gray et al., 1995; Linsley and Shrives, 2005a; 
Linsley et al., 2006; Hill and Short, 2009). However, some prior studies have focussed 
on the disclosure of good and bad news to examine the patterns of disclosures without 
considering neutral news (Skinner, 1994; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Shin, 2006; 
Linsley and Lawrence, 2007; Suijs, 2007; Hassan, 2009). Good and bad news are key 
messages for analysts to use to investigate risk disclosures. Consequently, the directors 
need to carefully choose what news should be declared in annual reports. Generally, 
good news is used to create a good corporate image (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). 
Meanwhile, bad news tends to be concealed (Linsley et al., 2006) and its release is often 
postponed because it may increase the level of volatility (Kothari et al., 2009).  
                                                          
5
  HSBC and Barclays have addressed this risk including social and community issues, environment, and 
responsible global citizenship, whereas the other banks mean this risk as environmental risk. 
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Although good and bad news play a key role in engaging the firm’s risk position, 
neutral news is the largest proportion of risk disclosures in annual reports (Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2005a; Linsley et al., 2006). Linsley and Shrives 
(2005a) found in their study of disclosure direction in the UK public companies that 
25% of disclosures were ‘good news’, 21% of disclosures were ‘bad news’, and 54% of 
disclosures were ‘neutral news’. In their comparative study of UK and Canadian banks, 
Linsley et al. (2006) identified 25% of disclosures as ‘good news’, 21% of disclosures 
as ‘bad news’, and 54% of disclosures as ‘neutral news’. Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) 
demonstrated 10.3% of disclosures as being positively signed, 4.8% as being negatively 
signed, 0.4% as ‘equal’, and 84.5% as not disclosed (i.e. does not contain any risk 
information).  
 
Several previous studies have tried to explain the reason for the predominance of neutral 
news. For example, Suijs (2007) found that companies disclose neutral information, and 
delay bad and good information because neutral information tends to be more attractive 
to investors in terms of the level of risk considerations, which become risk factors in 
predictions for investment opportunities when publishing further good and bad news 
information. Moreover, Kothari et al. (2009) found that disclosures of good and bad 
news mean that market participants are more aware of the risks, and this is reflected in 
the firm’s cost of capital, stock return volatility, and dispersion in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. This leads to a criticism that companies could omit to disclose some good and 
bad news that they deem to be too commercially sensitive to reveal in their public 
disclosures (Linsley et al., 2006). 
 
In the study of disclosure, it is difficult to precisely define and code the news disclosure 
direction. However, Gray et al. (1995, p.99) coded the definition of disclosure direction 
as in table 5.4. In this study, this coding instrument has been adopted in the pilot test. 
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Table 5.4  Disclosure direction as defined by Gray et al. (1995, p.99) 
Direction Definition  Examples from Barclays (2008) 
Neutral Statement of policy or intent within 
statutory minimum with no details of 
what or how. Statement of facts whose 
credit/discredit to the company is not 
obvious, which are unaccompanied by 
editorialising. 
The majority of the environmental 
and social risks associated with our 
business are indirect (p.67).  
Good Statements beyond the minimum which 
include (for example) specific details 
where these details have a creditable or 
neutral reflection on the company. Any 
statements which reflect credit on the 
company. Upbeat 
analysis/discussion/statements. 
To support risk taking, Barclays has 
continue to strengthen the 
independent and specialised risk 
teams in each of its businesses, 
supported by matching teams at 
group level, acting in both a 
consultancy and oversight capacity 
(p.77). 
Bad Any statement which reflects, or which 
might reflect, discredit on the company. 
Including, for example, numbers made 
redundant (if redundancy is spoken of as 
a human rather than an economic act), 
and any increase in accidents. 
The group may be liable for 
damages to third parties harmed by 
the conduct of its business (p.73). 
 
As can be seen from the above coding, the pilot study found that there were many units 
of analysis facing an ambiguous classification of good news. The difficulty with coding 
ambiguous narrative is exemplified in the three examples which follow. 
 
The first announcement was made by the HSBC in 2008, it states that: ‘Additionally, 
HSBC Bank is now benefiting from having intentionally reduced its market share in 
2006 and 2007 as property prices continued to rise’ (HSBC, 2008, p.212). The first 
example might seem at first to be good news from the meaning of ‘benefiting’ the bank; 
however, HSBC’s market share decreased following this announcement, despite 
HSBC’s intention. This may then be considered to be bad news when the result of the 
decrease in market share is considered in the long term.  
 
The second announcement was also made by HSBC in 2008, it states that: ‘The 
maintenance of good credit quality in difficult market conditions is attributable to the 
business model pursued by HSBC in the UK’ (HSBC, 2008, p.211). The second 
example shows that HSBC put the positive word ‘good’ in the negative situation that 
company was facing in difficult market conditions. Lightstone and Driscoll (2008, p.15) 
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pointed out that some companies tend to blend optimistic information with bad news, 
such as: “we are satisfied”, “we are pleased”, “gives us a boost”, “building a resourceful 
management team”, “establishing a strong presence”, “remain encouraged”, and “highly 
successful”. Consequently, this optimistic language can mislead shareholders into 
ignoring the financial jeopardy that companies may be experiencing. 
 
The third announcement was made by Lloyds TSB in 2008, it states that: ‘As part of the 
completion process, we have amended Lloyds TSB Group high level policies so that 
they could be introduced for Lloyds Banking Group’ (Lloyds TSB, 2008, p.47). In this 
example there is no sign of disclosure direction, the ‘amendment’ to policies could 
either be good news or bad news 
 
In these examples, the disclosure patterns may affect investors’ decision. Linsley and 
Shrives (2005a) found that companies may discuss bad news by referring to 
uncontrollable external factors in order to describe the good news that they have 
mitigated the risk effectively. They do this because the good news occurs in companies 
who are working in a negative situation in market conditions which tend to be expected 
favourably by investors who receive the explanation of good news that directors can 
manage the risk. In other words, good news is likely to balance the level of sensitive 
reaction because the response to bad news disclosures is more sensitive than the 
response to the good news (Skinner, 1994). Additionally, Suijs (2007, p. 392) found that 
if disclosure by the firm reveals that its return is worse than the investor’s outside 
option,
6
 then the investor responds unfavourably by investing more of his capital in the 
outside option and less in the firm when compared to the investments made if the firm 
had not disclosed. Similarly, if disclosure by the firm reveals that its return is better than 
the investor’s outside option, then the investor responds favourably by increasing his 
investment in the firm. However, Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) found that the companies 
having lower profitability tend to convey positive disclosures to shareholders. 
 
Although the release of bad news may be delayed in disclosure, there are two reasons to 
pressure directors to disclose bad news in a timely manner (Skinner, 1994). Firstly, 
investors may sue if the directors do not reveal the adverse effects in the large volatility 
                                                          
6
 The model that Suijs (2007) considers consists of a single (representative) investor and a single firm. 
The investor has a limited amount of capital available which they can invest in three different projects, 
namely: the firm, the risk free asset and some alternative risky investment project, henceforth referred to 
as the outside option. 
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of stock price on earnings announcement days. Secondly, a reputational cost may be 
incurred when directors fail to disclose bad news at a proper time. For example, 
investors may choose not to hold the stocks of firms whose directors have a reputation 
for withholding bad news and analysts may choose not to follow these firm’s stocks 
(Skinner, 1994, p.39). Moreover, Linsley et al. (2006) proposed that companies need to 
be prepared to reveal bad news to avoid the suspicion that they are concealing problems. 
 
The ambiguous information relating to good news disclosures means that many 
companies are very conscious of the opportunity to manage their image through good 
news statements. Therefore, it is difficult to judge whether such disclosures are really 
good news, which may lead to the management’s preferable disclosures becoming 
incredible (Kothari et al., 2009). However, it has been argued that this bias against 
positive information may hinder directors from revealing understandable warning signs 
(Deumes, 2008). Good news is essential for risk disclosures, even if it seems to distract 
attention from more serious issues and it is difficult to verify its credibility. Therefore, 
coding good news was not skipped but it was merged with neutral news to increase the 
reliability of measures of disclosure in this study, as shown in table 5.5. 
 
Table 5.5  Disclosure direction definitions  
Direction Definition 
Neutral 
From statement of policy or intent within statutory minimum with no detail 
of what or how, the statement of fact whose credit/discredit to the company 
is not obvious - which are unaccompanied by editorialising statements 
beyond the minimum which include (for example) specific details where 
these detail have a creditable or neutral reflection on the company’s upbeat 
analysis/ discussion/ statement. 
Bad 
Any statement which reflects (or which might reflect) discredit on the 
company; including, for example numbers made redundant (if redundancy 
is spoken of as a human rather than an economic act), and any increase in 
accidents or reports on adverse performance against targets and/or 
tolerances. 
 
 
5.5  The Time Orientation of Disclosures 
 
The risk disclosures published in the annual report can be classified into three 
categories, which are:  
1) Backward-looking information, or past information; 
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2) Present information; and,  
3) Future, or forward-looking, information.  
However, many studies relating to risk disclosures focus on forward-looking 
information because it can be employed to predict the risks faced and the firm’s future 
performance (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2005a, 2005b, 2006; 
Linsley et al., 2006; Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007; Deumes, 2008; Bozzolan et al., 2009; 
Hill and Short, 2009). Even though predictability is the distinctive feature of future 
information, both present and past information have their own strengths. For example, 
the current financial risk disclosures (i.e. the present information) are required to 
provide sufficient information relating to the financial status of companies in order to 
assess the effects of both strategic and operational risks (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). 
Meanwhile, past information (or backward-looking) can provide insight into the 
company’s background and performance.  
 
Since the recent collapse of several large companies that were subsequently found to 
have created a fake image of having a low risk and high profitability (e.g. Enron and 
WorldCom), the relevant and understandable disclosure of forward-looking information 
about risk has heightened the need for revising the conceptual framework that is used by 
regulators (Deumes, 2008). Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) used ICAEW’s (1998) 
document to show that in the UK, companies had provided only 13% of some 
meaningful discussions relating to future trends and only 18% of some relevant risks 
and uncertainties involving the main effect on future results in their major business. 
Linsley and Shrives (2005a) also found that the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (ICAEW) intended companies to disclose not only past risk 
information but also forward-looking risk information. They further explained that the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), as a part of the extensive company law review 
that was commenced by the UK government in 1998, issued a consultative document in 
May 2004 that was entitled “Draft Regulations on the Operating and Financial Review 
and Directors' Report” (DTI, 2004), which shows that the British government envisaged 
improving forward-looking reporting through adopting a new Operating and Financial 
Review (OFR) in their requirements for the corporate annual report. 
 
There are various arguments about including forward-looking information in annual 
reports. Firstly, forward-looking information is thought to be helpful to investors in 
their investment decision-making (Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007; Linsley and Shrives, 
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2005a). However, directors may be reluctant to provide this information because 
forward-looking information has an inherent risk of unreliability and, therefore, 
investors may claim that they gain adverse results from using this information (Linsley 
and Shrives, 2005a). Consequently, directors prefer historical information to uncertain 
future information when they convey messages to shareholders (Deumes, 2008). 
Secondly, some findings show that high levels of forward-looking disclosure in annual 
report can improve the ability of stock markets to forecast future earning changes 
(Schleicher and Walker, 1999; Hussainey et al., 2003; Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007). In 
another study, Gietzmann (2006) provided evidence that forward-looking disclosures 
increased share price volatility; however, these disclosures tend to decrease the degree 
of variability in shareholdings in which the major institutional shareholders invest. In 
contrast, Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) warned that it can be the difficulty to predict 
future corporate performance with accuracy. Thirdly, Hussainey et al. (2003) showed 
that forward-looking disclosures in the annual report help the market make a better 
forecast about the firm’s future earnings. However, it may be argued that providing 
useful information about forward-looking information might affect a company’s 
competitive position in the market (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Aljifri and Hussainey, 
2007).  
 
From the research discussed above it can be concluded that forward-looking disclosures 
are valuable to investors because they have a significant effect on forecast properties, 
although concern should be exercised over their accuracy. 
 
Time orientation of risk disclosure includes past risk, present risk, and future risk; 
however, each timely disclosure has different volumes and different purposes between 
senders and receivers. In terms of receivers, Linsley et al. (2006) found that information 
relating to future risks is more useful to stakeholders than information relating to past 
risks. Meanwhile, from the point of view of the sender’s purpose, Beretta and Bozzolan 
(2004) found that firms focus upon disclosing information on past and present risks 
rather than future risks. For the purposes of this study, the time orientation of disclosure 
is an important component in the risk disclosures, both from the sender’s perspective 
and from the receiver’s perspective; therefore, the relevance and the proportion of 
timely disclosures, past risk, present risk, and forward-looking risk are examined in this 
study. 
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To investigate forward-looking disclosures it is necessary to establish a relevant 
definition in the coding scheme. Aljifri and Hussainey (2007, p.883) defined forward-
looking information as the class of information that refers to current plans and future 
forecasts, enabling investors and other users to assess a company’s future financial 
performance. Meanwhile, Bozzolan et al. (2009, p.435) defined forward-looking 
information as disclosed with the characteristics of being quantified and directed (and 
financial). It should also be financially verifiable because it facilitates the comparison 
with its subsequent realisation in relation to expected future financial performance. 
Based on the Factiva
7
 classification headings for all Regulatory News Service (RNS) 
announcements, Gietzmann (2006) examined forward-looking disclosures by 
categorising them into 5 types, which are:  
1) Plans and strategy; 
2) Regulation; 
3) Performance including earnings projections; 
4) New products; and, 
5) Research and development.  
 
In this study, the relevant definitions of forward-looking information were applied to 
generate keywords that were then used to identify the forward-looking disclosures in 
each sentence. This was done because words play a key role in terms of keywords that 
can support capturing meaning precisely for categorisation. In addition, when using 
only sentences it is difficult to identify the boundaries of meaning of forward-looking 
information clearly when compared with the use of words.  
 
Other research studies have applied keywords to identify forward-looking disclosures 
(Hussainey et al., 2003; Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007; Hussainey and Aal-Eisa, 2009). 
Using keywords can be a reliable method for dealing with risk disclosures in annual 
reports containing various issues because it is deemed to be straightforward in the 
coding plan. Consequently, indicative words were used to help capture forward-looking 
disclosures in this study. Table 5.6 lists the keywords as given by four sample 
companies and by Hussainey et al. (2003). 
 
                                                          
7
  Factiva is a business information and research tool that is owned by Dow Jones & Company 
(Wikipedia). 
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Table 5.6  A comparison of indicative words used by the sample companies and by 
previous studies 
HSBC 
(2008) 
Lloyds 
(2008) 
Barclays 
(2008) 
NatWest 
(1999) 
Hussainey et al. (2003, p.277) 
‘expects’, 
‘anticipates’, 
‘intends’, 
‘plans’, 
‘believes’,  
‘seeks’, 
‘estimates’, 
‘potential’, 
‘reasonably  
possible’ 
 
and 
variations of 
these words 
and similar 
expressions 
‘believes’, 
‘anticipates’, 
‘estimates’, 
‘expects’, 
‘intends’, 
‘aims’, 
‘potential’,  
’will’, 
‘would’, 
‘could’, 
‘considered’, 
‘likely’, 
‘estimate’  
 
and  
variations of 
these words 
and similar 
future or 
conditional  
expressions 
‘may’,  
‘will’, 
‘seek’, 
‘continue’, 
‘aim’, 
‘anticipate’, 
‘target’, 
‘expect’, 
‘estimate’, 
‘intend’, 
‘plan’,  
‘goal’, 
‘believe’  
 
and  
other words 
of similar 
meaning 
‘target’, 
‘goal’, 
‘objective’, 
‘expect’, 
‘estimate’, 
‘project’, 
‘anticipate’, 
‘should’, 
‘intend’, 
‘probability’, 
‘risk’, 
‘VaR’  
 
and  
similar 
expressions 
or variations 
on such 
expressions 
1. accelerate, 
2. anticipate, 
3. await,  
4. coming (financial) year(s),  
5. coming months, 
6. confidence (or confident), 
7. convince,  
8. current (financial) year,  
9. envisage, 
10. estimate, 
11. eventual, 
12. expect,  
13. forecast, 
14. forthcoming,  
15. hope,  
16. intend (or intention), 
17. likely (or unlikely), 
18. look forward or look ahead, 
19. next,  
20. novel, 
21. optimistic, 
22. outlook,  
23. planned (or planning),  
24. predict,  
25. prospect,  
26. remain,  
27. renew, 
28. scope for (or scope to),  
29. shall,  
30. shortly,  
31. should,  
32. soon, 
33. will,  
34. well placed or well positioned, 
35. year(s) ahead. 
 
There are several views of the adoption of proper content analysis tools that are used to 
study the time orientation of disclosures; however, this study has applied indicative 
words that are based on both the previous studies and on the companies providing these 
words in the annual reports under the headings of cautionary statement regarding 
forward-looking disclosures. In terms of past and present information, a grammatical 
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tense was employed in this study to code past information, while present information 
was coded by using the gap when a recording unit was neither past nor forward-looking 
information. Table 5.7 contains the forward-looking characteristics, their example 
keywords, and the coding of past and present information which were employed in the 
study.  
 
Table 5.7  Time orientation coding 
Time 
Orientation 
Characteristic Guidance Example Words 
Forward-
looking 
Future statement Words related to 
future tense or 
similar inflection. 
may, anticipate, will, potential, 
should, soon, shall, next, 
possible, continue, and 
variations of these words and 
similar expressions 
Predictive 
statement 
Information referred 
to projection, plan, 
appraisal, and 
management. 
plan, target, goal, objective, 
hope, schedule, aim, believe, 
expect, estimate, intend, 
project, and variations of these 
words and similar expressions 
Conditional 
statement 
Change in condition. change in, depend on, if, based 
on assumption , condition, 
uncertain, fluctuation in, and 
variations of these words and 
similar expressions 
Past Using past tense for coding. 
Present If it is not forward-looking and past information, it will be classified as 
present information. 
 
However, Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) warned that categorising past and forward-
looking narratives may not be simple when some recording units convey relevant 
messages between past and future information. Therefore, to enhance the reliability for 
measuring time-oriented disclosures, this study classified such ambiguous 
classifications, containing both past and future information, in the same recording unit 
as forward-looking information. 
 
 
5.6  The Disclosure of Factuality and Perception 
 
This quality of the disclosure of factuality and perception can play a key role in 
communication because the directors need to convey messages to investors so that they 
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will support the director’s decision making. Arnold et al. (2011) suggested that the 
investor’s main decision in their investment should be based on the factual information 
and that the next decision should be regarded as the relevant information that contains 
the reliability of the control system to assess the firm’s future performance. In terms of 
non-factual content or managerial perception, Hooper and Pratt (1995) noted that the 
directors have an incentive to disclose in their rhetorical statements because they can 
support confidence in the factual information that they claim. Since they are 
explanatory, rhetorical disclosures tend to be made in large volumes and they should 
gain less credibility than factual disclosures in content analysis (Toms, 2002). In 
addition, rhetorical disclosures may be made to manage a corporate image or to reduce 
the effects of events that the company has faced. However, it is inevitable that annual 
reports contain both factual information and rhetorical information; consequently, this 
feature has become an important component in risk disclosure. 
 
In order to classify risk disclosures that have been disclosed as factual or non-factual 
information it is important to define both terms. Campbell and Rahman (2010) defined 
factual information as something that has actually happened or something that is 
expressed in a proven or verifiable manner. However, Beattie and Thomson (2007, 
p.152) defined a fact as only information that is capable of verification while, 
perception means judgement or unsubstantiated statement. Santos and García (2006, 
p.753) defined perception as “the internal sensation that results from a material 
impression made on our senses… the act and fact of perceiving,” or, in other words, 
“receiving external images, impressions or sensations through one of the senses”. 
Similarly, Mezias and Starbuck (2003, p.4) interpreted the term ‘perception’ as the 
sense of mind in which there are many alternative terminologies, such as awareness, 
beliefs, cognition, estimations or sense-making. 
 
There are several factors involved in the coding of factual disclosures. Arnold et al. 
(2011) suggested that the adequacy of a company’s control systems may prevent or 
detect misstatements in financial reporting. Meanwhile, since factual information is 
based on the verifiable facts, Toms (2002) pointed out that the credibility of information 
can increase when such information is submitted voluntarily to audit. However, it has 
been argued that audited information may be merely managerial perception and that this 
can possibly lead to false, misleading, or untruthful accounting; such as, Arthur 
Andersen’s demise and the collapse of several large companies, including Enron, 
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Global Crossing, WorldCom and Tyco Corporate (Bayou et al., 2011). Consequently, 
audited information is not necessary to indicate its factuality when it is linked, directly 
or indirectly, to false, misleading, or untruthful accounting. However, a financial 
statement which is audited by an external auditing firm can be used to support the 
credibility of evidence for classifying factual information. Another issue relating to 
factual information is that the quantified disclosures tend to be factual information. 
Beattie and Thomson (2007, p.153) found that the intellectual capital disclosures of 
Next plc in their annual report for the year 2004 presented 51% quantified disclosures, 
68% of disclosures were factual, and approximately 33% of disclosures were neither 
quantified nor factual. Consequently, almost all of the quantified disclosures were also 
recorded as factual. 
 
Although the quantified disclosures support the determination of factuality, all of the 
quantified information must be analysed with its context before it can be classified as 
factual disclosures. To clarify the characteristic of disclosures, this study has defined the 
factual disclosures and perception as shown in the following table.  
 
Table 5.8  Definitions of factuality and perception, including examples 
Definition Examples 
Factuality is information 
reported as fact which is 
immediately verifiable or 
objective in nature.  
As at 31 December 2008, total loans and advances to 
customers and banks net of impairment allowance were 
£542,118m (2007: £410,789m), a rise of 32% on the 
previous year (Barclays, 2008, p.89). 
Perception is subjective 
information which is not 
immediately verifiable or which 
is opinion.  
The Group ensures that the collateral held is sufficiently 
liquid, legally effective, enforceable, and regularly valued 
(Barclays, 2008, p. 86). 
 
 
5.7  The Recording Unit and the Coding Instruction 
 
The choice of recording unit is an important component in research design and it plays a 
key role in obtaining reliable information because different units may produce strikingly 
different results (Holsti, 1969). The types of recording unit which were reviewed in 
Chapter 4 (i.e. numbers of words, themes and sentences) can all be adopted in content 
analysis; however, coding a sentence as a recording unit has been widely used in 
previous studies of disclosure (e.g. Hackston and Milne, 1996; Beretta and Bozzolan, 
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2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2005a; Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Coding a sentence as a 
recording unit has been widely used in previous studies because it suits analysts who 
need to infer the meaning of the content (Gray et al., 1995). In addition, this recording 
unit provides complete, reliable and meaningful data for further analysis (Milne and 
Adler, 1999). Unlike coding at the level of the phrase, clause or themes, sentences offer 
the advantage of convenient measurement and second coder verification. 
 
Each type of recording unit has its own strengths and weaknesses and the sentence is no 
exception. Using the sentence for the measurement of contents is more accurate than the 
measurement of pages and themes because both themes and pages face the problem of 
difference in length of unit when considering the different annual reports. For example, 
print size, column size and page size may not be compared accurately from one annual 
report to another; however, when comparing measurements between words and 
sentences, words overcome sentences in this point because words can be counted with a 
high degree of accuracy (Unerman, 2000). Meanwhile, the length of sentences can often 
depend on a company’s writing style (Abraham and Cox, 2007) and, therefore, counting 
them is sometimes less accurate than counting words. Although this weakness was 
accepted in this study, it would probably not significantly affect the results because all 
of the sample companies are UK banks whose writing style is based on the same 
linguistic culture. 
 
In this study, using sentences as recording units was performed in three interrogations 
of the characteristics of disclosures, as guided in the coding matrix (see Section 5.2): 
disclosure direction, the time orientation of disclosures, and the disclosure of factuality 
and perception. Three interrogations were used because the meaning in each 
interrogation has the interconnection of meaning for coding that a coder needs to infer 
the meaning of the content. Consequently, the distinction of the sentence approach is 
that it is better able to perform coding than using the word approach alone. Although 
some authors employed sentences for coding and words for counting (Abraham and 
Cox, 2007; Zéghal and Ahmed, 1990), this study agrees with Linsley and Shrives (2006, 
p.393) in that the unit of analysis should be consistent for coding and counting. 
 
A further decision that is required in all content analyses is coding instruction. 
Recording units are considered to be quantification in the system of analysis (Holsti, 
1969) and counting them is one of the simplest summarising measurements in 
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quantitative content analysis (Riffe et al., 2005). The importance of reliability in coding 
rules is also of concern; hence, it is important to justify the characteristics of risk 
disclosures by having a clear coding instrument that can be used so that coding will give 
the same results whether it is performed by the same coder or by different coders. Table 
5.9 shows the coding instruction for risk disclosures in this study: 
 
Table 5.9  Coding instructions for the disambiguation rules used in this study 
Decision Rules for Risk Disclosures 
 Risk disclosures shall be classified according to table 5.3 in Section 5.3, identifying 
thirty-five risk categories. 
 All sentences are to be coded as risk disclosures if the reader is informed of any 
information given by company’s grouping under the heading of risk categories. 
 All of the sentences in a whole paragraph are to be coded as risk disclosures if the 
reader is informed of any information relating to any hazard, danger, harm, 
uncertainty or exposure without giving the heading of risk categories.  
 Although some disclosures may be interpreted as risk, disclosures must be 
specifically stated, which means that they will not be implied. 
 If a disclosure is rather vague about its reference to risk, then it will not be recorded 
as a risk disclosure. 
 If a sentence has more than one possible risk category, then the sentence should be 
classified as to the activity most emphasised in the sentence. 
 Any disclosure that is repeated will be recorded as a risk disclosure sentence in each 
time of disclosure. 
 One sentence is to be coded for three rounds according to the definition of 
characteristics in each type as defined.  
     The first round is for disclosure direction (neutral news or bad news), as defined 
in table 5.5. 
     The second round is for the time orientation of disclosures (past, present, and 
forward-looking information), as provided in table 5.7.  
     The third round is for the factuality and perception, as defined in table 5.8. 
 If a sentence has contained both neutral and bad news, it will be classified into bad 
news. 
 If a sentence has contained both past and forward-looking information, it will be 
classified into forward-looking information. 
 If a sentence has contained both present and forward-looking information, it will be 
classified into forward-looking information. 
 If a sentence has contained both present and past information, it will be classified 
into past information. 
 If a sentence has contained both factuality and perception, it will be classified into 
perception. 
 
Based on the coding instructions in table 5.9, each sentence has been analysed for three 
rounds (the first round for disclosure direction, the second round for time orientation, 
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and the third round for factuality and perception) according to the definition that is 
given in Sections 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6. The recording results were counted and the sum of 
the results was then filled in on the recording sheet in each risk category and each 
company for the individual company analysis. The results in each company were added 
together in totality in order to analyse the overall pattern.  
 
Figure 5.2 shows an excerpt from the examples of the recoding sheets for the 
characteristics of disclosures (for both individual company’s and for all companies). 
 
Figure 5.2  Examples of recording sheets for characteristics of disclosures 
 
The recording 
sheet in each 
risk category 
and each 
company for 
individual 
company 
analysis were 
added together 
in totality to 
analyse the 
overall pattern. 
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As shown in figure 5.2, each sentence was analysed for three rounds, based on each risk 
category of individual company. The first round was conducted for disclosure direction. 
When a company (e.g. HSBC) disclosed bad news, a sentence was coded as ‘B’. When 
the other sentences were analysed, the number of ‘B’ sentences was counted and then 
the sum of the results were filled in on the recording sheet in each risk category. For 
example, in the year 2000, HSBC had no bad news disclosure in the risk management 
category, so the recording sheet showed zero. Similarly, when a company disclosed 
neutral news, a sentence was coded ‘C’. Then the number of ‘C’ of all sentences in each 
category was counted and the sum of the results was filled in on the recording sheet in 
each risk category. For example, in the year 2000, HSBC had thirty-three sentences of 
neutral news in the risk management category.  
 
The second round was conducted for time orientation. When a sentence contained 
forward-looking information, it was coded as ‘D’. Meanwhile, if a sentence was present 
information then it was coded as ‘E’, and if a sentence was past information then it was 
coded as ‘F’. The process of counting each code and filling in on the recording sheet in 
each risk category was performed the same as categorising disclosure direction. For 
example, risk management disclosure of HSBC in the year 2000 contained thirteen 
forward-looking sentences, twenty present sentences, and no past sentence. 
 
The third round was conducted for factuality and perception. If a sentence was fact, it 
was coded as ‘G’ and if a sentence was perception then it was coded as ‘H’. The same 
process of counting each code and filling in on the recording sheet in each risk category 
was performed next. For example the year of 2000, risk management disclosure of 
HSBC had no sentences of fact, but there were thirty-three sentences of perception. 
 
After the process of counting each code and filling in on the recording sheet in each risk 
category was completed, the results in each company were added together in totality to 
analyse the overall pattern. For example, as shown in the lower figure of figure 5.2 all 
companies in the year 2000 disclosed 293 sentences in the risk management category 
with three characteristics. Firstly, disclosure direction was comprised of 5 sentences of 
bad news and 288 sentences of neutral news. Secondly, time orientation was comprised 
of 127 sentences of forward-looking information, 162 sentences of present information, 
and 4 sentences of past information. Thirdly, factuality and perception was comprised 
of 57 sentences of fact and 236 sentences of perception.  
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5.8  The Quality of Risk Disclosures 
 
Research into disclosures in annual reports has recently become increasingly interested 
in their quality (Bayou et al., 2011), especially following the collapse of several large 
companies (e.g. Enron, Global Crossing, WorldCom and Tyco Corporate). Beretta and 
Bozzolan (2004, p.285) proposed that the quality of disclosure depends both on the 
quantity of information disclosed and on the richness offered by additional 
information.
8
 In terms of quantity, they examined the amount of content disclosure 
provided by companies, whereas the richness of information concerning the future 
prospects was proposed for three factors, which are:  
1) The economic sign attributed to expected impacts;9  
2) The types of measures used to quantify and qualify the expected impacts;10 and,  
3) The managerial approach to the management of risks.  
 
However, Botosan (2004, p.293) found that this framework is difficult to follow and is 
not sufficiently well developed to measure the quality of a firm’s risk disclosures. For 
example, Botosan (2004) argued that this framework meant that the future prospects 
may help analysts to forecast a company’s earnings more accurately than being assessed 
as risk disclosures. This controversial opinion may stem from the different definitions of 
risk that were used by Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), who defined risk as both 
opportunities and failures, while Botosan (2004) only focused on the adverse effects of 
risk. Botosan (2004) also proposed the well-known conceptual frameworks for 
information quality of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which 
identified four qualitative characteristics of information that enhance the usefulness of 
information to economic decision makers, which are:  
1) Understandability;  
2) Relevance;  
3) Reliability; and, 
4) Comparability.  
                                                          
8
 Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) studied the framework of risk communication of nonfinancial companies 
(chemical, clothing, electronic, food, media, transport, and utility) listed in the ordinary market of the 
Italian Stock Exchange at the end of 2001. 
9
 The economic sign communicates the direction of the expected impact of risks upon the future 
performance of the firm (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004, p.270). 
10
 The type of measure used in order to specify the economic sign. The measurement can be expressed in 
qualitative or quantitative terms, using either monetary or nonmonetary scales (Beretta and Bozzolan, 
2004, p.270). 
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To examine the quality of disclosure, some authors have employed a content analysis 
approach that focuses on the volumetric count as a proxy of disclosure (Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004; Lajili and Zéghal, 2005; Linsley et al., 2006; Hill and Short, 2009). In 
contrast, other authors have argued that this approach appears unable to provide 
understandable information reflecting its quality by counting (Laan Smith et al., 2005). 
Therefore, some authors have used indices of disclosure to measure the different level 
of quality disclosed (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Wallace and Naser, 1995). However, 
unlike the scale metric, the competency of assessing the different level by such indices 
still faces the problem of clarity (Marston and Shrives, 1991). When compared to 
quantitative information, qualitative information deals with the increasing level of 
complexity of business strategies, operations, and regulations (Marston and Shrives, 
1991); hence, the measurement of quality is more complex than the measurement of 
quantity (Linsley and Shrives, 2006).  
 
Each method has its own advantages. So far, however, this study has employed the 
volumetric count for examining characteristics of disclosures (as discussed in Sections 
5.4, 5.5, and 5.6). In terms of the indices of disclosure, this method was also used for 
the interrogation of quality of risk disclosures by scoring the distinct levels of quality. 
 
Since information in the annual report consists of both qualitative and quantitative data, 
both were used in this study to distinguish the level of disclosure quality. In order to 
weight disclosures, the researcher needs to justify the disclosure quality of both 
qualitative and quantitative information (Beattie and Thomson, 2007). In terms of 
qualitative information, the narrative component of financial communication is able to 
convey messages for clarifying and validating; it is also able to offer useful insights into 
risk reporting. Understandability and relevance are factors in the IASB framework, 
which provide sufficient information about risk and offering management, or 
mitigation, of risk. Consequently, the importance of sufficient information and 
disclosures of risk management were considered in order to classify the distinct level of 
quality.  
 
There are two striking points of quantitative disclosures that enable them to gain higher 
scores when companies disclose quantified information in risk reporting. Firstly, with 
regard to the importance of quantified information, some authors have examined the 
proportion of quantitative risk disclosures in annual reports. For example, Linsley et al. 
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(2006) found that the proportions of qualitative and quantitative disclosures in annual 
reports were 67% and 33%, respectively. Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) reported that 
15.2% of risks disclosed were quantitative against 31% qualitative, while 53.8% were 
not disclosed. From the previous studies, it is evident that the volume of quantitative 
disclosures is lower than qualitative disclosures. This happens because quantified risk 
information is easier to understand than qualitative information. Therefore, it is not 
necessary to disclose as much as quantitative risk information as qualitative risk 
information (Linsley et al., 2006). Consequently, quantitative risk information is 
considered to possess greater information value than qualitative disclosure. 
Accordingly, in this study quantitative risk information was weighted more highly than 
pure qualitative risk information in an index of the pilot study. Secondly, since 
comparability is one of the disclosure qualities in the IASB framework, longitudinal 
analysis and cross-sectional analysis are key issues and they require that risk disclosures 
should be assessed for comparability of these disclosures (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). 
Therefore, this study has adopted both methods to examine the quality of disclosures. 
Moreover, regarding the usefulness of qualitative information and comparability, this 
study also gave a higher level of quality when companies disclose a comparison of 
numeric information.  
 
From the literature review it was found that quantitative information and comparability 
should be weighted more than pure qualitative information (Beck et al., 2010). 
Consequently, this study generated the indices to measure disclosure quality in the pilot 
study by having four levels, from the level of minimal discussion with pure narrative 
(level 1) to the level of providing comparison of quantified information, including 
qualitative explanations (level 4) (see Section 5.10.3). However, these indices have 
faced the problem of the definition of the meaning of qualitative information, and the 
effects of mixing qualitative and quantitative measurement. Therefore, new indices were 
developed for the main study following the lessons that were learned in the pilot study 
(see Section 5.11). 
 
 
5.9  Frequency (By Year) of Newspaper Hits by Risk Category 
 
News reports are some of the most important sources of information about society and 
politics (Ohkura, 2003; Boykoff, 2008). Many researchers accept that news media have 
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an influence on public perception when events and concepts are reported (Barkemeyer 
et al., 2010; Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012; Pasquaré and Oppizzi, 2012; An et al., 2011; 
Joshi et al., 2011). Furthermore, authors understand the role of media attention in 
different ways. For example, Norris (2001) proposed that the media serve three key 
functions, which are: to act as a civic forum; to act as a mobilising agent for change or 
action; and to act as a watchdog overseeing behaviour. Meanwhile, Yoo (2011) 
identified four factors that influence behaviour and attitude towards online newspapers, 
which are: information-seeking; pastime; entertainment; and socialisation. Meanwhile, 
Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), and Pasquaré and Oppizzi (2012) suggested the five 
frames that are used in the news media, which are: conflict; (economic) consequences; 
responsibility; human interest; and morality.  
 
News coverage can differ considerably depending on people’s behaviour and their 
attitudes related to the issue being discussed. However, it is commonly believed that a 
careful analysis of media coverage in a particular issue can influence not only the level 
of awareness of particular issues but also the prominence of their coverage (Barkemeyer 
et al., 2010; Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012). Therefore, this study has measured the number 
of newspaper hits about risk issues in order to analyse the public concern about the 
importance of risk in the banking and finance sector. Moreover, the correlation between 
risk issues published in the UK newspapers and risk disclosures in annual report was 
also examined. 
 
It is not widely known that media reporting can have an influence on attitudes and risk 
perception (Vilella-Vila and Costa-Font, 2008). These relationships also articulate 
public opinion and become more intense as concerns about risk rises in society, which 
include the relevance of risk disclosure by these companies. Some researchers have 
found that media attention influences firm behaviour (Koning et al., 2010; 
Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012). In addition, Carvalho and Burgess (2005) found that media 
coverage has a significant impact on risk reporting. Moreover, Dyck et al. (2008) 
pointed out that press coverage increases the probability of companies taking action to 
improve corporate governance. In their study of the relationship between risk reporting 
and public interest, Dahlstrom et al. (2011) indicated that an increase in levels of precise 
risk information in the media has a positive correlation with the rationale for risk 
perceptions in the public. Meanwhile, critical news that is reported by regulators 
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through the media is also indicated to impact awareness among investors, they can also 
change the companies’ reporting behaviour (Koning et al., 2010). 
 
The review of the influence of media coverage on public perception which was 
conducted in this study has found that newspapers are one of the most important mass 
media channels that provides in-depth coverage of the issues. The number of newspaper 
citations can help to convey the public’s interest in many subjects (Joshi et al., 2011). 
Consequently, in this study, content analysis of the news coverage through the UK 
newspapers was conducted over the period from 1995 to 2010 (see Section 5.1.2 for a 
more detailed discussion of why this time period was adopted in the longitudinal 
sample). Furthermore, using the defined risk categories to retrieve the number of 
newspaper citations was performed on the LexisNexis electronic database. LexisNexis 
has become the most popular online searchable tool in content analysis for searching an 
archive of important newspapers and magazines, financial records, interview questions 
and results of opinion polls, legislative materials and court decisions (Krippendorff, 
2004, p. 274). This may be because text analysis is the most widely used tool by many 
researchers who wish to examine news content (Neuendorf, 2002). In this study, 
LexisNexis was also used via Newcastle University database archives to search citations 
of risk news. Although the LexisNexis database includes hundreds of sources of UK 
and international news, only UK newspapers were selected in this study. Furthermore, 
text searches were based on the keywords of thirty-five risk categories (as defined in 
table 5.3) to capture risk issues and to count the number of newspaper citations. 
 
The semantic validity of the search results of an archive depends on the quality of the 
archive’s collections and on the systems of access (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 275). To 
retrieve the relevant newspaper hits, this study has used two stages dealing with the 
archive’s collections. The first stage was the assignment of the number of UK 
newspaper publishers. There are one hundred publishers stored within the database 
archive of UK newspaper publishers. However, not all of the publishers met the criteria 
that they had to provide risk news according to the keywords of thirty-five risk 
categories over a period of sixteen years between 1995 and 2010. In addition, many 
publishers have not been stored in the database contiguously during this period (i.e. 
1995 to 2010). After a verifiable process was set according to these criteria, it was 
found that there were fourteen publications that met the selection criteria:  
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   1) Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday;     2) Daily Record & Sunday Mail;  
   3) The Evening Standard (London);     4) The Guardian (London);  
   5) The Herald (Glasgow);       6) The Independent (London);  
   7) The Mirror and The Sunday Mirror;     8) The Northern Echo;  
   9) The Observer;        10) The People;  
   11) The Scotsman & Scotland on Sunday;     12) The Sunday Time (London);  
   13) Times Higher Education Supplement;     14) The Times (London). 
 
The second stage was the creation of groups of keywords to meet programmed criteria. 
It is difficult to capture all of the newspaper hits in a database archive if thirty-five risk 
categories are used as search keywords because one keyword can have more than one 
close meaning. Moreover, the meaning of some words which are used to refer to risk 
categories in annual reports may differ from their meaning in newspaper publications. 
Therefore, some risk categories which have a close meaning were expanded in order to 
retrieve all of the number of newspaper hits related to this group of keywords, as in 
table 5.10: 
 
Table 5.10  The group of keywords as used in LexisNexis  
Risk Categories Group of Keywords 
Liquidity and funding risk Liquidity risk, Funding risk 
Cross-border risk Country risk, Cross-border risk 
Currency risk Currency risk, Foreign exchange rate risk 
Risk related to derivatives Risk related to derivatives, Risk of derivatives, Derivative risk 
Hedged risk Hedging risk, Hedged risk 
Operational risk Operation risk, Operational risk 
Legal and Regulation risk Legal risk, Regulation risk, Regulatory risk, Compliance risk 
Capital management risk Capital management risk, Capital risk 
Insurance and Investment 
risk 
Insurance and investment risk, Insurance risk, Investment risk 
Strategic and Business risk Strategic and business risk, Strategic risk, Strategy risk, 
Business risk Reputation risk Reputation risk, Reputational risk 
Risk related to fair value Risk related to fair value , Fair value risk, Risk of fair value 
Financial crime risk Fraud risk, Financial crime risk 
Safety and security risk Safety and security risk, Safety risk, Security risk 
Leasing risk Leasing risk, Residual value risk, Risk of lease 
Sustainability risk Sustainability risk, Environment risk, Environmental risk 
Customer treatment Customer risk 
People risk People risk, Staff risk 
Risk related to impairment Risk related to impairment, Impairment risk 
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Using the keywords as detailed in table 5.10, the number of newspaper citations in each 
risk category between 1995 and 2010 that were retrieved from the LexisNexis database 
were recorded on a recording sheet. Figure 5.3 is an excerpt from an example recording 
sheet that was used to record the frequency (by year) of newspaper hits by risk category.  
 
Figure 5.3  An example of the recording sheet as recorded the frequency (by year) of  
newspaper hits by risk category  
 
 
 
 
5.10  The Pilot Study 
 
To develop the research method, it is important to test a particular research instrument 
before a major study is undertaken. The pilot study is an appropriate choice for 
developing and testing the accuracy of the research instrument. Moreover, it is crucial 
that the coding scheme should be reflected upon at the conclusion of such a study 
because it affects the reliability of the method. Therefore, to achieve both accuracy and 
reliability, the annual reports of all sample companies (i.e. Barclays, HSBC, HBOS, 
Lloyds, RBS, and NatWest) in 2008 (the latest year that annual reports existed in the 
time of testing) were employed to perform the pilot study, with three concerns: testing 
the method, reliability, and any problems that may be found in the pilot study. 
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5.10.1   Testing the method 
 
Testing the coding scheme presents a number of problems, including the possibility of 
making an inaccurate ‘scope of testing’ on the basis of pilot data (such as problems 
related to inappropriate assumption) and any other problems arising from testing. The 
research supervisor plays a key role in supporting the assessment of whether each 
coding rule is difficult or ambiguous, and also in checking that all coding decisions are 
able to answer the research questions. The supervisor in this study performed both these 
roles, beginning with the test. The following issues were the key points that were found 
in the pilot study, and addressing these issues was essential to improving the coding 
scheme. 
 
Firstly, the areas of analysis covered all sections in the annual reports because the initial 
performance of the test found that risks may be disclosed in all sections, which are not 
specific to merely risk management in the financial overview section.  
 
Secondly, all of the risk disclosures must be straightforwardly captured by using the 
words according to the risk categories that are given in table 5.3, which means that the 
vague disclosures (those that may or may not be intended as risk disclosures) will not be 
counted. Although some statements in annual reports that provided the heading of risk 
categories were clearly able to be classified as risk categories, some texts had no such 
signification and it would be unreliable to code them as risk disclosures. Therefore, only 
texts that contain words of risk or any information relating to hazard, danger, harm, 
exposure, and uncertainty were ultimately considered for coding. 
 
Thirdly, the use of sentences as a unit of analysis aims to measure three characteristics 
of risk disclosures. This was reflected upon and the three qualitative interrogations were 
finalised:  
1) Disclosure direction;  
2) The time orientation of disclosure; and, 
3) The disclosures of factuality and perception.  
The method development for examining these characteristics was described in Section 
5.4, Section 5.5, and Section 5.6. Their coding instruction was concluded in table 5.9 of 
Section 5.7. 
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Fourthly, regardless of the number of sentence, the quality of disclosures was assessed 
by using risk categories as themes. This method was developed and described in Section 
5.8. 
 
Fifthly, based on the indicative terms for each risk category, another interrogation for 
examining risk disclosures was developed by using the LexisNexis online database. 
Some words that are used to refer to risk categories in annual reports may differ from 
their meaning in newspaper publications; therefore, some indicative terms of risk 
categories which have a close meaning were expanded in order to retrieve all of the 
number of newspaper hits related to this group of keywords. Additionally, all of the UK 
newspaper publishers that have been stored in the database contiguously during 1995 to 
2010 were verified to select only those publications that met these criteria. The details 
of this development are described in Section 5.9.  
 
Sixthly, the recording sheets were well organised to support the multiple variables 
according to three main recording, sentences, themes, and newspapers hits. These 
recording sheets had advantages, both for rechecking their accuracy and for creating 
new sheets that could enhance understanding for the relevant variables. 
 
Finally, all of the recording sheets in this pilot study were submitted to the supervisor in 
order to obtain his advice and to discuss their use. The results of the discussion were 
used to improve the coding scheme and the new coding rules then were then brought to 
practise again before being used in the main study. 
 
 
5.10.2   Reliability 
 
Reliability was discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Several studies have defined reliability 
as a measuring procedure that yields the same results on repeated trials, even though it 
is made by different coders (Holsti, 1969; Weber, 1990; Neuendorf, 2002; 
Krippendorff, 2004; Riffe et al., 2005). Consequently, reliability is crucial to content 
analysis. The problem of assessing reliability comes from testing coder agreement in 
order to verify the assumption that content coding is determined by the concept 
definitions (Riffe et al., 2005, p.124). Moreover, Holsti (1969, p.135) described 
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reliability as a function of coders’ skill, insight, and experience, the clarity of categories 
and coding rules which guide their use, and the degree of ambiguity in the data. 
 
The coder’s ability is one of the most important factors for achieving reliability in 
content analysis. Consequently, a coder should receive adequate training in the 
classification of categories (Milne and Adler, 1999; Riffe et al., 2005). Moreover, the 
clarity of categories that is defined clearly to increase the precision in coder’s judgment 
is also a critical factor in content analysis (Holsti, 1969; Milne and Adler, 1999). 
Therefore, testing the method is able to improve both the coder’s ability and the clarity 
of the coding rules, which both affect the level of reliability. 
 
In this study, stability (test-retest condition or intracoder assessment) is one of three 
types of testing for reliability that was adopted. This type of reliability test is referred to 
as the extent to which a measuring or coding procedure yields the same results on 
repeated trials (Krippendorff, 2004, p.215). Unlike reproducibility and accuracy, which 
are both types of reliability test that require more than one coder, in stability or 
intracoder assessment on coder can measure the reliability in coding when performing 
the test more than once (Weber, 1990). Since this study had a single coder, stability was 
tested to verify the results of coding. The complete coding rules were tested twice at 
different points in time. The first recording of results from sample companies (i.e. six 
banks) in 2008 was performed after revising the coding rules. It was then re-recorded 
two weeks later to test for the stability of recording. The results from the different 
points in time were recorded in recording sheets, which were then compared with the 
prior test. The results of this comparison showed that there was no significant difference 
in coding. Moreover, turning to the process before having completed the coding rules, 
the results of testing were discussed with the supervisor. Following this, the coding 
rules were revised. The test was then performed as described in stability. Regardless of 
the results in the changing rules part, the other results had no substantial difference in 
results as compared with the previous test before the rules were changed.  
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5.10.3   The problem of measuring the quality of risk disclosure 
 
Based on the literature review in Section 5.8, this study has generated the indices in 
table 5.11, which are based on the study of Beck et al. (2010),
11
 in order to measure the 
level of disclosure quality in the pilot study. 
 
Table 5.11  The definitions of quality levels of risk disclosures  
Quality Level Definition 
1 Disclosing with mention only, or mention with minimal discussion, pure 
narrative. 
2 Disclosing with contextualised explanations, pure narrative. 
3 Disclosures provide issues related to category in a numerical way, 
including qualitative explanations, and narrative and quantitative 
disclosures. 
4 Disclosures provide issues related to category in comparison of quantified 
information, including qualitative explanations, and narrative and 
comparison of quantitative information. 
 
According to the above indices, the testing method in the pilot study faced two 
problems. Firstly, quality level 2 was defined too broadly to capture the quality of risk 
disclosures when considering the sufficiency of information to justify its level. This 
happened because some risk categories provided merely general discussion, which 
achieved the same level as some of the risk categories that contained a large volume of 
description in risk and exposure (including how companies managed and mitigated that 
risk). Secondly, mixing quantitative disclosures with qualitative disclosure has misled 
the appropriate consideration of the quality level because both quantitative and 
qualitative reporting have their own distinctive characteristics of quality level, which 
means that it can be the difficulty to measure two different quality levels in the same 
measurement. For example, some risk categories provided only minimal risk discussion 
while they should reach quality level 1, but when these categories were added to the 
comparison of numeric information they jumped to achieve quality level 4. The 
evidence of this problem is corroborated by Bozzolan et al. (2009, p.466), who found 
                                                          
11
   Beck et al. (2010, p.213) evaluated information content by five different levels of disclosure content 
as follows: 1) disclosure addresses issue related to category definition, pure narrative; 2) disclosure 
addresses issue related to category and provides details, pure narrative; 3) disclosure addresses issue 
related to category in numerical way, purely quantitative; 4) disclosure addresses issue related to 
category in numerical way, including qualitative explanations, narrative and quantitative; and 5) any 
numerical disclosure to the category including qualitative statements demonstrating year comparisons; 
narrative, quantitative and comparable. 
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that quantity and quality effects must be separated. Consequently, new indices were 
developed from the above issues, which will be described in the next section.  
 
 
5.11  Following the Pilot Study 
 
Following on from the problem of measuring quality of risk disclosure in the pilot study 
(see Section 5.10.3), there were two main problems about the definition of qualitative 
disclosures and the effects of mixing quantitative and qualitative measurements. 
Therefore, new indices were developed from two issues: separating quantitative 
disclosures from qualitative disclosures and improving the definition of qualitative 
disclosures. Table 5.12 and table 5.13 provide the new indices that were developed from 
the lessons learned in the pilot study. 
 
Table 5.12  Definitions of the quality levels of qualitative disclosure  
Qualitative 
Disclosure Level 
(QL) 
Definition 
QL1 Disclosing with mention only, or mention with minimal discussion. 
QL2 Disclosing with contextualised explanations of risk and exposure. 
QL3 
Disclosing with contextualised explanations of risk and exposure, 
including a description of management or mitigation of that risk. 
 
Table 5.13  Definitions of the quality levels of quantitative disclosure 
Quantitative 
Disclosure Level 
(QN) 
Definition 
QN1 Disclosure of issue related to the category in a numerical way. 
QN2 Numerical disclosure to the category against comparison. 
 
 
As both indices were developed, each risk category disclosed in the annual report was 
recorded as a theme. The narrative was analysed on the basis of the defined qualitative 
level that is given in table 5.12, while the coding of numerical disclosures was based on 
the defined quantitative level that is given in table 5.13. All of the contents related to 
each defined table were interpreted in overall assessment in order to identify the quality 
level in each risk category and each sample bank. Figure 5.4 provides an excerpt from 
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an example of a recording sheet which was used to record the qualitative and 
quantitative disclosure level in each risk category, for all companies and for all years. 
 
Figure 5.4  An example of a recording sheet that was used to record quality level 
 
 
 
As shown in figure 5.4, each risk category (by year) of the annual report of each 
individual company was analysed as a theme for two rounds. Firstly, the narrative was 
evaluated on the basis of the defined qualitative level which is given in table 5.12. Three 
different levels of qualitative disclosure were used as coding categories (i.e. QL1, QL2, 
and QL 3), although a fourth field (i.e. zero, for non-disclosure of that category) was 
also present. For example, in 2010, HSBC disclosed information in the risk 
management category with contextualised explanations of risk and exposure, including 
a description of management, or mitigation, of that risk (i.e. QL3); therefore, the 
recording sheet showed ‘3’ in the qualitative disclosure level of risk management 
category. 
 
Secondly, the numerical disclosure of each risk category was evaluated on the basis of 
the defined quantitative level that is given in table 5.13. Two different levels of 
quantitative disclosure were used as coding categories (i.e. QN1 and QN2), although a 
third field (i.e. zero, for non-disclosure of that category or no numerical disclosure) was 
also present. For example, in 2010, HSBC disclosed information in the risk 
management category with purely qualitative information without any numerical 
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information; therefore the recording sheet showed ‘zero’ in the quantitative disclosure 
level of the risk management category. 
 
 
5.12  Summary 
 
The stages of method development have been described and presented in this chapter. 
The first stage began with sample selection. The annual reports of six banks (Barclays, 
HSBC, HBOS, Lloyds, RBS, and NatWest) over a sixteen year period between 1995 
and 2010 were selected to examine risk disclosures, in both longitudinal and 
intrasectoral effects. The risk disclosures of all sample companies were investigated by 
constructing a coding matrix. This matrix was developed to analyse the risk disclosures 
for six interrogations. 
 
The first interrogation was risk categories, consisting of thirty-five categories. 
Establishing risk categories brought the other interrogations into the verifiable scope of 
the research process. According to the defined risk categories, the characteristics of risk 
disclosures were examined by developing three interrogations, which are: disclosure 
direction (second interrogation), the time orientation of disclosures (third interrogation), 
and the disclosures of factuality and perception (fourth interrogation). The final coding 
instrument in each interrogation had various sub-categories. Disclosure direction 
consisted of two directions, neutral news and bad news. The time orientation of 
disclosure had three indicating terms: present, past, and forward-looking. For the 
interrogation related to factuality and perception, risk disclosures were distinguished 
between fact and perception according to defined rules. To analyse the characteristics of 
disclosures containing three interrogations stated above, sentences as units of analysis 
and their coding rules were established for the clarity of decision in analysis. 
 
With regard to the strength of theme, risk categories were used as themes in developing 
the fifth interrogation in order to examine the quality of disclosures containing both a 
qualitative aspect and a quantitative aspect. The sixth interrogation was developed to 
examine how press media reporting has influenced risk categories disclosure. By 
developing this interrogation, the number of newspaper citations related to risk 
categories was retrieved from fourteen publishers on the electronic database, 
LexisNexis. 
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The next stage addressed in this chapter was the pilot study, which was used to develop 
and test the accuracy of the research instrument. Testing on the basis of pilot data was 
performed to gain clear coding rules. Stability, or test-retest condition, was employed in 
this study to increase the reliability of the research method. Finally, the problem of 
measuring the quality of disclosures was found and was improved after the lessons were 
learned from the pilot study. 
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Chapter 6. Overall Findings and Analysis 
 
 
The previous chapters have presented the underpinnings and development of the content 
analysis method. In Chapter 5, the sample selection was described and justified. The 
findings and analysis in this chapter include an overall view of the findings for all six 
companies (i.e. RBS, NatWest, Lloyds TSB, HBOS, Barclays, and HSBC) in ninety-six 
annual reports that were published between 1995 and 2010. A total of 65,256 sentences 
were found and investigated, they were then used as recording units related to risk 
disclosure. The analysis of the risk disclosures for all years, and all companies was 
performed on all narrative sections, including the notes to the accounts (which are 
comprised of the basis of financial statement preparation, the summary of significant 
accounting policies details of assets and liabilities, and other additional information 
relating to a company’s periodic reports).  
 
The following sections outline the findings of the analysis of the longitudinal data by all 
years and all companies. Section 6.1 analyses by total volume, and by risk category. 
Section 6.2 analyses by information richness. And finally, Section 6.3 analyses the 
association between volumes of longitudinal banking sector risk disclosures against the 
intensity of societal discussion as proxied by the frequency, by year, of relevant 
newspaper citations, by risk category. 
 
 
6.1  Analysing Longitudinal Risk Category Membership in All Years and in All 
Companies 
 
In terms of sufficient risk information, the amount of risk information plays an 
important role in supporting stakeholder decision-making. Consequently, to perform 
volumetric analysis for the sample companies, sentences from all narrative of the annual 
reports were used to examine risk disclosures. The risk categories were classified and 
then the numbers of sentences in each risk category were counted to reflect the 
longitudinal patterns and trends.  
 
The data in table 6.1 presents the ranking number of sentences disclosed (from the most 
risk disclosure to the least risk disclosure) by risk category (in all years and in all 
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companies), including an average number of sentences per annual report, a minimised 
number of sentences per annual report, and a maximised number of sentences per 
annual report. 
 
Table 6.1  Overall statistical number of risk disclosures in each risk category, in all 
years and in all companies 
Ranking 
Number 
Risk Category Total 
Mean  
Per 
Annual 
Report 
Min Max 
  
Total number of sentences (in 
all companies and in all years) 65,256 4,079     1,075      9,941  
1 Credit risk 14,958 935       273      2,446  
2 Risk management 7,996 500       100      1,425  
3 Market risk 5,530 346        61        774  
4 Insurance and Investment risk 4,393 275         3        727  
5 Liquidity and funding risk 4,176 261        37        732  
6 Capital management risk 3,887 243        72        721  
7 Legal and regulation risk 3,443 215        69        638  
8 Risk related to derivatives 3,441 215       165        301  
9 Interest rate risk 2,510 157        58        234  
10 Operational risk 2,243 140        -         493  
11 Risk related to impairment 2,144 134        -         406  
12 Risk related to fair value 1,662 104        -         480  
13 Strategic and Business risk 1,441 90        -         396  
14 Currency risk 1,284 80        37        115  
15 Hedged risk 857 54        17        140  
16 Special purpose entities 854 53        -         286  
17 Cross-border risk  746 47        18        141  
18 Sustainability risk 654 41        -         133  
19 Economic risk 550 34        -         164  
20 Pension risk 406 25        -         116  
21 Reputation risk 257 16        -          62  
22 Tax risk 253 16        -          64  
23 Leasing risk 237 15        -          37  
24 Safety and security risk 219 14        -          38  
25 People risk 215 13        -          88  
26 Financial crime risk 195 12        -          54  
27 Equity risk 166 10        -          29  
28 Customer treatment 165 10        -          41  
29 Industries risk 147 9        -          77  
30 Governance risk 73 5        -          23  
31 Competition risk 56 4        -          22  
32 Change risk 33 2        -          10  
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Ranking 
Number 
Risk Category Total 
Mean  
Per 
Annual 
Report 
Min Max 
33 Political risk 29 2        -          10  
34 Financial report risk 22 1        -          19  
35 Technology risk 14 1        -          11  
 
The statistical data in table 6.1 presents the overall view of findings which is found by 
counting the number of risk disclosure sentences for all six companies with ninety-six 
annual reports over sixteen years between 1995 and 2010. The total number of risk 
disclosures over sixteen years was 65,256 sentences, the average number of risk 
disclosure was 4,079 sentences per annual report, and the highest was 9,941 sentences 
while the lowest was 1,075 sentences. 
 
To identify what risk categories have an influence on disclosures of all banks, the 
volume of sentences was counted and the risk categories disclosed were ranked. The top 
ten risk categories included credit risk, risk management, market risk, insurance and 
investment risk, liquidity and funding risk, capital management risk, legal and 
regulation risk, risk related to derivatives, interest rate risk, and operational risk. 
Meanwhile, the minimum risk categories show that there were twenty-three out of the 
thirty-five risk categories that showed zero. This means that the companies did not 
disclose some categories in their annual reports for certain years. To describe the 
development of risk disclosure of all companies by focusing on risk categories, figure 
6.1 shows the average number of risk categories between 1995 and 2010, for all 
companies. 
 
Figure 6.1  Average number of categories of risk disclosure, for all companies 
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As can be seen from figure 6.1, the number of risk categories disclosed has risen over 
time in all companies. The average lowest category disclosed was eight categories in 
1995 and the average highest was twenty-five categories in 2010. To analyse risk 
categories disclosure, volumetric analysis was developed on the basis of the content of 
disclosures and topics that have been disclosed by all of the sample companies. Figure 
6.2 shows the overall trend of risk disclosures measured by the number of sentences 
disclosed over a period of 1995 to 2010, for all risk categories and for all companies. 
 
Figure 6.2  The number of sentences disclosed, in all risk categories and in all 
companies, by year 
 
 
The above figure shows that the number of sentences (for all risks and for all 
companies) has increased over time from 1,075 sentences in 1995 to 9,941 sentences in 
2010, which is an approximate nine times increase. When considering the results of 
increasing both number of risk categories (see figure 6.1) and the volume of disclosures 
(see figure 6.2), it can be seen that there was a smooth upward trend in the quantity of 
risk disclosures over the period of 1995 to 2010. However, although number of 
sentences has experienced a smooth increase over time, this is likely to conceal some 
switch-points and fluctuations in certain risk categories. Therefore, the following 
findings and analysis are divided into three main patterns of disclosure, which are: 
1) A smooth increase in volume;  
2) Change in volume with switch points; and,  
3) Volume fluctuation. 
Each of these three categories will be explored in more depth in the subsections which 
follow. 
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6.1.1   A smooth increase in volume 
 
The increase in volumetric disclosures depends on business activities (such as key 
assumptions underpinning risk appetite) and the management decisions which are 
anticipated to be necessary to mitigate risks. Consequently, it was found that there were 
three risk disclosures which contained a smooth change in volume, which are detailed in 
figures 6.3 to 6.5. 
 
Figure 6.3  Disclosure of risk management, for all companies 
 
 
Figure 6.4  Disclosure of market risk, for all companies 
 
 
Figure 6.5  Disclosure of risk related to capital management, for all companies 
 
From these figures it can be seen that there were clear smooth longitudinal volumetric 
increases in risk management, market risk, and risk related to capital management. 
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6.1.2   Change in volume with switch points 
 
It should be highlighted that in the period between 2005 and 2009 there was a range of 
time occurring volumetric increases with clear switch points in seventeen risk 
categories, as detailed in table 6.2 below: 
 
Table 6.2  Risk categories with switching increase in volume of risk disclosure (all 
companies), by year 
Switching Year Risk Categories 
2005 1) Risk related to fair value 
2) Risk related to impairment 
3) Hedged risk 
4) Insurance and investment risk  
5) Tax risk 
2006 6) Sustainability risk 
7) Economic risk 
8) Pension risk 
2007 9) Liquidity and funding risk 
10) Credit risk 
11) Operational risk 
12) Financial crime risk 
13) Special purpose entities 
2008 14) Strategic and business risk 
15) Reputation risk 
16) Equity risk 
2009 17) Legal and regulations risk 
 
To illustrate the characteristic of switching increase in volume of disclosure, Figure 6.6 
shows the sample of risk categories which have a clear switching increase in volume of 
risk disclosure in 2005. 
 
Figure 6.6  Disclosure of insurance and funding risk, for all companies  
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Appendix A contains all of the figures that illustrate the risk categories (for all years and 
for all companies) that have a significant switching increase in volume of risk 
disclosure, as classified by year. Meanwhile, the following sections describe the 
possible reasons why these risk categories have a significant switching increase in 
volume of risk disclosure, as classified by year. 
 
 
a) Switch point in 2005 
 
The year 2005 was a switching year for five risk categories, which are: risk related to 
fair value; risk related to impairment; hedging risk; insurance and investment risk; and, 
tax risk. The reason for this significant increase was that in 2005 the International 
Accounting Standard 32 ‘Financial Instruments: Presentation’ (‘IAS 32’), IAS 39 
‘Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement’ (‘IAS 39’), and IFRS 4 
‘Insurance Contracts’ (‘IFRS 4’) were all adopted for the first time. This introduction 
led to an increased level of risk disclosures in all companies, which was related to 
financial instrument and insurance risk. It also impacted on tax disclosures because of 
the effects of the change in accounting standards.  
 
 
b) Switch point in 2006 
 
The year 2006 was a switching year of three risk categories: sustainability risk, 
economic risk, and pension risk. The remarkable increase in disclosure of sustainability 
risk reflects the policy and actions of companies in response to the needs of sustainable 
development in order to mitigate environmental effects. In 2006 many companies 
responded to environmental concerns, including risk disclosures on issues of 
environmental awareness. The public concern about environmental risks at that time 
may relate to a 2006 documentary film ‘An Inconvenient Truth’, directed by Davis 
Guggenheim about former United States Vice President Al Gore's campaign to educate 
citizens about global warming via an informative slide show. Carbon neutral awareness 
attracted wide-ranging public interest and this in turn led to a marked growth in 
disclosures in 2006. In addition, sustainability risk also involves social and community 
issues, the environment, and the need for responsible global citizenship, which are all 
likely to affect a firm’s corporate image. 
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The disclosures of economic risk and pension risk were also at a switching point in 
2006, which was the beginning period of the current economic slowdown. The UK 
Consumer Price Index (‘CPI’) inflation rate increased through the year, from 1.9% in 
January to 3% in December. This rise in inflation was coupled with large increases in 
the prices of petrol and gas. In response, the Bank of England raised the interest rate 
from 4.5% to 5%. At the same time, a number of households were struggling with the 
burden of debt as personal insolvencies and repossessions increased as a result of an 
increase in the unemployment rate. 
 
 
c) Switch point in 2007  
 
The year 2007 was a switching year for five risk categories: liquidity and funding risk, 
credit risk, operational risk, financial crime risk, and risk related to special purpose 
entities. It is evident that these risk categories, which experienced a switching increase 
pattern, were related to the 2007 financial crisis. This crisis revealed that massive 
financial frauds and misconduct have long been a part of the enormous risks taken by 
many banks and financial institutions (Tomasic, 2011). The crisis of 2007 developed 
from the sub-prime credit problems that followed the collapse of the US housing market 
and the subsequent devaluation of many American mortgages. The severity of the crisis 
affected credit markets, constraining the banks’ ability to lend because of the 
deterioration in credit quality. This was coupled with a lack of liquidity in the market, 
which led to the need to manage liquidity resources and capital in order to run the 
ongoing banking systems.  
 
In August 2007, the interbank markets experienced severe pressure to raise massive 
amounts of liquidity; however, it was very difficult to increase capital at that time due to 
significant changes in the collateralised markets and high levels of low quality collateral 
(Allen and Carletti, 2010). Moreover, a lack of confidence among financial institutions 
and investors, especially fears about their financial stability, made it much more 
difficult for them to improve their liquidity. This crisis of confidence, which became 
known as the credit crunch, later caused a credit crisis (Andersen et al., 2012). During 
the autumn of 2007 the prices of subprime securitisations continued to worsen and 
many financial institutions began to face adverse effects. Although the financial system, 
and in particular banks, came under tremendous strain during this time, this was not the 
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riskiest or the worst effect. This period has been identified as the initial phase of the 
crisis (Pisani-Ferry and Sapir, 2010). 
 
 
d) Switch point in 2008 
 
The year 2008 was a switching year for three risk categories: strategic and business risk, 
reputation risk, and equity risk. The significant increase in volumes of risk disclosure 
was related to the most critical stage of the crisis, which started in September 2008 
when Lehman Brothers collapsed, inducing significant losses in many counterparties. 
Large amounts of money were withdrawn from money markets in the week following 
Lehman’s collapse. More disruptive consequences spread to the international markets, 
affecting the majority of cross-border banks. This severe downturn led the financial 
services industry into extraordinary turbulence. A shortage of liquidity, lack of funding, 
pressure on capital and the adverse effects on price volatility across a wide range of 
asset classes led governments and central banks to undertake unprecedented 
intervention that was designed to stabilise the global and domestic financial systems, to 
stimulate new lending, and to support systemically important institutions that were at 
risk of failing. Hence, all of the companies in this study proposed how to manage 
equity, potential strategy, and business risk reflecting a switching increase in volume of 
risk disclosure of strategic and business risk, reputation risk, and equity risk. 
 
 
e) Switch point in 2009 
 
The year 2009 witnessed a significant increase in legal and regulation risk, which 
happened because the European Commission, the UK Tripartite Authorities (i.e. HM 
Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority ‘FSA’), the US 
Government and others made a number of proposals for adjustment in regulatory 
regimes aiming to improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks, risk 
management, and the strength of bank transparency and disclosure. 
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6.1.3   Volume fluctuation 
 
Apart from the patterns of smooth increase and switching increase in risk disclosures, 
this present study found that all sample companies disclosed risk information with the 
pattern of volume fluctuation in six risk categories over the period of investigation. Six 
risk categories were consequently developed from these volume fluctuation patterns, 
which are: 
1) Currency risk; 
2) Interest rate risk; 
3) Cross-border risk; 
4) Derivative risk; 
5) Leasing risk; and, 
6) Safety and security risk. 
To illustrate the characteristics of volume fluctuation, the first of these six risk 
categories is illustrated below in figure 6.7 (the complete figures for the six risk 
categories are given in Appendix B): 
 
Figure 6.7  Disclosure of currency risk, for all companies 
 
 
The liberalisation of financial markets in many countries has given more latitude for 
banks in those countries to obtain funds and extend credit. Consequently, these banks 
now find difficulty in avoiding the volatility of the financial market. It is noticeable that 
this study has found that disclosures in cross-border risk, interest rate risk, currency 
risk, risk related to derivatives, leasing risk, and safety and security risk all experienced 
volume fluctuation. In addition, the fluctuation pattern in cross-border risk, interest rate 
risk, and currency risk is related to the derivatives that banks employ to reduce their risk 
exposures. This volatility depends on the effects of a volatile environment in the 
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financial markets and on the features of international banking; it also depends on the 
bank’s policies of managing assets and funding.  
 
 
6.2  Analysing Longitudinal Data by Information Richness 
 
Driven by increased complexities in business, and an objective to promote transparency 
and enhance quality of disclosure by reducing information asymmetries, risk disclosures 
have many potential benefits for shareholders, analysts, investors, and other 
stakeholders (Lajili and Zéghal, 2005). However, Linsley and Shrives (2005b) warned 
that disclosure by itself will not create transparency when it appears to lack useful 
information. Consequently, this study has investigated how companies disclosed risk 
issues with regard to information richness. The key aspects of risk disclosures were 
classified by risk categories by companies and by year into four interrogations, which 
were: 
1) Time orientation of disclosure (i.e. future, present, past information);  
2) The disclosure of factuality and perception;  
3) Disclosure news direction (i.e. neutral news, bad news); and, 
4) Quality of disclosure. 
Each of these four aspects will be explored in more depth in the subsections which 
follow. 
 
 
6.2.1   Time orientation of disclosure 
 
In this present study there are three characteristics of time orientation in the information 
disclosed in annual reports, which are: past, present and forward-looking. In particular, 
various stakeholders are broadly interested in forward-looking statements based on 
plans and objectives for future operations, financial matters, future economic 
performance, as well as the assumptions underlying or relating to those statements 
because these statements involve stakeholders in the decision-making processes. 
However, a major point for using forward-looking information is that it creates 
accountability because the users should be given the relevant factors causing actual 
results to differ, in some instances materially, from those anticipated or implied in any 
forward-looking statement. Based on an investigation of annual reports of sample 
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companies, most companies provided meaningful cautionary forward-looking 
statements explaining the scope of meaning and the important factors that could cause 
differences from actual results. 
 
The adoption of effective content analysis tools for examining forward-looking 
information has many perspectives; therefore, this study has defined forward-looking 
characteristics by using a set of words to capture forward-looking sentences in risk 
disclosures. Table 6.3, containing forward-looking characteristics was used as a 
framework to guide the volumetric count (which was described in Chapter 5). 
 
Table 6.3  Forward-looking characteristics and the indicative words 
Characteristic Guidance Sample Words 
Future Statement Words related to future tense 
or similar inflection 
may, anticipate, will, potential, 
should, soon, shall, next, possible, 
continue, and variations of these 
words and similar expressions 
Predictive Statement Information referred to 
projection, plan, appraisal, and 
management 
plan, target, goal, objective, hope, 
schedule, aim, believe, expect, 
estimate, intend, project, and 
variations of these words and 
similar expressions 
Conditional 
Statement 
Change in condition change in, depend on, if, based on 
assumption , condition, uncertain, 
fluctuation in, and variations of 
these words and similar 
expressions 
 
When companies disclosed risk information according to forward-looking 
characteristics and the indicative words mentioned above, each sentence containing 
forward-looking information was then counted. The number of sentences for all 
companies was calculated for the proportion of disclosure by dividing the number of 
forward-looking sentences by the total sentences. Meanwhile, past information and 
present information were performed for the volumetric counts using the same process as 
forward-looking information; however, past disclosure was based on the past tense for 
coding, while present disclosure was counted when it was not either forward-looking or 
a past disclosure. 
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Figure 6.8  The percentage of time orientation of disclosures as a proportion of total 
sentences (in all companies) between 1995 and 2010 
 
 
It can be seen from figure 6.8 that there was no meaningful longitudinal change in the 
time orientation of disclosures as a proportion of all disclosures. However, present 
information was the largest quantity of time oriented of disclosures throughout the 
period between 1995 and 2010. The proportion of present disclosures slightly declined 
from 53.9% in 1995 to 42.3% in 1998. It then gradually increased at approximately the 
same rate as total sentences (in all companies) over time; it varied between 42.3% of 
total and 54.9%. Meanwhile, forward-looking disclosures increased at approximately 
the same rate as total sentences (in all companies); it varied between 27.1% of total and 
42.3%. Past information was the lowest proportion of time orientation of disclosures 
throughout the period. Past information had a small change from 1995 to 1998; it varied 
between 18.1% of total and 20.9% before gradually declined to 9.1% in 2001. 
Subsequently, the trend of past information grew slightly from 9.3% in 2002 to 15.7% 
in 2010. 
 
 
6.2.2   Factual disclosures and perception disclosures 
 
Fact and perception are a natural pair of statements for communication. Therefore, not 
surprisingly, both are used in all of the annual reports that were included in this study 
where they provide operational information and present managerial perception. It is a 
modest step to consider fact and perception disclosure because some sentences are 
broadly associated with thinking without verifying the accuracy of the information. This 
happens because the directors have an incentive to disclose in their rhetorical statements 
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to support confidence in the factual information that they claim (Hooper and Pratt, 
1995). Although perception information is a managerial expectation (or something that 
is expressed in a forward-looking manner), it is useful for investors who use it to 
support their decision-making. Non-factual information should be carefully used 
because it can mislead investors. However, factual information or hard fact presented as 
a proven or verifiable content may delay reporting because of the verifiable process.  
 
The use of sentences as a unit of analysis was employed in this study to capture the 
trend of disclosures between fact and perception. Each sentence was determined to find 
whether the information was fact or perception. Consequently, the definition of fact or 
perception plays an important role in information capture. This study defines fact as 
information reported as fact, which is immediately verifiable or objective in nature. On 
the other hand, non-factual information or perception (including the forward-looking 
content that was mentioned in table 6.3) was defined as subjective information, which is 
not immediately verifiable or which is opinion. The proportion of factual disclosure was 
employed to reflect the longitudinal patterns and trends between 1995 and 2010, as in 
figure 6.9. 
 
Figure 6.9  The percentage of factual disclosures as a proportion of total sentences (in 
all companies) between 1995 and 2010  
 
 
As can be seen from figure 6.9, the factual disclosures as a proportion of total sentences 
(in all companies) slightly decreased over the period of 1995 to 2010. This means that 
as volume increased over time, perception-based sentences were slightly favoured over 
(higher volumes by sentences) those containing ‘hard facts’. Over time, risk reporting 
has become proportionately more concerned with opinion and perception than facts. The 
possible reason for this is that the director’s rhetorical statements have an incentive to 
disclose because they can support confidence in the factual information that they claim 
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(Hooper and Pratt, 1995). Since they are explanatory, rhetorical disclosures tend to be 
made in large volumes and they have less credibility than factual disclosures in content 
analysis (Toms, 2002). However, it is inevitable that annual reports contain both factual 
information and rhetorical information, with rhetorical statements becoming a 
prominent feature of risk disclosure. 
 
 
6.2.3   Disclosure news direction  
 
The aim of this section is to identify the attitudes of UK banks towards risk disclosure, 
using the empirical evidence of the content analysis approach and using sentences as 
recording units to examine the interrogation of disclosure news direction. Generally, 
there are three characteristics disclosed in annual reports: good news, neutral news, and 
bad news. One of the difficulties in evaluating the attitudes of UK banks towards risk 
disclosure is that it is often difficult to identify the disclosure direction of good and 
neutral news because the good news tone is used very broadly. 
 
As described in Chapter 5, Section 5.4, the difficulty with coding ambiguous narrative 
of good news was exemplified in the three examples. Firstly, good news may be bad 
news when the rhetorical disclosure is considered in the long term. Secondly, the use of 
optimistic language in good news may mislead shareholders into ignoring the financial 
jeopardy that companies are experiencing. Thirdly, some good news has no clear sign of 
good news, which is likely to be either good news or neutral news. In addition, it is 
difficult to judge whether such ambiguous disclosure is really good news, which may 
lead the management’s rhetorical statements to become incredible (Kothari et al., 2009). 
However, it has been argued that the bias against positive information may hinder the 
directors from revealing understandable warning signs (Deumes, 2008). Good news is 
essential for risk disclosures, even if it seems to distract attention from more serious 
issues and its credibility is difficult to verify. Consequently, in this study the coding of 
good news was not skipped but was instead merged with neutral news to increase the 
reliability of the measures of disclosure. 
 
Table 6.4 was prepared by adapting the procedure used by Gray et al. (1995), merging 
good news with neutral news, as described in Chapter 5. 
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Table 6.4  Disclosure direction definitions 
Direction Definition 
Neutral 
From a statement of policy or intent within statutory minimum, with no detail 
of what or how. A statement of fact whose credit/discredit to the company is 
not obvious, which is unaccompanied by editorialising to statements beyond 
the minimum; including (for example) specific details where these detail have 
a creditable or neutral reflection on the company, upbeat analysis/ discussion/ 
statement. 
Bad 
Any statement which reflects, or which might reflect, discredit on the 
company. For example, numbers made redundant (if redundancy is spoken of 
as a human rather than an economic act) and any increase in accidents or 
reports on adverse performance against targets and/or tolerance. 
 
To analyse and classify risk disclosures within the annual report, the definition of 
direction mentioned above was coded and all risk statements were counted for the 
amount of sentences over the period of 1995 to 2010. It should be noted that measuring 
the volume of risk disclosures by this method is more reliable than a word count 
because this method is deemed to be more suitable as a coding method whereas the use 
of a word count does not convey any meaning. The results of this study indicate that the 
majority of the reports were neutral news. Consequently, the proportion of bad news 
disclosed that was an inverse relationship of this method had a minority of risk 
reporting. The following figure provides the findings of trend for proportion of bad 
news disclosed. 
 
Figure 6.10  The percentage of bad news sentences as a proportion of total number of 
sentences disclosed, in all risk categories, in all companies, by year 
 
 
It was found that the proportion of sentences containing bad news (divided by all 
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(i.e. from 0.7% in 1995 to a high of 9.8% in 2010) when compared to the proportion of 
neutral news.  
 
 
6.2.4   The quality of risk disclosures 
 
While a variety of approaches for analysing risk disclosures have been suggested, this 
study classified risk disclosures in annual reports using two different approaches. The 
first approach used qualitative disclosures containing purely narrative statements while 
the second approach used quantitative disclosures containing both narrative and 
numerical information. Consequently, two benchmark tools were used in this study to 
evaluate the quality of risk disclosure with two indices. The first index was used for 
evaluating the quality of qualitative disclosures against three levels. The second index 
was generated to evaluate the quality of quantitative disclosure against two levels. As 
both indices were developed, each risk category (by year) of the annual report of each 
individual company was analysed as a theme for two rounds. Firstly, the narrative was 
evaluated on the basis of the defined qualitative level that is given in table 6.5. Three 
different levels of qualitative disclosure were used as coding categories (i.e. QL1, QL2, 
and QL 3), although a fourth field (i.e. zero, for non-disclosure of that category) was 
also present. Secondly, the numerical disclosure of each risk category was evaluated on 
the basis of the defined quantitative level that is given in table 6.6. Two different levels 
of quantitative disclosure were used as coding categories (i.e. QN1 and QN2), although 
a third field (i.e. zero, for non-disclosure of that category or no numerical disclosure) 
was also present. The following findings will explain the companies’ disclosures in their 
annual reports, distinguished by the quality levels against content analysis benchmark 
studies.  
 
 
a) The quality of qualitative disclosure 
 
There are several different factors that influence the reliability of risk disclosure 
measurements. The quality of disclosure is one of the indicators that are used to 
measure how well companies disclose in their annual reports. In particular, qualitative 
characteristics of information (i.e. understandability and relevance) are factors in the 
IASB framework that can provide sufficient information about risk. Consequently, the 
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importance of sufficient information and offering management, or mitigation, of risk 
were considered in order to classify the distinct level of quality in this study.  
 
Based on the categories of risks that were identified in Chapter 5, the content analysis 
was used to identify the level of information that the companies intended to provide to 
the investors and other stakeholders through the annual report. This was done by 
translating the issues disclosed into code. 
 
Table 6.5 summarises the definitions of the different quality levels of qualitative 
disclosures which were presented in Chapter 5. 
 
Table 6.5  The definitions of quality levels of qualitative disclosure (based on the study 
of Beck et al., 2010) 
Qualitative 
Disclosure Level 
Definition 
QL 1 Disclosing with mention only, or mention with minimal discussion. 
QL 2 Disclosing with contextualised explanations of risk and exposure. 
QL 3 Disclosing with contextualised explanations of risk and exposure, 
including description of management or mitigation of that risk. 
 
The frequency of qualitative disclosure level was counted for all risk categories and all 
companies to identify the quality level in all risk categories and in all companies. The 
analysis of the improvement over a period of 16 years (i.e. 1995 to 2010) was 
investigated and the results are given in figure 6.11. 
 
Figure 6.11  Frequency counts of qualitative disclosure level, in all risk categories, in 
all companies, by year  
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It is apparent from figure 6.11 that the total frequencies of risk disclosures of all 
companies were mainly disclosed on level 3, which is described in table 6.5 as 
disclosure including a description of the management or mitigation of that risk. In 
addition, the total frequencies of risk categories with high information in all companies 
(at level 3) continued an upward trend over time, from 44 times in 1995 to 136 times in 
2010. However, this upward trend in the number of increased risk categories (as shown 
in figure 6.1, Section 6.1) shows that when a risk category increased it also had a chance 
to count more frequency of qualitative disclosure level. To examine the upward trend of 
qualitative disclosure at level 3, the number of risk categories disclosed at level 3 was 
divided by the total number of risk disclosures as a proportion of qualitative disclosure 
level 3. The following figure shows the results when controlled for the factor of 
increased risk category by expressing data as proportions. 
 
Figure 6.12  The frequency of qualitative disclosure level 3 (in all categories and in all 
companies) as a proportion of total risk categories  
 
 
Figure 6.12 shows that most risk categories were disclosed with high information 
content at level 3, varying between 84.2% of total categories and 95%. This suggests 
that the quality of qualitative disclosures at level 3 did not increase, as can be seen in the 
upward trend in figure 6.11, because the frequencies of risk categories with high 
information did not show an upward trend when the frequencies of qualitative 
disclosure level 3 (in all risk categories and in all companies) were made as a proportion 
of total risk categories. However, the quality of the qualitative disclosures contained the 
contextualised explanations of risk and exposure, including a description of 
management or mitigation of that risk. 
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b) The quality of quantitative disclosure 
 
The contents of risk disclosures in an annual report are mainly to be found in the 
narrative statements at the ‘front end’ of the document. However, the numerical 
statement influences the quality of disclosures because numerical information can 
convey a specific meaning to readers and it is also likely to be evidence of a responsive 
management who wish to communicate with investors.  
 
To distinguish clearly between qualitative and quantitative disclosures, the annual 
reports were analysed separately between narrative and numeric disclosures because this 
study found that the quality of qualitative disclosures were independent from 
quantitative disclosures. This means that some risk categories may disclose high levels 
of narrative statement with low levels of quantitative disclosure.  
 
Table 6.6 summarises the definitions of quality levels of quantitative disclosures which 
were presented in Chapter 5: 
 
Table 6.6  The definitions of quality levels of quantitative disclosure (based on the study 
of Beck et al., 2010) 
Quantitative 
Disclosure Level 
Definition 
QN 1 Disclosure of issues related to the category in a numerical way. 
QN 2 Numerical disclosure to the category against comparison. 
 
Based on frequency analysis, the risk categories of all companies were counted as part 
of the quantitative disclosure, as shown in the above table. The quantitative disclosure 
level was coded as level 1 or level 2, and it was accumulated to the total number of 
quantitative disclosures.  
  
Evaluation of the content of quantitative disclosures for all companies in these findings 
employed 2 levels of quality (as shown in table 6.6). The frequencies of levels were 
then counted to identify the pattern disclosed. The analysis of numerical data, coded as 
level 1 and level 2, showed significant different frequencies in both levels, as can be 
seen in figure 6.13. 
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Figure 6.13  The frequencies of quantitative disclosure levels in all risk categories, in 
all companies, by year  
 
 
The above figure indicates the significant difference between level 1 and 2 between 
1995 and 2010. Where risk categories were made quantitatively, a large majority (five 
times to twenty-nine times more than level 1) were at level 2, meaning that most 
disclosures contained comparison data providing higher and more meaningful 
information content than just a single number. Moreover, it seems that quantitative 
disclosures of level 2 showed a slight increase over time. This increase was related to 
the increasing number of risk categories disclosed. 
 
To examine the upward trend of quantitative disclosure as shown in figure 6.13, the 
proportion of quantitative disclosures was calculated by using total number of 
quantitative disclosures level 1 and 2 divided by total number of risk categories. Figure 
6.14 provides the proportion of frequencies containing both levels of quantitative 
disclosure (divided by total number of risk categories) between 1995 and 2010 by all 
companies. 
 
Figure 6.14  The frequency of quantitative disclosure as a proportion of total risk 
categories by year (in all categories and in all companies) 
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While the number of risk categories increased over time (see figure 6.1), figure 6.14 
shows that the proportions that were disclosed quantitatively fell against the total 
number of categories disclosed, particularly between 1995 and 2002, after which they 
slightly fluctuated between 57% and 65%.  
 
It was also notable that this downward longitudinal trend of quantitative disclosures was 
the same shape as the percentage of factual disclosures as a proportion of total sentences 
(in all companies) as shown in figure 6.9. Figure 6.15 below illustrates the correlation 
between factual disclosures and quantitative disclosures: 
 
Figure 6.15  The correlation between factual disclosures and quantitative disclosures 
(in all categories, in all companies, by year) (r = 0.632, n = 16, p = 0.009)  
 
 
It was evident that the factual disclosures are positively correlated with quantitative 
disclosures, Spearman’s rho (r) was 0.632, and the value of significance (Sig. 2-tailed or 
p) was less than 0.01. Between 1995 and 2004 the rates of decrease in the proportion of 
both disclosures were comparable, although in the subsequent years a rate of decrease in 
the percentage of factual disclosures gradually grew more than the decreased rate of the 
percentage of frequency of quantitative disclosures.  
 
The rationality for this finding was to be able to explain that almost all of the numerical 
information was proven or verifiable information, which can be explained by the 
sentences mainly containing statements of fact. In addition, Beattie and Thomson 
(2007) also found that quantified disclosures tended to be factual information in their 
study of the intellectual capital disclosures of Next plc in its annual report for the year 
2004. 
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6.3  The Intensity of Societal Discussion 
 
Despite steadily declining sales, the newspaper still plays a vital role in many public 
discussions. The newspaper has become one of the main sources of information to 
report news, containing current events, informative articles, diverse features and 
advertising. In the business world, newspapers as well as annual reports are used by 
many firms to convey their economic and commercial information to investors and 
other stakeholders, both domestically and internationally. Accordingly, this study 
investigated the correlation between volumes of longitudinal banking sector risk 
disclosures against the intensity of societal discussion as proxied by the frequency and 
risk category of specific mentions in a range of British newspapers by year. 
 
This study used the online search tool that is provided by Newcastle University database 
archives to search and to count news mentions related to thirty-five risk categories using 
specific words. However, by using a keyword search of thirty-five risk categories it is 
probably difficult to capture all of the newspaper hits in the database archive because 
one keyword may have more than one meaning. Moreover, some of the words that are 
used to refer to risk categories in annual reports may differ from those used in 
newspapers. Consequently, some risk categories that have near meanings were 
expanded in order to retrieve all of the related newspaper hits, as shown in Table 6.7. 
 
Table 6.7  The group of keywords that were used in LexisNexis  
Risk Categories Group of Keywords 
Liquidity and funding risk Liquidity risk, funding risk 
Cross-border risk Country risk, cross-border risk 
Currency risk Currency risk, foreign exchange rate risk 
Risk related to derivatives Risk related to derivatives, risk of derivatives, derivative risk 
Hedged risk Hedging risk, hedged risk 
Operational risk Operation risk, operational risk 
Legal and Regulation risk Legal risk, regulation risk, regulatory risk, compliance risk 
Capital management risk Capital management risk, capital risk 
Insurance and Investment 
risk 
Insurance and investment risk, insurance risk, investment risk 
Strategic and Business risk Strategic and business risk, strategic risk, strategy risk, 
business risk 
Reputation risk Reputation risk, reputational risk 
Risk related to fair value Risk related to fair value, fair value risk, risk of fair value 
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Risk Categories Group of Keywords 
Financial crime risk Fraud risk, financial crime risk 
Safety and security risk Safety and security risk, safety risk, security risk 
Leasing risk Leasing risk, residual value risk, risk of lease 
Sustainability risk Sustainability risk, environment risk, environmental risk 
Customer treatment Customer risk 
People risk People risk, staff risk 
Risk related to impairment Risk related to impairment, impairment risk 
 
LexisNexis (the online searchable tool), was employed via Newcastle University 
database archives to search and to count news hits in fourteen newspapers: 
1) Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday;  
2) Daily Record and Sunday Mail;  
3) The Evening Standard (London);  
4) The Guardian (London);  
5) The Herald (Glasgow);  
6) The Independent (London);  
7) The Mirror and The Sunday Mirror;  
8) The Northern Echo;  
9) The Observer;  
10) The People;  
11) The Scotsman and Scotland on Sunday;  
12) The Sunday Times (London);  
13) The Times (London); and, 
14) Times Higher Education Supplement.  
 
Three main results were retrieved from a LexisNexis search of news stories about risks 
in these fourteen newspapers, which are:  
1) Newspaper citations of all sectors and all countries;  
2) Newspaper citations of the banking and finance sector in all countries; and, 
3) Newspaper citations of the banking and finance sector in the UK.  
Table 6.8 and figure 6.16 show the details of these three sets of results that were 
retrieved from LexisNexis, arranged by year. 
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Table 6.8  The number of newspaper hits accumulated from searching 35 risk 
categories as given keywords in LexisNexis, by year 
Year Number of Newspaper Hits Retrieved from Three Sources 
All Sectors and All 
Countries 
Banking and Finance 
Sector of all Countries 
Banking and Finance 
Sector in the UK 
1995 1,635 864 500 
1996 1,447 502 341 
1997 1,587 559 394 
1998 2,230 1,123 746 
1999 1,886 966 662 
2000 1,922 942 673 
2001 2,284 1,038 694 
2002 2,381 1,136 713 
2003 2,388 981 661 
2004 2,261 986 638 
2005 2,122 966 651 
2006 2,269 998 667 
2007 2,678 1,379 899 
2008 2,878 1,615 1,027 
2009 2,879 1,758 1,293 
2010 2,604 1,310 966 
 
 
Figure 6.16  The number of newspaper hits accumulated from searching thirty-five risk 
categories for given keywords in LexisNexis, by different sources and by year 
 
 
Figure 6.16 shows that, although the patterns of newspaper citations from all three 
sources of retrieving risk news were comparable, the pattern of risk news in all sectors 
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and countries (as shown in the top line of figure 6.16) is the most frequently cited in 
these fourteen newspapers. This happened because the search involved a wide variety of 
sectors and countries and, therefore, it had more chance to report risk news. In the 
period of financial crisis between 2007 and 2009 there was a significant increase in the 
number of newspaper citations in all three sources, and this then declined in 2010. 
 
The correlation between the total number of newspaper citations from three sources of 
retrieving risk news and numbers of sentences disclosed (by all risk categories) was 
investigated to examine which sources of retrieving risk news are the most obvious area 
of concern or the best correlation. Table 6.9 shows the findings of this relationship: 
 
Table 6.9  The outcome of correlation between three different sources of newspaper 
citations and number of sentences disclosed, by all risk categories 
Sources of Newspaper Hits Pearson Correlation 
Coefficients 
Sig. (p) 
All sectors and all countries 0.841 0.000 
Banking and finance sector of all countries 0.821 0.000 
Banking and finance sector in UK 0.850 0.000 
 
Table 6.9 shows that the correlation was significant when the value of significance (p 
hereafter) was less than 0.01; therefore, the volume of risk news citations from all three 
sources was positively associated with the quantity of risk disclosures. Moreover, the 
volume of newspaper citations from the banking and finance sector in UK is found to be 
the best correlation (i.e. 85%). This may reflect that risk reporting in the UK banking 
sector is a more concerning issue than reporting in the other sectors and other countries. 
Consequently, this study employs the risk news cited in UK banking and finance sector 
to examine the other correlations. 
 
Focusing on risk reporting in UK banking sector, correlation between the volume of 
newspaper citations and risk disclosures of all sampling companies was examined. To 
explore these relationships, a Pearson correlation was employed for this calculation. 
However, when the parametric assumptions were tested to find the normality of 
distribution, it appeared that many of the data sets were non-parametric data. 
Consequently, a Spearman option for non-parametric correlation was selected to test in 
this study. Table 6.10 shows the outcomes of various findings of correlation. 
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Table 6.10  Correlations between the number of risk issues cited in newspapers and 
various variables of disclosures (in all companies) 
Variable Spearman 
Correlation (r) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
(p) 
Level of 
Significance 
Information richness (by proportion) 
  Bad news disclosed 0.700 0.003 0.01 
  Neutral news disclosed -0.700 0.003 0.01 
  Forward looking disclosure 0.068 0.803 No association 
  Present disclosure 0.179 0.506 No association 
  Past disclosure -0.191 0.478 No association 
  Fact -0.688 0.003 0.01 
  Perception 0.688 0.003 0.01 
  Quantitative disclosure (all levels) -0.374 0.154 No association 
  Qualitative disclosure at level 3 -0.068 0.803 No association 
Risk categories (by number of sentences) 
  Total risk categories 0.706 0.002 0.01 
  Risk management 0.717 0.002 0.01 
  Liquidity and funding risk 0.671 0.004 0.01 
  Credit risk 0.700 0.003 0.01 
  Market risk 0.697 0.003 0.01 
  Economic risk 0.697 0.003 0.01 
  Operational risk 0.728 0.001 0.01 
  Legal and regulation risk 0.776 0.000 0.01 
  Insurance and investment risk 0.638 0.008 0.01 
  Tax risk 0.674 0.004 0.01 
  Sustainability risk 0.745 0.001 0.01 
  Equity risk 0.705 0.002 0.01 
  Cross-border risk 0.606 0.013 0.05 
  Currency risk 0.620 0.010 0.05 
  Strategic and business risk 0.557 0.025 0.05 
  Reputation risk 0.510 0.043 0.05 
  Pension risk 0.575 0.020 0.05 
  Risk related to fair value 0.597 0.015 0.05 
  Financial crime risk 0.611 0.012 0.05 
  Competition risk 0.517 0.040 0.05 
  Financial report risk 0.527 0.036 0.05 
  Safety and security risk 0.516 0.041 0.05 
  People risk 0.603 0.013 0.05 
  Political risk 0.611 0.012 0.05 
  Risk related to impairment 0.569 0.021 0.05 
  Special purpose entities 0.581 0.018 0.05 
  Technology risk 0.527 0.036 0.05 
  Interest rest risk 0.465 0.069 No association 
  Risk related to derivatives -0.300 0.259 No association 
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Variable Spearman 
Correlation (r) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
(p) 
Level of 
Significance 
  Hedged risk 0.483 0.058 No association 
  Capital management risk 0.459 0.074 No association 
  Leasing risk 0.411 0.114 No association 
  Customer treatment 0.383 0.143 No association 
  Industries risk -0.106 0.695 No association 
  Change risk 0.065 0.810 No association 
  Governance risk -0.018 0.947 No association 
 
As shown in table 6.10, correlation between the number of risk issues cited in 
newspapers concerning the UK banking and finance sector can be reported in two 
sections, which are information richness and risk categories. 
 
 
6.3.1   Correlation between intensity of societal discussion and information richness 
disclosed (in all companies) 
 
For many people news reports are important sources of information about society and 
politics (Ohkura, 2003; Boykoff, 2008) and many researchers accept that news media 
have an influence on public perception when events and concepts are reported 
(Barkemeyer et al., 2010; Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012; Pasquaré and Oppizzi, 2012; An 
et al., 2011; Joshi et al., 2011). Furthermore, there are a number of different views of the 
role of the media. For example, while Norris (2001) proposed that the media serves 
three key functions (i.e. a civic forum, a mobilising agent for change or action, and as a 
watchdog overseeing behaviour), Yoo (2011) identified four factors influencing 
behaviour and attitude towards online newspapers (i.e. information-seeking, pastime, 
entertainment, and socialisation). 
 
It is commonly believed that an analysis of media coverage of a particular issue can 
influence not only the level of awareness of particular issues but also the prominence of 
their coverage (Barkemeyer et al., 2010; Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012). For this study, the 
correlations between the intensity of societal discussion and information richness 
disclosed (in all companies) were examined to analyse the public concern for 
information richness of risk reporting in the banking sector. 
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Table 6.10 illustrates the information richness. It was found that there was a high 
association between disclosure direction and newspaper citations. In particular, the 
disclosures of bad news were found to be positively associated with newspaper 
citations, with a Spearman correlation (r hereafter) of 0.700. Meanwhile, the disclosures 
of neutral news were negatively associated with newspaper citations. The following 
figure shows the correlation between proportion of bad news disclosed and the number 
of risk citations. 
 
Figure 6.17  The correlation between the disclosure of bad news as proportion of all 
sentences and the number of newspaper citations (in all companies) (r = 0.70, n = 16, p 
<0.01) 
 
 
It can be seen from figure 6.17 that this correlation has been very close since 2003. This 
may be due to the outbreak of the Enron scandal, which began in late 2001 and 
continued until 2002. This may have led to an increased public awareness of banking 
risks. Moreover, the financial crisis that emerged following the negative signal of an 
economic slowdown in 2006 (which became a crisis between 2007 and 2009) was an 
influential factor. In this figure, this crisis shows as a strong association during this 
period of time. Therefore, it can be said that a bank’s disclosure tended to respond to an 
intensification of societal concern about bad news, particularly during stressful events.  
 
Moreover, when considering the disclosures of fact and perception; there was also a 
significant association between the proportion of perceptions disclosed and the number 
of newspaper citations (i.e. 68.8%) (see table 6.10). Figure 6.18 demonstrates this 
relationship. 
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Figure 6.18  The correlation between the disclosure of perception as a proportion of all 
sentences and the number of newspaper citations (in all companies) (r = 0.688, n = 16, 
p < 0.01) 
 
 
Figure 6.18 provides evidence of a positive correlation between the proportion of 
perceptions disclosed and the number of newspaper citations (r = 0.688, p = 0.003). In 
contrast to this relationship, the proportion of fact disclosures was found to be 
negatively associated with the number of newspaper citations (r = - 0.688, p = 0.003). 
These results suggest that the sample banks’ disclosure responded to societal discussion 
with information containing opinion and perception rather than fact or verified 
information. 
 
For the other interrogations of risk disclosures, it is apparent from table 6.10 that there 
was no apparent association between the time orientation of disclosures (i.e. future, 
present, and past) and the number of newspaper citations. Further findings also showed 
that the quality of disclosure (either quantitative or qualitative disclosures) was not 
associated with the number of newspaper citations. 
 
 
6.3.2   The correlation between intensity of societal discussion and individual risk 
categories (in all companies) 
 
The notion that press media reporting has an influence on attitudes and risk perception 
is contested (Vilella-Vila and Costa-Font, 2008). These relationships also articulate 
public opinion and become more intense as concerns about risk rises in society, this 
includes the relevance of risk disclosure by companies. Some researchers have found 
that media attention influences a firm’s behaviour (Koning et al., 2010; Zyglidopoulos 
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et al., 2012). In addition, Carvalho and Burgess (2005) found that media coverage has a 
significant impact on risk reporting. This section aims to examine the correlations 
between the intensity of societal discussion and individual risk categories (in all 
companies). 
 
Table 6.10 shows the results obtained from an analysis of the variables of risk 
categories. A total of twenty-seven risk categories out of a total of thirty-five were 
found to have variables of total risk categories that have a positive correlation with the 
number of newspaper citations. It was also apparent that the intensity of societal 
discussion about banking risks may have had an influence on the patterns of bank risk 
disclosures. The results were categorised into three main groups of correlation, which 
are: high correlation (r is between ± 0.63 and ±1.00, p < 0.01), moderate correlation (r is 
between ± 0.50 and ± 0.62, p < 0.05), and no correlation (r is less than ± 0.50).  
 
 
a) High correlation 
 
Table 6.11 below shows the twelve high correlations between intensity of risk issues 
cited in newspapers and individual risk categories disclosed (in all companies). The 
detailed figures of twelve high correlations can be seen in Appendix C. 
 
Table 6.11  High correlations between the number of risk issues cited in newspapers 
and individual risk categories disclosed (in all companies) 
Variable Spearman 
Correlation (r) 
Significance 
2-tailed (p) 
Level of 
Significance 
Risk categories (by number of sentences) 
1. Total risk categories 0.706 0.002 0.01 
2. Risk management 0.717 0.002 0.01 
3. Liquidity and funding risk 0.671 0.004 0.01 
4. Credit risk 0.700 0.003 0.01 
5. Market risk 0.697 0.003 0.01 
6. Insurance and investment risk 0.638 0.008 0.01 
7. Operational risk 0.728 0.001 0.01 
8. Legal and regulation risk 0.776 0.000 0.01 
9. Equity risk 0.705 0.002 0.01 
10. Tax risk 0.674 0.004 0.01 
11. Economic risk 0.697 0.003 0.01 
12. Sustainability risk 0.745 0.001 0.01 
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As shown table 6.11, the findings can be divided into three main groups of risk 
categories, which are:  
1) Key strategic banking risks; 
2) Operational banking risks; and, 
3) High correlation in some periods of time. 
 
Firstly, there were significant positive correlations between the number of newspaper 
citations of risk categories and the number of sentences of seven variables: 
1) Total risk categories; 
2) Risk management; 
3) Liquidity and funding risk;  
4) Credit risk;  
5) Market risk;  
6) Insurance and investment risk; and, 
7) Equity risk.  
It should be noted that these risk categories were the key strategic risks of banks, which 
can offer two perspectives of the findings in this study, that is: either a British citizen or 
a banking supervisor. Firstly, in terms of the British citizen’s perspective, disclosures of 
the key strategic risks of banks are central issues of societal discussion when 
considering the finding that the disclosures of these seven risk categories had a 
significant positive correlation with the number of newspaper citations. Secondly, in 
terms of the banking supervisor’s perspective, banking supervisors responded 
increasingly to the key strategic banking risks when considering the findings that these 
seven risk categories were disclosed with longitudinal volumetric increases (see Section 
6.1.1 and Section 6.1.2). Consequently, it should be considered from these findings of 
this present study that these risk categories were the key strategic risks of banks that 
both banking supervisors and British citizens responded to strongly.  
 
Secondly, risk disclosures in the group of operational banking risks were found to have 
a significant correlation with the number of newspaper citations, particularly in 
operational risk, legal and regulation risk as well as tax risk. Interestingly, given the 
findings that the disclosures of the key strategic risk of banks in financial risk were 
central issues of societal discussion, in terms of operational risk it was legal and 
regulation risk and tax risk that were the main issues that the British public were 
concerned about.  
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Thirdly, there were two risk categories (i.e. economic risk and sustainability risk) which 
were found during the longitudinal analysis to have a clear correlation in some periods 
of time while the other periods had vague figures of correlation (see figure 6.19 and 
figure 6.20). Figure 6.19 shows the high correlation between the intensity of risk issues 
cited in newspapers and economic risk in some periods of time. 
 
Figure 6.19  The correlation between the number of sentences of economic risk and the 
number of newspaper citations (in all companies) (r = 0.697, p < 0.01) 
 
 
As can be seen from figure 6.19, the results obtained from the preliminary analysis of 
correlation showed that the disclosure of economic risk is positively associated with the 
number of newspaper citations. There was an even more remarkable correlation 
between 2006 and 2010, which may be explained because the banks’ disclosures of 
economic risk involving societal concerns have risen since the start of the current 
financial crisis in 2006. Another risk category that also has a clear correlation in the 
same period of time is shown in figure 6.20. 
 
Figure 6.20  The correlation between the number of sentences of sustainability risk, and 
the number of newspaper citations (in all companies) (r = 0.745, p < 0.01) 
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Figure 6.20 shows the clear correlation between the disclosures of sustainability risk 
and newspaper citations since 2006. As described in Section 6.1.2, there was a switch 
point in 2006. Following which the remarkable increase in disclosure of sustainability 
risk has reflected the policy and actions of companies to respond the needs of 
sustainable development. Most companies over this period have organised their 
response to environmental concern, including risk disclosures of environmental 
awareness. Sustainability risk involves social and community issues, the environment, 
and responsible global citizenship, which are all likely to affect the corporate image. 
Therefore, this finding suggested that companies have responded to societal concerns as 
they became critical issues.  
 
 
b) Moderate correlation 
 
As shown in table 6.10, there are fifteen variables that have a moderately positive 
association with the number of risk citations in newspapers (i.e. Spearman correlation 
during 0.510 – 0.620, Sig. 2 tailed less than 0.05), which are:  
1) Cross-border risk;  
2) Currency risk;  
3) Risk related to fair value;  
4) Risk related to impairment; 
5)  Strategic and business risk;  
6)  Reputation risk;  
7)  Pension risk;  
8)  Financial crime risk;  
9)  Competition risk;  
10)  Financial report risk;  
11) Safety and security risk;  
12) People risk;  
13) Political risk;  
14) Special purpose entities; and, 
15) Technology risk. 
Four out of these fifteen risk categories can be grouped as key strategic banking risks 
(e.g. market risk, credit risk), which are: cross-border risk; currency risk; risk related to 
fair value; and, risk related to impairment. This finding is likely to explain how societal 
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debates have focused on the disclosure of key strategic banking risks that have affected 
the public dramatically when banks are faced with the adverse effects of crises (see also 
the description of key strategic banking risks in high correlations). The other ten risk 
categories show moderate correlations. These risk categories are related to the 
operational banking risks group, which is also a public concern; even if their concerns 
were less than those for operational risk, legal and regulation, and tax risk (as found in 
the high correlations). 
 
 
c) No association 
 
As shown in table 6.10, there are nine variables that have no association with the 
number of risk citations in newspapers, which are:  
1)  Interest rate risk;  
2)  Risk related to derivatives;  
3) Hedged risk;  
4) Capital management risk;  
5) Leasing risk;  
6) Customer treatment;  
7) Industries risk;  
8) Change risk; and,  
9) Governance risk. 
A further review of these variables shows that interest rate risk, risk related to 
derivatives, hedged risk; and leasing risk are related to financial products which are of 
public concern; especially when the details of these products, rather than the risk related 
these products, reflects the complexity and difficulty of predicting the profitability of an 
investment. When considering the aspect of banking disclosure, however, in this period 
disclosures of financial instruments were required by IFRS 7, which means that the 
banks were required to disclose information with rich content that enables users to 
evaluate the significance of financial instruments, the nature and extent of risks arising 
from them, and how entities manage those risks. Therefore, when a search for these 
variables (i.e. derivative risk, leasing risk, hedged risk) was conducted in database the 
results showed a low quantity of newspaper citations, while a search by product name 
(i.e. derivatives, leasing, and hedged) showed a high volume of newspaper citations.  
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In the cases of capital management risk and governance risk, although both variables 
were key categories in the banking sector, retrieving an outcome from database showed 
that there was only a low volume of newspaper citations. This happened because these 
risk categories were perceived as aspects of risk management, capital management and 
corporate governance rather than the extent of risk. Similarly, industry risk, customer 
treatment, and the change of risk in the banking sector were not frequently reported in 
newspapers. Consequently, there was no association found between disclosures of these 
risk categories and the number of newspaper citations. 
 
 
6.4  Summary 
 
This chapter has presented a number of findings in three major areas. Firstly, analysis of 
the longitudinal risk category of membership (in all years and in all companies) was 
presented to reflect the longitudinal patterns and trends. Secondly, the findings were 
analysed to show how companies disclosed risk issues that were information rich. This 
was done by classifying them into four interrogations, which are: the time orientation of 
disclosure (i.e. future, present, past information); the disclosure of factuality and 
perception; the disclosure news direction (i.e. neutral news or bad news); and, the 
quality of disclosure. Thirdly, the last section has described the results of an 
investigation of the correlation between volumes of longitudinal banking sector risk 
disclosures and the intensity of societal discussion (as proxied by frequency and by 
year) of relevant newspaper citations (by risk category). The next chapter will present 
the findings and analysis by focusing on the intrasectoral longitudinal findings by 
comparing the six companies (i.e. RBS, NatWest, Lloyds TSB, HBOS, Barclays, and 
HSBC). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
184 
 
Chapter 7. Findings and Intrasectoral Analysis 
 
 
Chapter 6 has described the findings for all six companies (i.e. RBS, NatWest, Lloyds 
TSB, HBOS, Barclays, and HSBC). Meanwhile, the details of the findings and analysis 
of individual companies are provided in Appendix D
1
. This chapter aims to analyse the 
intrasectoral longitudinal findings by comparing the six companies for three aspects, 
which are: volumetric analysis of risk categories, information richness, and the 
association between risk disclosures and the intensity of societal discussion. This 
chapter will also compare the findings of this research and those of prior research. 
 
 
7.1  A Comparison of Volumetric Analysis and Risk Categories 
 
The rankings of the risk categories that were disclosed risk showed that credit risk was 
the most disclosed risk in all of the companies (see Appendix D). This indicates that 
credit risk was the most concerned risk in all companies.  
 
Analysing the longitudinal data by the number of risk categories disclosed shows that 
the number of risk categories disclosed by all companies increased gradually over the 
period between 1995 and 2010. To investigate risk categories in terms of quantity of 
disclosure, a volumetric analysis was developed on the basis of counting the number of 
sentences disclosed over time. The findings showed that there was an upward trend in 
the quantity of risk disclosures from total risk categories in all companies. However, 
although the number of risk disclosures showed an upward trend, this was likely to 
conceal some risk categories disclosed with switching increase in volume, as well as 
some risk categories disclosed with fluctuations in volume. Therefore, the following 
comparison of findings and analysis has been divided into three main patterns of 
disclosure, which are:  
1) A smooth increase in volume;  
2) Change in volume with switch point; and, 
                                                          
1
  Appendix D gives the findings of the longitudinal data of each of the individual companies (i.e. RBS, 
NatWest, Lloyds TSB, HBOS, Barclays, and HSBC), which were analysed to examine trends and 
patterns of risk disclosures (by volume, by risk categories, and by information richness). Additionally, 
statistical tests were used to analyse the correlation between volumes of longitudinal risk disclosures 
against the intensity of societal discussion (as proxied by the frequency and by the year) of relevant 
newspaper citations (by risk category). 
185 
 
3) Volume fluctuation. 
These three main patterns will be described in detail in the subsections which follow. 
 
 
7.1.1   A smooth increase in volume, comparing six companies 
 
Table 7.1 presents the risk categories that the companies disclosed with a smooth 
increase in volume over the sixteen year period between 1995 and 2010. 
 
Table 7.1  Risk categories with smooth increase in volume of disclosure by company 
Company Risk category with a smooth increase in volume 
RBS Liquidity and funding risk 
NatWest None 
Lloyds TSB Market risk  
Insurance and investment risk 
HBOS Market risk 
Barclays Risk management  
Liquidity and funding risk  
Market risk 
HSBC Credit risk 
Market risk  
Capital management 
 
It can be seen from table 7.1 that all of the risk categories with a smooth increase in 
volume were the same key strategic banking risks that the companies gave increasing 
attention to over time. In particular, market risk was the most frequently disclosed risk 
with this pattern; four out of six companies revealed this risk (i.e. Lloyds TSB, HBOS, 
Barclays, and HSBC) while liquidity and funding risk was disclosed with this pattern by 
two companies (i.e. RBS and Barclays). In the other risk categories, different companies 
disclosed this pattern with different risk categories. However, only NatWest had no 
pattern of smooth increase in the volume of disclosure.  
 
 
7.1.2   Change in volume with switch point, comparing six companies 
 
There were many risk categories that had a volumetric increase with clear switch points 
in different years. The switching point tends to be a signal to reflect the likely impact on 
companies that are faced with unprecedented problems. Table 7.2 shows the risk 
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categories that contain a significant increase in volume of disclosure, as categorised by 
switching year and by company. 
 
Table 7.2  Risk categories containing significant increase in volume of disclosure, as 
categorised by switching year and by company 
RBS NatWest Lloyds TSB HBOS Barclays HSBC 
     2001 
 operational risk 
  2003 
 liquidity and 
funding risk 
   
   2004 
 insurance and 
investment 
risk 
2004 
 operational 
risk 
 
2005 
 risk related to 
impairment 
 insurance and 
investment risk 
2005 
 hedged risk 
 
  2005 
 tax risk 
 risk related to 
impairment 
2005 
 hedged risk 
 risk related to 
impairment 
 insurance and 
investment risk 
2006 
 market risk 
    2006 
 pension risk 
 sustainability 
risk 
 2007 
 risk related to 
impairment 
2007 
 risk 
management 
2007 
 liquidity and 
funding risk 
 credit risk 
 capital 
management 
 risk related to 
fair value 
2007 
 credit risk 
 capital 
management 
2007 
 liquidity and 
funding risk 
 
2008 
 credit risk 
 cross-border 
risk 
 operational 
risk 
 capital 
management 
 reputation risk 
 pension risk 
 special purpose 
entities 
 strategic and 
business risk 
 equity risk 
 
2008 
 risk 
management 
 liquidity and 
funding risk 
 credit risk 
 market risk 
 operational 
risk 
 strategic and 
business risk 
 pension risk 
 tax risk 
  2008 
 legal and 
regulation 
risk 
2008 
 economic risk 
 
2009 
 risk 
management 
 financial crime 
risk 
 competition 
risk 
2009 
 legal and 
regulation risk 
 capital 
management 
 safety and 
security risk 
 customer 
treatment risk 
2009 
 credit risk 
   
     2010 
 risk management 
 cross-border risk 
187 
 
Table 7.2 shows that the year 2008 contained nineteen risk categories, which was the 
most frequently occurring risk category with clear switch points that were disclosed by 
four of six companies (i.e. RBS, NatWest, Barclays, and HSBC). Meanwhile, the year 
2007 contained nine risk categories, which was the second most occurring risk category 
of this pattern as disclosed by five of six companies (i.e. NatWest, Lloyds TSB, HBOS, 
Barclays, and HSBC). The striking results from this investigation are caused by the 
financial crisis of 2007 to 2008, which began in the second half of 2007 and lasted until 
2009. Consequently, a number of risk categories were disclosed with switching increase 
in this period; including in 2009, which contained six risk categories that were disclosed 
by three companies (i.e. RBS, NatWest and Lloyds TSB). Hence, this finding indicates 
that the financial crisis has had a significant effect on the risk categories that were 
disclosed with switching increase pattern. The 2007 financial crisis has revealed that 
massive financial fraud and misconduct has long been a part of the enormous risks 
taken by many banks and financial institutions (Tomasic, 2011).  
 
The year 2005 was one of the switching years when four companies (i.e. RBS, NatWest, 
Barclays, and HSBC) disclosed risks with switching pattern for many risk categories, 
including: the risks related to impairment, hedged risk, insurance and investment risk, 
and tax risk. One of the most striking observations to emerge from this result was that 
most risk categories were related to the first-time adoption of International Accounting 
Standard 32 ‘Financial Instruments: Presentation’ (‘IAS 32’), IAS 39 ‘Financial 
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement’ (‘IAS 39’), and IFRS 4 ‘Insurance 
Contracts’ (‘IFRS 4’).  
 
The other switching years of 2001, 2003, 2004, 2006, and 2010 contained only a few 
risk categories of switching pattern that were disclosed by only one or two companies. 
For example, in 2001 the disclosure of operational risk was disclosed with this pattern 
by HSBC while in 2003 disclosure of liquidity and funding risk was disclosed with this 
pattern by Lloyds TSB. This happens because some companies took the effect of a 
specific risk, or unsystematic risk; therefore, determination of the extent of exposure to 
individual risks was made by a single company.  
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7.1.3   Volume fluctuation, comparing six companies 
 
There were many risk categories that had a disclosure with volumetric fluctuation. This 
reflects how these companies faced uncertainty in many areas related to their 
operations. The following table presents the number of risk categories that the 
companies disclosed with volume fluctuation over a sixteen year period between 1995 
and 2010. 
 
Table 7.3  The number of risk category containing volume fluctuation of disclosure, by 
company 
Company The number of risk categories Percentage 
RBS 15 of 31 categories 48.39% 
NatWest 16 of 30 categories 53.33% 
Lloyds TSB 26 of 31 categories 83.87% 
HBOS 20 of 26 categories 76.92% 
Barclays 23 of 32 categories 71.87% 
HSBC 16 of 29 categories 55.17% 
 
As shown in table 7.3, the risk category disclosed with the pattern of volume fluctuation 
was most frequently disclosed by Lloyds TSB. Meanwhile, this pattern was the second 
most frequently disclosed by HBOS, as a subsidiary company of Lloyds TSB. The 
number of risk categories disclosed with volume fluctuation showed that both Lloyds 
TSB and HBOS have tended to face more uncertainty in their operation than the other 
companies. 
 
 
7.2  Analysing Longitudinal Data by Information Richness  
 
The key aspect of information richness (by company and by year) was classified into 
four interrogations, which are: 
1) Time orientation of disclosure (i.e. future, present, past information);  
2) The disclosure of factuality and perception;  
3) Disclosure direction (i.e. neutral news, bad news); and, 
4) Quality of disclosure. 
The following sections present the findings of intrasectoral longitudinal analysis. 
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7.2.1   The time orientation of disclosure  
 
The following figure shows the percentage of time orientation of disclosure (i.e. 
forward-looking, present, and past) as a proportion of total disclosure over a sixteen 
year period between 1995 and 2010, by company. 
 
Table 7.4  The percentage of three characteristics, forward-looking, present, and past 
disclosures as a proportion of total disclosure over sixteen years, by company  
Company 
Proportion of forward-
looking disclosures 
Proportion of 
present disclosures 
Proportion of past 
disclosures 
RBS 39.6% 48.6% 11.8% 
NatWest 44.4% 45.8% 9.7% 
Lloyds TSB 36.8% 53.2% 10.0% 
HBOS 37.5% 54.4% 8.2% 
Barclays 34.2% 51.5% 14.3% 
HSBC 32.3% 46.5% 21.3% 
 
As shown in table 7.4, the proportion of present disclosure was the largest proportion of 
time orientation of disclosure for all companies while the proportion of forward-looking 
disclosure was the second largest proportion. Furthermore, the proportion of past 
disclosure was the smallest proportion for all companies. 
 
 
7.2.2   Factual disclosures and perception disclosures  
 
A volumetric measure was employed to reflect the longitudinal trends of factual and 
perception disclosures. Table 7.5 shows the proportion of disclosure of fact and 
perception measured as a proportion of total disclosure over a sixteen year period 
between 1995 and 2010, by company. 
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Table 7.5  The percentage of disclosure of fact and perception as a proportion of total 
disclosure over sixteen years, by company 
Company Proportion of factual 
disclosures 
Proportion of perception 
disclosures 
RBS 8.9% 91.1% 
NatWest 9.1% 90.9% 
Lloyds TSB 7.2% 92.8% 
HBOS 10.5% 89.5% 
Barclays 10.8% 89.2% 
HSBC 10.6% 89.4% 
 
Table 7.5 shows that the factual disclosures, as an inverse proportion of disclosure of 
perception, were a small proportion of all companies (it varied between 7.2% and 10.8% 
of total disclosures in each company). Therefore, all companies mainly disclosed risk 
information on perception in their annual reports between 1995 and 2010. 
 
 
7.2.3   Disclosure direction  
 
With the exception of Lloyds TSB, the proportion of bad news as an inverse proportion 
of neutral news showed an upward trend over the period between 1995 and 2010 for all 
companies (see details in Appendix D). In this section, all companies were compared by 
the percentage of disclosure of bad news and neutral news as a proportion of total 
disclosure over a sixteen year period between 1995 and 2010. 
 
Table 7.6  The percentage of disclosure of bad news and neutral news as a proportion 
of total disclosure over sixteen years, by company 
Company Proportion of bad news Proportion of neutral news 
RBS 8.5% 91.5% 
NatWest 9.7% 90.3% 
Lloyds TSB 4.5% 95.5% 
HBOS 3.6% 96.4% 
Barclays 3.9% 96.1% 
HSBC 4.1% 95.9% 
 
Table 7.6 shows the proportion of bad news disclosure as a proportion of total 
disclosures were a small proportion of all companies (i.e. it varied between 3.6% and 
191 
 
9.7% of total disclosures). Therefore, all of the companies mainly disclosed risk 
information on neutral news in their annual reports between 1995 and 2010, although 
bad news disclosures were increasingly disclosed by most companies over time. 
 
 
7.2.4   The quality of risk disclosures  
 
The quality of risk disclosure in this study was divided into two groups, qualitative 
disclosure and quantitative disclosure. 
 
 
a) The quality of qualitative disclosure 
 
It was found that the frequency counts of qualitative disclosure
2
 at Level 3 under all risk 
categories in each company (see Appendix D) were the main proportion of disclosures, 
which showed an upward trend for all companies. However, this upward trend in the 
frequency counts of qualitative disclosure at Level 3 showed that when a risk category 
increased it also had a chance to count more frequency of qualitative disclosure level. 
To examine the upward trend of qualitative disclosure at Level 3, the number of risk 
categories disclosed at Level 3 was divided by the total number of risk disclosures as a 
proportion of qualitative disclosure Level 3. The results showed that qualitative 
disclosure of high information content (i.e. Level 3) did not show an upward trend. In 
this section, all of the companies were compared with the frequency counts of 
qualitative levels and the percentage of disclosure of qualitative levels as a proportion of 
total number of risk categories over a sixteen year period between 1995 and 2010. 
 
  
                                                          
2
  See table 6.5 of Chapter 6. There are three quality levels of qualitative disclosure: Level 1 (QL 1) is 
defined as disclosing with mention only or mention with minimal discussion; Level 2 (QL 2) is defined 
as disclosing with contextualize explanations of risk and exposure; Level 3 (QL 3) is defined as 
Disclosing with contextualised explanations of risk and exposure, including a description of 
management or mitigation of that risk. 
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Table 7.7  The quality of qualitative disclosure over sixteen years measured by 
frequency counts, by percentage as a proportion of total number of risk categories, and 
by company 
Company Qualitative Level 1 Qualitative Level 2 Qualitative Level 3 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
RBS 6 2.3% 21 8.0% 236 89.7% 
NatWest 10 4.6% 25 11.6% 181 83.8% 
Lloyds TSB 16 6.2% 16 6.2% 225 87.5% 
HBOS 2 1.0% 17 8.5% 182 90.5% 
Barclays 10 3.5% 17 6.0% 258 90.5% 
HSBC 0 0.0% 12 4.6% 248 95.4% 
 
It is apparent from table 7.7 that the total frequencies of qualitative disclosure were 
mainly disclosed on Level 3, defined as the disclosure including a description of the 
management or mitigation of that risk, by all companies. It was noticeable that 
Barclays’s risk disclosure was the most frequently disclosed on qualitative disclosure 
Level 3, at 258 times over a sixteen year period. However, when considering the 
percentage of high information content (Level 3) as a proportion of total risk categories 
disclosed, HSBC provided the largest proportion of qualitative disclosure Level 3 
among sampling companies, with 95.4% of total number of risk categories over a 
sixteen year period. 
 
 
b) The quality of quantitative disclosure 
 
By evaluating the quality of quantitative disclosures in all risk categories, it was found 
that annual reports contained both purely narrative disclosure and quantitative 
disclosure. Quantitative disclosure was measured by using two levels. Level 1 was 
defined as numerical data on risk and while Level 2 was defined as numerical data 
against comparison (see table 6.6 of Chapter 6). The frequency counts of both levels 
were then performed to identify the pattern of risk disclosure. The analysis of numerical 
data classified as Level 1 and Level 2 showed significantly different frequencies. The 
proportions both levels are shown in the following table: 
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Table 7.8  The quality of quantitative disclosure over sixteen years measured by 
frequency counts, by percentage as a proportion of total risk categories, and by 
company 
Company Quantitative Disclosure Level 1 Quantitative Disclosure Level 2 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
RBS 14 5.3% 157 59.7% 
NatWest 17 7.9% 132 61.1% 
Lloyds TSB 17 6.6% 121 47.1% 
HBOS 12 6.0% 103 51.2% 
Barclays 12 4.2% 164 57.5% 
HSBC 18 6.9% 167 64.2% 
 
Table 7.8 shows that total frequencies of quantitative disclosure were mainly disclosed 
on Level 2 by all companies. However, it was noticeable that HSBC’s risk disclosure 
was the most frequently disclosed on quantitative disclosure Level 2, with 167 
frequencies of risk categories over a sixteen year period. Moreover, when considering 
the percentage of high quantitative content (Level 2) as a proportion of total risk 
categories disclosed, it can be seen that HSBC also provided the largest proportion of 
quantitative disclosure Level 2 among sampling companies (with 64.2% of total number 
of risk categories over a sixteen year period). 
 
 
7.3  The Association between Risk Disclosures and the Intensity of Societal 
Discussion 
 
It is commonly believed that an analysis of media coverage of a particular issue can 
influence not only the level of awareness of particular issues but also the prominence of 
their coverage (Barkemeyer et al., 2010; Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012). For this study, the 
correlations between the intensity of newspaper citations in the UK banking sector and 
the risk disclosures of sampling companies were examined to analyse the public 
concern for information richness of risk reporting in the banking sector. These 
correlations were categorised into two groups, which are: information richness and risk 
categories.  
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7.3.1   Associations for information richness 
 
There are four interrogations of information richness. Firstly, the bad news disclosure of 
RBS, NatWest, HBOS, and HSBC was positively associated with the number of 
newspaper citations with a high level, while the bad news disclosure of Barclays had an 
association with a moderate level and the bad news disclosure of Lloyds TSB had no 
association.  
 
Secondly, the time orientation of disclosure showed that most variables in this 
interrogation of all companies had no association with the number of newspaper 
citations, except for the forward-looking disclosure of NatWest which had a positive 
correlation with high level and the past disclosure of HBOS had a negative correlation 
with a moderate level.  
 
Thirdly, the interrogation of fact and perception disclosures showed that the factual 
disclosure of HSBC had a negative association at a high level with the number of 
newspaper citations. In addition, the factual disclosures of RBS and Barclays had a 
negative association at a moderate level with the number of newspaper citations. The 
disclosures of other companies had no association with the number of newspaper 
citations in this interrogation. 
 
Finally, the fourth interrogation is disclosure quality, which is focused on qualitative 
disclosure Level 3 and two levels of quantitative disclosure. The disclosure quality of 
most companies had no association with the number of newspaper citations, except for 
quantitative disclosure of NatWest which had a negative association at a moderate level 
with the number of newspaper citations and the qualitative disclosure Level 3 of Lloyds 
TSB which had a negative association at a moderate level with the number of 
newspaper citations. 
 
 
7.3.2   Associations for risk categories 
 
This section focuses on the high correlations between the number of newspaper 
citations and the various risk categories. Although the disclosure of risk which related to 
the derivatives of NatWest had a negative correlation with the number of newspaper 
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citations, the other risk categories disclosed were found to have had positive 
correlations. The following table compares the outcomes of a number of variables that 
had a high positive correlation with the number of newspaper citations, by company. 
 
Table 7.9  List of variables having high positive correlations between the number of risk 
issues cited in newspapers and various variables of six companies 
RBS NatWest Lloyds TSB HBOS Barclays HSBC 
1) Risk 
management 
2)  Credit risk 
3)  Market risk 
4)  Operational 
risk 
5) Economic  
risk 
6) Reputation 
risk 
7) Pension risk 
8) Equity risk 
1)  Liquidity 
risk 
2)  Market risk 
3)  Operational 
risk 
4)  Reputation 
risk 
5) Pension risk 
6) Tax risk 
7) impairment 
 
1) Risk 
management 
2) Credit risk 
3) Operational 
risk 
4) Insurance risk 
5) Safety and 
security 
6) Impairment 
 
1) Market risk 
2) Liquidity  
risk 
3) Fair value  
4) Legal and 
regulation 
risk 
 
1) Credit risk 
2) Risk 
management 
3) Liquidity risk 
4) Currency risk 
5) Sustainability 
risk 
6) Financial 
crime risk 
1) Market risk 
2) Liquidity risk 
3) Sustainability 
risk 
4) Legal and 
regulation 
5) Strategic and 
business risk 
6) Tax risk 
7) Special 
purpose 
entities 
8) Economic 
risk 
 
Table 7.9 shows that there were disclosures of two risk categories from four of six 
companies that had a significant positive correlation with the number of newspaper 
citations. The first was the market risk disclosure made by RBS, NatWest, HBOS, and 
HSBC. The second was the liquidity and funding risk disclosure made by NatWest, 
HBOS, Barclays, and HSBC.  
 
There were disclosures of three risk categories from three of six companies that had a 
significant positive correlation with the number of newspaper citations. The first was 
the risk management disclosure that was made by RBS, Lloyds TSB, and Barclays. The 
second was the credit risk disclosure that was made by RBS, Lloyds TSB, and Barclays. 
The third was the operational risk disclosure that was made by RBS, NatWest, and 
HBOS. 
 
The most striking result to emerge from the data was that the risk categories disclosed 
by three or four companies (i.e. market risk, liquidity and funding risk, risk 
management, credit risk, and operational risk) all had a significant association with the 
intensity of societal discussion and they were all disclosed as key strategic risks of the 
banks. This indicates that the disclosures of the key strategic risks of banks all involved 
societal discussions on risk issues.  
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There were a number of risk categories disclosed by one or two companies that had an 
association with the number of newspaper citations, which are:  
1) Economic risk disclosure of RBS and HSBC;  
2) Reputation risk disclosure of RBS and NatWest;  
3) Pension risk disclosure of RBS and NatWest;  
4) Legal risk disclosure of HBOS and Barclays;  
5) Sustainability risk disclosure of Barclays and HSBC;  
6) Tax risk disclosure of NatWest and HSBC;  
7) Disclosure of risk related to impairment of NatWest and Lloyds TSB;  
8) Equity risk disclosure of RBS;  
9) Insurance risk disclosure of Lloyds TSB;  
10) Safety and security risk disclosure of Lloyds TSB;  
11) Disclosure of risk related to fair value of HBOS;  
12) Currency risk disclosure of Barclays;  
13) Financial crime risk disclosure of Barclays;  
14) Strategic and business risk disclosure of HSBC; and,  
15) Special purpose entities disclosure of HSBC. 
 
It should be noted that these risk categories, which were disclosed by one or two 
companies as having an association with the number of newspaper citations, were not 
among the key strategic banking risks. This relationship reflects how societal discussion 
is involved in certain risks that a particular company faces. On the other hand, those 
companies who were faced with risk categories that were issues of public concern 
tended to provide more information on those areas.  
 
 
7.4  A Comparison of the Findings between this Research and Prior Research 
 
The findings in this research were based on the examination of risk disclosures over a 
sixteen year period between 1995 and 2010. Additionally, the findings also offered the 
opportunity for longitudinal study. They also presented the opportunity for an 
intrasectoral study about risk disclosure practices among different banks in the UK. 
However, there are some previous studies that have explored the extent of risk 
disclosures in various countries. Consequently, this section aims to compare the 
findings in this research with prior research related to risk disclosures. After reviewing 
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the previous literature on risk reporting as provided in Chapter 2, there were seven 
findings in this study that could compare to the prior research. 
 
Firstly, this study found that the top ten most disclosed categories by volume, all 
companies, all years were:  
1) Credit risk;  
2) Risk management;  
3) Market risk;  
4) Insurance and investment risk;  
5) Liquidity and funding risk;  
6) Capital management risk;  
7) Legal and regulation risk;  
8) Risk related to derivatives; 
9) Interest rate risk; and, 
10) Operational risk.  
This finding was different from those of the prior studies. Lajili and Zéghal (2005) 
found that the most frequently cited categories were financial risk, commodity and 
market risk. Helbok and Wagner (2006) found that disclosures mainly covered market 
and credit risk. Meanwhile, Bischof (2009) found that the major part of the risk report 
covered the three areas of risk exposure, which were: credit risk, liquidity risk and 
market risk. 
 
Secondly, this analysis has shown that the volume of risk disclosures (in all risks and in 
all companies) increased over time. This present finding confirmed the findings of 
previous studies (e.g. Bischof, 2009; Hill and Short, 2009; Pérignon and Smith, 2010; 
Hughes et al., 2011). 
 
Thirdly, the pattern of switching increase in disclosure in this study showed that the 
adoption of IAS 32 ‘Financial Instruments: Presentation’, IAS 39 ‘Financial 
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement’ and IFRS 4 ‘Insurance Contracts’ caused a 
pattern of switching increase in disclosure in 2005. This finding confirmed the previous 
findings in the aspect of increasing overall risk disclosures when adopting IAS/IFRS 
standards (Iatridis, 2008; Bischof, 2009; Taylor et al., 2010). However, Oliveira et al. 
(2011b), who examined risk disclosure in the annual reports of Portuguese companies in 
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the non-finance sector for the year 2005, argued that the adoption of IFRSs in 2005 did 
not positively affect the quantity and quality of risk disclosure. 
 
Fourthly, while Helbok and Wagner (2006) found that voluntary risk disclosure 
increased in both extent and content over the period between 1998 and 2001, the 
striking findings in this study showed that there were three risk categories of voluntary 
disclosures having a clear switching increase in disclosure in 2006 (i.e. sustainability 
risk, economic risk, and pension risk).  
 
Fifthly, there was no meaningful longitudinal change in the time orientation of 
disclosures as a proportion of all disclosures. The largest quantity of time orientation of 
disclosures was present information and the second largest quantity was forward-
looking disclosure. The lowest proportion of time orientation of disclosures was past 
information. This finding disagreed with the findings of Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), 
who studied risk reporting of non-financial listed companies in Italy and found that 
disclosed items were more focused on the present and the past than on the future. 
Additionally, this finding also disagreed with the findings of Linsley et al. (2006) and 
Oliveira et al. (2011b), who found that future information was disclosed less often than 
past information.  
 
Sixthly, the largest proportion of risk disclosure were the general statements (neutral 
news direction) while there was a small proportion of bad news disclosure. This current 
finding is confirmed by the findings of several previous studies (i.e. Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2005a; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Linsley et al., 
2006; Oliveira et al., 2011b).  
 
Seventhly, focusing on the volume of quantitative disclosure, several studies have found 
that risk reporting appeared to lack the disclosure of quantified information (i.e. Lajili 
and Zéghal, 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2005a; Yong et al., 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 
2006; Linsley et al., 2006). Moreover, the further finding in the aspect of quality of 
quantified information in this study showed that the proportions that were disclosed 
quantitatively fell against the total number of categories disclosed over time. 
Meanwhile, Pérignon and Smith (2010), who attempted to measure quality of market 
risk by investigating VaR disclosure in the banking sector between 1996 and 2005, 
found that the quality of quantified risk disclosure did not improve over time. 
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7.5  Summary 
 
This chapter has presented a number of findings under four main areas. Firstly, 
analysing longitudinal risk category membership was presented to reflect the 
longitudinal pattern and trend by comparing the findings of the six sample companies. 
Secondly, the findings compared how risk disclosures on an inter-company basis were 
disclosed in the aspect of information richness, which consists of time orientation of 
disclosure, disclosure of factuality and perception, disclosure news direction, and 
quality of disclosure. Thirdly, the correlations between the volumes of longitudinal 
banking sector risk disclosures against the intensity of societal discussion as proxied by 
the frequency, by year, of relevant newspaper citations, by risk category were analysed 
and compared among six companies. The final section has made a comparison of the 
findings between the findings in this research and prior research. The next chapter will 
provide the key findings and analysis in order to focus on the key contributions of this 
study.  
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Chapter 8. Key Findings 
 
 
The results of the content analysis were presented in Chapter 6, and Chapter 7. In 
Chapter 6, the findings of longitudinal data were analysed in respect of the overall 
analysis of all companies. Meanwhile, in Chapter 7 the findings were analysed on an 
inter-company basis by comparing the findings of the six sample companies (i.e. RBS, 
NatWest, Lloyds TSB, HBOS, Barclays, and HSBC). 
 
The primary aim of this chapter is to summarise the major findings and contributions of 
this research. The annual reports of six sample companies were selected to be examined 
over the period between 1995 and 2010. The contents of risk disclosures in the annual 
reports were investigated in all narrative sections, including the notes to the accounts 
that include details of the preparation of the financial statement, a summary of 
significant accounting policies, details of the assets and liabilities, and other additional 
information that relates to the company’s periodic reports.  
 
The key findings of this chapter are presented in four sections. The first section 
describes the volumetric analysis explaining the overall risk disclosures for all 
companies by year. The second section deals with risk disclosure for all companies with 
regard to information richness (i.e. time orientation of disclosure, fact and perception, 
disclosure direction, and quality of disclosure). The third section presents the key 
findings on the association between the volumes of longitudinal banking sector risk 
disclosures against the intensity of societal discussion. The fourth section (with respect 
to the comparison of all companies) provides the key findings of intrasectoral effects, 
focusing on the key themes that were identified in the analysis.  
 
 
8.1  Volumetric Analysis 
 
There has recently been an increasing level of interest in the quality of disclosure in 
annual reports (Bayou et al., 2011), which has intensified following the failures of 
several large companies (e.g. Enron, Global Crossing, WorldCom and Tyco Corporate). 
The quality of disclosure depends both on the quantity of the information disclosed and 
on the richness offered by additional information (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). In 
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terms of the quantity of disclosure, the narrative component with sufficient information 
is able to convey messages for clarification and validation; it is also able to offer useful 
insights into risk reporting. In addition, a sufficient volume of risk contents (as 
classified into categories) is important for investors because risk disclosure is related to 
the crucial points that assist investors and other stakeholders when they make decisions 
about their investments. Accordingly, a volumetric analysis of risk disclosure was 
performed in this study, based on the six sample companies. Sentences from all of the 
narratives of the annual reports were used to examine risk disclosures. The risk 
categories were classified. The numbers of sentences in each risk category were then 
counted to reflect the longitudinal pattern and trend. The following sections present the 
key findings related to this volumetric analysis. 
 
 
8.1.1   Most disclosed categories by volume (in all companies and in all years) 
 
To identify the risk categories that have influenced UK banks in terms of the volume of 
sentences, this finding shows the top ten risk categories, ranked by number of sentences 
disclosed over time, as shown in table 8.1. 
 
Table 8.1  The top ten most disclosed risk categories by volume (in all companies and in 
all years) 
Ranking Number Risk Categories Number of Sentences 
1 Credit risk 14,958 
2 Risk management 7,996 
3 Market risk 5,530 
4 Insurance and investment risk 4,393 
5 Liquidity and funding risk 4,176 
6 Capital management risk 3,887 
7 Legal and regulation risk 3,443 
8 Risk related to derivatives 3,441 
9 Interest rate risk 2,510 
10 Operational risk 2,243 
 
A review of both aspects (for all of the companies and for each individual company) has 
shown that credit risk was the most disclosed risk by volume (for all companies and in 
all years). The other risk categories did not have sequential ranking when considered as 
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individual companies, as shown in table 8.1. For example, market risk disclosure was 
the third ranking disclosure of RBS, the second ranking disclosure of NatWest, the 
fourth ranking disclosure of Lloyds TSB, the fourth ranking disclosure of HBOS, the 
third ranking disclosure of Barclays, and the third ranking disclosure of HSBC. This 
happened because risk disclosures involved varying degrees of analysis, evaluation, 
acceptance and management of risks or combinations of risks.  
 
 
8.1.2   The number of risk categories disclosed 
 
The key finding in this section shows the development of risk disclosure of all 
companies by focusing on categories of risks. While most categories in the annual 
reports were classified by the companies themselves, where there was no classification 
the content was considered as the context and it was classified under the most relevant 
risk category. Figure 8.1 shows the average number of risk categories between 1995 and 
2010, by all companies. 
 
Figure 8.1 Average number of categories of risk disclosure, by all companies 
 
 
As can be seen in figure 8.1, the number of risk categories disclosed has risen over time, 
in all companies. There was no significant difference in shape between overall and 
individual companies. The average lowest categories disclosed were eight categories 
and the average highest were twenty-five categories. 
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8.1.3   The number of sentences disclosed 
 
The quantity of disclosures can sometimes represent the importance of the issues that 
the companies intend to manage. Consequently, the volumetric count is reflected in the 
trends and patterns of the risk disclosures that are related to banking risks. It is also 
notable that the quantity of disclosures involved the awareness and sensitivity of the 
stakeholders. Therefore, this key finding (which arises from counting those sentences 
that are related risk categories in annual reports) shows how the companies have 
responded to risks.  
 
Figure 8.2 The number of sentences disclosed, in all risk categories, in all companies 
and by year 
 
 
Figure 8.2 shows that the number of sentences (in all risks and in all companies) 
increased over time, from 1,075 sentences in 1995 to 9,941 sentences in 2010 (an 
increase of approximately nine times). When considering the results of increasing both 
the number of risk categories (see figure 8.1) and the volume of disclosures (see figure 
8.2) it can be seen that there was a smooth upward trend in the quantity of risk 
disclosures from both findings during the period between 1995 and 2010.  
 
Although both the number of risk categories and the number of sentences by all 
companies had a smooth increase over time, these increases in risk disclosures contain 
other patterns of disclosure. It has been found from the findings and analysis of this 
study that risk disclosure by all companies can be divided into three main patterns, 
which are: a smooth increase in volume, a change in volume with a switch point, and 
volume fluctuation. However, striking results were found in the patterns of smooth 
increase in volume and in the pattern of change in volume with switch point, which will 
be described in more detail in the subsections that follow. 
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a) Smooth increase in volume 
 
An increase in volumetric disclosures depends on business activities (such as key 
assumptions underpinning risk appetite) and management decisions, which are 
anticipated to be necessary to mitigate risks. The findings and analysis in this study 
show that there were three risk categories that experienced a smooth increase in volume 
of disclosure, which are: risk management, market risk, and risk related to capital 
management. 
 
It should be noted that the three risk categories that had a smooth increase in volume of 
disclosure were also the key strategic banking risks that all banks were called upon to 
provide both mandatory information and voluntary information to their stakeholders.  
 
When investigating the risk disclosures of each of the sample companies that 
experienced a smooth increase in volume, it was found that all of the risk categories 
with this pattern of disclosure were also the key strategic risks of banks that have 
received increased attention over time. In particular, in four out of the six companies 
(i.e. Lloyds TSB, HBOS, Barclays, and HSBC) market risk was the most frequently 
disclosed risk that had this pattern, while liquidity and funding risk was disclosed with a 
smooth pattern by two companies (i.e. RBS and Barclays). Of the other risk categories, 
different companies disclosed this pattern with different risk categories, including: a 
disclosure of insurance and investment risk at Lloyds TSB; a risk management 
disclosure at Barclays; a credit risk disclosure at HSBC; and, a capital management 
disclosure at HSBC. However, NatWest was found to have had no pattern of smooth 
increase in its volume of disclosure.  
 
 
b) Change in volume with switch points 
 
It should be highlighted that the period between 2005 and 2009 experienced a number 
of volumetric increases with clear switch points. A switching increase in the volume of 
disclosure tends to be a signal to reflect the likely impact of disclosure on companies 
who are faced with unprecedented problems. The key findings in this study indicate that 
there are two factors related to the pattern of the switching increase in volume of 
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disclosure (in all companies), which are: the initial adoption of international accounting 
standards and a financial crisis. 
 
Firstly, there were four risk categories that had a clear switching increase in disclosure 
in the year 2005, which are: risk related to fair value, risk related to impairment, 
hedging risk, and insurance and investment risk. The reason for this significant increase 
was that in 2005 the International Accounting Standard 32 ‘Financial Instruments: 
Presentation’ (‘IAS 32’), IAS 39 ‘Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement’ (‘IAS 39’), and IFRS 4 ‘Insurance Contracts’ (‘IFRS 4’) were all 
adopted for the first time. This introduction led to an increased level of risk disclosures 
in all companies, which was related to financial instrument and insurance risk. 
 
Secondly, the pattern of a clear switching increase in volume of risk disclosure during 
2006 to 2009 reflects the effects of the financial crisis. In 2006, the disclosure of 
economic risk showed a clear pattern of switching increase in volume of disclosure that 
was caused by the beginning of a period of a severe economic slowdown. The 
Consumer Price Index (‘CPI’) inflation rate increased from 1.9 per cent in January 2006 
to 3.0 per cent in December 2006. Consequently, a large number of UK households 
found themselves struggling with a heavy debt burden while personal insolvencies and 
repossessions increased as a result of an unemployment rate increase. The economic 
slowdown in the UK in 2006 was partly caused by the deterioration in the US housing 
market that began in 2006, accelerated during 2007, and has since continued to spread 
beyond the sub-prime mortgage market into the wider economy.  
 
It is evident that in the year 2007 the disclosures of liquidity and funding risk, credit 
risk, and operational risk all increased significantly. The main reason behind the 
increase of risk disclosure was the severity of the financial crisis that affected the credit 
markets, which constrained the ability to lend because of the deterioration in credit 
quality. When coupled with the lack of a liquidity market, this led to problems with 
liquidity resources and capital to run the on-going banking systems.  
 
In 2008, the strategic and business risk had a clear switching increase in disclosure. This 
may be an effect of the financial crisis, which entered a critical stage in September 2008 
when the Lehman Brothers collapse induced significant losses to many counterparties. 
This severe downturn led the financial services industry into extraordinary turbulence.  
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It is apparent that the disclosures of legal and regulation risk increased significantly in 
2009. Following the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009, many regulations were proposed to 
improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks and to manage risk as well as to 
strengthen bank transparency and disclosure. The European Commission, the UK 
Tripartite Authorities (i.e. HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial 
Services Authority ‘FSA’), the US Government and others made a number of proposals 
for adjustment of their regulatory regimes, which has been found to have affected all of 
the companies in this study. 
 
 
8.2  Information Richness 
 
Driven by increased complexities in business, and an objective to promote transparency 
and enhance quality of disclosure by reducing information asymmetries, risk disclosures 
have the potential to benefit shareholders, analysts, investors, and other stakeholders 
(Lajili and Zéghal, 2005). However, Linsley and Shrives (2005b) warned that disclosure 
by itself will not create transparency, particularly when it appears to lack useful 
information. Consequently, this study has investigated how companies have disclosed 
risk issues in the aspect of information richness. The striking results of examining 
information richness were found in four main aspects (as presented in the following 
subsections), which are: 
1) The disclosure of factuality and perception; 
2) Disclosure news direction; 
3) The quality of disclosures (i.e. qualitative disclosure and quantitative 
disclosure); and, 
4) The association between quantitative disclosure and factual disclosure. 
 
 
8.2.1   The disclosure of factuality and perception 
 
Fact and perception are a natural pair of statements for communication; therefore, and 
perhaps not surprisingly, both appear in all of the annual reports where they are used to 
provide operational information and present managerial perception. Fact and perception 
disclosure is a modest step to take because some sentences are broadly associated with 
thinking without verifying the accuracy of the information. This happens because the 
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directors have an incentive to disclose in their rhetorical statements in order to support 
confidence in the factual information that they claim (Hooper and Pratt, 1995). 
Although perception information is managerial expectation, or something that is 
expressed in a forward-looking manner, it is useful for investors to support their 
decision-making. However, non-factual information should be carefully used because it 
can easily mislead investors. Meanwhile, factual information or hard facts presented as 
a proven or verifiable content may delay reporting because of the verification process. 
 
In this study, the proportion of factual disclosures was employed to reflect the 
longitudinal patterns and trends between 1995 and 2010, as shown in figure 8.3.  
 
Figure 8.3 The percentage of factual disclosures as a proportion of total sentences (in 
all companies) between 1995 and 2010  
 
 
As can be seen from figure 8.3, the factual disclosures as a proportion of total sentences 
(in all companies) slightly decreased over the period between 1995 and 2010. This 
means that as volume increased over time, perception-based sentences were slightly 
favoured over (higher volumes by sentences) those containing ‘hard facts’. Over time, 
risk reporting has become proportionately more concerned with opinion and perception 
than facts because managerial perception tends to be made in large volume for 
explanatory disclosure, which has less credibility than factual disclosures (Toms, 2002). 
In addition, non-factual content (or managerial perception) can be used to support 
confidence in the directors’ claim of factual information (Hooper and Pratt, 1995).  
 
The comparative findings of the results of the individual companies showed that there 
was no significant cross-sectional difference of proportion of time orientation 
disclosure, which was found by comparing the total disclosures among all of the 
companies. 
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8.2.2   Disclosure news direction  
 
Generally, there are three characteristics of disclosure direction in annual reports, which 
are: good news, neutral news and bad news. However, because of the difficulty in 
evaluating the attitudes of UK banks towards risk disclosure of good news, this study 
classified the sentence of good news as neutral news because the tone of good news
1
 is 
too ambiguous to be classified appropriately. Consequently, there were two 
characteristics of disclosure direction used in this study: neutral news and bad news.  
 
The results of this study indicate that most news was classed as neutral news; therefore, 
the proportion of bad news disclosed as an inverse relationship of neutral news had a 
small proportion of disclosures. Figure 8.4 provides the findings of the trend for the 
proportion of bad news disclosed. 
 
Figure 8.4  The percentage of bad news sentences as a proportion of total number of 
sentences, as disclosed between1995 and 2010 by all companies 
 
 
It was found in this study that the proportion of sentences containing bad news (when 
divided by all sentences) increased smoothly over time, although bad news was a low 
proportion (i.e. from 0.7% in 1995 to a high of 9.8% in 2010) when compared to the 
proportion of neutral news. However, it is difficult to indicate that companies faced 
more risks over time because there are a number of possible reasons behind the 
disclosure of bad news. For example, Kothari et al. (2009) found that disclosure of good 
and bad news means that the market participants are more aware of the risks, which is 
reflected in the firm’s cost of capital, stock return volatility, and dispersion in the 
                                                          
1
 As described in Section 5.4 of Chapter 5, this study has exemplified three ambiguous classifications of 
good news. Firstly, good news may be bad news when the rhetorical disclosure is considered in the long 
period. Secondly, the use of optimistic language in good news may mislead shareholders into ignoring 
the financial jeopardy that companies are experiencing. Thirdly, some good news has no clear sign of 
good news, which is likely to be either good news or neutral news. 
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analysts’ earnings forecasts. Linsley and Shrives (2005a) found that companies 
sometimes discuss bad news by referring to uncontrollable external factors in order to 
describe the good news that they have mitigated the risk effectively. Additionally, 
Linsley et al. (2006) advised that companies need to be prepared to reveal bad news to 
avoid the suspicion that they are concealing problems. 
 
The comparative findings of the results of the individual companies showed that there 
was no significant cross-sectional difference of proportion of disclosure direction, 
which was done by comparing the total disclosure among all of the companies. 
 
 
8.2.3   The quality of disclosures  
 
The quality of disclosure is one of the indicators that are used to measure how well 
companies disclose in their annual reports. In particular, the qualitative characteristics 
of information (i.e. understandability and relevance) are factors in the IASB framework 
that can provide sufficient information about risk. Consequently, the importance of 
providing sufficient information and offering management (or mitigation) of risk were 
considered in order to classify the distinct level of quality. To measure the quality of 
risk disclosure, this present study has classified quality of risk disclosures in annual 
reports into two types: the qualitative disclosure and the quantitative disclosure. The key 
findings of both types are shown in the following subsections. 
 
 
a) The quality of qualitative disclosure 
 
The interrogation of disclosure quality in the aspect of qualitative disclosure in this 
study had three levels: Level 1 included disclosures with mention only or mention with 
minimal discussion; Level 2 included disclosures with contextualised explanations of 
risk and exposure; and, Level 3 included disclosures with contextualised explanations of 
risk and exposure, including a description of the management or mitigation of that risk 
(see also table 6.5, Chapter 6). Frequencies of qualitative disclosure levels were counted 
for all risk categories and in all companies in order to identify the quality level in all 
risk categories and in all companies. The analysis of this improvement over a period of 
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sixteen years (i.e. 1995 to 2010) was investigated and the results are shown in figure 
8.5. 
 
Figure 8.5  Frequency counts of qualitative disclosure level, in all companies and 
under all risk categories  
 
 
It is apparent from figure 8.5 that the total frequencies of risk categories of all 
companies were mainly disclosed on level 3, which is defined as disclosures that 
include a description of the management or mitigation of that risk. In addition, the total 
frequencies of risk categories with high information in all companies (at level 3) 
continued an upward trend over time, from 44 times in 1995 to 136 times in 2010. 
However, this upward trend involved the number of increased risk categories (as shown 
in figure 8.1 of Section 8.1.2), which means that when a risk category increased it also 
had a chance to count a higher frequency of qualitative disclosure level 3. 
Consequently, to examine the upward trend of qualitative disclosure at level 3 it is 
necessary that the number of risk categories disclosed at level 3 is divided by the total 
number of risk categories as a proportion of qualitative disclosure level 3. The results 
show that the quality of qualitative disclosures at level 3 did not have an upward trend 
when the frequencies of qualitative disclosure level 3 (in all risk categories and in all 
companies) were made as a proportion of total risk categories. However, the quality of 
the qualitative disclosures of all companies mainly contained the contextualised 
explanations of risk and exposure, including a description of the management or 
mitigation of that risk. 
 
The comparative findings of the results of the individual companies showed that there 
was no significant cross-sectional difference of proportion of disclosure direction, 
which was done by comparing the total disclosure among all of the companies. 
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b) The quality of quantitative disclosure 
 
The contents of the risk disclosures in an annual report are mainly to be found in the 
narrative statements at the ‘front end’ of the document. However, the numerical 
statement influences the quality of disclosures because numerical information can 
convey a specific meaning to readers and it is also likely to be evidence of a responsive 
management who wish to communicate with investors. Therefore, this study has clearly 
distinguished between qualitative and quantitative disclosures. In terms of quantitative 
disclosure, there were 2 levels: level 1 was defined as disclosure of issues related to the 
numerical category while level 2 was defined as numerical disclosure to the category 
against comparison. 
 
The analysis of numerical data classified as level 1 and level 2 has shown a significantly 
different frequency count in both levels, as illustrated in figure 8.6. 
 
Figure 8.6   The frequencies of quantitative disclosure levels (in all companies)
 
 
Figure 8.6 indicates the significant difference between level 1 and 2 between 1995 and 
2010. Where risk categories were made quantitatively, a large majority (i.e. five times 
to twenty-nine times more than level 1) were at level 2. This means that disclosure 
contained comparison data providing higher and more meaningful information content 
than just a single number. Moreover, it appears that quantitative disclosures of level 2 
showed a slight increase over time. This increase was related to the increasing number 
of risk categories disclosed. 
 
To examine the upward trend of quantitative disclosure (as shown in figure 8.6), the 
proportion of quantitative disclosures was calculated by using total number of 
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quantitative disclosures level 1 and 2 divided by total number of risk categories. Figure 
8.7 provides the proportion of frequencies containing both levels of quantitative 
disclosure (divided by total number of risk categories) between 1995 and 2010, in all 
companies. 
 
Figure 8.7  The frequency of quantitative disclosure as a proportion of total risk 
categories (in all companies) 
 
 
Since the number of risk categories has increased over time (see figure 8.6), the 
proportions that were disclosed quantitatively fell against the total number of categories 
disclosed (particularly between 1995 and 2002), after which they slightly fluctuated 
between 57% and 65%.  
 
 
8.2.4   The Association between quantitative disclosure and factual disclosure 
 
It was notable that the downward longitudinal trend of quantitative disclosures was the 
same shape as the percentage of factual disclosures as a proportion of total sentences (in 
all companies). To explore this relationship, figure 8.8 illustrates the correlation 
between factual disclosures and quantitative disclosures.  
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Figure 8.8  The correlation between factual disclosures and quantitative disclosures (in 
all companies) (r = 0.632, n = 16, p = 0.009) 
 
 
It is evident from figure 8.8 that factual disclosures were positively correlated with 
quantitative disclosures: Spearman’s rho (r) was 0.632. The rates of decrease in the 
proportion of both disclosures were comparable between 1995 and 2004, although in the 
subsequent years the rate of decrease in the percentage of factual disclosures gradually 
grew more than the decrease rate of the percentage of frequency of quantitative 
disclosures.  
 
The rationality for this finding is that almost all of the numerical information was 
proven or verifiable information, which was caused because the sentences mainly 
contained statements of fact. In addition, Beattie and Thomson (2007) in their study of 
the intellectual capital disclosures of Next plc in its annual report for the year 2004 also 
found that quantified disclosures tended to be factual information. There was also a 
higher rate of decrease in factual disclosures of Next plc after 2004. They explained this 
as the effect of the introduction of a new international accounting standard in 2005, 
which meant that Next plc tended to disclose a large volume of explanatory risk to 
support confidence in their factual information and numerical information. When 
coupled with the economic collapse in the US, which began in 2006, and the accelerated 
collapse in the UK, which began in 2007, it was inevitable that the companies in this 
present study have provided perceptive information that was significantly larger than 
fact.  
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8.3  The Intensity of Societal Discussion 
 
This study has also investigated the correlation between the number of newspaper 
citations for risk issues and the risk disclosures in the companies’ annual reports. 
LexisNexis (an online searchable database) was employed via Newcastle University 
database archives to search and to count news related to thirty-five risk categories by 
using specific words cited in fourteen newspapers (see Chapter 5, table 5.13).  
 
The results of the Spearman correlation (r hereafter) are categorised into three main 
groups of correlation, which are: high correlation (r is between ± 0.63 and ±1.00, p < 
0.01), moderate correlation (r is between ± 0.50 and ± 0.62, p < 0.05), and no correlation 
(r is less than ± 0.50).  
 
 
8.3.1   Correlations between intensity of societal discussion and information richness 
disclosed (in all companies) 
 
In this study there was a high association between disclosure direction and newspaper 
citations. Specifically, the disclosures of bad news were found to be positively 
associated with newspaper citations. Meanwhile, the disclosures of neutral news were 
negatively associated with newspaper citations. Figure 8.9 shows the correlation 
between proportion of bad news disclosed and number of risk citations in newspaper. 
 
Figure 8.9  The correlation between the disclosure of bad news as proportion of all 
sentences and the number of newspaper citations (in all companies) 
(r = 0.70, n = 16, p = 0.003)  
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As can be seen from figure 8.9, there was a high correlation between the disclosure of 
bad news as a proportion of all sentences and the number of newspaper citations at 70% 
(r = 0.70). It should be noted that this correlation has been very close since 2003. This 
may have been caused by the onset of the Enron scandal (which began in late 2001 and 
spread continually in 2002), which has led to societal discussion about banking risks. 
Moreover, the financial crisis that emerged following the negative signal of an 
economic slowdown in 2006 (which became a crisis between 2007 and 2009) was an 
influential factor. In this figure, this crisis shows as a strong association during this 
period of time. Therefore, it can be said that a bank’s disclosure tended to respond to an 
intensification of societal concern about bad news, particularly during stressful events.  
 
The disclosures of fact and perception show that there was a significantly positive 
correlation between the proportion of perception disclosed and the number of 
newspaper citations (r = 0.688, p = 0.003). In contrast to this relationship, the proportion 
of fact disclosures was found to be negatively associated with the number of newspaper 
citations (r = -0.688, p = 0.003). These results suggested that the bank’s disclosure 
responded to societal discussion with information containing opinion and perception, 
rather than fact or verified information. 
 
The other interrogations of risk disclosures show that there was no association between 
the time orientation of disclosures (i.e. future, present, and past) and the number of 
newspaper citations. Further findings also showed that the quality of disclosure (either 
quantitative or qualitative disclosures) was not associated with number of newspaper 
citations. 
 
 
8.3.2   Correlations between intensity of societal discussion and risk categories (in all 
companies) 
 
The statistical analysis shows that there were eleven risk categories out of a total of 
thirty-five risk categories that have a positive correlation with the number of newspaper 
citations, as well as variable numbers of total risk categories. It is apparent that the 
intensity of societal discussion about banking risks can be seen in the patterns of bank 
risk disclosures.  
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In the three main areas of risk (i.e. total risk categories, risk management, and financial 
risk) there were significantly positive correlations between the number of newspaper 
citations of risk categories and the number of sentences of seven variables, which 
include: 
1) All risk categories; 
2) Risk management; 
3) Liquidity and funding risk; 
4) Credit risk; 
5) Market risk; 
6) Insurance and investment risk; and, 
7) Equity risk.  
It should be noted that these risk categories were the key strategic risks of banks. They 
can offer two perspectives of the findings in this study, that is: either from the point of 
view of a British citizen or from the point of view of a banking supervisor. Firstly, in 
terms of the British citizen’s perspective, disclosures of the key strategic risks of banks 
are central issues of societal discussion when considering the finding that the 
disclosures of these seven risk categories had a significant positive correlation with the 
number of newspaper citations. Secondly, in terms of the banking supervisor’s 
perspective, banking supervisors responded increasingly to the key strategic banking 
risks when considering the findings that these seven risk categories were disclosed with 
longitudinal volumetric increases (see Section 8.1.3). Consequently, it should be 
considered from the findings of this present study that these risk categories were the key 
strategic banking risks that were perceived by both the British public and by banking 
supervisors. 
 
Moreover, the striking results from an in-depth sectoral analysis showed that risk 
categories disclosed by three or four companies (i.e. market risk, liquidity and funding 
risk, risk management, credit risk, and operational risk) had a significant positive 
association with the intensity of societal discussion. The risk categories disclosed were 
also the key strategic banking risks. This indicates that disclosures of key strategic 
banking risks were involved in the societal discussions on risk issues.  
 
Turning to the associations for risk categories (in all companies) related to banking 
operation, the disclosure of operational risk, legal and regulation risk (as well as tax 
risk) were found to have had a significant positive correlation with the number of 
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newspaper citations. Interestingly, given the findings that disclosures of key strategic 
banking risks in financial risk were the central issues of societal discussion, the risks 
related to banking operation, operational risk, legal and regulation risk and tax risk were 
the main issues that were of concern to the British public and banking supervisors.  
 
Longitudinal analysis shows that there were two risk categories (i.e. economic risk and 
sustainability risk) which the public enthusiastically responded to. Figure 8.10 shows 
the correlation between economic risk disclosure and the number of newspaper 
citations: 
 
Figure 8.10  The correlation between the number of sentences of economic risk and the 
number of newspaper citations (in all companies) (r = 0.697, p = 0.003) 
 
 
Figure 8.10 shows that disclosure of economic risk is positively associated with the 
number of newspaper citations. There was an even more remarkable correlation 
between 2006 and 2010, which may be explained because the banks’ disclosures of 
economic risk involving societal concerns have risen since the start of the current 
financial crisis in 2006. Another risk category that also has a clear correlation in the 
same period of time is shown in figure 8.11: 
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Figure 8.11  The correlation between the number of sentences of sustainability risk and 
the number of newspaper citations (in all companies) (r = 0.745, p = 0.001) 
 
 
Figure 8.11 shows that there has been a clear correlation between disclosures of 
sustainability risk and the number of newspaper citations since 2006. The remarkable 
increase in the disclosure of sustainability risk reflects the policy and actions of 
companies in response to the needs for sustainable development of environmental 
effects, following which most companies have organised environmental concerns 
(including risk disclosures of environmental awareness). In addition, the public concern 
about sustainability risk may relate to the 2006 documentary film ‘An Inconvenient 
Truth’, directed by Davis Guggenheim about former United States Vice President Al 
Gore's campaign to educate citizens about global warming via a comprehensive slide 
show. Sustainability risk involves social and community issues, environment, and 
responsible global citizenship which are all likely to affect corporate image. Therefore, 
this finding suggested that companies have responded to societal concerns as they 
became critical issues.  
 
 
8.4  An Intrasectoral Analysis  
 
This section presents the key findings by comparing the empirical results of six sample 
companies. 
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8.4.1   Disclosure with switching increase by comparing six companies 
 
In this study there were many risk categories that had a volumetric increase with clear 
switch points in different years. The switching point tends to be a signal to reflect the 
likely impact on companies that are faced with unprecedented problems.  
 
The results showed that 2008 contained nineteen risk categories, which was the most 
frequently occurring risk category, with clear switch points as disclosed by four of six 
companies (i.e. RBS, NatWest, Barclays, and HSBC). Meanwhile, 2007 contained nine 
risk categories, which was the second most occurring risk category of this pattern, as 
disclosed by five of six companies (i.e. NatWest, Lloyds TSB, HBOS, Barclays, and 
HSBC). The reason for the striking results from this investigation was that this was a 
period of financial crisis, which began in the second half of 2007. Therefore, many risk 
categories were disclosed with switching increase in this period, including 2009, which 
contained six risk categories disclosed by three companies (i.e. RBS, NatWest and 
Lloyds TSB). Hence, this finding indicates that the financial crisis has had an effect on 
risk category disclosed with switching increase pattern because the financial crisis of 
2007 has revealed that massive financial fraud and misconduct has long been a part of 
the enormous risks taken by many banks and financial institutions (Tomasic, 2011).  
 
There was another switching year in 2005, when four companies (i.e. RBS, NatWest, 
Barclays, and HSBC) disclosed with switching pattern for many risk categories (i.e. risk 
related to impairment, hedged risk, insurance and investment risk). The most striking 
observation to emerge from this result was that most risk categories were related to the 
first-time adoption of International Accounting Standard 32 ‘Financial Instruments: 
Presentation’ (‘IAS 32’), IAS 39 ‘Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement’ (‘IAS 39’) and IFRS 4 ‘Insurance Contracts’ (‘IFRS 4’). This in-depth 
sectoral analysis also confirmed the key finding of switching increase of risk disclosures 
in 2005 by all companies, as mentioned in Section 8.1.3. 
 
 
8.4.2   Disclosure with volume fluctuation by comparing six companies 
 
Many of the risk categories had a disclosure with volumetric fluctuation. This reflects 
that the companies have faced uncertainty in many areas related to their operations. 
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Table 8.2 presents the number of risk categories that the companies disclosed with 
volume fluctuation over a sixteen year period between 1995 and 2010. 
 
Table 8.2  The number of risk categories containing volume fluctuation of disclosure 
(by company) 
Company The Number of Risk Categories Percentage 
RBS 15 of 31 categories 48.39% 
NatWest 16 of 30 categories 53.33% 
Lloyds TSB 26 of 31 categories 83.87% 
HBOS 20 of 26 categories 76.92% 
Barclays 23 of 32 categories 71.87% 
HSBC 16 of 29 categories 55.17% 
 
As shown in table 8.2, Lloyds TSB disclosed the largest number of risk categories 
containing a pattern of volume fluctuation. Meanwhile, HBOS disclosed the second 
largest number of risk categories containing a pattern of volume fluctuation. The 
number of risk categories disclosed with volume fluctuation show that both Lloyds TSB 
and HBOS tended to face more uncertainty in their operation than the other companies. 
 
 
8.5   Summary 
 
This chapter has summarised the key findings of an investigation of risk disclosures in 
the annual reports of UK banks. The present study was designed to determine the effect 
of longitudinal and intrasectoral analysis by using content analysis. The findings have 
shown that all companies have increased their risk disclosures, both by number of risk 
categories and by volume of disclosures. Almost all of the risks were disclosed with 
high information content (both qualitative and quantitative aspects), although the 
proportion of quantitative disclosures declined over time. Meanwhile, factual 
disclosures as a proportion of total sentences (in all companies) have slightly decreased 
over time. The results show that a decrease in factual disclosure is positively correlated 
with the proportion of quantitative disclosure. In addition, the proportions of sentences 
containing bad news have increased smoothly over time.  
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Moreover, the key finding to emerge from investigating the risk categories disclosed 
was that credit risk was by far the most disclosed risk (by volume) for all banks (in all 
years). The volume of overall risk disclosures smoothly increased over time, although 
this trend concealed a switch point in many risk categories (particularly during 2005 to 
2009). These findings provide revealing insights into the causes of the switch point that 
involved the first-time adoption of international accounting standards and the financial 
crisis. Moreover, the pattern of risk disclosure in each risk category was examined by 
the correlations between all risk categories disclosed and the number of newspaper 
citations. The results show that newspapers citations are positively correlated with the 
key strategic banking risks (i.e. risk management, credit risk, liquidity risk, and market 
risk). 
 
In the last section, the findings of longitudinal and intrasectoral analysis have indicated 
that the first-time adoption of international accounting standard in 2005 and the 
financial crisis during 2007 to 2009 have had an effect on risk category disclosed with 
switching increase pattern by most companies. Meanwhile there was a clear pattern of 
disclosure with volume fluctuation by Lloyds TSB and HBOS.  
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Chapter 9. Conclusions and Discussion 
 
 
This chapter has six sections. The first section summarises the main aspects of this 
study. The second section presents the key findings and answers the research questions. 
The third section presents a summary of the original contributions of this study, 
including the method development that has been used and the risk disclosures that were 
found in the annual reports of the banking sector. The fourth section states the 
implications of this study that can be developed for further practice. The fifth section 
states the important limitations have been observed in this study. Finally, the sixth 
section proposes a number of ideas for further research based on the findings of this 
study. 
 
 
9.1  Summary of the Study 
 
The 2007 financial crisis revealed the weaknesses in modern corporate governance and 
risk management, which were both critical causes of the crisis. As the importance of the 
financial crisis became clear, it was obvious that risk was among the most significant 
issues in the UK banking sector. In the aftermath of the crisis, bankers, investors, 
regulators and researchers around the world showed an increased interest in re-
evaluating existing prudential regulatory standards, corporate governance, risk 
management, and risk monitoring in the banking sector. Consequently, Chapter 1 stated 
the motivations for the present research project and gave a brief overview of the risks, 
which were: corporate governance, risk management, and the importance of risk 
disclosure. 
 
Chapter 2 reviewed banking risks and risk disclosures. In terms of banking risks, seven 
of the main risks are related to market movements or changes in the economic 
environment, which were: credit risk, liquidity risk, capital adequacy, market risk, 
interest rate risk, currency risk, and operational risk. These seven risk categories were 
used to explain the conceptual issues in each risk category, including its definition and 
its management framework. In addition to the operational framework of risk 
management, this chapter also identified a number of recommendations and principles 
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of risk management that were related to these risk categories, which included the 
requirements of the Basel Committee. 
 
The influence of various stakeholders meant that risk disclosures were expected to 
engage the effectiveness of risk management and control systems, which may have 
affected an increase in shareholder value. A broad definition of risk disclosures was 
discussed to identify any hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure that the banks may 
have conducted to the relevant stakeholders. Risk disclosures were developed to 
determine the nature and extent of risk disclosure in corporate reports. Furthermore, 
prior research into risk disclosure in a variety of countries has been reviewed. The 
rationale underlying the purpose of a review of the prior research was to identify the 
various concepts related to risk reporting and to identify any potential relationship 
between these concepts. Chapter 3 has built on this review by identifying potential 
topics of concern and by establishing the research questions. 
 
Chapter 3 provided a theory justification that showed why agency theory was employed 
as the theoretical background to examine risk disclosures in this research. This chapter 
also described the key points of discussion in the previous studies. It then explained the 
need for this present research project, which aimed to address this research gap. 
Consequently, the main objectives of this study were to investigate risk disclosures in 
the UK banking sector, in both longitudinal and intrasectoral aspects, and to develop a 
method for evaluating the content of risk disclosures in annual reports. Given the gaps 
in the previous research and the research objectives, the research questions have 
addressed four main points (which were detailed in Section 9.2). Content analysis as a 
method involving the creation of research design was developed in this study to answer 
the research questions. 
 
Chapter 4 described the conceptual and methodological developments of content 
analysis. It introduced the concept of content analysis design, which was comprised of 
categorising data, unitising text, and recording units. This chapter also described the 
issues of measurement under the analytical construct topic. Measurement was 
developed to link the selected concepts and the collected data by transforming the data 
into numbers that can be analysed statistically. All measures (i.e. nominal, ordinal, 
interval and ratio) were important to help researchers clarify the textual evidence in the 
same story because the appropriate measures may have affected the reliability and 
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validity of the content analysis. This chapter also described how reliability, validity and 
limitations in content analysis involved the use of a proper procedure to increase the 
quality of measurement.  
 
Chapter 5 presented the method development, which was summarised into two main 
topics: the sample and the coding matrix. This chapter started with a description of the 
sample, which included the selection of the samples, the selected time frame, and the 
reasons for using annual reports as media selection. The annual reports of six companies 
(i.e. RBS, NatWest, Lloyds TSB, HBOS, Barclays, and HSBC) over a sixteen year 
period between 1995 and 2010 were selected to examine risk disclosures in terms of 
both longitudinal and intrasectoral effects. The analysis of the risk disclosures for the 
sample companies was performed on all narrative sections, including the notes to the 
accounts that contained details of the preparation of the financial statement, a summary 
of significant accounting policies, details of the assets and liabilities, and other 
additional information that related to the company’s periodic reports. The risk 
disclosures of all sample companies were then investigated by constructing coding 
matrix. This matrix was developed to analyse risk disclosures for six interrogations 
(which are described in the subsections which follow). 
 
 
9.1.1   Interrogation one: Risk categories 
 
The articulations and structuring of data related to risk disclosures were conducted to 
obtain risk categories in two aspects. In the first aspect, the risk categories were 
classified by name, as given by the companies. In the second aspect, the risk categories 
were classified as the companies disclosed risks without grouping risk categories. 
Consequently, when based on the generating categories, there were thirty-five risk 
categories that were used in this study (see table 5.3 of Chapter 5). 
 
 
9.1.2   Interrogation two: Disclosure direction  
 
One interrogation of the narrative in content analysis was the direction of disclosures, 
which generally had three directions of disclosures that were grouped as: bad news, 
good news, and neutral news. However, because of the difficulty in evaluating the 
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attitudes of UK banks towards risk disclosure of good news, this study has classified the 
sentences that contain good news as neutral news because the tone of good news was 
ambiguous and difficult to classify appropriately (for example, see three ambiguous 
classifications of good news in Section 5.4 of Chapter 5). Consequently, two 
characteristics of disclosure direction (i.e. neutral news and bad news) were used in this 
study.  
 
 
9.1.3   Interrogation three: Time orientation of disclosures  
 
Risk disclosures published in the annual report were classified into three categories, 
which were: firstly, backward-looking information (or past information); secondly, 
present information; and thirdly, future (or forward-looking) information. The adoption 
of effective content analysis tools for examining forward-looking information had many 
perspectives; therefore, this study has defined forward-looking characteristics by using a 
set of words to capture forward-looking sentences in risk disclosures, which was based 
on both the previous studies and on the companies providing these words in the annual 
reports under the heading of a cautionary statement regarding forward-looking 
disclosures (see table 5.6 and table 5.7 of Chapter 5). In terms of past and present 
information, a grammatical tense was employed in this study to code past information 
while present information was coded by using the gap when a recording unit was 
neither past nor forward-looking information. 
 
 
9.1.4   Interrogation four: The disclosures of factuality and perception  
 
It is crucial to define both terms in order to classify the risk disclosures that have been 
disclosed as factual or non-factual information. This study defined fact as information 
reported as fact, which is immediately verifiable or objective in nature. On the other 
hand, non-factual information or perception (including the forward-looking content that 
was defined in table 5.7 of Chapter 5) was defined as subjective information, which is 
not immediately verifiable or which is opinion. 
 
Based on four interrogations mentioned above, the interrogations of risk categories were 
used as themes to capture risk disclosure. When using risk categories as themes, 
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sentences under a theme as recording units were performed in three interrogations, as 
guided in the coding matrix, which were: disclosure direction, time orientation of 
disclosures, and the disclosure of factuality and perception. Each sentence was analysed 
for three rounds (the first round for disclosure direction, the second round for time 
orientation, and the third round for factuality and perception). The recording results 
were counted and the sum of the results was then filled in on the recording sheet in each 
risk category and for each company in the individual company analysis. The results in 
each company were added together in totality in order to analyse the overall pattern (see 
the recording sheet in figure 5.2 of Chapter 5). 
 
 
9.1.5   Interrogation five: The quality of risk disclosures 
 
The contents of risk disclosures in an annual report were mainly to be found in the 
narrative statement. However, the numerical statement influences the quality of 
disclosures because numerical information may have conveyed a specific meaning to 
readers and it was also likely to be evidence of a responsive management who wished to 
communicate with investors. To distinguish clearly between qualitative and quantitative 
disclosures, the annual reports were analysed separately between narrative and numeric 
disclosures. This was done because this study found that the quality of qualitative 
disclosures were independent from quantitative disclosures. Evaluation of the content of 
qualitative disclosures for all companies in this study employed three levels of quality: 
Qualitative Level 1 was defined as disclosing with mention only, or mention with 
minimal discussion; Qualitative Level 2 was defined as disclosing with contextualised 
explanations of risk and exposure; and, Qualitative Level 3 was defined as disclosing 
with contextualised explanations of risk and exposure, including a description of 
management or mitigation of that risk. Meanwhile, quantitative disclosure was 
measured by using two levels: Quantitative Level 1 was defined as numerical data on 
risk while Quantitative Level 2 was defined as numerical data against comparison. Each 
risk category (by year) of the annual report of each individual company was analysed as 
a theme for two rounds: firstly, the narrative was evaluated on the basis of the defined 
qualitative level; and secondly, the numerical disclosure of each risk category was 
evaluated on the basis of the defined quantitative level. Frequency counts of both 
qualitative levels and quantitative levels were then performed to examine the risk 
disclosures in the interrogation of the quality of disclosures. 
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9.1.6   Interrogation six: Frequency (by year) of newspaper hits (by risk category)  
 
The review of the influence of media coverage on public perception which was 
conducted in this study has found that newspapers are one of the most important mass 
media channels that provide an in-depth coverage of the issues. The number of 
newspaper citations may have helped to reflect the publics’ interest in many subjects 
(Joshi et al., 2011). In this study content analysis of the news coverage through the UK 
newspapers was conducted over the period from 1995 to 2010. The LexisNexis 
electronic database was used via Newcastle University database archives to search for 
citations of risk news. Risk categories were used as keywords to search the LexisNexis 
database. The number of newspaper citations in each risk category between 1995 and 
2010 that were retrieved from the LexisNexis database was then recorded on a 
recording sheet. The association between volumes of longitudinal banking sector risk 
disclosures against the intensity of societal discussion (as proxied by the frequency and 
by the year) of relevant newspaper citations (by risk category) was examined. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 provided the results of the longitudinal findings and analysis in three 
aspects, which were: a volumetric analysis of risk categories, information richness, and 
the association between volumes of longitudinal risk disclosures against the intensity of 
societal discussion (as proxied by the frequency and by the year) of relevant newspaper 
citations (by risk category). Chapter 6 gave an overall view of the findings for all six 
companies (i.e. RBS, NatWest, Lloyds TSB, HBOS, Barclays, and HSBC). Meanwhile, 
Chapter 7 provided the intrasectoral longitudinal findings, which were analysed by 
comparing six companies for three aspects as mentioned. It then compared findings 
between this research and those of prior research. The main findings and discussions 
from Chapters 6 and 7 were highlighted in Chapter 8 in order to focus on the key 
contributions and to answer research questions in this study.  
 
 
9.2  Answering the Research Questions 
 
This thesis has addressed four research questions (as detailed in Chapter 3), as follows: 
 
Research Question 1: How can longitudinal banking sector risk reporting by total 
volume, by company, and by year be described? 
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Research Question 2: How can longitudinal banking sector risk reporting by risk 
category, by company, and by year be described? 
 
Research Question 3: How can longitudinal banking sector risk reporting by 
information richness (i.e. the time orientation of disclosure, the disclosure of factuality 
and perception, disclosure direction, and quality of disclosure) by company and by year 
be described? 
 
Research Question 4: How can the association between volumes of longitudinal 
banking sector risk disclosures against the intensity of societal discussion as proxied by 
the frequency, by year, of relevant newspaper citations, and by risk category be 
described?  
 
Table 9.1 shows how the research questions of this study have been answered by 
summarising the main findings as presented in Chapter 8. 
 
Table 9.1  Research Questions (RQ), answers and analysis 
RQ Answer Analysis 
RQ1 
and 
RQ2 
The top ten most disclosed categories 
by volume, in all companies, and in 
all years were:  
1) Credit risk;  
2) Risk management;  
3) Market risk;  
4) Insurance and investment risk;  
5) Liquidity and funding risk;  
6) Capital management risk;  
7) Legal and regulation risk;  
8) Risk related to derivatives;  
9) Interest rate risk; and, 
10) Operational risk. 
Credit risk was the most disclosed risk by 
volume for all companies and all years, 
the other risk categories did not have 
sequential ranking as provided in this 
answer when considered as individual 
companies. This indicated that credit risk 
was the most concerned risk in all 
companies.  
 
RQ1 
and 
RQ2 
The number of risk categories 
disclosed had risen over time in all 
companies. There was no significant 
difference in shape when considering 
overall and individual companies. 
The average lowest categories disclosed 
were eight categories and the average 
highest were twenty-five categories. 
RQ1 The number of sentences of risk 
disclosures (in all risks and in all 
companies) increased over time from 
Although both the number of risk 
categories and the number of sentences 
by all companies had a smooth increase 
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RQ Answer Analysis 
1,075 sentences in 1995 to 9,941 
sentences in 2010, an increase of 
approximately nine times. 
over time, the increase in risk disclosures 
contained the other patterns of disclosure 
(i.e. a switching increase and volume 
fluctuation). 
RQ1 
and 
RQ2 
There were three risk disclosures 
which contained a smooth change in 
volume (in all companies), which 
were: risk management, market risk, 
and risk related to capital 
management. 
These three risk categories were the key 
strategic banking risks. 
When investigating risk disclosures of 
each sample company (as the pattern of 
smooth increase in volume), all of the 
risk categories with this pattern were also 
found to be the key strategic banking 
risks. 
RQ1 
and 
RQ2 
Risk disclosures in 2005 (in all 
companies) had a significant increase 
in risk related to fair value, risk 
related to impairment, hedged risk, 
and insurance and investment risk. 
This switching increase was caused by 
the first-time adoption of IAS 32 
‘Financial Instruments: Presentation’, 
IAS 39 ‘Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement’ and IFRS 
4 ‘Insurance Contracts’. 
RQ2 The year 2005 was one of the 
switching years when four companies 
(i.e. RBS, NatWest, Barclays, and 
HSBC) disclosed risks with 
switching pattern for many risk 
categories, including the risks related 
to impairment, hedged risk, insurance 
and investment risk, and tax risk. 
Most risk categories were related to the 
first-time adoption of IAS 32 ‘Financial 
Instruments: Presentation’, IAS 39 
‘Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement’ and IFRS 4 ‘Insurance 
Contracts’. 
RQ1 
and 
RQ2 
Risk disclosures in 2006 (in all 
companies) had a significant increase 
in economic risk. 
The year 2006 was the beginning of the 
current economic slowdown in the UK.  
RQ1 
and 
RQ2 
Risk disclosures in 2007 (in all 
companies) had a significant increase 
in liquidity and funding risk, credit 
risk, and operational risk.  
The severity of the financial crisis during 
2007-2009 affected credit markets, 
constraining the ability to lend. When 
coupled with a lack of liquidity market, 
this led to the problems of liquidity 
resources and capital to run on-going 
banking systems. 
RQ1 
and 
RQ2 
Risk disclosures in 2008 (in all 
companies) had a significant increase 
in strategic and business risk.  
The significant increase in volume of risk 
disclosure was related to the most critical 
stage of the crisis, which started in 
September 2008 when Lehman Brother’s 
collapsed, inducing significant losses in 
many counterparties.  
RQ1 
and 
RQ2 
Risk disclosures in 2009 (in all 
companies) had a significant increase 
in legal and regulation risk.  
A number of proposals for the adjustment 
of regulatory regimes were put forward 
because of the impact of the financial 
crisis of 2007 to 2009. The aim was to 
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RQ Answer Analysis 
improve the banking sector’s ability to 
absorb shocks, risk management, and to 
strengthen bank transparency and 
disclosure. 
RQ2 The year 2008 contained nineteen 
risk categories, which were the most 
frequently occurring risk category 
with clear switch points as disclosed 
by four companies (i.e. RBS, 
NatWest, Barclays, and HSBC). 
Meanwhile, the year 2007 contained 
nine risk categories, which was the 
second most occurring risk category 
of this pattern as disclosed by five 
companies (i.e. NatWest, Lloyds 
TSB, HBOS, Barclays, and HSBC).  
This finding indicated that the financial 
crisis that started during the second half 
of 2007 had a significant effect on the 
risk categories that were disclosed with 
switching increase pattern.  
RQ2 The risk category disclosed with the 
pattern of volume fluctuation was 
most frequently disclosed by Lloyds 
TSB. Meanwhile, this pattern was the 
second most frequently disclosed by 
HBOS.  
Both Lloyds TSB and HBOS have tended 
to face more uncertainty in their 
operation than the other companies. 
 
RQ3 The factual disclosures as a 
proportion of total sentences (in all 
companies) slightly decreased over 
the period of 1995 to 2010. This 
meant that as the volume increased 
over time the perception-based 
sentences were slightly favoured over 
(higher volumes by sentences) those 
containing ‘hard facts’. 
The director’s rhetorical statements may 
have had an incentive to disclose because 
they supported confidence in the factual 
information that they claimed. Since they 
were explanatory, rhetorical disclosures 
tended to be made in large volumes and 
they had less credibility than factual 
disclosures in content analysis.  
When considering the results of the 
individual company, there was no 
significant difference of proportion with 
analysis in all companies. 
RQ3 The proportion of sentences (in all 
companies) containing bad news 
(divided by all sentences) increased 
smoothly over time, although bad 
news was a low proportion.  
It was difficult to indicate that companies 
faced more risks over time because there 
were several possible reasons behind the 
disclosure of bad news. For example, 
market participants were more aware of 
the risks. Companies may discuss bad 
news by referring to uncontrollable 
external factors in order to describe the 
good news that they have mitigated the 
risk effectively. Additionally, companies 
needed to be prepared to reveal bad news 
to avoid the suspicion that they were 
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RQ Answer Analysis 
concealing problems.  
When considering the results of the 
individual company, there was no 
significant difference of proportion with 
analysis in all companies. 
RQ3 The total frequencies of risk 
categories of all companies were 
mainly disclosed on Level 3, which 
was described as the disclosure 
including a description of the 
management or mitigation of that 
risk. 
Most risk categories were disclosed with 
high information content. 
When considering the results of the 
individual company, there was no 
significant difference of proportion of 
qualitative disclosure with analysis in all 
companies. 
RQ3 Where risk categories (in all 
companies) were made 
quantitatively, a large majority of 
quantitative disclosure contained 
comparison data providing higher 
and more meaningful information 
content than just a single number. 
However, while the number of risk 
categories (in all companies) 
increased over time, the proportions 
that were disclosed quantitatively fell 
against the total number of categories 
disclosed. 
This confirmed that the number of 
categories disclosed qualitatively that 
were an inverse relationship of this 
method had increased as a proportion.  
 
RQ3 The proportion of factual disclosures 
(in all companies) was positively 
correlated with the proportion of 
quantitative disclosures.  
Almost all of the numerical information 
was proven or verifiable information, 
which can be explained by the sentences 
mainly containing statements of fact.  
RQ4 The proportion of disclosures of bad 
news (in all companies) was found to 
be positively associated with 
newspaper citations. 
A bank’s disclosure tended to respond to 
an intensification of societal concern 
about bad news, particularly during 
stressful events (i.e. the outbreak of 
Enron scandal during 2001-2002, an 
economic slowdown in 2006, and the 
financial crisis during 2007-2009). 
RQ4 There was a positive correlation 
between the proportion of 
perceptions disclosed (in all 
companies) and the number of 
newspaper citations. Meanwhile, the 
proportion of fact disclosures (in all 
companies) was found to be 
negatively associated with the 
number of newspaper citations.  
 
A bank’s disclosure responded to societal 
discussion with information containing 
opinion and perception rather than fact or 
verified information. 
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RQ Answer Analysis 
RQ4 There were significant positive 
correlations between the number of 
newspaper citations of risk categories 
and the number of sentences (in all 
companies) of seven variables, which 
were: 
1) Total risk categories; 
2) Risk management; 
3) Liquidity and funding risk;  
4) Credit risk;  
5) Market risk;  
6) Insurance and investment risk; 
and, 
7) Equity risk.  
These risk categories were the key 
strategic risks of banks for banking 
supervisors and also British citizens, who 
both responded strongly to the risk. 
The risk categories disclosed by three or 
four companies (i.e. market risk, liquidity 
and funding risk, risk management, credit 
risk, and operational risk) all had a 
significant association with the intensity 
of societal discussion and they were all 
disclosed as key strategic risks of the 
banks. This indicated that the disclosures 
of the key strategic risks of banks all 
involved societal discussions on risk 
issues.  
RQ4 Risk disclosures in the group of 
operational banking risks were found 
to have a significant correlation with 
the number of newspaper citations, 
particularly in operational risk, legal 
and regulation risk as well as tax risk.  
Given the findings that disclosures of key 
strategic risk of banks in financial risk 
were central issues of societal discussion, 
in terms of operational banking risk it 
was found that operational risk, legal and 
regulation risk, and tax risk were the 
main issues that the British public were 
most concerned about.  
RQ4 There were two risk categories (i.e. 
economic risk and sustainability risk) 
which were found during the 
longitudinal analysis to have a clear 
correlation with newspaper citations 
since 2006. 
The banks’ disclosures of economic risk 
involving societal concerns had risen 
since the start of the current financial 
crisis in 2006. Meanwhile, disclosure of 
sustainability risk since 2006 had a clear 
association with societal concerns 
because disclosure of sustainability risk 
had reflected the policy and actions of 
companies to respond the needs of 
sustainable development.  
 
 
9.3  Summary of Original Contributions 
 
The current findings added two main contributions to a growing body of literature, 
which are:  
1) Contributions to the development of methodology; and, 
2) Contributions to the understanding of risk disclosure in the banking sector.  
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9.3.1   The development of methodology 
 
This study has gone some way towards enhancing the development of the methodology 
on risk disclosure. For example, the content analysis instrument that was developed for 
this study represented an extension and enrichment of the prior method. In addition, this 
study made an original contribution by establishing the comprehensive coding matrix 
that contained six interrogations for analysing risk disclosures. The interrogation itself 
contributed to knowledge by addressing comprehensive aspects in the methodology 
when compared with the previous studies. 
 
The first interrogation uses risk categories that cover all risks of all banks over a sixteen 
year period between 1995 and 2010 (which consisted of thirty-five categories) while the 
prior method only used the main categories for capturing risk disclosures. For example, 
Linsley and Shrives (2006), Kothari et al. (2009), and Poshakwale and Courtis (2005) 
used six categories and Linsley et al. (2006) used twelve categories (for more details see 
table 5.2 of Chapter 5). The use of more categories in this study has clearly indicated the 
risk categories that affected a company’s disclosure. 
 
There were three interrogations used for analysing contents in this study that were based 
on the frequency counts of the sentences, which were: 
1) The second interrogation: disclosure direction (i.e. neutral and bad news); 
2) The third interrogation: the time orientation of disclosures (i.e. future, present, 
and past information); and, 
3) The fourth interrogation: the disclosures of factuality and perception.  
Some authors have employed disclosure direction and time orientation to analyse the 
contents of risk disclosures (e.g. Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 
2005a; Linsley et al., 2006; Hill and Short, 2009); however, this study has improved the 
content analysis method by adding the interrogation of factuality and perception to 
explain and interpret the findings in a more meaningful way. 
 
This study developed a fifth interrogation of content categories. In particular, the 
interrogation of disclosure quality was developed from the study of Beck et al. (2010), 
who examined content analysis in environment reporting with a five score system that 
mixed both qualitative and quantitative measures. This study made an original 
contribution by constructing a content analysis score of disclosure quality by separating 
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the quantitative measure from the qualitative measure. The score system had two quality 
indicators, which were: measuring qualitative disclosures (which was comprised of 
three levels) and measuring quantitative disclosures (which was comprised of two 
levels). 
 
For the sixth interrogation, this is the first study that has explored the association 
between volumes of longitudinal banking sector risk disclosures against the intensity of 
societal discussion as proxied by the frequency, by year, of relevant newspaper 
citations. Furthermore, this interrogation was the first to draw multiple aspects of linked 
variations in risk reporting by investigating the correlation between the interrogation of 
frequency (by year) of newspaper hits (by risk) and the other five interrogations. 
 
In conclusion, the method developed in this study contributed to the methodology of 
comparative studies that used both longitudinal analysis and intrasectoral analysis. The 
enrichment of method under six interrogations of coding matrix to capture information 
content of risk disclosures can be used by further studies to indicate the quality of 
content. 
 
 
9.3.2   The understanding of risk disclosures 
 
This study contributed to the further understanding of risk disclosures over a sixteen 
year period between 1995 and 2010. This was the longest period of time that has so far 
been used to investigate risk reporting in the UK banking sector. Additionally, the 
constitution of the sample offered the opportunity for longitudinal study and also the 
opportunity for an intrasectoral study about risk disclosure practices among different 
banks in the UK. This study presented contributions with four areas of findings that are 
based on the longitudinal period, and which are described in more detail in the 
subsections which follow. 
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a) Volumetric findings 
 
The key results of the volumetric analysis in this study allowed a number of insights to 
be made into the disclosure pattern and trends, which were based on an analysis of 
disclosures. 
 
The top ten most disclosed categories by volume, all companies, all years were:  
11) Credit risk;  
12) Risk management;  
13) Market risk;  
14) Insurance and investment risk;  
15) Liquidity and funding risk;  
16) Capital management risk;  
17) Legal and regulation risk;  
18) Risk related to derivatives; 
19) Interest rate risk; and, 
20) Operational risk.  
This finding was different from those of the prior studies, which have employed a 
shorter period of investigation and captured merely the main risk categories in different 
business sectors. For example, Lajili and Zéghal (2005) found that the most frequently 
cited categories were financial risk, commodity and market risk. Helbok and Wagner 
(2006) found that disclosures mainly covered market and credit risk, while Bischof 
(2009) found that the major part of the risk report covered the three areas of risk 
exposure, which were: credit risk, liquidity risk and market risk. 
 
Analysis showed that the volume of risk disclosures (in all risks and in all companies) 
increased over time. This present finding confirmed the findings of previous studies 
(e.g. Bischof, 2009; Pérignon and Smith, 2010; Hughes et al., 2011). However, this 
study contributed additional evidence to show that the quantity of risk disclosures and 
the number of risk categories disclosed have risen over time in all companies.  
 
Further findings and unique aspects indicated that there were three main patterns of risk 
disclosures, which were: a smooth increase in volume of disclosure, a switching 
increase in disclosure, and volume fluctuation. It should be noted that the pattern of 
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smooth increase consisted of risk management, market risk, and risk related to capital 
management were all key strategic risks of banks.  
 
The pattern of switching increase in disclosure in this study showed that the adoption of 
IAS 32 ‘Financial Instruments: Presentation’, IAS 39 ‘Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement’ and IFRS 4 ‘Insurance Contracts’ caused a pattern of 
switching increase in disclosure in 2005. This finding confirmed the previous findings 
in the aspect of increasing overall risk disclosures when adopting IAS/IFRS standards 
(Iatridis, 2008; Bischof, 2009; Taylor et al., 2010); however, this present study 
identified that a switching increase in 2005 was related to risk related to fair value, risk 
related to impairment, hedging risk, and insurance and investment risk, which affected 
four out of a total of six companies (i.e. RBS, NatWest, Barclays, and HSBC). 
 
While Helbok and Wagner (2006) found that voluntary risk disclosure increased in both 
extent and content over the period between 1998 and 2001, the striking findings in this 
study have shown that there were three risk categories of voluntary disclosures having a 
clear switching increase in disclosure in 2006, comprised of sustainability risk, 
economic risk, and pension risk.  
 
The pattern of switching increase in volume of disclosure was practised in many risk 
categories between 2007 and 2009, which was related to a period of intense financial 
crisis. The risk categories disclosed with this pattern in this period were liquidity and 
funding risk, credit risk, operational risk, strategic and business risk, and legal and 
regulation risk. 
 
 
b) Information richness 
 
The original findings that emerged as a result of this study consisted of four 
interrogations of information richness, which were: firstly, the time orientation of 
disclosures; secondly, the disclosures of factuality and perception; thirdly, disclosure 
direction; and fourthly, quality of disclosure. 
 
There was no meaningful longitudinal change in the time orientation of disclosures as a 
proportion of all disclosures. The largest quantity of time orientation of disclosures was 
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present information and the second largest quantity was forward-looking disclosure. 
The lowest proportion of time orientation of disclosures was past information. This 
finding disagreed with the findings of Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), who studied risk 
reporting of non-financial listed companies in Italy and found that disclosed items were 
more focused on the present and the past than on the future. While studies categorised 
time orientation of disclosures for future and past information without present 
information, Linsley et al. (2006) and Oliveira et al. (2011b) found that future 
information was disclosed less often than past information.  
 
Over time, the clear pattern of risk reporting had become proportionately more 
concerned with opinion and perception rather than facts. This finding showed that the 
interrogation of factuality and perception was capable of depicting data that was 
overlooked in previous studies. 
 
The largest proportion of risk disclosure were the general statements (neutral news 
direction) while there was a small proportion of bad news disclosure. This current 
finding confirmed the findings of several previous studies (i.e. Beretta and Bozzolan, 
2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2005a; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Linsley et al., 2006; 
Oliveira et al., 2011b). This study contributed additional evidence that the proportion of 
bad news disclosure increased over time, although it was a low proportion. 
 
Looking closer at the main proportion of generalised statements, the analysis of 
disclosure quality showed that most risk categories were disclosed by the description of 
the management or mitigation of those risks. 
 
Focusing on the volume of quantitative disclosure, several studies have found that risk 
reporting appeared to lack the disclosure of quantified information (i.e. Lajili and 
Zéghal, 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2005a; Yong et al., 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; 
Linsley et al., 2006). Moreover, the further finding in the aspect of quality of quantified 
information in this study showed that risk categories (in all companies) were disclosed 
at quantitative disclosure Level 2 or comparison data provided higher and more 
meaningful information content than simply a single number; however, the proportions 
that were disclosed quantitatively fell against the total number of categories disclosed 
over time.  
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The findings also supported the conclusion that risk reporting has become 
proportionately more concerned with the narrative of opinion and perception rather than 
facts and quantified information. This was especially observed in the outcome of the 
positive association between factual disclosures and quantitative disclosures, in which 
both factual and quantitative information was disclosed with decreased proportions of 
total disclosures over time. 
 
 
c) Intensity of societal discussion 
 
To analyse the influence of societal discussion on risk reporting of banking sector, this 
study has investigated what variables of risk disclosure are associated with the societal 
discussion. The following findings show the original contributions of those associations. 
 
Overall, the proportion of disclosure of bad news was positively associated with the 
number of newspaper citations. Hence, the risk disclosures of banks have tended to 
respond to an intensity of societal concern about bad news, particularly in the stressful 
events (e.g. the outbreak of Enron scandal of 2001 to 2002 and the financial crisis of 
2007 to 2009). 
 
The disclosures of fact and perception showed that there was a significantly positive 
correlation between the proportion of perception disclosed and the number of 
newspaper citations. Meanwhile, the proportion of fact disclosures was found to be 
negatively associated with the number of newspaper citations. These results suggested 
that the bank’s disclosures responded to societal discussion with information containing 
opinion and perception rather than fact or verified information. 
 
There were significantly positive correlations between the number of newspaper 
citations of risk categories and the number of sentences of seven variables, which 
included: 
1) Total risk categories; 
2) Risk management; 
3) Liquidity and funding risk; 
4) Credit risk;  
5) Market risk;  
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6) Insurance and investment risk; and, 
7) Equity risk.  
It should be noted that these risk categories were the key strategic risks of banks, which 
offered two perspectives of the findings in this study, that is: either a British citizen or a 
banking supervisor. Firstly, in terms of the British citizen’s perspective, disclosures of 
the key strategic risks of banks were central issues of societal discussion when 
considering the finding that the disclosures of these seven risk categories had a 
significant positive correlation with the number of newspaper citations. Secondly, in 
terms of the banking supervisor’s perspective, banking supervisors responded 
increasingly to the key strategic banking risks when considering the findings that these 
seven risk categories were disclosed with longitudinal volumetric increases (see Section 
9.3.2). Consequently, it should be considered from the findings of this present study that 
these risk categories were the key strategic risks of banks that both banking supervisors 
and British citizens responded to strongly.  
 
The risks related to banking operation, operational risk, legal and regulation risk, and 
tax risk were found to be positively associated with the number of newspaper citations. 
Interestingly, given the findings that the disclosures of the key strategic risks of banks in 
financial risk were central issues of societal discussion, in terms of operational risk it 
was legal and regulation risk and tax risk that were the main issues that the British 
public were concerned about.  
 
The findings that there were clear correlations since 2006 showed that disclosures of 
economic risk and sustainability risk had a significant positive correlation with the 
number of newspaper citations. This happened because the public and banking 
supervisors had enthusiastically responded to economic risk since 2006, which marked 
the start of the current financial crisis. Meanwhile, a switching increase of sustainability 
risk disclosure in 2006 was related to the policy and actions of the companies in 
response to the need for sustainable environmental development. Consequently, this 
finding suggested that the companies responded to societal concerns when they are of 
critical concern.  
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d) Intrasectoral effects 
 
With respect to intrasectoral study, most studies in the field of risk reporting have 
focussed on inter-country comparative studies (Linsley et al., 2006; Poshakwale and 
Courtis, 2005; Helbok and Wagner, 2006; Bischof, 2009; Yong et al., 2005). However, 
no previous study has investigated risk disclosures in the banking sector by conducting 
a comparative study among banks. 
 
The results showed that 2008 contained nineteen risk categories, which was the most 
frequently occurring risk category, with clear switch points disclosed by four of six 
companies (i.e. RBS, NatWest, Barclays, and HSBC). Meanwhile, 2007 contained nine 
risk categories, which was the second most occurring risk category of this pattern, as 
disclosed by five of six companies (i.e. NatWest, Lloyds TSB, HBOS, Barclays, and 
HSBC). This finding indicated that the financial crisis has had an effect on risk category 
disclosed with switching increase pattern because the financial crisis of 2007 has 
revealed that massive financial fraud and misconduct has long been a part of the 
enormous risks taken by many banks and financial institutions (Tomasic, 2011).  
 
Lloyds TSB has disclosed the largest number of risk categories containing a pattern of 
volume fluctuation. Meanwhile, HBOS has disclosed the second largest number of risk 
categories containing a pattern of volume fluctuation. The number of risk categories 
disclosed with volume fluctuation showed that both Lloyds TSB and HBOS have 
tended to face more uncertainty in their operation than the other companies. 
 
 
9.4  Implications 
 
In terms of both the quantity and the number of risk categories, UK banks have 
increasingly disclosed risk information over the sixteen year period between 1995 and 
2010. This suggested that UK banks have faced a wide array of risks. Moreover, the 
assessment of risk reporting has recently become one of the most significant issues in 
financial markets because of the internationalisation of financial flows. A number of 
findings of this study can help to enhance the understanding of risk disclosures. In 
particular, it has enhanced the understanding of risk categories, information richness, 
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and intrasectoral effects, which will be described in more detail in the subsections which 
follow. 
 
 
9.4.1   Risk categories 
 
Credit risk was found to be the most disclosed category by volume and by all 
companies. Credit risk was one of the most significant risk categories in the banking 
sector because a bank’s profitability closely relates to credit risk and the weakness in 
credit risk management was the most important underlying cause of many bank failures. 
However, the top ten most disclosed categories were grouped into three main areas of 
risk, which were:  
1) Financial risk, which is the key strategic risk of most banks;  
2) Operational banking risks; and, 
3) Risks related to financial instruments. 
 
These three main areas of risk are explored in more detail in the subsections that follow. 
 
 
a) Financial risk 
 
In terms of financial risk, it should be noted that all risks in this group were also key 
strategic risks of banks (i.e. credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, and capital 
management). In addition, these risks have recently received greater attention from 
banks. This supported the finding that banks disclosed risk with a pattern of smooth 
increase in risk management, market risk, and capital management. However, when the 
banks were faced with the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009, it became apparent that 
liquidity risk and credit risk were disclosed with a switching increase pattern, reflecting 
that both risks were a core component in the banking system and were sensitive issues.  
 
Moreover, the evidence from the interrogation of frequency (by year) of newspapers 
hits (by risk category) also suggested that banking supervisors and British citizens were 
concerned about the issues of overall risk disclosed, risk management, liquidity and 
funding risk, credit risk, market risk, insurance and investment risk, and equity risk.  
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b) Operational banking risk 
 
Operational risk and legal and regulation risk were among the top ten most disclosed 
risks in most annual reports. Considered together, both risks were also positively 
associated with the number of newspaper citations. This indicated that operational risk, 
and legal and regulation risk were causes of concern for many British citizens. In 
particular, they were strongly concerned with the ability of their banks to manage these 
risks. Consequently, UK banks have been required to enhance their practices for the 
management and supervision of operational risk, and legal and regulation risk. 
 
Moreover, the finding of a pattern of switching increase in disclosure also suggested 
that the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 has affected operational risk, strategic and 
business risk, and legal and regulation risk. 
 
 
c) Risks related to financial instruments 
 
Analysis of the group of risks related to financial instruments showed that risk related to 
derivatives was among the top ten most disclosed risks. Meanwhile, an analysis of the 
disclosures throughout the period of study showed that there was a pattern of switching 
increase in 2005 for three risks, which were: risk related to fair value, risk related to 
impairment, and hedging risk. The findings of this study suggested that risk related to 
financial instruments played an increasingly important role in banking activities 
following the adoption of IAS 32 ‘Financial Instruments: Presentation’, IAS 39 
‘Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement’ in 2005. In other words, the 
adoption of these accounting standards in 2005 increased the disclosure of risks related 
to these standards. 
 
 
9.4.2   Information richness 
 
The definition of quality level showed that the perspective of providing information of 
risk management or risk mitigation was measured as the high quality of qualitative 
disclosure, while comparison numerical data was measured as the high quality of 
quantitative disclosure. This study indicated that most risk categories were disclosed at 
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a high level of quality, containing the description of the management or mitigation of 
those risks as well as the comparison numerical data. However, the highest proportion 
of risk disclosures were neutral statements while there was a small proportion of 
warning direction of bad news disclosure. This finding was also supported by the study 
of Suijs (2007), who found that companies disclose neutral information but delay 
disclosing bad and good information because neutral information tends to be more 
attractive to investors in terms of the level of risk considerations, which become risk 
factors in predictions for investment opportunities when publishing further good and 
bad information. Moreover, Kothari et al. (2009) found that disclosures of good and bad 
news mean that market participants are more aware of the risks, which was reflected in 
the firm’s cost of capital, stock return volatility, and dispersion in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. This led to a criticism that companies could omit the disclosure of some good 
and bad news that they deem to be too commercially sensitive to reveal in their public 
disclosures (Linsley et al., 2006). 
 
Based on disclosures of fact and perception, the findings showed that risk reporting had 
become proportionately more concerned with the narrative of opinion and perception 
rather than facts and quantified information, which were both disclosed with decreased 
proportions over time. Meanwhile, the proportion of sentences containing bad news 
(when divided by all sentences) increased smoothly over time, although bad news was a 
low proportion. In addition, the proportion of perception disclosed and the disclosure of 
bad news as a proportion of all sentences were positively associated with the number of 
newspaper citations. The implication of these findings was that the bank’s disclosure 
responded to societal discussion with information containing opinion and perception 
rather than fact or verified information, while the societal discussion increasingly 
became concerned about bad news over time. 
 
 
9.4.3   Intrasectoral effects 
 
The results showed that 2008 contained nineteen risk categories, which was the most 
frequently occurring risk category, with clear switch points disclosed by four of six 
companies (i.e. RBS, NatWest, Barclays, and HSBC). Meanwhile, 2007 contained nine 
risk categories, which was the second most occurring risk category of this pattern, as 
disclosed by five of six companies (i.e. NatWest, Lloyds TSB, HBOS, Barclays, and 
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HSBC). Hence, this finding indicated that the financial crisis has had an effect on risk 
category disclosed with switching increase pattern because the financial crisis of 2007 
has revealed that massive financial fraud and misconduct has for some time been a part 
of the enormous risks taken by many banks and financial institutions (Tomasic, 2011).  
 
There was another switching year in 2005, when four companies (i.e. RBS, NatWest, 
Barclays, and HSBC) disclosed with switching pattern for many risk categories (i.e. risk 
related to impairment, hedged risk, insurance and investment risk). The most striking 
observation to emerge from this result was that most risk categories were related to the 
first-time adoption of International Accounting Standard 32 ‘Financial Instruments: 
Presentation’ (‘IAS 32’), IAS 39 ‘Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement’ (‘IAS 39’) and IFRS 4 ‘Insurance Contracts’ (‘IFRS 4’). Consequently, 
this present finding indicated that a switching increase in 2005 was related to the risk 
related to fair value, the risk related to impairment, hedging risk, and the insurance and 
investment risk. 
 
A study of the risk categories disclosed with the pattern of volume fluctuation showed 
that the most frequently disclosed risks were made by Lloyds TSB. Meanwhile, this 
pattern was the second most frequently disclosed by HBOS. This finding suggested that 
companies who disclose risk information with volume fluctuation pattern in many risk 
categories tended to face more uncertainty in their operations than the companies 
disclosing less risk categories with this pattern. 
 
 
9.4.4   Policy implications 
 
Recently, there has been a considerable amount of interest in understanding what causes 
banks to fail and many attempts have been made to try to predict which banks will 
encounter difficulty next. Much of this concern stems from the taxpayers, depositors, 
shareholders and investors who want to be able to identify any potentially weaknesses 
in banks that may cause them to fail. Even though the banking disclosure data that is 
available is quite comprehensive, most of the disclosures do not include any direct 
information on the quality of a bank’s management (Hahn, 2009). In addition, this 
present findings and the findings of several previous studies (i.e. Beretta and Bozzolan, 
2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2005a; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Linsley et al., 2006; 
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Oliveira et al., 2011b) also found that the largest proportion of risk disclosures were 
general statements (neutral news direction) while there was a small proportion of 
warning direction (bad news). However, it was argued that there were several fault-lines 
related to the collapse of banks, such as over-reliance on short-term market instruments, 
poor risk management, poor corporate governance (Llewellyn, 2008), the failure in the 
role of monitoring, and a lack of basic knowledge of banking risks (Holland, 2010). 
 
As the importance of the financial crisis became clear, it was obvious that risk is among 
the greatest significant issues in the UK banking sector. This reflects the needs for a 
new conceptual frame-based development in risk management and risk disclosures. In 
addition, the Basel committee recommended that corporate governance, risk 
management, the importance of disclosure, and transparency in maintaining confidence 
in banks are essential elements in the safe and sound functioning of banks (BCBS, 
2011e). Moreover, shareholders and other stakeholders (including the UK public) 
require UK banks to disclose information affecting their prospects for future 
performance (i.e. operational risk, legal and regulation risk, tax risk, and sustainability 
risk) and information about key strategic banking risks. In this sense, the UK banks 
have responded by increasing both the quantity of risk disclosures and the number of 
risk categories disclosed over time. However, Linsley and Shrives (2005b) warned that 
increasing the volume of disclosure will not create transparency when it lacks useful 
information. Consequently, useful information should contain transparency, which is 
defined as the public disclosure of reliable and timely information that enables its users 
to make an accurate assessment of a bank’s financial condition and performance, its 
business activities, and the risks related to those activities (BCBS, 1998, p. 15). 
 
In terms of reliable information, the factual disclosure and the quantified disclosure 
need to be considered for the quality of risk disclosure. Arnold et al. (2011) suggested 
that the investor’s main decision in their investment should be based on factual 
information and that the next decision should be regarded as the relevant information 
that contains the reliability of information to assess the firm’s future performance. 
However, Hooper and Pratt (1995) argued that the directors have an incentive to 
disclose in their rhetorical statements because they can support confidence in the factual 
information that they claim. Since they are explanatory, rhetorical disclosures tend to be 
made in large volumes and they should gain less credibility than factual disclosures 
(Toms, 2002). For the quality of risk disclosure, quantified information offers useful 
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insights into the narrative component of financial communication. However, several 
studies have found that risk reporting appeared to lack the disclosure of quantified 
information (i.e. Lajili and Zéghal, 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2005a; Yong et al., 2005; 
Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Linsley et al., 2006). When considering the findings of 
disclosures of fact, perception, and quantified information in this study, the clear pattern 
of risk reporting had become proportionately more concerned with the narrative of 
opinion and perception rather than fact and quantified information. In addition, the UK 
bank’s disclosures responded to societal discussion with information containing opinion 
and perception rather than fact or verified information. The further finding also showed 
that factual disclosures were disclosed with decreased proportions of total disclosure 
over time. In addition, while the number of risk categories (in the UK banks) increased 
over time, the proportions that were disclosed quantitatively fell against the total 
number of categories disclosed. This reflects that shareholders and other stakeholders 
should be concerned about the reliability of information before making their investment 
decisions. Consequently, to effectively fulfil the demands of shareholders and other 
stakeholders for reliable information, the UK banks should improve the credibility of 
their communications by increasing the amount of information disclosed with regard to 
verified information and quantified information. 
 
In terms of timely information, although risk disclosures in annual reports are not the 
distinct media for the purpose of providing timely information, the UK banks responded 
strongly to risk disclosures related to the adoption of international accounting standards 
in a timely manner when considering  the findings that the adoption of IAS 32 
‘Financial Instruments: Presentation’, IAS 39 ‘Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement’ and IFRS 4 ‘Insurance Contracts’ in 2005 caused a pattern of switching 
increase in disclosure of risks related to these standards. In contrast, it was considered 
that in the period of intense financial crisis between 2007 and 2009 that the UK banks 
did not provide useful information in a timely manner and that their risk disclosures had 
the role of reporting ex post rather than serving a more alerting role in providing useful 
forward-looking information to avoid the disruption. Moreover, the findings also 
showed that there was no meaningful longitudinal change in forward-looking 
information as a proportion of all disclosures, both before and during a period of the 
financial crisis. 
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With respect to the quality of risk disclosure, this present research suggests that a bank’s 
disclosure should adequately reflect the bank’s true financial condition and 
performance. The risk disclosures of the UK banks should improve the quality of 
disclosure in the aspects of reliability and timeliness of information.  
 
 
9.5  Limitations of this Study 
 
This section attempts to address the research limitations that have been observed in this 
study and it describes how these limitations have been minimised.  
 
 
9.5.1   Sample size 
 
Although UK banks were selected as a sampling frame to examine their risk 
disclosures, this study was unable to analyse all UK banks because of the limitations of 
time and capacity. Consequently, this study selected large companies based on the 
sampling frame of companies incorporated in the UK and listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. This method generated four sample companies, comprising of HSBC, 
Lloyds, Barclays and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS).  
 
In order to increase the number of sampling companies, HBOS plc (which is owned by 
Lloyds) and National Westminster Bank plc (or NatWest, which is owned by RBS) 
were chosen as additional sample companies. Hence, six large UK banks were chosen 
because of their known size effects, which were: HSBC, Lloyds, Barclays, RBS, HBOS, 
and NatWest.  
 
 
9.5.2   Method 
 
One caveat of content analysis that needs to be noted in this study is the reliability of the 
method. This study did not employ the approach of intercoder reliability, which states 
that the coding scheme should be used by more than one coder and that all coders 
should have independence from individual subjective judgement. Instead, this study 
used the alternative intracoder assessment approach, which is used to measure the 
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reliability of coding by one single coder when it is performed more than once. In order 
to minimise the problem of reliability, the results of testing were discussed with the 
supervisor. The complete coding rules were tested twice with different points in time. 
The first recording of results from six sample companies in 2008 was performed after 
revising the coding rules. It was then re-recorded two weeks later to test for the stability 
of recording. Furthermore, in order to satisfy the criteria that are used by content 
analysis theory, clear coding instruction were established to help the coder to make 
coding decisions and for the disambiguation of the rules used in this study (see table 5.9 
of Chapter 5). 
 
 
9.5.3   Media selection 
 
This study has only examined risk disclosures in annual reports. This might have failed 
to capture risk reporting of sample companies through other media relating to risk 
issues. Looking on the positive side, the use of the same sources of documents that are 
published on an annual basis relates to consistency because all of the companies need to 
provide risk information in line with the requirements of accounting standards and 
market regulations. However, one could also argue that some companies may choose to 
report risk with voluntary disclosure in other publications. Therefore, in order to prevent 
bias, this study has also examined risk issues in newspapers as an external reflection on 
risk in the banking sector by observing the correlations between the number of 
newspaper citations for risk issues and the risk disclosures in the companies’ annual 
reports.  
 
 
9.5.4   Measurement of disclosure quality 
 
This study was not specifically designed to evaluate all perspectives of disclosure 
quality because risk in itself is complex and difficult to capture the clear contents 
reflecting quality disclosed. In addition, risk is a sensitive issue and some bank’s may 
choose to delay reporting risk or even conceal risk.  
 
With respect to disclosure quality, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have 
required that a bank’s disclosure should adequately reflect the bank’s true financial 
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condition and performance. They also stipulated that disclosure should adhere to 
standards promoting comparability, relevance, reliability and timeliness of the 
information disclosed. In addition, the required disclosures included both qualitative 
and quantitative information on a bank’s financial performance, financial position, risk 
management strategies and practices, risk exposures, aggregate exposures to related 
parties, transactions with related parties, accounting policies, and basic business, 
management, governance and remuneration (BCBS, 2011e). 
 
Nonetheless, with regard to the importance of quality of disclosure, this study scored the 
distinct levels of quality in order to measure quality of qualitative disclosure in the 
aspect of description of management or mitigation of risk. In terms of quantitative 
disclosure, quality levels were used to distinguish between disclosure containing 
comparison numerical data (i.e. Level 2) and merely numerical data (i.e. Level 1). 
 
 
9.6  Recommendations for Further Research 
 
The findings of this study provided a great degree of understanding on risk disclosures; 
however, it is recommended that further research may be undertaken in three main areas 
(as follows). 
 
Firstly, it would be interesting to assess longitudinal risk disclosure in the banking 
sector of other countries, particularly in the US and other countries in Europe because 
these countries were the most affected by the financial crisis of 2007. Moreover, further 
research related to a cross-regional study might investigate the different factors in risk 
categories disclosed and patterns of risk disclosures in longitudinal analysis between 
UK banks and banks in other countries. It is believed that comparative inter-counties 
longitudinal studies may provide more insight into the field of risk disclosures in the 
banking sector. 
 
Secondly, since the interrogation of risk disclosure quality in this study used limited 
perspectives, considerably more work will need to be done in the other perspectives 
(such as aggregate exposures to related parties, the effects of financial position, and 
timeliness of information). In terms of quantitative disclosure, more information on 
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disclosure of quantified risk is suggested to establish a better understanding of risk 
disclosure in the quantitative disclosure. 
 
Finally, since annual reports have been used in this study, it is recommended that 
further research might investigate corporate risk reporting by analysing contents via the 
corporate website. Based on the use of different media selection, further research might 
reveal new aspects of risk reporting because some interesting observations and 
interpretations can be drawn from the use of the Internet for corporate reporting. 
Moreover, a website can convey information with the purpose of timeliness and contain 
a much broader range of information for a broader range of stakeholders, which is not 
specifically intended for consumption by investors who receive the annual report. 
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Appendix A:    
A Pattern of Switch Points in Risk Disclosure (in All Companies) 
 
 
The figures demonstrate risk categories (for all years, and for all companies), which 
have a significant switching increase in volume of risk disclosure, as classified by year 
in figure 1 to 17 below. 
 
Switch Point in 2005 
Figure 1  Disclosure of risk related to 
fair value 
Figure 2  Disclosure of risk related to 
impairment 
  
Figure 3  Disclosure of hedged risk Figure 4  Disclosure of insurance and 
funding risk 
  
Figure 5  Disclosure of tax risk  
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Switch Point in 2006 
Figure 6  Disclosure of sustainability risk Figure 7  Disclosure of economic risk 
  
Figure 8  Disclosure of pension risk  
 
 
 
Switch Point in 2007  
Figure 9  Disclosure of liquidity and  
funding risk 
Figure 10  Disclosure of credit risk 
  
Figure 11   Disclosure of operational risk Figure 12   Disclosure of financial 
crime risk 
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Figure 13  Disclosure of special purpose entities 
 
 
 
Switch Point in 2008 
Figure 14   Disclosure of strategic and 
business risk 
Figure 15   Disclosure of reputation 
risk 
  
Figure 16   Disclosure of equity risk  
 
 
 
Switch Point in 2009 
Figure 17  Disclosure of legal and regulation 
risk 
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Other risk categories with switch point 
The following figures demonstrate risk categories which have a switch point with low 
volume of disclosure. 
 
Figure 18   Disclosure of financial report  
risk 
Figure 19   Disclosure of customer 
treatment risk 
  
  
Figure 20   Disclosure of people  risk Figure 21   Disclosure of political  risk 
  
  
Figure 22   Disclosure of industries risk Figure 23   Disclosure of technologies 
risk  
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Figure 24   Disclosure of change risk Figure 25   Disclosure of governance risk  
  
Figure 26   Disclosure of competition risk 
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Appendix B:   
Figures of Volume Fluctuation in Risk Disclosure in All Companies 
 
 
To illustrate the characteristics of volume fluctuation, the below figures are illustrated in 
Figure 1 to 6. 
 
Figure 1   Disclosure of cross-border 
risk 
Figure 2   Disclosure of interest rate risk 
  
  
Figure 3   Disclosure of currency risk Figure 4   Disclosure of derivative risk 
  
  
Figure 5   Disclosure of leasing risk  Figure 6   Disclosure of safety and 
security risk 
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Appendix C:   
Figures of High Correlation between Intensity of Societal Discussion 
and Individual Risk Categories in All Companies 
 
 
The following figures present twelve high correlations in the Figure 1 to 12. 
 
Figure 1   The correlation between the number of sentences of all risk categories and 
the number of newspaper citations (in all companies) (r = 0.706, p < 0.01) 
 
 
Figure 2   The correlation between the number of sentences of risk management and the 
number of newspaper citations (in all companies) (r = 0.717, p < 0.01) 
 
 
Figure 3   The correlation between the number of sentences of liquidity and funding risk 
and the number of newspaper citations (in all companies) (r = 0.671, p < 
0.01) 
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Figure 4   The correlation between the number of sentences of credit risk and number 
of newspaper citations (in all companies) (r = 0.700, p < 0.01) 
 
 
Figure 5   The correlation between the number of sentences of market risk and the 
number of newspaper citations (in all companies) (r = 0.697, p < 0.01) 
 
 
Figure 6   The correlation between the number of sentences of insurance and 
investment risk, and the number of newspaper citations (in all companies) (r 
= 0.638, p < 0.01) 
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Figure 7   The correlation between the number of sentences of equity risk, and the 
number of newspaper citations (in all companies) (r = 0.705, p < 0.01) 
 
 
Figure8   The correlation between the number of sentences of operational risk and the 
number of newspaper citations (in all companies) (r = 0.728, p < 0.01) 
 
 
Figure 9   The correlation between the number of sentences of legal and regulation 
risk, and the number of newspaper citations (in all companies) (r = 0.776, p 
< 0.01) 
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Figure 10   The correlation between the number of sentences of tax risk, and the 
number of newspaper citations (in all companies) (r = 0.674, p < 0.01) 
 
 
Figure 11   The correlation between the number of sentences of economic risk, and the 
number of newspaper citations (in all companies) (r = 0.697, p < 0.01) 
 
 
Figure 12   The correlation between the number of sentences of sustainability risk, and 
the number of newspaper citations (in all companies) (r = 0.745, p < 0.01) 
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Appendix D:  
Findings and Analysis of Individual Companies 
 
 
In this appendix, the findings of longitudinal data of individual companies between 
1995 and 2010 are analysed for six interrogations, which are: 
1) Risk category membership; 
2) Time orientation of disclosure; 
3) Factual and perception disclosures; 
4) Disclosure direction; 
5) The quality of risk disclosures; and, 
6) The intensity of societal discussion. 
The following sections provide the findings and analysis of the individual companies 
(i.e. RBS, NatWest, Lloyds TSB, HBOS, Barclays, and HSBC). 
 
 
1.  Findings and Analysis of RBS 
 
1.1   Analysing Longitudinal Risk Category Membership, in All Years, at RBS 
 
The following table shows the top ten most disclosed risk categories of RBS, which are 
illustrated to analyse the longitudinal data by total volume of sentences disclosed and by 
risk category. 
 
Table 1  The top ten most disclosed risk categories of RBS 
Ranking Number Risk Categories 
The Number of Sentences 
Disclosed 
1 Credit risk 2,541 
2 Risk management 1,274 
3 Market risk 1,047 
4 Liquidity and funding risk 1,014 
5 Insurance and investment risk 823 
6 Operational risk 643 
7 Risk related to derivatives 625 
8 Capital management risk 608 
9 Interest rate risk 552 
10 Legal and regulation risk 492 
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Table 1 shows that credit risk is the most disclosed risk category of RBS, having more 
than double the number of sentences disclosed when compared to risk management 
(which ranks second), market risk (which ranks third), and liquidity and funding risk 
(which ranks fourth). This indicates that credit risk is the most concerned risk in RBS’s 
operations. 
 
The following figure shows the number of risk categories that RBS disclosed between 
1995 and 2010. This figure is used to analyse the longitudinal data by the number of 
risk categories disclosed. 
 
Figure 1  The number of categories of risk disclosure at RBS 
 
 
Figure 1 shows that the number of risk categories disclosed by RBS has increased 
slightly over time. The lowest number of category disclosed was six categories in 1995 
and the highest number of category was thirty categories in 2010. To investigate risk 
categories in terms of quantity of disclosure, volumetric analysis was developed on the 
basis of counting the number of sentences disclosed over time. The following finding 
shows the overall trend of risk disclosures over the period between 1995 and 2010, by 
all risk categories. 
 
Figure 2  The number of sentences disclosed in all risk categories by RBS (by year) 
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Figure 2 is a line graph of the number of risk disclosures at RBS between 1995 and 
2010. Overall, the graph shows a gradual increase in the number of risk disclosures, 
from 135 sentences in 1995 to 920 sentences in 2007. The numbers of disclosures then 
increase dramatically in 2008 and in the subsequent year. In other words, the risk 
disclosure in 2008 was a switch point in volume of disclosure. In addition, this study 
found that there were three main patterns of disclosure, which are:  
1) A smooth increase in volume;  
2) A volumetric increase with switch point; and, 
3) Volume fluctuation. 
The following table shows the risk categories in each pattern of disclosure. 
 
Table 2  Patterns of longitudinal disclosure of risk categories membership at RBS 
Patterns of Longitudinal Disclosure 
A Smooth Increase in 
Volume 
A Volumetric Increase with 
Switch Point, by Year 
Volume Fluctuation 
1. Liquidity and funding 
risk 
2005, year of switch point 
1) Risk related to impairment 
2) Insurance and investment 
risk 
2006, year of switch point 
3) Market risk 
2008, year of switch point 
4) Credit risk 
5) Operational risk 
6) Capital management risk 
7) Reputation risk 
8) Cross-border risk 
9) Pension risk 
10) Risk related to special 
purpose entities 
11) Strategic and business risk 
12) Equity risk 
2009, year of switch point 
13) Risk management 
14) Financial crime risk 
15) Competition risk 
1) Interest rate risk 
2) Currency risk 
3) Risk related to 
derivatives 
4) Hedged risk 
5) Economic risk 
6) Legal and regulation 
risk 
7) Tax risk 
8) Leasing risk 
9) Safety and security risk 
10) Sustainability risk 
11) People risk 
12) Customer treatment 
risk  
13) Political risk 
14) Industries risk 
15) Risk related to fair 
value  
 
 
As shown in figure 2 and in table 2, there was a distinctive switch point pattern in the 
risk category disclosures of RBS, which particularly happened in 2008. This key feature 
may have been due to the failure of RBS in October 2008, following which the 
government had to inject £45.5bn of equity capital to prevent RBS’s complete collapse 
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(FSA, 2011). In addition there was a strong public interest in whether bank executives 
and boards had adequate competence to balance appropriately between risk and return. 
Consequently, in 2008 RBS significantly increased the number of risk disclosures in its 
annual report, particularly in credit risk, operational risk, and capital management risk 
(as can be seen below in figures 3, 4 and 5). 
 
Figure 3  Disclosure of credit risk by 
RBS 
Figure 4  Disclosure of operational risk 
by RBS 
  
  
Figure 5  Disclosure of capital management risk by RBS  
 
 
 
 
1.2   Time Orientation of Disclosure at RBS 
 
The following figure shows the percentage of three characteristics, forward-looking, 
present, and past disclosures as a proportion of total sentences for RBS between 1995 
and 2010. 
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Figure 6  The percentage of forward-looking, present, and past disclosures as a 
proportion of total sentences at RBS between 1995 and 2010 
 
 
As shown in figure 6, in this period there was no meaningful longitudinal change in the 
time orientation of disclosures as a proportion of all disclosures. Throughout the period 
between 1995 and 2010, the largest quantity of time orientation of disclosures was 
present information. The proportion of present disclosures gradually declined from 65% 
in 1995 to 47% in 1997. It then gradually increased at approximately the same rate as 
total sentences over time; that is, it varied between 46% of the total and 60% of the 
total. Meanwhile, forward-looking disclosures increased at approximately the same rate 
as total sentences; that is, it varied between 27% of the total and 43% of the total. The 
lowest proportion of time orientation of disclosures throughout the period was past 
information, which gradually increased from 8% in 1995 to 17% in 1998. It then had a 
fluctuation in volume of disclosures that varied between 4% of the total and 17% of the 
total. 
 
 
1.3   Factual Disclosures and Perception Disclosures at RBS 
 
A volumetric measure was employed to reflect the longitudinal trend of factual and 
perception disclosures. The following figure shows the proportion of factual disclosures 
measured as an inverse proportion of perception. 
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Figure 7  The percentage of factual disclosures as a proportion of total sentences at 
RBS between 1995 and 2010  
 
 
As can be seen from figure 7, the factual disclosure as a proportion of total disclosures 
shows the fluctuation in the quantity of disclosures over a period of time; that is, it 
varied between 6% of total disclosures and 16.7% of total disclosures. This indicates 
that the major proportion of risk disclosures of perception as the inverse proportion of 
fact had over five times greater volume than fact.  
 
 
1.4   Disclosure Direction at RBS 
 
The following figure illustrates the findings of the trend of bad news as a proportion of 
total sentences disclosed at RBS over the period. 
 
Figure 8  The percentage of bad news sentences as a proportion of total number of 
sentences disclosed between1995 and 2010 by RBS 
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news. The pattern of bad news disclosure at RBS was similar to the bad news pattern of 
all companies (as described in Chapter 6, Section 6.2.3). 
 
 
1.5   The Quality of Risk Disclosures at RBS 
 
The quality of risk disclosure in this study was divided into two groups: qualitative 
disclosure and quantitative disclosure. These two groups are described in detail in the 
subsections which follow. 
 
 
1.5.1 The quality of qualitative disclosure at RBS 
 
The frequency of qualitative disclosure levels was counted for all risk categories of RBS 
to identify the quality level in all risk categories at RBS. The analysis looked at the 
improvement over a period of sixteen years between 1995 and 2010; the results are 
shown in the following figure. 
 
Figure 9  Frequency counts of qualitative disclosure level under all risk categories at 
RBS 
 
 
It is apparent from figure 9 that the total frequencies of qualitative disclosure were 
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happened because the disclosure included a description of the management or 
mitigation of that risk. In addition, the result shows that there was an upward trend of 
high information content (level 3), from six risk categories in 1995 to twenty-eight risk 
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it also had a chance to count more frequency of qualitative disclosure level. To examine 
the upward trend of qualitative disclosure at level 3, the number of risk categories 
disclosed at level 3 was divided by the total number of risk disclosures as a proportion 
of qualitative disclosure level 3.  
 
Figure 10  The frequency of qualitative disclosure level 3 as a proportion of total risk 
categories at RBS 
 
 
Figure 10 shows that most risk categories were disclosed with high information content 
at level 3; however the clear upward trend that was seen in figure 9 is absent. There is 
now only a slight change in frequency, which varied between 74% of total categories to 
100% of total categories.  
 
 
1.5.2 The quality of quantitative disclosure at RBS 
 
Evaluating the quality of quantitative disclosures employed 2 levels (as described in 
table 6.6 in Chapter 6). The frequencies of both levels were counted in order to identify 
the pattern disclosed. An analysis of numerical data classified as level 1 and level 2 
shows that there are significant different frequencies in both levels, as can be seen in the 
following figure. 
 
Figure 11  The frequencies of quantitative disclosure levels at RBS 
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Figure 11 shows that there was a significant difference between level 1 and 2 during 
1995 to 2010. During this time RBS disclosed risk categories quantitatively with 
comparison numerical data, and it purely disclosed level 2 in many years, with the 
exceptions of 1996, 1997, 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2010. The results of the numerical 
data without comparing (i.e. level 1) were mixed between one category and five 
categories. Moreover, quantitative disclosures of level 2 showed a slight increase from 
four categories in 1995 to ten categories in 2007, before switching to sixteen categories 
in 2008 and remaining at the same frequency in the subsequent years.  
 
The factor of the increased number of risk categories is examined. Consequently, the 
following figure shows the result of making frequencies of quantitative disclosure level 
2 as a proportion of total risk categories between 1995 and 2010. 
 
Figure 12  The frequency of quantitative disclosure level 2 as a proportion of total risk 
categories at RBS 
 
 
Figure 12 shows the quantitative disclosure with number against a comparison (level 2), 
which fluctuates in proportion of total risk categories (it varied between 44% and 75%). 
However, there was no the upward trend of quantitative disclosures (as demonstrated in 
figure 11) when the number of increased risk categories were examined by making them 
a proportion. 
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Table 3  Correlations between the number of risk issues cited in newspapers and 
various variables in RBS’s disclosures 
Variable Spearman 
Correlation (r) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
(p) 
Level of Sig. 
Information Richness (by proportion)    
  Bad news disclosed 0.745 0.001 0.01 
  Neutral news disclosed -0.745 0.001 0.01 
  Forward looking disclosure 0.344 0.192 no association 
  Present disclosure -0.438 0.090 no association 
  Past disclosure 0.012 0.966 no association 
  Fact -0.591 0.016 0.05 
  Perception 0.591 0.016 0.05 
  Quantitative disclosure (all levels) -0.155 0.566 no association 
  Qualitative disclosure at level 3 -0.172 0.523 no association 
Risk Categories (by number of sentences) 
Total risk categories 0.674 0.004 0.01 
Risk management 0.744 0.001 0.01 
Credit risk 0.624 0.010 0.01 
Market risk 0.779 0.000 0.01 
Economic risk 0.746 0.001 0.01 
Operational risk 0.817 0.000 0.01 
Reputation risk 0.669 0.005 0.01 
Pension risk 0.750 0.001 0.01 
Equity risk 0.641 0.007 0.01 
Cross-border risk  0.533 0.034 0.05 
Currency risk 0.503 0.047 0.05 
Legal and Regulation risk 0.522 0.038 0.05 
Insurance and Investment risk 0.555 0.026 0.05 
Risk related to fair value  0.560 0.024 0.05 
Competition risk 0.533 0.034 0.05 
Tax risk 0.599 0.014 0.05 
Safety and security risk 0.617 0.011 0.05 
Industries risk 0.608 0.013 0.05 
Risk related to impairment 0.597 0.015 0.05 
Special purpose entities 0.51 0.043 0.05 
Liquidity and funding risk 0.474 0.064 no association 
Interest rate risk 0.244 0.362 no association 
Risk related to derivatives -0.200 0.457 no association 
Hedged risk 0.410 0.114 no association 
Capital management risk 0.149 0.582 no association 
Strategic and business risk 0.384 0.142 no association 
Financial crime risk 0.457 0.075 no association 
Residual value risk 0.383 0.143 no association 
Sustainability risk 0.422 0.104 no association 
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Variable Spearman 
Correlation (r) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
(p) 
Level of Sig. 
Customer treatment risk 0.434 0.093 no association 
People risk 0.489 0.055 no association 
Political risk 0.335 0.205 no association 
Financial report risk no disclosure  
Technology risk no disclosure  
Change risk no disclosure  
Governance risk no disclosure  
 
As can be seen in table 3, the results have been categorised into three main groups of 
correlation: high correlation (r is between ± 0.63 and ±1.00, p < 0.01), moderate 
correlation (r is between ± 0.50 and ± 0.62, p < 0.05), and no correlation (r is less than ± 
0.50). The correlations can be reported on two aspects (i.e. information richness and risk 
categories).  
 
In terms of information richness, there was a positive association between the disclosure 
direction of bad news and newspaper citations. On the other hand, the disclosure of 
neutral news as the inverse proportion of bad news had a negative relationship with the 
number of newspaper citations. Disclosure of perception was associated positively with 
newspaper citations at a moderate level while factual information as the inverse 
proportion of perception had a negative association. Both the interrogation of time 
orientation of disclosures and the interrogation of disclosure quality had no association 
with the number of newspaper citations. 
 
In terms of the variables based on risk categories, it was noticeable that the high 
correlation group consisted of total risk categories and the key strategic risks of the 
bank (i.e. risk management, credit risk, market risk, operational risk, and equity risk). 
These categories were also contained in the group of high correlation of overall analysis 
(in all companies), as described in Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2. However, the reputation 
risk and the pension risk had high correlations in RBS’s disclosures, while both risks 
had moderate correlations in the overall analysis (in all companies). This indicates that 
the intensity of societal concern is associated with certain specific risk categories as 
disclosed by different banks. 
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2.  Findings and Analysis of NatWest 
 
2.1   Analysing Longitudinal Risk Category Membership, in All Years, at NatWest 
 
The following table shows the top ten most disclosed risk categories of NatWest, which 
are illustrated to analyse the longitudinal data by total volume of sentences disclosed 
and by risk category. 
 
Table 4  The top ten most disclosed risk categories of NatWest 
Ranking Number Risk Categories 
The Number of Sentences 
Disclosed 
1 Credit risk 1,041 
2 Market risk 760 
3 Risk management 628 
4 Legal and Regulation risk  483 
5 Liquidity and funding risk 442 
6 Interest rate risk  388 
7 Risk related to derivatives 363 
8 Capital management risk 331 
9 Operational risk 303 
10 Risk related to fair value 186 
 
Table 4 shows that credit risk is the most disclosed risk category of NatWest. This 
indicates that credit risk was the most concerned risk in NatWest’s operation. 
 
The following figure shows the number of risk categories that NatWest disclosed 
between 1995 and 2010 in order to analyse the longitudinal data by the number of risk 
categories disclosed. 
 
Figure 13  The number of categories of risk disclosure at NatWest 
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As can be seen from figure 13, the number of risk categories disclosed by NatWest 
changed slightly between 1995 and 2007 (i.e. it varied between nine categories and 
thirteen categories). However, since 2008 the number of risk categories switched from 
eleven categories in 2007 to nineteen categories in 2008, and it continued to increase in 
the subsequent year, reaching the highest point at twenty-seven categories in 2010. 
 
Volumetric analysis was developed on the basis of counting the number of sentences 
disclosed over time in order to investigate the risk categories in terms of quantity of 
disclosure. The following figure shows the overall trend of risk disclosures over a 
period of time between 1995 and 2010, by all risk categories. 
 
Figure 14  The number of sentences disclosed in all risk categories by NatWest (by 
year) 
 
 
Figure 14 shows that over the period between 1995 and 2007 the quantity of risk 
disclosure slightly changes in a narrow range (i.e. from 194 to 311 sentences) before 
changing with a switching point in 2008. It experienced a more than three times 
increase in 2007. It should be considered that this pattern was comparable with the 
pattern of the number of risk categories disclosed (see figure 13). Since the change with 
switch point in 2008 happened in both the number of risk categories and in the quantity 
of risk disclosure, the key feature for many risk categories disclosed tends to be a switch 
point pattern. However, this study found that NatWest had two main patterns of 
disclosure, which are: a volumetric increase with switch point and volume fluctuation.  
The following table shows the risk categories in each pattern of disclosure. 
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Table 5  Patterns of longitudinal disclosure of risk categories membership at NatWest 
Patterns of Longitudinal Disclosure 
A Volumetric Increase with Switch Point, by Year Volume Fluctuation 
2005, year of switch point 
1) Hedged risk  
2007, year of switch point 
2) Risk related to impairment 
2008, year of switch point 
3) Credit risk 
4) Liquidity and funding risk 
5) Operational risk  
6) Market risk  
7) Risk management  
8) Strategic and business risk 
9) Pension risk 
10) Tax risk 
2009, year of switch point 
11) Legal and regulation risk  
12) Capital management risk  
13) Safety and security risk  
14) Customer treatment risk 
1) Cross-border risk 
2) Interest rate risk 
3) Risk related to derivatives 
4) Currency risk 
5) Economic risk 
6) Insurance and investment 
risk 
7) Reputation risk 
8) Financial crime risk 
9) Risk related to fair value 
10) Competition risk 
11) Leasing risk 
12) Sustainability risk 
13) People risk 
14) Political risk 
15) Industries risk 
16) Equity risk.  
 
 
As shown in figure 14 and table 5, the key feature for many risk categories was the 
pattern of volumetric increase with switch point, which particularly happened in 2008. 
NatWest has been a part of RBS since 2000; therefore, the failure of RBS in 2008 (as 
described in Section 1.1) directly affected NatWest’s risk disclosure in many risk 
categories, with a significant switching increase in 2008 (i.e. risk management, liquidity 
and funding risk, credit risk, market risk, and operational risk).  
 
 
2.2   Time Orientation of Disclosure at NatWest 
 
The following figure shows the percentage of three characteristic disclosures (i.e. 
forward-looking, present, and past disclosures) as a proportion of total sentences at 
NatWest between 1995 and 2010. 
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Figure 15  The percentage of forward-looking, present, and past disclosures as a 
proportion of total sentences at NatWest between 1995 and 2010 
 
 
Figure 15 shows that throughout the period between 1995 and 2010 the lowest quantity 
of time orientation of disclosures was past information. The proportion of past 
disclosures slightly changed from 22% in 1995 to 29% in 1999, it then steeply dropped 
to 4% in 2000. After the year of 2000 the proportion of past disclosures had only slight 
change, it varied between 1% of total and 8% of the total. Meanwhile, both forward-
looking disclosure and present disclosure switched to be the largest proportion of risk 
disclosures, often within close proportion of one another. The proportion of forward-
looking disclosure varied between 31% and 53%, while the proportion of present 
disclosure varied between 34% and 56%. 
 
 
2.3   Factual Disclosures and Perception Disclosures at NatWest 
 
The volumetric measure was employed in this study to reflect the longitudinal trend of 
factual and perception disclosures. The following figure shows the proportion of factual 
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Figure 16  The percentage of factual disclosures as a proportion of total sentences at 
NatWest between 1995 and 2010  
 
 
Figure 16 shows that the factual disclosure as a minor proportion of total disclosures 
gradually increased from 12.2% in 1995 to 26% in 1999, it then sharply decreased to 
8.5% in 2000. It then fluctuated in the period between 2000 and 2010, which varied 
between 4.1% of total disclosures and 10.8% of total disclosures.  
 
 
2.4   Disclosure Direction at NatWest 
 
The following figure provides the findings of the trend of bad news as an inverse 
proportion of disclosure of neutral news. 
 
Figure 17  The percentage of bad news sentences as a proportion of total number of 
sentences disclosed between 1995 and 2010 at NatWest 
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bad news disclosure at NatWest was comparable to the bad news pattern of all 
companies (as described in Chapter 6, Section 6.2.3). 
 
 
2.5   The Quality of Risk Disclosures at NatWest 
 
The quality of risk disclosure in this study was divided into two groups, qualitative 
disclosure and quantitative disclosure. 
 
 
2.5.1 The quality of qualitative disclosure at NatWest 
 
The frequency of qualitative disclosure levels was counted for all risk categories at 
NatWest to identify the quality level in all risk categories at NatWest. The analysis 
looked at the improvement over a period of sixteen years between 1995 and 2010; the 
results are shown in the following figure. 
 
Figure 18  Frequency counts of qualitative disclosure level under all risk categories at 
NatWest 
 
 
It is apparent from figure 18 that the total frequencies of qualitative disclosure at 
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the disclosure included a description of the management or mitigation of that risk. In 
addition, the result shows that there was an upward trend of high information content 
(level 3) from seven risk categories in 1995 to twenty-five risk categories in 2010. 
However, this upward trend involved the number of increased risk categories and, 
therefore, the following figure shows the results when the frequency of qualitative 
disclosure level 3 was examined by making them a proportion. 
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Figure 19  The frequency of qualitative disclosure level 3 as a proportion of total risk 
categories at NatWest 
 
 
Figure 19 shows that most risk categories were disclosed with high information content 
at level 3 with a slight change in frequency without the upward trend, which varied 
between 70% of total categories to 93% of total categories.  
 
 
2.5.2 The quality of quantitative disclosure at NatWest 
 
Evaluation of the quality of quantitative disclosures employed 2 levels (as mentioned in 
table 6.6 of Chapter 6). The frequencies were then counted for both levels to identify the 
pattern disclosed. The analysis of numerical data classified as level 1 and level 2 
showed significantly different frequencies in both levels, as shown in the following 
figure. 
 
Figure 20  The frequencies of quantitative disclosure levels at NatWest 
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comparison numerical data, and purely disclosed level 2 in the period between 2000 and 
2007. Moreover, quantitative disclosures of level 2 showed a fluctuation in frequencies 
between six categories and eleven categories. It shows that there has been an upward 
trend since 2007. 
 
To examine the factor of the increased number of risk categories, the following figure 
shows the result of making frequencies of quantitative disclosure level 2 as a proportion 
of total risk categories between 1995 and 2010. 
 
Figure 21  The frequency of quantitative disclosure level 2 as a proportion of total risk 
categories at NatWest 
 
 
Figure 21 shows that quantitative disclosure with number against comparison (level 2) 
was disclosed with a fluctuation in the proportion of total risk categories over the period 
between 1995 and 2007, it varied between 55% and 85%. However, after 2007 the 
proportion of quantitative level 2 significantly decreased from 73% to 42% in 2008, 
before it slightly decreased to 41% in 2010. In contrast, the frequency of quantitative 
disclosure level 2 increased over a similar period between 2007 and 2010 (see figure 
20). This result suggested that, although NatWest increased risk disclosure in both the 
number of risk categories and the volume of disclosure, these increased disclosures 
contained narrative rather than numerical data. 
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Table 6  Correlations between the number of risk issues cited in newspapers and 
various variables in NatWest’s disclosures 
Variable Spearman 
Correlation (r) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
(p) 
Level of Sig. 
Information Richness (by proportion)    
Bad news 0.712 0.002 0.01 
Neutral news -0.712 0.002 0.01 
Forward looking disclosure 0.671 0.004 0.01 
Present disclosure -0.109 0.688 no association 
Past disclosure -0.047 0.863 no association 
Fact -0.303 0.254 no association 
Perception 0.303 0.254 no association 
Quantitative disclosure (all levels) -0.535 0.033 0.05 
Qualitative disclosure at level 3 0.229 0.393 no association 
Risk Categories (by number of sentences) 
Liquidity and funding risk 0.730 0.001 0.01 
Risk related to derivatives -0.697 0.003 0.01 
Market risk 0.682 0.004 0.01 
Reputation risk 0.668 0.005 0.01 
Pension risk 0.669 0.005 0.01 
Tax risk 0.669 0.005 0.01 
Risk related to impairment 0.654 0.006 0.01 
Operational risk 0.642 0.007 0.01 
Industries risk 0.574 0.020 0.05 
Hedged risk 0.568 0.022 0.05 
People risk 0.537 0.032 0.05 
Strategic and business risk 0.531 0.034 0.05 
Customer treatment risk 0.533 0.034 0.05 
Safety and security risk 0.527 0.036 0.05 
Total risk categories 0.371 0.157 no association 
Sustainability risk 0.420 0.105 no association 
Currency risk 0.378 0.148 no association 
Equity risk 0.376 0.151 no association 
Risk management 0.361 0.170 no association 
Interest rate risk -0.344 0.192 no association 
Credit risk 0.339 0.199 no association 
Fair value of financial instrument 0.325 0.220 no association 
Economic risk 0.308 0.246 no association 
Financial crime risk 0.308 0.246 no association 
Competition risk 0.308 0.246 no association 
Political risk 0.308 0.246 no association 
Cross-border risk (country risk) 0.279 0.296 no association 
Insurance and Investment risk -0.268 0.315 no association 
Legal and Regulation risk 0.218 0.417 no association 
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Variable Spearman 
Correlation (r) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
(p) 
Level of Sig. 
Residual value risk 0.197 0.464 no association 
Capital management risk 0.184 0.495 no association 
Financial report risk no disclosure 
Special purpose entities no disclosure 
Technology risk no disclosure 
Change risk no disclosure 
Governance risk no disclosure 
 
As shown in table 6, the results have been categorised into three main groups of 
correlation: high correlation (r is between ± 0.63 and ±1.00, p < 0.01), moderate 
correlation (r is between ± 0.50 and ± 0.62, p < 0.05), and no correlation (r is less than ± 
0.50). The correlations can be reported on two aspects (i.e. information richness and risk 
categories).  
 
In terms of information richness, there was a positive association between the disclosure 
direction of bad news and the number of newspaper citations. Meanwhile, the disclosure 
of neutral news as the inverse proportion of bad news had a negative relationship. For 
the time orientation of disclosures, only forward-looking disclosure was found to be 
positively associated with the number of newspaper citations, while present and past 
disclosures had no association. The interrogation of factual and perception disclosure 
was not associated with the number of newspaper citations. For the interrogation of 
quality of disclosure, quantitative disclosure was found to be negatively associated with 
the number of newspaper citations at a moderate level, while qualitative disclosure level 
3 had no association. 
 
In terms of the variables based on risk categories, it was noticeable that there were many 
risk categories having no association which consisted of total risk categories and key 
risk categories of banking (such as credit risk, risk management, capital management 
risk, interest rate risk, and currency risk). This result suggests that NatWest did not 
respond to societal considerations in key risk issues by disclosing those risks in annual 
reports. 
 
However there were certain risk categories that had a high correlation with societal 
concerns. Except for the risk related to derivatives (which had a high negative 
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correlation), the group of high positive correlation consisted of liquidity and funding 
risk, market risk, reputation risk, pension risk, tax risk, risk related to impairment, and 
operational risk. 
 
 
3.  Findings and Analysis of Lloyds TSB 
 
3.1   Analysing Longitudinal Risk Category Membership, in All Years, at Lloyds 
TSB 
 
The following table shows the top ten most disclosed risk categories of Lloyds TSB, 
which are illustrated to analyse the longitudinal data by total volume of sentences 
disclosed and by risk category. 
 
Table 7  The top ten most disclosed risk categories of Lloyds TSB 
Ranking Number Risk Categories 
The Number of Sentences 
Disclosed 
1 Credit risk 1,565 
2 Risk management 1,541 
3 Insurance and Investment risk  1,023 
4 Market risk  693 
5 Liquidity and funding risk 630 
6 Capital management risk  477 
7 Risk related to derivatives 395 
8 Operational risk 341 
9 Strategic and business risk 304 
10 Legal and regulation risk 288 
 
Table 7 shows that credit risk is the most disclosed risk category by Lloyds TSB, while 
risk management is the second ranking (having nearly the same number of sentences 
disclosed as the first ranking). This indicates that both credit risk and risk management 
were the most concerned risks in Lloyds TSB’s operation. 
 
The following figure shows the number of risk categories that Lloyds TSB disclosed 
between 1995 and 2010, which are illustrated in order to analyse longitudinal data by 
the number of risk category disclosed. 
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Figure 22  The number of categories of risk disclosure at Lloyds TSB 
 
 
As can be seen from figure 22, the number of risk categories disclosed by Lloyds TSB 
has risen slightly over time. Eight categories were disclosed in 1995 and this decreased 
to seven categories in 1996. The number of risk categories then gradually increased, it 
reached a peak of twenty-four categories in 2008 and it then dropped to twenty-two 
categories in 2009 and 2010. Volumetric analysis was developed on the basis of 
counting the number of sentences disclosed over time in order to investigate risk 
categories in terms of quantity of disclosure. The following figure shows the overall 
trend of risk disclosures over the period between 1995 and 2010, by all risk categories. 
 
Figure 23  The number of sentences disclosed in all risk categories by Lloyds TSB (by 
year) 
 
 
Figure 23 illustrates the number of risk disclosures made by Lloyds TSB between 1995 
and 2010. Overall, the graph shows a smooth increase in the number of risk disclosures. 
The notable exception was the number of risk disclosures in 2003, which had a 
significant increase in volume because this was a year of considerable change for 
Lloyds TSB’s strategic direction (i.e. it decided to focus on its core business). This 
change affected certain risks and, therefore, it led to an increase in volume of disclosure 
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in the relevant risks (such as credit risk, liquidity risk, and legal and regulation risk). 
Problematically, the overall trend of a smooth increase in the volume of disclosure 
conceals other switch-points and fluctuations in certain risk categories. The following 
table the shows risk categories under three main patterns of disclosure, which are: a 
smooth increase in volume, a volumetric increase with switch point, and volume 
fluctuation. 
  
Table 8  Patterns of longitudinal disclosure of risk categories membership at Lloyds 
TSB 
Patterns of Longitudinal Disclosure 
A Smooth Increase in 
Volume 
A Volumetric Increase with 
Switch Points, by Year 
Volume Fluctuation 
1) Market risk  
2) Insurance and 
investment risk  
2003, year of switch point 
1) Liquidity and funding 
risk  
2007, year of switch point 
2) Risk management  
2009, year of switch point 
3) Credit risk  
1) Operational risk 
2) Interest rate risk 
3) Currency risk 
4) Capital management risk 
5) Cross-border risk 
6) Risk related to derivatives 
7) Risk related to fair value 
8) Hedged risk 
9) Economic risk 
10) Reputation risk 
11) Legal and regulation risk 
12) Pension risk 
13) Financial crime risk 
14) Strategic and business risk 
15) Competition risk 
16) Tax risk 
17) Leasing risk 
18) People risk 
19) Safety and security risk 
20) Sustainability risk 
21) Equity risk 
22) Risk related to impairment 
23) Technology risk 
24) Change risk 
25) Governance risk 
26) Customer treatment risk 
 
As shown in table 8, there were three categories that had a pattern of volumetric 
increase with a switch point in different years (i.e. 2003, 2007, and 2009). 
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Firstly, disclosure of liquidity and funding risk increased significantly in 2003. In this 
year Lloyds TSB raised funds by issuing loan capital without issuing equity for this 
purpose; therefore, they provided more information about credit rating, contractual 
obligation, and off-balance sheet arrangements in this year.  
 
Secondly, risk management was disclosed with a significant increase in volume in 2007, 
which increased to a peak in 2008. This shows that Lloyds TSB’s risk management 
disclosure was one of the strategic policies that they used to respond to the financial 
crisis that began in 2007.  
 
Thirdly, disclosure of credit risk has a volumetric increase with a clear switch point in 
2009. In July of 2009 Lloyds TSB made an acquisition of HBOS. In addition, the 
effects of the financial crisis caused Lloyds to launch its largest ever capital-raising 
effort in November of 2009, comprising a £9 billion debt exchange and a £13.5 billion 
rights issue that was backed by the UK government’s support through UK Financial 
Investments, which meant that the HM Treasury took a 43.4 % stake in Lloyds TSB 
(Lloyds, 2009). 
 
In terms of the pattern of volume fluctuation, this pattern was the key feature for many 
of the risk categories disclosed; it had twenty-six out of a total of thirty-one risk 
categories (see table 8). This reflects the frequent high volatility that Lloyds TSB have 
faced in their operations and in various risk categories over the longitudinal period. 
 
 
3.2   Time Orientation of Disclosure at Lloyds TSB 
 
The following figure shows the percentage of three characteristics (i.e. forward-looking, 
present, and past disclosures) as a proportion of total sentences at Lloyds TSB between 
1995 and 2010. 
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Figure 24  The percentage of forward-looking, present, and past disclosures as a 
proportion of total sentences at Lloyds TSB between 1995 and 2010 
 
 
Figure 24 shows that since 1997 the lowest quantity of time orientation of disclosure 
was past information. The proportion of past disclosure gradually declined from 38% in 
1995 to 4% in 2006, after which it gradually increased to 13% in 2010. Meanwhile, 
present disclosure was the largest proportion throughout the period between 1995 and 
2010, which varied between 36% and 61% of total disclosures. And finally, following 
1997 forward-looking disclosure was the second largest proportion, which varied 
between 26% and 47% of total disclosures.  
 
 
3.3   Factual Disclosures and Perception Disclosures at Lloyds TSB 
 
The volumetric measure was employed to reflect the longitudinal trend of factual and 
perception disclosures. The following figure shows the proportion of factual disclosures 
measured as an inverse proportion of perception. 
 
Figure 25  The percentage of factual disclosures as a proportion of total sentences at 
Lloyds TSB between 1995 and 2010  
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Figure 25 shows that the factual disclosure as a minor proportion of total disclosures 
gradually decreased from 20.7% in 1995 to 12.2% in 1998, it then increased to 17.9% in 
1999. Following 1999 it had a slight fluctuation in quantity of disclosures on a 
downward trend, which varied between 4.4% of total disclosures and 11.2% of total 
disclosures.  
 
 
3.4   Disclosure Direction at Lloyds TSB 
 
The following figure provides the findings of trend of bad news as an inverse proportion 
of disclosure of neutral news. 
 
Figure 26  The percentage of bad news sentences as a proportion of total number of 
sentences disclosed between1995 and 2010 by Lloyds TSB 
 
 
Figure 26 shows the proportion of sentences containing bad news (divided by all 
sentences). The fluctuation in the proportion of disclosures varied between no bad news 
and 7.3% of total disclosures.  
 
 
3.5   The Quality of Risk Disclosures at Lloyds TSB 
 
The quality of risk disclosure in this study was divided into two groups, qualitative 
disclosure and quantitative disclosure. 
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3.5.1 The quality of qualitative disclosure at Lloyds TSB 
 
The frequency of qualitative disclosure levels was counted for all risk categories of 
Lloyds TSB to identify the quality level in all risk categories at Lloyds TSB. The 
analysis of this improvement over a period of sixteen years (i.e. between 1995 and 
2010) was investigated and the results are given in the following figure. 
 
Figure 27  Frequency counts of qualitative disclosure level under all risk categories at 
Lloyds TSB 
 
 
It is apparent from figure 27 that the total frequencies of qualitative disclosure were 
mainly disclosed on level 3 (as defined in table 6.5 of Chapter 6) because the disclosure 
included a description of the management or mitigation of that risk. These results also 
show that there was an upward trend of high information content (level 3), from six risk 
categories in 1995 to twenty-one risk categories in 2005. It had then changed slightly 
since 2006; it varied between seventeen categories and nineteen categories. However, 
this upward trend involved the number of increased risk categories; therefore, the 
following figure shows the result when the frequency of qualitative disclosure level 3 
was examined by making them a proportion. 
 
Figure 28  The frequency of qualitative disclosure level 3 as a proportions of total risk 
categories at Lloyds TSB 
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Figure 28 shows that most of the risk categories were disclosed with high information 
content at level 3, with a slight change in frequency without the upward trend (as 
presented in figure 27), which varied between 75% of total categories to 100% of total 
categories.  
 
 
3.5.2 The quality of quantitative disclosure at Lloyds TSB 
 
Evaluating the quality of quantitative disclosures employed two levels (as mentioned in 
table 6.6 of Chapter 6). The frequencies of both levels were then counted to identify the 
pattern disclosed. The analysis of numerical data classified as level 1 and level 2 
showed significantly different frequencies in both levels, as shown in the following 
figure. 
 
Figure 29  The frequencies of quantitative disclosure levels at Lloyds TSB 
 
 
Figure 29 shows that there was a significant difference between level 1 and 2 over the 
period between 1995 and 2010. In this period Lloyds TSB disclosed risk categories 
quantitatively with comparison numerical data, it purely disclosed level 2 in 1999, 2000, 
and 2009. In addition, quantitative disclosures of level 2 showed a fluctuation in 
frequencies between four categories and thirteen categories.  
 
To examine the factor of increasing number of risk categories, the following figure 
shows the results of making frequencies of quantitative disclosure level 2 as a 
proportion of total risk categories between 1995 and 2010. 
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Figure 30  The frequency of quantitative disclosure level 2 as a proportion of total risk 
categories at Lloyds TSB 
 
 
As shown in figure 30, quantitative disclosure with number against comparison (level 2) 
was found to have fluctuations in proportion of total risk categories over the period 
between 1995 and 2010; it varied between 26% and 57%.  
 
 
3.6   The Intensity of Societal Discussion at Lloyds TSB 
 
The intensity of societal discussion was examined by looking at the correlation between 
the volume of newspaper citations in the UK banking and financial sector against the 
risk disclosures made by Lloyds TSB. The following table describes the outcome of the 
various findings of correlation. 
 
Table 9  Correlations between the number of risk issues cited in newspapers and 
various variables in Lloyds TSB’s disclosures 
Variable Spearman 
Correlation (r) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
(p) 
Level of Sig. 
Information Richness (by proportion)    
Bad news 0.462 0.072 no association 
neutral news -0.462 0.072 no association 
Forward looking 0.006 0.983 no association 
Present 0.426 0.099 no association 
Past -0.144 0.594 no association 
Fact -0.397 0.128 no association 
perception 0.397 0.128 no association 
Quantitative disclosure(level 1&2) -0.149 0.583 no association 
Qualitative disclosure level 3 -0.512 0.043 0.05 
Risk Categories (by number of sentences) 
Total risk categories 0.709 0.002 0.01 
Risk management 0.674 0.004 0.01 
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Variable Spearman 
Correlation (r) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
(p) 
Level of Sig. 
Credit risk 0.683 0.004 0.01 
Operational risk 0.680 0.004 0.01 
Insurance and Investment risk 0.680 0.004 0.01 
Safety and security risk 0.674 0.004 0.01 
Impairment 0.680 0.004 0.01 
Market risk 0.565 0.023 0.05 
Legal and Regulation risk 0.545 0.029 0.05 
Liquidity and funding risk 0.540 0.031 0.05 
Strategic/ Business risk 0.540 0.031 0.05 
Sustainability risk 0.537 0.032 0.05 
People (staff) 0.512 0.043 0.05 
Pension risk 0.504 0.046 0.05 
Tax risk 0.500 0.048 0.05 
Hedged risk 0.493 0.053 no association 
Reputation risk 0.420 0.105 no association 
Cross-border risk (country risk) -0.320 0.228 no association 
Technology risk 0.308 0.246 no association 
Financial crime risk 0.304 0.252 no association 
Capital management risk 0.286 0.282 no association 
Currency/ exchange rate risk 0.286 0.283 no association 
Derivatives -0.279 0.296 no association 
Interest rate risk 0.262 0.326 no association 
Fair value of financial instrument 0.241 0.368 no association 
Customer treatment 0.232 0.387 no association 
Economic risk 0.205 0.447 no association 
Competition risk -0.140 0.605 no association 
Equity risk -0.140 0.605 no association 
Residual value risk -0.138 0.610 no association 
Change risk 0.065 0.810 no association 
Governance risk -0.018 0.947 no association 
Financial report risk no disclosure 
Political risk no disclosure 
Industries risk no disclosure 
Special purpose entities no disclosure 
 
As shown in table 9, the results have been categorised into three main groups of 
correlation: high correlation (r is between ± 0.63 and ±1.00, p < 0.01), moderate 
correlation (r is between ± 0.50 and ± 0.62, p < 0.05), and no correlation (r is less than ± 
0.50). The correlations can be reported on two aspects (i.e. information richness and risk 
categories).  
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In terms of information richness, there was a negative association between disclosure 
quality of qualitative level 3 (high information content) and the number of newspaper 
citations at moderate level, while there was no association between disclosure quality of 
quantitative disclosure and the number of newspaper citations. The other three 
interrogations (i.e. disclosure direction, time orientation, and factual and perception) 
were not found to be associated with the number of newspaper citations. 
 
In terms of the variables based on risk categories, it was noticeable that the group of 
high correlation were of total risk categories and the key strategic risks of the bank (i.e. 
risk management, credit risk, operational risk, and insurance and investment risk). 
These categories are also contained in the group of high correlation of overall analysis 
(in all companies), as described in Section 6.3.2 of Chapter 6. However, the safety and 
security risk, as well as the risk related to impairment, had high correlations at Lloyds 
TSB, while both risks had moderate correlations in the overall analysis (in all 
companies). This indicates that the intensity of societal concern is associated with 
certain specific risk categories as disclosed by different banks. 
 
 
4.  Findings and Analysis of HBOS 
 
4.1   Analysing Longitudinal Risk Category Membership, in All Years, at HBOS 
 
The following table shows the top ten most disclosed risk categories of HBOS, which 
are illustrated to analyse the longitudinal data by total volume of sentences disclosed 
and by risk category. 
 
Table 10  The top ten most disclosed risk categories of HBOS 
Ranking Number Risk Categories 
The Number of Sentences 
Disclosed 
1 Credit risk 1,067 
2 Risk management 956 
3 Insurance and Investment risk  897 
4 Market risk 485 
5 Liquidity and funding risk 404 
6 Capital management risk  400 
7 Risk related to derivatives 316 
8 Operational risk 287 
9 Interest rate risk 269 
10 Currency risk 196 
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Table 10 shows that credit risk is the most disclosed risk category at HBOS. This 
indicates that credit risk was the most concerned risk in HBOS’s operation. 
 
The following figure shows the number of risk categories that HBOS disclosed between 
1995 and 2010 in order to analyse longitudinal data by the number of risk categories 
disclosed. 
 
Figure 31  The number of categories of risk disclosure at HBOS
 
 
As can be seen from figure 31, the number of risk categories disclosed by HBOS has 
increased gradually over time. The lowest number of categories disclosed was seven 
categories in 1995 and the highest number of category was eighteen categories in 2010. 
To investigate risk categories in terms of quantity of disclosure, volumetric analysis was 
developed on the basis of counting the number of sentences disclosed over time. The 
following finding shows the overall trend of risk disclosures over the period between 
1995 and 2010, by all risk categories. 
 
Figure 32  The number of sentences disclosed in all risk categories by HBOS (by year) 
 
 
Figure 32 illustrates the number of risk disclosures made by HBOS between 1995 and 
2010. The graph shows a gradual increase in the number of risk disclosures, from 45 
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sentences in 1995 to 979 sentences in 2007, after which it significantly decreases to 441 
sentences in 2009 and then slightly increases at 572 sentences in 2010. This study found 
that the overall trend of risk disclosure concealed three main patterns of disclosure, 
which were: a smooth increase in volume, a volumetric increase with switch point, and 
volume fluctuation. The following table shows the risk categories under these three 
patterns. 
 
Table 11  Patterns of longitudinal disclosure of risk categories membership at HBOS 
Patterns of Longitudinal Disclosure 
A Smooth Increase in 
Volume 
A Volumetric Increase 
with Switch Point, by Year 
Volume Fluctuation 
1) Market risk  
 
2004, year of switch point 
1) Insurance and 
investment risk  
2007, year of switch point 
2) Liquidity and funding 
risk, 
3) Credit risk 
4) Capital management 
5) Risk related to fair 
value.  
 
1) Risk management 
2) Cross-border risk 
3) Interest rate risk 
4) Currency risk 
5) Hedged risk 
6) Risk related to derivatives 
7) Economic risk 
8) Operational risk 
9) Legal and regulation risk 
10) Competition risk 
11) Tax risk 
12) Strategic and business risk 
13) Leasing risk 
14) People risk 
15) Safety and security risk 
16) Sustainability risk 
17) Customer treatment 
18) Risk related to impairment 
19) Special purpose entities 
20) Equity risk. 
 
Table 11 shows that the pattern of volume fluctuation was the key feature for many risk 
categories disclosed which had twenty out of a total of twenty-six risk categories. This 
reflects how HBOS has faced high volatility in their operation at many times and in 
various risk categories over a longitudinal period. 
 
In terms of the pattern of volumetric increase with switch point in 2007, there were four 
risk categories disclosed by this pattern, which were: liquidity and funding risk, credit 
risk, capital management, and risk related to fair value. This switch point in 2007 was 
caused when HBOS faced the unprecedented financial turmoil in global markets. The 
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severe effects of financial crisis led HBOS into a liquidity problem and a credit crunch, 
which this was caused by its acquisition by Lloyds TSB (which was begun in 2008 and 
completed in January 2009). It is noteworthy that, although the 2001 merger of Halifax 
plc and the Bank of Scotland which formed HBOS had no the clear effect on risk 
disclosures, in 2007 when HBOS was faced with the financial crisis their risk 
disclosures increased significantly. Hence, switching increases in the volume of risk 
disclosures tended to be critical indicators of the areas where the banks faced difficulty 
with their operations. 
 
In 2004, disclosure of insurance and investment risk increased significantly. In this year 
HBOS established their own underwriting capability for household insurance and 
general insurance as a core activity in HBOS’s investment businesses (HBOS, 2004); 
therefore, they provided more information about insurance and investment. 
 
 
4.2   Time Orientation of Disclosure at HBOS 
 
The following figure shows the percentage of three characteristics, forward-looking, 
present, and past disclosures as a proportion of total sentences at HBOS between 1995 
and 2010. 
 
Figure 33  The percentage of forward-looking, present, and past disclosures as a 
proportion of total sentences at HBOS between 1995 and 2010 
 
 
Figure 33 shows that, apart from 1996, the lowest quantity of time orientation of 
disclosure was past information over a period of 1995 to 2010. The proportion of past 
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slight fluctuation in volume, which varied between 4% and 14% of total disclosures 
between 2003 and 2010. Apart from 2005 and 2006, present disclosure was the largest 
proportion over a period of 1995 to 2010, which varied between 40% and 67% of total 
disclosures. Meanwhile, forward-looking disclosure was the second largest proportion, 
which varied between 11% and 51% of total disclosures.  
 
 
4.3   Factual Disclosures and Perception Disclosures at HBOS 
 
The volumetric measure was employed to reflect the longitudinal trend of factual and 
perception disclosures. The following figure shows the proportion of factual disclosures 
measured as an inverse proportion of perception. 
 
Figure 34  The percentage of factual disclosures as a proportion of total sentences at 
HBOS between 1995 and 2010  
 
 
Figure 34 shows the factual disclosure as a minor proportion of total disclosures. The 
high fluctuation in proportion of disclosures between 1995 and 2003 varied between 
5.3% and 35.8% of total disclosures. However, since 2004, it shows a slight fluctuation 
on the downward trend, which varied between 4.4% and 12% of total disclosures.  
 
 
4.4   Disclosure Direction at HBOS 
 
The following figure illustrates the finding of trend of bad news as an inverse 
proportion of disclosure of neutral news. 
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Figure 35  The percentage of bad news sentences as a proportion of total number of 
sentences disclosed between 1995 and 2010 by HBOS 
 
 
Figure 35 shows the proportion of sentences containing bad news as a minor proportion 
of disclosure direction. The fluctuation in proportion of disclosures between 1995 and 
2005 varied between no bad news and 3.8% of total disclosures. Subsequently, it 
gradually increased from 3.9% in 2006 to 8.4% in 2010. 
 
 
4.5   The Quality of Risk Disclosures at HBOS 
 
The quality of risk disclosure in this study was divided into two groups, qualitative 
disclosure and quantitative disclosure. 
 
 
4.5.1 The quality of qualitative disclosure at HBOS 
 
The frequency of qualitative disclosure levels was counted for all of the risk categories 
of HBOS to identify the quality level in all risk categories at HBOS. The analysis of this 
improvement over a period of sixteen years (i.e. between 1995 and 2010) was 
investigated and the results are given in the following figure. 
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Figure 36  Frequency counts of qualitative disclosure level under all risk categories at 
HBOS 
 
 
It is apparent from figure 36 that the total frequencies of qualitative disclosure were 
mainly disclosed on level 3 (as defined in table 6.5 of Chapter 6) because the disclosure 
included a description of the management or mitigation of that risk. Overall, the results 
show an upward trend of high information content (i.e. level 3), from six risk categories 
in 1995 to fifteen risk categories in 2010, although qualitative disclosure slightly 
fluctuates with a decrease in frequency for the years 1996, 2005, 2008, and 2009. 
However, this upward trend was found in the number of increased risk categories; 
therefore, the following figure shows the result when the frequency of qualitative 
disclosure level 3 was examined by making them a proportion. 
 
Figure 37  The frequency of qualitative disclosure level 3 as a proportion of total risk 
categories at HBOS 
 
 
Figure 37 has no the upward trend of qualitative disclosure of level 3. Most risk 
categories were disclosed with high information content at level 3, with fluctuations in 
frequency which varied between 63% of total categories to 100% of total categories. 
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4.5.2 The quality of quantitative disclosure at HBOS 
 
Evaluating the quality of quantitative disclosures employed 2 levels (mentioned at table 
6.6 of Chapter 6). The frequencies of both levels were counted in order to identify the 
pattern disclosed. An analysis of numerical data classified as level 1 and level 2 shows 
that there are significant different frequencies in both levels, as can be seen in the 
following figure. 
 
Figure 38  The frequencies of quantitative disclosure levels at HBOS 
 
 
Figure 38 shows that there was a significant difference between level 1 and 2 between 
1995 and 2010, when HBOS disclosed risk categories quantitatively with comparison 
numerical data (HBOS purely disclosed level 2 in 1995-1997, 1999, 2002, 2005 and 
2010). In addition, quantitative disclosures of level 2 fluctuated in frequency between 
three categories and eleven categories.  
 
The following figure shows the result making frequencies of quantitative disclosure 
level 2 as a proportion of total risk categories between 1995 and 2010. 
 
Figure 39  The frequency of quantitative disclosure level 2 as a proportion of total risk 
categories at HBOS 
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Figure 39 shows quantitative disclosure with number against a comparison (level 2), 
which fluctuated in proportion of total risk categories between 1995 and 2010 (it varied 
between 29% and 69% of total risk disclosures).  
 
 
4.6   The Intensity of Societal Discussion at HBOS 
 
The intensity of societal discussion was examined by looking at the correlation between 
the volume of newspaper citations in the UK banking and financial sector against the 
risk disclosures made by HBOS. The following table describes the outcome of the 
various findings of correlation. 
 
Table 12  Correlations between the number of risk issues cited in newspapers and 
various variables in HBOS’s disclosures 
Variable Spearman 
Correlation (r) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
(p) 
Level of Sig. 
Information Richness (by proportion)    
Bad news 0.684 0.003 0.01 
neutral news -0.684 0.003 0.01 
Forward looking -0.197 0.464 no association 
Present 0.471 0.066 no association 
Past -0.529 0.035 0.05 
Fact -0.385 0.141 no association 
perception 0.385 0.141 no association 
Quantitative disclosure(level 1&2) -0.081 0.765 no association 
Qualitative disclosure level 3 -0.026 0.925 no association 
Risk Categories (by number of sentences) 
Total risk categories 0.588 0.017 0.05 
Market risk 0.750 0.001 0.01 
Risk related to fair value 0.739 0.001 0.01 
Liquidity and funding risk 0.681 0.004 0.01 
Legal and regulation risk 0.645 0.007 0.01 
Credit risk 0.621 0.01 0.05 
Strategic and business risk 0.583 0.018 0.05 
Customer treatment 0.537 0.032 0.05 
People risk 0.527 0.036 0.05 
Capital management risk 0.464 0.070 no association 
Special purpose entities 0.445 0.084 no association 
Risk related to Impairment 0.429 0.097 no association 
Tax risk 0.420 0.105 no association 
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Variable Spearman 
Correlation (r) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
(p) 
Level of Sig. 
Insurance and Investment risk 0.390 0.136 no association 
Safety and security risk -0.367 0.162 no association 
Cross-border risk  -0.314 0.236 no association 
Equity risk 0.308 0.246 no association 
Sustainability risk -0.284 0.287 no association 
Competition risk 0.252 0.346 no association 
Operational risk 0.241 0.369 no association 
Economic risk 0.176 0.513 no association 
Risk related to derivatives 0.167 0.537 no association 
Leasing risk 0.145 0.592 no association 
Currency risk 0.075 0.782 no association 
Hedged risk 0.072 0.791 no association 
Interest rate risk 0.055 0.841 no association 
Risk management -0.022 0.935 no association 
Reputation risk no disclosure 
Pension risk no disclosure 
Financial crime risk no disclosure 
Financial report risk no disclosure 
Political risk no disclosure 
Industries risk no disclosure 
Technology risk no disclosure 
Change risk no disclosure 
Governance risk no disclosure 
 
As shown in table 12, the results have been categorised into three main groups of 
correlation: high correlation (r is between ± 0.63 and ±1.00, p < 0.01), moderate 
correlation (r is between ± 0.50 and ± 0.62, p < 0.05), and no correlation (r is less than ± 
0.50). The correlations can be reported on aspects (i.e. information richness and risk 
categories).  
 
In terms of information richness, there was a positive association between disclosure 
direction of bad news and the number of newspaper citations. On the other hand, the 
disclosure of neutral news was the inverse proportion of bad news, which had a negative 
relationship with the number of newspaper citations. For the interrogation of time 
orientation of disclosures, only past disclosure had a moderate positive association with 
the number of newspaper citations while forward-looking and present disclosure had no 
association. For the interrogation of fact and perception, and the interrogation of 
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disclosure quality, both interrogations were not found to be associated with the number 
of newspaper citations.  
 
In terms of the variables based on risk categories, it was noticeable that HBOS’s risk 
disclosures (i.e. total risk categories) were associated with the number of newspaper 
citations at a merely moderate level. The group of high correlation had four risk 
categories, which are: market risk, risk related to fair value, liquidity and funding risk, 
and legal and regulation risk. Meanwhile, the group of moderate correlations included: 
credit risk, strategic and business risk, customer treatment, and people risk. The group 
of no association (including certain risk categories that were the key strategic risk of 
bank) consisted of: operational risk, risk management, capital management, currency 
risk, and interest rate risk. 
 
 
5.  Findings and Analysis of Barclays 
 
5.1   Analysing Longitudinal Risk Category Membership, in All Years, at Barclays 
 
The following table shows the top ten most disclosed risk categories of Barclays, which 
are illustrated to analyse the longitudinal data by total volume of sentences disclosed 
and by risk category. 
 
Table 13  The top ten most disclosed risk categories at Barclays 
Ranking Number Risk Categories 
The Number of Sentences 
Disclosed 
1 Credit risk 4,917 
2 Risk management 2,497 
3 Market risk  1,381 
4 Risk related to derivatives 1,136 
5 Capital management risk  1,126 
6 Legal and regulation risk 1,078 
7 Liquidity and funding risk 936 
8 Operational risk 471 
9 Interest rate risk 449 
10 Risk related to fair value 376 
 
Table 13 shows that credit risk is the most disclosed risk category at Barclays, having 
double times of the number of sentences disclosed when compared to risk management 
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(ranking number two). This indicates that credit risk was the most concerning risk in 
Barclays’s operations. 
 
The following figure shows the number of risk categories that Barclays disclosed 
between 1995 and 2010 in order to analyse longitudinal data by the number of risk 
categories disclosed. 
 
Figure 40  The number of categories of risk disclosure at Barclays
 
 
Figure 40 shows that the number of risk categories disclosed by Barclays has increased 
gradually over time. The lowest number of categories disclosed was twelve categories 
in 1995 and the highest number of category was twenty-six categories in 2010. To 
investigate the risk categories in terms of quantity of disclosure a volumetric analysis 
was developed on the basis of counting the number of sentences disclosed over time. 
The following figure shows the overall trend of risk disclosures between 1995 and 
2010, by all risk categories. 
 
Figure 41  The number of sentences disclosed in all risk categories by Barclays (by 
year) 
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Figure 41shows that there was a smooth increase in the number of risk disclosures, from 
388 sentences in 1995 to 1,960 sentences in 2010. However, this study found that the 
overall trend with a smooth increase in volume of disclosure concealed other switch-
points and fluctuations in certain risk categories.  
 
The following table shows risk categories under three main patterns of disclosure, 
which are: a smooth increase in volume, a volumetric increase with switch point, and 
volume fluctuation. 
 
Table 14  Patterns of longitudinal disclosure of risk categories membership at Barclays 
Patterns of Longitudinal Disclosure 
A Smooth Increase in 
Volume 
A Volumetric Increase with 
Switch Point, by Year 
Volume Fluctuation 
1) Risk management 
2) Liquidity and 
funding risk 
3) Market risk  
2004, year of switch point 
1) Operational risk  
2005, year of switch point 
2) Risk related to 
impairment 
3) Tax risk  
2007, year of switch point 
4) Credit risk  
5) Capital management risk 
2008, year of switch point 
6) Legal and regulation risk 
1) Cross-border risk 
2) Interest rate risk 
3) Risk related to derivatives 
4) Currency risk 
5) Hedged risk 
6) Strategic and business risk 
7) Economic risk 
8) Reputation risk 
9) Insurance and investment 
risk 
10) Pension risk 
11) Financial crime risk 
12) Safety and security risk 
13) Leasing risk 
14) People risk 
15) Competition risk 
16) Sustainability risk 
17) Industries risk 
18) Special purpose entities 
19) Technology risk 
20) Political risk 
21) Risk related to fair value 
22) Financial report risk 
23) Equity risk. 
 
Table 14 shows that the pattern of volume fluctuation was the key feature for many risk 
categories disclosed; it had twenty-three out of a total of thirty-two risk categories. This 
reflects that Barclays has experienced frequent high volatility in their operations and in 
various risk categories over a longitudinal period. 
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In terms of the pattern of volumetric increase with switch point, a clearly significant 
switching increase of disclosure happened in 2007 with two risks, which are: credit risk 
and capital management risk. The switch point in 2007 was the result of a severe 
disruption in the global financial crisis, which began in the second half of 2007. 
Barclays also suffered both direct and indirect impacts from the effects of this crisis. 
This indicates that the worsening economic conditions affected the volume of risk 
disclosures at Barclays, particularly in credit risk and capital management, which are 
both key risk of banks. 
 
 
5.2   Time Orientation of Disclosure at Barclays 
 
The following figure shows the percentage of three characteristic (i.e. forward-looking, 
present, and past disclosures) as a proportion of total risk disclosures of Barclays 
between 1995 and 2010. 
 
Figure 42  The percentage of forward-looking, present, and past disclosures as a 
proportion of total sentences at Barclays between 1995 and 2010 
 
 
Figure 42 shows that the lowest quantity of time orientation of disclosures as a 
proportion of risk disclosures was past information, which varied between 10% and 
23% of total disclosures. Meanwhile, the largest proportion was present disclosure, 
which varied between 39% and 58% of total disclosures. In addition, the second largest 
proportion was forward-looking disclosure, which varied between 29% and 44% of total 
disclosures. 
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5.3   Factual Disclosures and Perception Disclosures at Barclays 
 
A volumetric measure was employed in this study to reflect the longitudinal trend of 
factual and perception disclosures. The following figure shows the proportion of factual 
disclosures measured as an inverse proportion of perception. 
 
Figure 43  The percentage of factual disclosures as a proportion of total sentences at 
Barclays between 1995 and 2010  
 
 
Figure 43 shows that the factual disclosure as a minor proportion of total disclosures 
fluctuates on a downward trend as a proportion of disclosures, it varied between 5.1% 
and 18.3% of total disclosures.  
 
 
5.4   Disclosure Direction at Barclays 
 
The following figure shows the trend of bad news as an inverse proportion of disclosure 
of neutral news. 
 
Figure 44  The percentage of bad news sentences as a proportion of total number of 
sentences disclosed between1995 and 2010 at Barclays 
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Figure 44 shows that the proportion of sentences containing bad news as a minor 
proportion of disclosure direction fluctuates on an upward trend of disclosures over 
time, it varied between 0.5% and 8.7% of total disclosures.  
 
 
5.5   The Quality of Risk Disclosures at Barclays 
 
The quality of risk disclosure in this study was divided into two groups, qualitative 
disclosure and quantitative disclosure. 
 
 
5.5.1 The quality of qualitative disclosure at Barclays 
 
The frequency of qualitative disclosure levels was counted for all risk categories of 
Barclays to identify the quality level in all risk categories at Barclays. The analysis of 
this improvement over a period of sixteen years between 1995 and 2010 was 
investigated; the results are given in the following figure: 
 
Figure 45  Frequency counts of qualitative disclosure level under all risk categories at 
Barclays 
 
 
It is apparent from figure 45 that the total frequencies of qualitative disclosure were 
mainly disclosed on level 3 (as defined in table 6.5 of Chapter 6) since the disclosure 
included a description of the management or mitigation of that risk. Overall, the results 
show that there was an upward trend of high information content (level 3), from twelve 
risk categories in 1995 to twenty-five risk categories in 2010. However, this upward 
trend involved a number of increased risk categories; therefore, the following figure 
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shows the result when the frequency of qualitative disclosure level 3 was examined by 
making them a proportion. 
 
Figure 46  The frequency of qualitative disclosure level 3 as a proportion of total risk 
categories at Barclays 
 
 
Figure 46 shows that most risk categories were disclosed with high information content 
at level 3, with fluctuations in frequency without a clear upward trend (it varied between 
73% of total categories to 100% of total categories). 
 
 
5.5.2 The quality of quantitative disclosure at Barclays 
 
Evaluating the quality of quantitative disclosures employed 2 levels (mentioned at table 
6.6 of Chapter 6). The frequencies of both levels were counted to identify any pattern 
disclosed. The analysis of numerical data classified as level 1 and level 2 showed 
significantly different frequencies in both levels, as illustrated in the following figure. 
 
Figure 47  The frequencies of quantitative disclosure levels at Barclays 
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Figure 47 shows that there was a significant difference between level 1 and 2 when 
Barclays disclosed risk categories quantitatively with comparison numerical data 
(purely disclosed level 2 in 2001 and during 2006 to 2009). Moreover, quantitative 
disclosures of level 2 showed a fluctuation in frequencies, between seven categories and 
thirteen categories.  
 
The following figure shows the result of making frequencies of quantitative disclosure 
level 2 as a proportion of total risk categories between 1995 and 2010. 
 
Figure 48  The frequency of quantitative disclosure level 2 as a proportion of total risk 
categories at Barclays 
 
 
Figure 48 shows that quantitative disclosure with number against comparison (level 2) 
gradually decreased from 83% of total disclosures in 1995 to 45% of total disclosures in 
2003. It then gradually increased to 59% in 2009 before dropping to 46% in 2010. 
  
 
5.6   The Intensity of Societal Discussion at Barclays 
 
The intensity of societal discussion was examined by looking at the correlation between 
the volume of newspaper citations in the UK banking and financial sector against the 
risk disclosures made by Barclays. The following table describes the outcome of the 
various findings of correlation. 
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Table 15  Correlations between the number of risk issues cited in newspapers and 
various variables in Barclays’s disclosures 
Variable Spearman 
Correlation (r) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
(p) 
Level of Sig. 
Information Richness (by proportion)    
Bad news 0.591 0.016 0.05 
neutral news -0.591 0.016 0.05 
Forward –looking -0.294 0.269 no association 
Present 0.315 0.235 no association 
Past -0.091 0.737 no association 
Fact -0.600 0.014 0.05 
Perception 0.600 0.014 0.05 
Quantitative disclosure(level 1&2) -0.304 0.252 no association 
Qualitative disclosure level 3 -0.301 0.257 no association 
Risk Categories (by number of sentences) 
Total risk categories 0.721 0.002 0.01 
Sustainability risk 0.745 0.001 0.01 
Credit risk 0.718 0.002 0.01 
Currency risk 0.677 0.004 0.01 
Financial crime risk 0.680 0.004 0.01 
Liquidity and funding risk 0.665 0.005 0.01 
Risk management 0.656 0.006 0.01 
Interest rate risk 0.611 0.012 0.05 
Capital management risk 0.600 0.014 0.05 
Tax risk 0.601 0.014 0.05 
Market risk 0.552 0.027 0.05 
Financial report risk 0.527 0.036 0.05 
People risk 0.527 0.036 0.05 
Technology risk 0.527 0.036 0.05 
Legal and regulation risk 0.517 0.040 0.05 
Risk related to impairment 0.497 0.050 no association 
Operational risk 0.436 0.092 no association 
Strategic and business risk 0.433 0.094 no association 
Reputation risk 0.420 0.105 no association 
Safety and security risk 0.387 0.139 no association 
Insurance and investment risk 0.377 0.149 no association 
Risk related to fair value  0.358 0.173 no association 
Risk related to derivatives 0.325 0.219 no association 
Pension risk -0.145 0.592 no association 
Cross-border risk  0.109 0.688 no association 
Hedged risk -0.105 0.699 no association 
Economic risk 0.033 0.904 no association 
Special purpose entities 0.032 0.906 no association 
Political risk -0.028 0.918 no association 
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Variable Spearman 
Correlation (r) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
(p) 
Level of Sig. 
Industries risk -0.028 0.918 no association 
Equity risk -0.028 0.918 no association 
Leasing risk 0.026 0.924 no association 
Competition risk -0.019 0.945 no association 
Customer treatment no disclosure 
Change risk no disclosure 
Governance risk no disclosure 
 
As shown in table 15, the results have been categorised into three main groups of 
correlation: high correlation (r is between ± 0.63 and ±1.00, p < 0.01), moderate 
correlation (r is between ± 0.50 and ± 0.62, p < 0.05), and no correlation (r is less than ± 
0.50). The correlations can be reported on two aspects (i.e. information richness and risk 
categories).  
 
In terms of information richness, there was a positive association between the disclosure 
direction of bad news and the number of newspaper citations with moderate level. On 
the other hand, disclosure of neutral news as an inverse proportion of bad news had a 
negative relationship with the number of newspaper citations. For the interrogation of 
fact and perception, there was a negative association between the disclosure of fact and 
the number of newspaper citations with moderate level, while disclosure of perception 
as an inverse proportion of fact had a positive association with moderate level. 
However, the interrogation of time orientation (i.e. forward-looking, present, and past) 
and the interrogation of disclosure quality (i.e. both qualitative and quantitative 
disclosure) were not associated with the number of newspaper citations.  
 
In terms of the variables based on risk categories, it was noticeable that the group of 
high correlation consisted of total risk categories and the key strategic risks of the bank 
(i.e. risk management, credit risk, and liquidity and funding). These categories were also 
contained in the group of high correlation of overall analysis (in all companies), as 
described in Section 6.3.2 of Chapter 6.  
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6.  Findings and Analysis of HSBC 
 
6.1   Analysing Longitudinal Risk Category Membership, in All Years, at HSBC 
 
The following table shows the top ten most disclosed risk categories of HSBC, which 
are illustrated to analyse the longitudinal data by total volume of sentences disclosed 
and by risk category. 
 
Table 16  The top ten most disclosed risk categories of HSBC 
Ranking Number Risk Categories 
The Number of Sentences 
Disclosed 
1 Credit risk 3,827 
2 Insurance and investment risk  1,410 
3 Market risk  1,164 
4 Risk management 1,100 
5 Risk related to impairment  1,045 
6 Legal and regulation risk 965 
7 Capital management risk 945 
8 Liquidity and funding risk 750 
9 Risk related to fair value 657 
10 Interest rate risk 620 
 
Table 16 shows that credit risk is the most disclosed risk category at HSBC, having 
more than double the number of sentences disclosed when compared to insurance and 
investment risk (which ranking number two). This indicates that credit risk was the 
most concerned risk in HSBC’s operation. 
 
The following figure shows the number of risk categories that HSBC disclosed between 
1995 and 2010 in order to analyse longitudinal data by the number of risk categories 
disclosed. 
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Figure 49  The number of categories of risk disclosure at HSBC
 
 
Figure 49 shows that the number of risk categories disclosed by HSBC has increased 
gradually over time. The lowest number of categories disclosed was eight categories in 
1995 and the highest number of categories was twenty-six categories in 2010. To 
investigate risk categories in terms of quantity of disclosure, a volumetric analysis was 
developed on the basis of counting the number of sentences disclosed over time. The 
following finding shows the overall trend of risk disclosures over a period of 1995 to 
2010, by all risk categories. 
 
Figure 50 The number of sentences disclosed in all risk categories by HSBC (by year) 
 
 
Figure 50 shows the number of risk disclosures made by HSBC between 1995 and 2010 
(by year). There was a smooth increase in the number of risk disclosures, from 187 
sentences in 1995 to 2,463 sentences in 2008. It then slightly declined in 2009 and 
2010. Problematically, this study found that the overall trend with a smooth increase in 
volume of disclosure concealed other switch-points and fluctuations in certain risk 
categories. The following table shows the risk categories under three main patterns of 
disclosure, which are: a smooth increase in volume, a volumetric increase with switch 
point, and volume fluctuation. 
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Table 17  Patterns of longitudinal disclosure of risk categories membership at HSBC 
Patterns of Longitudinal Disclosure 
A Smooth Increase in 
Volume 
A Volumetric Increase with 
Switch Point, by Year 
Volume Fluctuation 
1) Credit risk 
2) Market risk 
3) Capital management 
risk  
2001, year of switch point 
1) Operational risk  
2005, year of switch point 
2) Insurance and investment 
risk  
3) Risk related to impairment 
4) Hedged risk  
2006, year of switch point 
5) Pension risk  
6) Sustainability risk 
2007, year of switch point 
7) Liquidity and funding risk  
2008, year of switch point 
8) Economic risk 
2010, year of switch point 
9) Risk management 
10) Cross-border risk 
1) Currency risk 
2) Interest rate risk 
3) Risk related to derivatives 
4) Reputation risk 
5) Political risk 
6) Strategic and business risk 
7) Tax risk 
8) Financial crime risk 
9) Risk related to fair value 
10) Leasing risk 
11) People risk 
12) Safety and security risk 
13) Industries risk 
14) Special purpose entities 
15) Equity risk 
16) Legal and regulation risk. 
 
Table 17 shows that the pattern of volume fluctuation was the key feature for many risk 
categories disclosed a total of sixteen out of a total of twenty-nine risk categories. This 
reflects that HSBC have frequently faced high volatility in their operation and in various 
risk categories over a longitudinal period. 
 
In terms of the pattern of volumetric increase with switch point, a clear significant 
switching increase of disclosure happened in 2005 with three risks, which were: hedge 
risk, risk related to impairment and insurance and investment risk. This was probably 
caused by the effects of implementation of IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition 
and Measurement (which governs fair value, impairment, derivatives, and hedge 
accounting). Meanwhile, disclosure of insurance and investment risk increased 
significantly in 2005 because the effects of implementation of IFRS 4 ‘Insurance 
Contracts’. In addition, in August 2005, HSBC acquired a further 9.91 % of Ping An 
Insurance, increasing its investment to 19.9 per cent; Ping An Insurance is the second-
largest life insurer and the third-largest property and casualty insurer in China (HSBC, 
2005). The switching years of 2007, 2008 and 2010 were the result of the severe 
disruption of the global financial crisis that began in the second half of 2007. HSBC 
also suffered the effects of this crisis, in both direct and indirect impacts. Consequently, 
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liquidity and funding risk, economic risk, risk management, and cross-border risk were 
disclosed with the pattern of volumetric increase with switch point. 
 
 
6.2   Time Orientation of Disclosure at HSBC 
 
The following figure shows the percentage of three characteristics (i.e. forward-looking, 
present, and past disclosures) as a proportion of total sentences at HSBC between 1995 
and 2010. 
 
Figure 51  The percentage of forward-looking, present, and past disclosures as a 
proportion of total sentences at HSBC between 1995 and 2010 
 
 
Figure 51 shows that the largest quantity of time orientation of disclosures as a 
proportion was present information, which varied between 41% and 54% of total 
disclosures. Meanwhile, the second largest proportion was forward-looking disclosure, 
which varied between 20% and 42% of total disclosures. Finally, the lowest proportion 
was past disclosure, which varied between 11% and 28% of total disclosures. 
 
 
6.3   Factual Disclosures and Perception Disclosures at HSBC 
 
A volumetric measure was employed to reflect the longitudinal trends of factual and 
perception disclosures. The following figure shows the proportion of factual disclosures 
measured as an inverse proportion of perception. 
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Figure 52  The percentage of factual disclosures as a proportion of total sentences at 
HSBC between 1995 and 2010  
 
 
As can be seen from figure 52, the factual disclosure as a minor proportion of total 
disclosures shows the fluctuation on the downward trend in proportion of disclosures, 
which varied between 6.5% and 16.4% of total disclosures.  
 
 
6.4   Disclosure Direction at HSBC 
 
The following figure illustrates the finding of trend of bad news as an inverse 
proportion of disclosure of neutral news. 
 
Figure 53  The percentage of bad news sentences as a proportion of total number of 
sentences disclosed between1995 and 2010 by HSBC 
 
 
As shown in figure 53, the proportion of sentences containing bad news as a minor 
proportion of disclosure direction gradually increased from no bad news in 1995 to 
6.8% of total disclosures in 2008, it then slightly decreased to 5.6% in 2009 and 4.9% in 
2010. 
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6.5   The Quality of Risk Disclosures at HSBC 
 
The quality of risk disclosure in this study was divided into two groups, qualitative 
disclosure and quantitative disclosure. 
 
 
6.5.1 The quality of qualitative disclosure at HSBC 
 
The frequency of qualitative disclosure levels was counted for all risk categories of 
HSBC to identify the quality level in all risk categories at HSBC. The results of the 
analysis of this improvement over a period of sixteen years (i.e. 1995 to 2010) are 
shown in the following figure. 
 
Figure 54  Frequency counts of qualitative disclosure level under all risk categories at 
HSBC 
 
 
It is apparent from figure 54 that the total frequencies of qualitative disclosure were 
mainly disclosed on level 3 (as defined in table 6.5 of Chapter 6) because the disclosure 
included a description of the management or mitigation of that risk. It is noticeable that 
HSBC did not disclose on level 1 (i.e. mention with minimal discussion). Overall, the 
results show an upward trend of high information content (level 3), from seven risk 
categories in 1995 to twenty-six risk categories in 2008. It then slightly decreases to 
twenty-three categories in 2009 and twenty-five categories in 2010. However, this 
upward trend involved the number of increased risk categories; therefore, the following 
figure shows the results when the frequency of qualitative disclosure level 3 was 
examined by making them a proportion. 
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Figure 55  The frequency of qualitative disclosure level 3 as a proportion of total risk 
categories at HSBC 
 
 
Figure 55 shows that most risk categories were disclosed with high information content 
at level 3, with slight fluctuation in frequency without the clear upward trend, which 
varied between 78% of total categories to 100% of total categories. 
 
 
6.5.2 The quality of quantitative disclosure at HSBC 
 
Evaluating the quality of quantitative disclosures employed 2 levels (as mentioned in 
table 6.6 of Chapter 6). The frequencies of both levels were then counted to identify the 
pattern disclosed. The analysis of numerical data classified as level 1 and level 2 
showed significantly different frequencies in both levels, as shown in the following 
figure: 
 
Figure 56  The frequencies of quantitative disclosure levels at HSBC 
 
 
Figure 56 shows that there was a significant difference between level 1 and 2 between 
1995 and 2010 when HSBC disclosed risk categories quantitatively with comparison 
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number of risk categories disclosed on level 2 increased from nine categories in 2004 to 
fourteen categories in 2005, after which it has operated in a range of between fourteen 
and sixteen categories. However, the quantitative disclosures of level 2 showed a 
fluctuation in frequencies of between six categories and sixteen categories over the 
period as a whole. 
 
The following figure shows the result of making frequencies of quantitative disclosure 
level 2 as a proportion of total risk categories between 1995 and 2010. 
 
Figure 57  The frequency of quantitative disclosure level 2 as a proportion of the total 
risk categories at HSBC 
 
 
Figure 57 shows that quantitative disclosure with number against comparison (level 2) 
had a downward trend (from 75% in 1995 to 56% in 2004). It then increased to 78% in 
2005 before decreasing continually to 54% in 2010. This result reveals that the quality 
of quantitative disclosure did not increase as shown in figure 56 when frequencies of 
quantitative disclosure level 2 were examined by making them a proportion.  
 
 
6.6   The Intensity of Societal Discussion at HSBC 
 
The intensity of societal discussion was examined by looking at the correlation between 
the volume of newspaper citations in the UK banking and financial sector against the 
risk disclosures made by HSBC. The following table describes the outcome of the 
various findings of correlation. 
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Table 18  Correlations between the number of risk issues cited in newspapers and 
various variables in HSBC’s disclosures 
Variable Spearman 
Correlation (r) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
(p) 
Level of Sig. 
Information Richness (by proportion)    
Bad news 0.662 0.005 0.01 
neutral news -0.662 0.005 0.01 
Forward- looking 0.188 0.485 no association 
Present -0.088 0.745 no association 
Past -0.209 0.438 no association 
Fact -0.803 0.000 0.01 
perception 0.803 0.000 0.01 
Quantitative disclosure(level 1&2) -0.381 0.145 no association 
Qualitative disclosure level 3 0.473 0.065 no association 
Risk Categories (by number of sentences) 
Total risk categories 0.705 0.002 0.01 
Sustainability risk 0.774 0.000 0.01 
Legal and regulation risk 0.716 0.002 0.01 
Strategic and business risk 0.682 0.004 0.01 
Tax risk 0.681 0.004 0.01 
Liquidity and funding risk 0.657 0.006 0.01 
Special purpose entities 0.644 0.007 0.01 
Economic risk 0.632 0.009 0.01 
Market risk 0.625 0.010 0.01 
Insurance and Investment risk 0.600 0.014 0.05 
Pension risk 0.600 0.014 0.05 
Political risk 0.575 0.020 0.05 
Financial crime risk 0.570 0.021 0.05 
Hedged risk 0.568 0.022 0.05 
Risk management 0.564 0.023 0.05 
Credit risk 0.565 0.023 0.05 
Risk related to impairment 0.549 0.028 0.05 
Residual value risk 0.534 0.033 0.05 
Risk related to fair value 0.520 0.039 0.05 
Interest rate risk 0.513 0.042 0.05 
Capital management risk 0.509 0.044 0.05 
Industries risk -0.440 0.088 no association 
Operational risk 0.410 0.115 no association 
Currency risk 0.393 0.132 no association 
People risk 0.364 0.166 no association 
Safety and security risk 0.291 0.274 no association 
Cross-border risk 0.250 0.351 no association 
Reputation risk 0.218 0.418 no association 
Equity risk -0.068 0.801 no association 
Risk related to derivatives -0.024 0.931 no association 
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Variable Spearman 
Correlation (r) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
(p) 
Level of Sig. 
Competition risk no disclosure 
Financial report risk no disclosure 
Customer treatment no disclosure 
Technology risk no disclosure 
Change risk no disclosure 
Governance risk no disclosure 
 
As shown in table 18, the results have been categorised into three main groups of 
correlation: high correlation (r is between ± 0.63 and ±1.00, p < 0.01), moderate 
correlation (r is between ± 0.50 and ± 0.62, p < 0.05), and no correlation (r is less than ± 
0.50). The correlations can be reported on aspects (i.e. information richness and risk 
categories).  
 
In terms of information richness, there was a positive association between the disclosure 
direction of bad news and the number of newspaper citations with high level. On the 
other hand, disclosure of neutral news as an inverse proportion of bad news had a 
negative relationship with the number of newspaper citations. The interrogation of fact 
and perception shows that there was a negative association between disclosure of fact 
and the number of newspaper citations with high level, while disclosure of perception as 
the inverse proportion of fact had a positive association with high level. However, the 
interrogation of time orientation (which was comprised of forward-looking, present, and 
past) and the interrogation of disclosure quality (both qualitative and quantitative 
disclosure) were not found to be associated with the number of newspaper citations.  
 
In terms of the variables based on risk categories, it was noticeable that the high 
correlation group consisted of total risk categories and two strategic banking risks, 
which are: liquidity and funding risk, and market risk. Both of these categories were 
also found to be contained in the group of high correlation of overall analysis (in all 
companies), as described in Section 6.3.2 of Chapter 6. The other risk categories in the 
high correlation group were: sustainability risk, legal and regulation risk, strategic and 
business risk, tax risk, special purpose entities and economic risk. The moderate 
correlation group included: insurance and investment risk, pension risk, political risk, 
financial crime risk, hedged risk, risk management, credit risk, risk related to 
impairment, interest rate risk, and capital management risk. 
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